THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF ATHENS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY

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Abstract: The view that the successes of Macedon in the fourth century marked the failure, or the end, of the Greek polis is increasingly being abandoned, and some scholars are abandoning also the view that Athens was great and glorious in the fifth century but degenerate in the fourth. However, the successes of Macedon meant for Athens the loss of that ultimate freedom which it had aspired to and had often enjoyed between the early fifth century and the late fourth, freedom not merely from receiving orders from others but to give orders to others, and in this paper I explore the reasons for that change. Some scholars believe that fourth-century Athens was led astray by “the ghost of empire;” others believe that the Athenians were unwilling to pay for a response which could have defeated Philip; I argue that except in the years after Leuctra the ghost of empire did not have malign effects, and even with more expenditure Athens could not have defeated Philip. There was nothing fundamentally wrong with Athens in the fourth century, but Sparta’s success in the Hellespont in 387 and the resulting King’s Peace, the rule in Macedon of Philip II, who was too clever diplomatically and became too strong militarily for the Athenians, and Alexander’s succession in 336 and his success and survival in his campaigns, placed Athens in situations which it could not overcome.

Keywords: Athens, Sparta, Macedon, Philip II of Macedon, Persia.

The view that the successes of Macedon in the fourth century marked the failure, or the end, of the Greek polis is increasingly and I think rightly being abandoned. Similarly some scholars, though not all, are abandoning the view (inherited from the fourth-century orators) that Athens was great and glorious in the fifth century but degenerate in the fourth. It is, however, true that the successes of Macedon meant for Athens the loss of that ultimate freedom which it had aspired to and had often enjoyed between the early fifth century and the late fourth, freedom not merely from receiving orders from others

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1 This paper has been lightly revised and updated from my contribution, with the title “Athens in the Fourth Century: What—If Anything—Went Wrong?” to a conference at Sunium organised by Mr. A. L. Pierris in July 2006 on “Mind, Might, Money: The Secular Triad in Golden-Age Athens;” the conference proceedings have not yet been published. I thank Mr. Pierris and all those involved in the Sunium conference; and Prof. Sprawski for inviting me to contribute to this volume and accepting this paper.


3 For recent expressions of the view that fourth-century Athens was degenerate see, e.g., Samons 2004; Romilly 2005.
but to give orders to others: archein gave way to what could be seen by comparison as douleuein. In this paper I want to focus on the reasons for that change.

A quarter of a century ago G.L. Cawkwell wrote “Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy”, concluding that at first the Second League was a success and Athens kept the promises made at its foundation; but that after the defeat of Sparta at Leuctra had ended for ever the threat which the League had been founded to counter Athens revived its old imperial ambitions and practices, bankrupting itself and alienating its allies, so that when the opportunity arose several allies fought their way out in the Social War, and what survived of the League after that was of no great significance. More recently E. Badian has seen a far more pervasive influence of “The Ghost of Empire” in fourth-century Athenian foreign policy, claiming that again and again a success led to hopes of imperial power which in turn led to nemesis, with a downward spiral marked by increasingly lower peaks and deeper troughs. First came the Corinthian War and the naval campaign of Thrasybulus; then the League, which Badian sees as an attempt to make Athens a great naval power again, even if at first the promises were kept; later the imperial policies embarked on after Leuctra, in particular the attempt to regain Amphipolis and the disastrous attempt to do a deal with Philip at the beginning of his reign. After the Social War Eubulus, with his turn from imperial adventures to financial recovery, is seen as “the first major politician in Athens who had personally exorcised the ghost”. After the middle of the century there were still ambitious decrees and campaigns by ambitious generals, but the citizens would no longer pay for them; there was Demosthenes’ opposition to Philip, the “Periclean” policy of Lycurgus and Demades; and finally the ghost led Athens to the Lamian War and to “political and military destruction”.

Other scholars have painted very different pictures. L.J. Samons, in a book whose overriding purpose is to suggest that what was great about classical Athens was not its democracy, condemns that concentration on financial prosperity which Badian sees as the dawning of realism. The democracy with its payments to citizens had been created in the fifth century when the payments could be funded by the Delian League; in the fourth century the funding had to come from taxes and the richer citizens, and the poor would not give up their subsidies and the rich would not pay the heavier taxes which (Samons thinks) would have made effective resistance to Philip possible. Samons also thinks that increasing risks of prosecution for failure deterred men of sufficient calibre from putting themselves forward as military and political leaders.

For yet another view we may turn to P. Harding. He rejects the usual concentration on leading figures and what are believed to be their policies, and also the claim of H. Montgomery, echoing Demosthenes, that the Athenian democracy was structurally incapable of maintaining an effective foreign policy in the face of a ruler such as Philip.

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4 For this view of the highest kind of freedom see Hdt. 1.210.2, 9.122.3, cf. 6.109.3; [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.8; Thuc. 1.76.1, 2.63.1, 3.45.6, 6.18.3, 87.2, 7.75.7, 8.68.4; cf. 5.9.9 on what was possible for lesser states; Pl. Grg. 452 d; Dem. 22. Androt. 68; Lycurg. Leoc. 42.
5 Cawkwell 1981.
6 Badian 1995.
7 Ibidem: 101.
Harding takes a “bottom up” view, and argues that “the overall direction of Athenian foreign policy was by the people in the Assembly,” and that after the King’s Peace Athens pursued a consistent and often though not always successful policy. This was a defensive policy which involved identifying and protecting Athens’ vital interests as far as limited resources allowed; by 340 “the Athenians had been so successful in containing and frustrating Philip that he had lost the initiative;” he was forced to invade Greece and fight at Chaeronea, where he won – but he risked real disaster if he did not win. For Athens Chaeronea was not the end, but by the time of the Lamian War the balance of power had changed too much for the attempt to strike back to succeed.10

So here I wish to ask once more how successful or unsuccessful Athens was in the fourth-century world, and why.

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The consequences for Athens of defeat in the Peloponnesian War were much less drastic than we might have expected. Plague and war casualties had at best halved the number of citizens, and in this respect there was to be little recovery.11 The city was not destroyed as some of Sparta’s allies would have liked, but it lost all its overseas possessions, the long walls and the Piraeus walls were demolished, the navy was reduced to twelve ships, Athens was made a subordinate ally of Sparta, and although there was probably no formal requirement of constitutional change in the peace treaty12 the oligarchy of the Thirty was set up under pressure from Lysander. Yet after a year the restoration of the democracy was facilitated by Pausanias; there was probably little long-term damage to Athenian agriculture;13 the 2% tax was collected on 1,650 talents’ worth of trade in 402/401 and on over 1,800 talents’ worth in 401/400.14 As for foreign affairs, Athens dutifully assisted in Sparta’s war against Elis c. 401, and sent oligarchically-minded cavalrymen to Asia Minor with Thibron in 400;15 but before long there were the beginnings of a move away from Sparta. In 397 officers and weapons were sent to Conon for the fleet which he was assembling for Pharnabazus, and envoys were dispatched to the Persian King but caught by the Spartans;16 in 396 reinforcements were not sent to Asia with Agesilaus, and Damaenetus set out with a trireme to join Conon, though when that became known there was a panic in Athens.17 In 395 Athens was drawn fairly readily into joining Sparta’s disaffected allies in the Corinthian War, and Xenophon represents the Thebans

[11] See, e.g., Hansen 1988: 14–28 (c. 60,000 in 431); 1986 (c. 30,000 after the war).
[13] Hanson 1998 is not in this respect refuted by Thorne 2001. The territory of Attica was, of course, the same after the Peloponnesian War as before; there were only half as many citizens after the war as before to share it (cf. above with n. 11), but Athens had no overseas possessions immediately after the war and not many other than Imbros, Lemnos and Scyros at any time in the fourth century.
[14] Andoc. 1. Mysteries 133–134. That these were very large figures for Athens just after the Peloponnesian War is stressed by Hansen 2006: 92.
as saying, “We all know that you would like to recover the empire you had before.”

We do not know how soon Athens started rebuilding its navy, but the rebuilding of the walls was already under way at the end of 395/394, before the battle of Cnidus, the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos was in Athens’ hands again by 393/392, and the north-Aegean islands of Imbros, Lemnos and Scyros had been regained by 392/391.

The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* is one of the few texts which suggest that the Athenians were divided on class lines, with the “many and democratic” soon inclined to war against Sparta while the “respectable and propertied” were in 396 content with the status quo. Thrasybulus was on the side of caution in 396, but in 395 he was in favour of joining in the Corinthian War and himself commanded the Athenian forces in Boeotia. It seems clear that within a few years majority opinion shifted from subservience to Sparta to opposition to Sparta, and the main distinction is simply that some men were quicker than others to change.

Relations with Persia were complicated. Sparta, to gain Persian support against Athens in the Peloponnesian War, had undertaken to return the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; but from 400 it was fighting for the Asiatic Greeks against Persia, though from time to time pausing to consider a compromise deal. Persia therefore supported Sparta’s enemies in Greece: it was probably in 397 or 396 and by Pharnabazus, the satrap of Dascylium, that Timocrates of Rhodes was sent to Greece with Persian money. In 398 Pharnabazus had obtained the King’s permission to raise a fleet, which was commanded by the Athenian refugee Conon, with the support of Conon’s and Athens’ friend Evagoras of Salamis in Cyprus, and in 394 that fleet defeated the Spartans at Cnidus. This was a Persian victory over Greeks, but it suited Athens to represent it as a Greek victory over Spartan imperialism and to award extravagant honours to Conon and Evagoras; Spartan harmosts were driven out, and Phranabazus promised to leave the akropoleis unfortified and the cities autonomous. The inscription on Conon’s statue base claimed that “Conon freed the allies of Athens.” Seager cynically comments, “The unfortunate break in Athenian domination was now at an end and could henceforth be disregarded.”

But in 392, with Sparta making no progress either in Asia or in Greece, Antalcidas made his first attempt at securing a common peace treaty, by which Sparta would after all return the Asiatic Greeks to Persia in return for Persian support in Greece. That first attempt failed, and the King sent Struthas to continue the war; but in 392/391 Sparta had a second attempt, with concessions which Andocides and his fellow envoys were willing to accept, but the Athenian assembly on account of the proposed abandonment

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18 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.10.
20 *IG II* 1634 = *I. Delos* 97; contra *I. Delos* 87 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 3, of 403 or shortly after.
23 In favour: Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.16; commanding: Plut. *Lys.* 29.1; Paus. 3.5.4.
The Alleged Failure of Athens in the Fourth Century

of the Asiatic Greeks was not. Athens was still opposed to Sparta but now not so well disposed towards Persia: Conon had been arrested by Antalcidas’ friend Tiribazus in 392, Evagoras, who had been increasing his power in Cyprus, was from 391 onwards perceived by the Persians as a rebel who had to be dealt with, and Athens sent support to him, c. 390, intercepted by Persia’s enemy Sparta, and c. 388. It is against this background that we must set Thrasybulus’ campaign of c. 390: whatever may have been the case in 395, by the end of the 390’s Athens was rebuilding its walls and its navy and had begun to recover old possessions and to hope to recover more, and it no longer thought that to oppose Sparta it needed to be on good terms with Persia. There can be no doubt about Thrasybulus’ imperial ambitions, his campaign, ostensibly to support democrats against pro-Spartan oligarchs in Rhodes, took him from Thrace and Thasos, Byzantium and Calchedon in the north to Aspendus, well outside the Aegean, in the south, and involved the revival of Alcibiades’ 10% Bosporus tax, a 5% tax in the Aegean, a claim by Athens to exile men from the territory of Athens and its allies, and a willingness to impose governors and garrisons. Thrasybulus was killed. Some of his subordinates were recalled and prosecuted, but this does not seem to indicate disapproval of the policy: the Athenians supported Evagoras, and in the months before the King’s Peace they talked of “not giving up Erythrae to the barbarians,” and for Clazomenae they insisted on Thrasybulus’ 5% tax and considered but decided against sending a governor and garrison.

What brought this to an end was not any change of heart in Athens or any fundamental weakness but the large result of a small but important episode: in 387 Antalcidas regained control of the Hellespont for Sparta, and Tiribazus was by then again satrap in Sardis, and they were in a strong enough position to obtain from the King and impose on the Greeks terms almost the same as those first attempted in 392 (apart from the concession of the three north-Aegean islands to Athens). The Asiatic Greeks were “given up to the barbarians,” but Agesilaus notoriously proclaimed that Sparta was not Medising but Persia was Laconising: except in Persia’s sphere and Athens’ three islands, all cities and islands were to be autonomous, and Agesilaus insisted that this requirement entailed the dissolution of the Boeotian federation and of the union of Corinth and Argos. This was followed by a Spartan war of revenge against Mantinea, which ended with Man-

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27 I accept the use of Philoch, FGrH 328 F 149 to date Andoc. 3. Peace, with, e.g., Keen 1995, 1998, against, e.g., Badian 1991, and against the argument that Andoc. 3 is a later rhetorical exercise advanced by Harris 2000.

28 Xen. Hell. 4.8.16.


30 Andoc. 3. Peace 15 suggests that by 392/391 there was talk of regaining the Chersonese and other places.

31 See Seager 1997; Cawkwell 1976.


36 Persia Laconising: Plut. Ages. 23.4; Artox. 22.4; Apophth. Lac. 213b; Boeotia and Corinth-and-Argos: Xen. Hell. 5.1.32–4.
tinea’s being split into its component villages, probably by a perverse application of the autonomy principle.  

The King’s Peace was a new kind of treaty, with its stipulation about the Greek states in general, and what Athens could do and what Athens should do in this new world was not immediately clear. We have a fragmentary decree of 386/385 concerning land on Lemnos, one of Athens’ three islands. In the same year Athens praised the Thracian ruler Hebryzelmis, and confirmed for him the honours voted to his forebears, but as Sinclair stressed the decree says nothing about an alliance. In 384/383 a way forward was found in the alliance with Chios, perhaps on the initiative of Chios, which was a defensive alliance “on terms of freedom and autonomy, not contravening any of the things written on the stelai about the peace;” Methymna at least, and perhaps other states, also made an alliance with Athens.

I am among those who believe that Lysias’ (33) *Olympic Speech* is to be dated not to 388 but to 384, and that the disgraceful state of affairs of which he is complaining is that after the King’s Peace, as Gorgias had done already in the last years of the Peloponnesian War, Lysias calls on the Greeks to stop fighting amongst themselves and unite against the barbarians, and in this new world and at a panhellenic gathering he regards the Spartans as the leaders of the Greeks. Isocrates in his (4) *Panegyric* of c. 380 contrasts the disgrace of the King’s Peace with the glories of the (actual or invented) mid-fifth-century Peace of Callias: at the beginning he says it is a commonplace of speakers that the Greeks ought not to fight against one another but to unite and fight against the Persians, and he goes on to say that this requires cooperation between Athens and Sparta – which turns out to mean that it requires acceptance by Sparta that Athens rather than Sparta deserves to be the leader of the Greeks. Much of the speech is then devoted to a defence of fifth-century Athens and the Delian League.

Athens did not support Mantinea, but did take in refugees afterwards. It sympathised with Olynthus when Sparta attacked it in 382, probably again with the ostensible intention of enforcing the autonomy clause of the King’s Peace, but there is no good reason for dating the fragment of an inscribed alliance to this time. It did, however, take

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37 Note the Athenians’ fear that if they supported Mantinea they might be in breach of the peace: Diod. Sic. 15.5.5.
44 *IG* II.33.3–7.8.
45 Athens and Olynthus: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.15; Sparta appealed to by Chalcidian cities: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.11–23, by Macedon (which may also be true): Diod. Sic. 15.19.3; alliance: *IG* II.36 = Tod 119, both dating it 384/383, 376/375, e.g. Lewis 1954: 33, and later dates have been considered (Zahrnt 1971: 124–127 favours the mid 370’s but restores without an archon’s name).
in refugees from Thebes when that city was occupied by Sparta. That led to support for Thebes in 379/378 when some of the refugees set out from Athens and overthrew the pro-Spartan régime. What changed everything was Sphodrias’ raid on Attica, misplaced chronologically by Diodorus. It was that which gave the Athenians the indignation and courage to declare that Sparta, while posing as the enforcer of the King’s Peace, was itself in breach of the peace, and that they would head a new league to uphold the peace against the Spartans. The prospectus shows two particular concerns: to spell out what was meant by the principle of autonomy, which Sparta had been exploiting since the peace was made; and to promise that Athens would not do various things for which it had been unpopular in the Delian League. What is surprising is that most of the states which joined the League in time to be included in its list of members (i.e., probably, by 375) were states of the Aegean and its Thracian coast, which as far as we can tell were not seriously threatened by Sparta after the King’s Peace. However, the campaign of 376 was to show that, if Agesilaus was obsessed with Thebes, other Spartans had not given up on the Aegean; and it may be that even before 376 the members recruited by Athens felt more vulnerable than our evidence allows us to see.

How lively was the ghost of empire? Isocrates provides evidence that some people were thinking of empire and of war against Persia; but Athens’ practice since the King’s Peace had been very cautious, and the Second League was founded not to fight Isocrates’ war against Persia but to uphold the King’s Peace against Sparta, and with promises that this league would not become an empire. In many respects the Athenians do seem to have behaved virtually in the 370’s, and it is striking that in spite of their past they were able to build up a sizeable league. Garrisons to protect Abdera against the Thracians, and in Cephallenia and perhaps elsewhere in the west, were contrary to the foundation promises, but probably in the particular situations in which they were installed they were welcomed – by most people in Abdera and by the supporters of Athens in the west. Why additions to the list of members inscribed with the prospectus ceased after (probably) 375 remains a mystery, but the evidence suggests that, although that list omits Corcyra and contains only one city of Cephallenia, Corcyra and the whole of Cephalenidid eventually become members, and there is no need to rule out other additions. Stasis in Paros was dealt with not by Athens but by the synedrion of the League, though

46 Xen. Hell. 5.2.31; Plut. Pelop. 6.3–5.
47 The support appears more official in Diod. Sic. 15.25.4–26.3, cf. Din. 1 Demosthenes 38–39, than in the different account of Xen. Hell. 5.4.9. Buck 1992, cf. 1994: 85–86 suggests that the Athenian generals were sent officially to the frontier region and on their own initiative went into Boeotia.
49 IG II² 43 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 22.
50 Xen. Hell. 5.4.58–61; Diod. Sic. 15.34.3–35.3.
51 Abdera: Diod. Sic. 15.36.4; Cephallenia etc.: IG II² 98 = Agora XVI: 46.16–17.
afterwards Paros was said to be a colony of Athens and was called on to send offerings to Athenian festivals.\textsuperscript{55}

The promise that there would be no tribute is so emphatic that I think at the outset there can have been no compulsory levies of money under any name: a complaint in 375 that the Thebans were not contributing money towards the fleet in a campaign which they had instigated perhaps points to voluntary arrangements, but it may well have been assumed that in general each allied state would provide and fund its own forces. \textit{Syntaxeis}, “contributions,” were being collected in 373, and Timotheus’ problems then in raising a fleet to go to Corcyra make that a likely time for the introduction of the new system.\textsuperscript{54} Our little evidence for the \textit{syntaxeis} suggests that they never yielded much money. The Athenians themselves reorganised the collection of \textit{eisphora} from rich citizens andmetics, grouping the payers in \textit{symmoriai}, in 378/377.\textsuperscript{55} In 374/373 the proceeds of the grain tax from the north-Aegean islands were ring-fenced for the stratiotic fund.\textsuperscript{56} The Athenians’ financial difficulties even in the early years of the League show that, whether their policies were altruistic or selfish, memories and/or hopes of naval power led them into campaigning beyond their financial means: to that extent at least the ghost was at work.

Leuctra and what followed in the next few years transformed the League and Athens’ policy. Sparta was defeated in battle, it was deprived of Messenia, and a treaty involving Corinth and other states but not Sparta ended the Peloponnesian League – in each case not at the instance of Athens and its allies but of Thebes. As in the 390’s, some Athenians made the change sooner and more readily than others, but in 369 Athens and Sparta became allies, and in 367 Thebes offered itself to Persia as the new agent of the King’s Peace and started to indicate that Athens’ naval power was its next target, so that Athens became less enthusiastic for the King’s Peace. What was to become of a League which had been founded to oppose Sparta and to uphold the King’s Peace? One might well ask. Mytilene did ask, and unfortunately there survives from Callistratus’ response only the beginning, which justifies the anti-Spartan policy of the 370’s, and what Callistratus went on to say about the new world after Leuctra has not survived.\textsuperscript{57}

Immediately after Leuctra the Athenians had hoped that they could fill the power vacuum, and had themselves organised the common peace of autumn 371. I believe, first, that swearing “to abide by the treaty which the King sent down and by the decrees

\textsuperscript{53} SEG XXXI, 67 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 29.


\textsuperscript{55} Clidemus, \textit{FGrH} 323 F 8.

\textsuperscript{56} SEG XLVII, 96 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 26.51–5, the earliest surviving mention of this fund. In lines 55–61 other sums are directed \(\varepsilon i z \tau h n \delta i o i k e t h \nu n\) which I take to mean that they are to be part of the ordinary finances of the city, received by the \textit{apodoktai} and passed on to different spending authorities in the \textit{merismos}.

\textsuperscript{57} IG II\textsuperscript{1} 107 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 31.35 sqq., of 369/368. It is interesting that in the prospectus of the League, IG II\textsuperscript{1} 43 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 22, the pro-King’s-Peace lines 12–15 were deleted but the anti-Spartan lines 9–12 were not: the talks in Persia in 367 and the willingness of one of the Athenian delegates to acquiesce provoked an angry reaction (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 7.1.33–8; Plut. \textit{Pelop.} 30; Dem. 19. \textit{Embassy} 31, 137, 191), and I imagine that in that reaction the one clause was deleted and the thought that another clause also had become embarrassingly obsolete did not occur.
of Athens and the allies” means renewing the King’s Peace and strengthening it with the interpretation of freedom and autonomy given in the League’s prospectus and other documents, but not that the Persians were on this occasion directly involved or that the participants – including Sparta – were all enrolled in the League; secondly, that later claims that the King and all the Greeks acknowledged Athens’ right to Amphipolis and the Chersonese are Athenian interpretation of a clause in the treaty that the participants should ἔχειν τὰ ἐαυτῶν possess not just what they possessed at the time but what was theirs by right.

In the middle of the fifth century, after Cimon’s death, the Athenians (with or without a Peace of Callias) discontinued the Delian League’s regular campaigning against Persia, but after a little uncertainty they kept the League in being as an Athenian empire. In the same way after the unifying purpose of the Second League had disappeared the Athenians kept the League in being for their own purposes, and the 360’s is the decade in which the ghost of empire walked most visibly. Athens began fighting for Amphipolis in 368, and in the Hellespont in 365; it had some successes as well as some failures, but did not succeed in gaining either Amphipolis or the Chersonese. On the west side of the Aegean Athens tangled with Macedon and Thessaly at the same time as Thebes: in Thessaly Thebes supported the koimôn while Athens supported the tyrants of Phereia. On the east side, since Thebes was now the friend of the Persian King, Athens and Sparta supported the rebel satraps. In 366–365 Timotheus took Samos from the Persians (who under the terms of the King’s Peace ought not to have had it) – but then it was not liberated but was taken over as an Athenian cleruchy. In 364/363, when Timotheus had moved to the western Aegean, he captured Torone and Potidaea, and in 361, at the invitation of Athens’ supporters there, cleruchs were sent to Potidaea too. Samos and Potidaea were not members of the Second Athenian League, but all of this must still have seemed very alarming to the members.

In other ways Athens’ actions did impinge directly on the members. On the island of Ceos there were four cities, and Athens preferred to deal with them as separate cities, but they or at any rate three of them preferred to function as a single federal state: this may lie behind the two stages of revolt in 363/362, after which all major lawsuits were to be transferred to Athenian courts. In 361/360 Chares intervened in Corcyra, supporting an oligarchic revolt, “as a result of which the Athenian demos gained a bad reputation among the allies.” According to Aeneas Tacticus Chares was in Corcyra as

60 I belong to the minority which does not believe in a Peace of Callias: see Rhodes 2010: 51–56.
62 Capture: Diod. Sic. 15.81.6; Isoc. 15. Antidosis 108, 113; Polyaeus Strat. 3.10.15; cleruchy: IG II 116 = Tod 147.
63 IG II 111 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 39; cf. decrees of separate cities IG II 1128 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 40; stipulation that the Cean were to be administered “by cities” IG II 404.13 = SEG XXXIX, 73.14 (perhaps mid 350’s, though at the SEG reference 363/362 is suggested). The city which tended not to join the others was Poeessa.
64 Diod. Sic. 15.95.3 (quotation); Aen. Tact. 11.13–15.
a garrison commander. We certainly find garrisons in the 350’s: in Andros during the Social War, paid for out of the syntaxeis with the approval of the synedrion; but in Arcesine on Amorgus probably before the outbreak of the Social War, and at the expense of the Arcesinians.⁶⁵

Thebes and Athens began their rival involvement with Thessaly and Macedon in 369 and 368, and it was in 367 that the Thebans won the support of Persia and proposed common peace terms which would include the disbanding of the Athenian navy.⁶⁶ In 366 they exploited a dispute to take Oropus from Athens.⁶⁷ In the years that followed Epaminondas urged the Thebans to build dockyards and a hundred new triremes; he tried to win over members of the Athenian League, with a naval campaign to the eastern Aegean in 364 which scared off an Athenian squadron.⁶⁸ It may have been this challenge to Athens which encouraged the Ceans to revolt when they did. To increase Athens’ problems, after the Thebans’ defeat of Alexander of Pherae in 364 he turned against Athens, attacking Tenos in 362 and Peparethus and even the Piraeus in 361, in response to which the Athenians switched to a short-lived alliance with the Thessalian koinon.⁶⁹

From the time of Timotheus’ siege of Samos, winter 366/365, we have the beginning of a decree for Erythrae, on the mainland opposite Chios, connected in some way with him: the substance has been lost but Timotheus perhaps raised money there for the siege.⁷⁰ There are other signs that Athens continually had problems in funding its campaigns: Timotheus in the north-western Aegean issued bronze coins; Apollodorus reports a shortage of public money to pay ships’ crews in 362–360.⁷¹ There had been a shortfall in the payment of the property tax, eisphora. 364/363 sees the earliest mention of proeisphora, the liturgy through which the three richest members of each symmoria were required to advance the whole sum due from their symmoria and were left to recover the other members’ share themselves.⁷² In the early 350’s there were 14 talents unpaid out of a total of about 300 talents – from 378/377 to perhaps the institution of proeisphora – and this was thought serious enough for Androtion to propose the creation of and himself to serve on a commission to collect the arrears (about half of the sum outstanding was collected).⁷³ The trierarchic system, under which originally one man had been given the

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⁶⁵ Andros: IG II¹ 123 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 52 (357/356); Arcesine: IG XII.vii 5 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 51 (Androtion praised perhaps 357/356 after a term of at least two years).
⁶⁷ Xen. Hell. 7.4.1; Diod. Sic. 15.76.1; schol. Aeschin. 3. Ctesiphon 85 (186 Dilts); Agatharchides, FGrH 86 F 8 with Buckler 1977.
⁶⁹ 362: [Dem.] 50. Polycles 4; 361: Diod. Sic. 15.95.1–3; Polyæmus Strat. 6.2; Athens and koinon: IG II² 116 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 44 (361/360).
⁷⁰ IG II¹ 108; generals raising money from Chios, Erythrae and wherever they could: Dem. 8. Chersonese 24–25.
⁷² Proeisphora mentioned 364/363: Isae. 6. Philoctemon 60; a date of 370–366 for the institution is suggested by Brun 1985.
general and financial responsibility for a warship for a year, was under increasing strain: sharing the burden of one ship between two men had become common; in 358/357 a law of Periander organised the 1,200 hundred richest citizens in symmoriai, after which there were still trierarchs but some of each year’s costs were shared among the whole body of 1,200; and in 354/353 Demosthenes unsuccessfully proposed changes in the new system.74 Another source of emergency funding was an appeal for voluntary contributions, epidoseis: the word and lists of men who gave and men who promised but failed to give are attested for 394, but Demosthenes refers to what was in some sense the first appeal in 357.75

The 350’s began with two protracted crises for Athens, of which one eventually turned out well but the other turned out badly. Late in 360 the Thracian king Cotys (whose sister Iphicrates had married) was murdered, and his son Cersuleptes was challenged by two other claimants, Amadocus and Berisades: it took Athens until the winter of 357/356 to achieve what was considered a satisfactory settlement, that for some purposes the three men were regarded as joint rulers but essentially Cersuleptes had the east, towards the Hellespont, Amadocus had the middle and Berisades had the west, and Greek cities on the coast had obligations both to Athens and its League and to the Thracian rulers.76 In 359 Perdiccas of Macedon was killed in a battle against the Illyrians, and the throne passed not to his young son but to his brother Philip. Again there were rival claimants, and Athens backed one of them, Argaeus. To undermine Athens’ support for Argaeus, Philip allowed the Athenians to think that he would let them regain Amphipolis, perhaps in exchange for Pydna, on the coast; in 357, once Argaeus had been defeated, he took Amphipolis for himself – and later Pydna, Potidaea (which he gave to Olynthus) and Methone.77 Athens responded by declaring war on Philip, and, although other preoccupations prevented it from prosecuting the war, the demand for Amphipolis became ever more insistent.

There was one last deceptive success: in 357 Athens quickly seized an opportunity and brought back into the League the cities of Euboea, which had sided with Thebes.


since Leuctra. But in 356 and 355 leading members of the League – Rhodes, Chios, Cos, Byzantium – which had been approached by Thebes in the 360’s and were now encouraged by Mausolus of Caria, fought against Athens in the Social War. Shockingly, the Athenians were defeated in naval battles, at Chios and at Embata; after Embata the general Chares retired into the service of the rebel satrap Artabazus, and that led to threats that Persia would give its support to Athens’ rebels, so the war came to an end with Athens’ rebels leaving the League.

So in about fifteen years after Leuctra Athens revived former imperial practices, and tried to recover former possessions; but it could not pay for what it was trying to do, it did not achieve its major objectives, it alarmed League members even though it did not take direct action against most of them, and in the Social War it was defeated in naval battles by the rebels. Some Athenians thought that enough was enough. That reflector of opinion Isocrates, who in his (4) Panegyric had defended the Delian League and advanced Athens’ claim to be the leader of Greece once more, in (8) On the Peace at the end of the Social War urged Athens to “stop coveting a maritime empire ... which is neither just nor possible to bring about nor advantageous” – though he naïvely suggested that if the Athenians underwent this conversion other Greeks would be so impressed that they would freely grant them τὰ ἑκαττόν (the Chersonese and Amphipolis) and more besides. Xenophon’s Poroi seems to reflect policies advocated by Eubulus after the Social War: to revive trade by making Athens more attractive to metics and visiting merchants, to invite investment in a capital fund to be spent on facilities for traders, to make more of the silver mines – and, to underpin all of this, to have peace. I believe that we should attribute to Eubulus and Diophantus and date to the late 350’s the creation of the theoric fund, which not only subsidised citizens’ theatre tickets but built up a surplus to be spent for purposes of which its treasurer approved, and which shifted the balance of Athens’ priorities by receiving not only an allowance in the merismos but any surplus revenue beyond the sums bespoken for the merismos, whereas previously it is likely that surpluses had gone to the stratistic fund. There is no doubt that between the time of the Social War and the time of Alexander Athens did once more become a prosperous state, and that this was achieved by cutting back on military expenditure as well as by increasing revenue.

This brings us to Philip of Macedon and the Athenians’ responses to him. At the beginning of his reign his hints over Amphipolis weakened the Athenians’ support for Argaeus and left them feeling cheated, but no Macedonian king had caused them serious trouble before: Philip had to be taken into account, just like his predecessors, but at first the Athenians still thought they would capture Amphipolis in the end. Eubulus’

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78 Diod. Sic. 16.7.2; Aeschin. 3. Ctesiphon 85; IG II' 124 = Rhodes/Osborne 2003: no. 48: see the commentary of Rhodes/Osborne 2003 for the chronology of this episode and the Social War.
79 Diod. Sic. 16.3.3–4, 21.1–22.2; cf. Isoc. 8. Peace 16; Dem. 15. Freedom of Rhodians 3, 26. There is no other evidence that Cos was a member of the League, but it is not unlikely.
80 Stop coveting: Isoc. 8. Peace 64–66; other Greeks will grant: §§ 22–23.
81 Trade: Xen. Poroi 2–3; mines: ch. 4; peace: ch. 5.
policy seems to have involved giving up such ambitions: the Athenians would still react when directly threatened, as they did in 352 when Philip advanced beyond Thessaly to Thermopylae, and Diophantus proposed the decree of thanksgiving afterwards; as they did again in thinking Euboea, through which an attacker from the north could by-pass Thermopylae, more important than Olynthus in 349/348. At first Demosthenes seems to have been no more worried than anybody else about Philip; but in 352 his speech (23) Against Aristocrates identifies Philip as Athens’ greatest enemy, and the (4) First Philippic followed in 351 or 350. The message of that was that Athens had suffered by letting Philip make the running, and ought instead to take the initiative and make trouble for Philip as near to the heart of his kingdom as possible. In the early years of Philip’s reign, when nobody yet realised the danger which he presented, that might have worked; but in those years the danger was not realised and Athens was quarrelling with the members of its League, and by the time Demosthenes advocated the policy it was too late: Philip was by then too secure in the north to be vulnerable to what Athens could do against him.

Philip was advancing eastwards into Thrace, which would take him to the Hellespont, and thanks to the Third Sacred War he was advancing southwards into central Greece, which would take him uncomfortably near to Athens. In the east Cersebleptes became worried enough to grant the Chersonese to Athens, and cleruchs were sent there in 353/352; in 352, when Philip after being checked at Thermopylae switched his attention to Cersebleptes, the Athenians voted to send a relief expedition, but ran out of momentum on hearing that Philip was ill. By 349/348 Olynthus, favoured by Demosthenes because to defend it would fit the strategy of the First Philippic, was surrounded by Philip’s territory, and it is hard to think that a greater effort by Athens could have kept it safe for long. Whether Philip was involved in the Euboean affair is uncertain, and how an intervention which began well ended in disaster is mysterious. Not only are the men involved in that intervention linked in various ways with Eubulus, but after Athens’ failures in Olynthus and Euboea it was Eubulus who was responsible for a first series of embassies to arouse the southern Greeks against Philip. In 346 Philip was expected to intervene on a large scale in the Sacred War once more, and further Athenian embassies...
were sent out, but after he had come to an arrangement with the Phocian leader Phalaecus the Phocians rejected Athenian help and the Athenians made peace with Philip after all.

I resist the temptation to discuss the problems of the Peace of Philocrates in detail. Eubulus and his associates had been planning to resist Philip but their plans had collapsed; and now they were receptive of Philip’s hints that he would end the Sacred War on terms with which they would be happy. Demosthenes, it seems, since the fall of Olynthus had been sulking: if the Athenians would not take his warnings seriously and resist Philip as he wanted, let them make peace on whatever terms they could get, and they would soon learn that Demosthenes had been right after all. Some men were opposed to peace on Philip’s terms, but Eubulus insisted that the alternative was an all-out war which would have to be paid for. Peace was made, but Philip’s hints turned out to have been deceptive: Eubulus’ associates wanted nevertheless to accept the unsatisfactory peace and make the best of it; some men clamoured for an immediate war; Demosthenes in (5) On the Peace wanted war but only when Philip had provided a justification for it.

What did Philip want, and what were the possibilities for Athens? I do not accept the theory that his hints were sincere, that he wanted to cooperate with Athens, but his plan was wrecked by Demosthenes. I do not accept that Isocrates’ (5) Philip and a statement by Diodorus are sufficient evidence that Philip was already in 346 thinking of a Persian war and wanted a cooperative Greece simply to pave the way for that. I think Greece was for him an objective in its own right, and the best indication of what he wanted is what he obtained after Chaeronea: a form of supremacy in which the Greeks were not conquered or directly ruled by him but were still compliant, yet were handled tactfully as subordinate allies. For most states that would be no worse than the conditions they had been accustomed to in the Greek world, but for Athens it would mean that archein had given way to douleuein. Until Philip’s deal with Phalaecus, Eubulus was no less opposed to him than Demosthenes, but disagreed only on where and how to resist; and it was Eubulus’ supporter Aeschines who in 348/347 reminded the Athenians of an earlier barbarian invader by reading out the decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles. If a ghost was haunting Athens in the early 340’s it was the ghost of the Persian Wars rather than of the empire.

In the deal with Phalaecus, and then in his hints to the envoys, Philip simply outmanoeuvred the Athenians, and even if the Athenians had been willing to abandon Eubulus’ financial policy they could not in the short term have undone Philip’s success. However, many Athenians were angry when it turned out that Philip’s hints had been false. Demosthenes looked for trouble, and duly found it; Philip’s offers to renegotiate the Peace of Philocrates were met with demands which he could not have been expected to agree to. What is remarkable is that, despite his claims that the Athenians were unwilling to accept his hard message, Demosthenes succeeded in convincing not only Athens but many of the Greek states that Philip was a threat to their freedom. In 339/338 he did persuade the
Athenians that surplus revenue should go not to the theoric but to the stratiotic fund.\textsuperscript{94} At Chaeronea Philip faced a substantial alliance, and the largest Greek army that had been assembled since Plataea in 479\textsuperscript{95} – and the better commander and the better army won. The resistance was a valiant effort, and although Philip was not beaten it was not unthinkable that he could be beaten; I do not think more money would have made much difference; it is hard for us now to see things as the Athenians will have seen them in 340–338, but I can believe that a majority of Athenians did agree with Demosthenes that Philip represented a major threat to them.

Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War had not been final, and it was not obvious that Athens’ defeat at Chaeronea would be final. The death of a Macedonian king often led to a disputed succession and a period of weakness – but in 336 it did not. Alexander might easily have been killed in the Balkans in 335 (when wishful thinking believed rumours that he had been killed\textsuperscript{96}), or in Asia after that – but he was not. Demosthenes rejoiced at Philip’s death in 336, supported the rising of Thebes in 335.\textsuperscript{97} Such measures in Athens as the remodelling of the ephebeia show a determination not only to revive the Athenians’ morale but to be ready to seize the opportunity when one arose. There was one manifestation of the ghost of empire. When Athens had been great, it had been a naval power, and it must have been shocking that in the Social War Athens was defeated in naval battles. After the Social War there was no serious threat to Athens at sea, but an enlargement of the navy was begun in the time of Eubulus, and the enlargement was continued and triremes were replaced by up-to-date quadriremes and quinqueremes in the time of Lycurgus, until in the 320’s the Athenians had more warships than ever before, but no need for them and no men to row them.\textsuperscript{98} They decided not to join in the Spartan-led rising in 331–330, when their joining in might have made the rising more serious; they did lead a rising after Alexander’s death, to be defeated on land and at sea.\textsuperscript{99}

I have argued that for the Greeks in general the hellenistic period was not noticeably worse than the classical: manoeuvring between the hellenistic kings did not differ too badly from manoeuvring between Athens, Sparta and Thebes, the kings did not often interfere directly in the internal affairs of the cities, and the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues were better than the leagues of the classical period in that they were not dominated by major cities. Athens was no longer in a position to dominate, but for half a century it did what it could to play a major role in the new world.\textsuperscript{100} Some kings declared their commitment to the freedom of the Greeks, and in making alliances with them I dare say the

\textsuperscript{94} Philoch, \textit{FGrH} 328 F 56a.

\textsuperscript{95} Plataea: 38,700 hoplites and more light-armed; Her. 9.28–30; Chaeronea: [Hammond]/Griffith 1979: 599 with n. 4 suggests 35,000 infantry and up to 2,000 cavalry, confronting Philip’s over 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry (Diod. Sic. 16.85.5).

\textsuperscript{96} Balkans: Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.7.2–3; Granicus first of many occasions in Asia when Alexander’s life was in danger: Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1.15.7–8; Diod. Sic. 17.20.6.

\textsuperscript{97} Philip’s death: Diod. Sic. 17.3.2, 5.1; Plut. \textit{Dem.} 22.1–3; Aeschin. 3. \textit{Ctesiphon} 77–78; Thebes: Diod. Sic. 17.8.5–6; Plut. \textit{Dem.} 23.1–2; \textit{Alex.} 11.6.


\textsuperscript{99} They used only 170 of their ships: cf. Morrison 1987.

\textsuperscript{100} See, on the general point, Rhodes/Lewis 1997: 542; on Athens in particular, Rhodes 2006.
Athenians tried to believe that they were not (let us say) Ptolemising but Ptolemy was Atticising.\(^{101}\) Except between 307 and 295 there were Macedonian garrisons in Attica; in 307 flattery required the creation of new tribes named after the “liberator” Demetrius and his father Antigonus. Nevertheless in 279/278 Athens joined in an Aetolian-led defence of Delphi against marauding Celtic tribes, and could believe that once more it was playing its part in Greek resistance to barbarian invaders. In 268/267 Athens, Sparta and other southern Greeks made an alliance with Ptolemy II against Antigonus Gonatas, to fight the Chremonidean War, and they could think of this as a Greek alliance led by the now cooperating Athens and Sparta, with the support of the friendly Ptolemy, rather than as their being caught up in a war between Antigonus and Ptolemy. But Athens and its allies were defeated in the Chremonidean War, and for a short time after that there was direct Antigonid intervention in the internal affairs of Athens. That does mark the end of Athens’ attempts to be a leading city in Greece.

So what did go wrong? The ghost of empire can certainly be seen behind what happened to the Second Athenian League after Leuctra had made its original purpose irrelevant, but I do not think it can be blamed for the King’s Peace before or the successes of Macedon after. (The large navy of the Eubulan and Lycurgan period was a waste of money, but money was plentiful once more and it does not seem to have been a damaging waste.) Nor should we let the orators persuade us that fourth-century Athenians were inferior to fifth-century Athenians, that everything might have been different if the poor had been more willing to give up their handouts and the rich more willing to pay eisphora. As for the calibre of leaders, it is certainly true that politicians and generals were seriously in danger of prosecution – the great Callistratus was acquitted in 366/365, but was condemned in absence in 361 and was put to death later when he risked returning to Athens; Hansen lists fourteen eisangeliai against generals between 366/365 and 356/355\(^{102}\) – but there was no shortage of men willing to face the danger, and I see no reason to think that there were more able men who were frightened out of public life. After the Peace of Philocrates Demosthenes did persuade the majority of the Athenians, and many other Greeks too, that his attitude to Philip was the right attitude – but still they were beaten at Chaeronea.

There was nothing fundamentally wrong in the state of Athens. Athens’ problem, as the British prime minister Harold Macmillan would have said, was “events, dear boy; events;”\(^{103}\) the Spartans’ success in the Hellespont in 387, which enabled them to impose the King’s Peace; the chances which gave Macedon Philip II, who was too clever diplomatically and became too strong militarily for the Athenians; Alexander’s succession in 336 and his success and survival in his campaigns. J. Ober in his contribution to a book of historical speculations about What If? suggests that, with Sparta weakened by Thebes and Thebes destroyed by Alexander, if Alexander had been killed at the Granicus in 334 Athens would once more have become the strongest state in Greece.\(^{104}\) But it was not to be.

\(^{101}\) Cf. what Agesilaus is alleged to have said about the King’s Peace, see above pp. 115–116 with n. 36.

\(^{102}\) Callistratus: Hansen 1975: nos. 83, 87; eisangeliai against generals: nos. 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 101, 102.

\(^{103}\) Alleged reply when asked what his greatest problem was (e.g. Knowles 1998: 202 no. 8).

\(^{104}\) Ober 1999.
Finally, was Demosthenes right to be afraid of Philip’s supremacy? We might as well ask whether some people today are right to be afraid of the increasing power of the European Union over its member states. The benefits of belonging to what you feel to be your own unit, free to take decisions based on its own interests, have to be weighed against the benefits of belonging to a large and flourishing combination, and there may be different answers if you posit as the alternative independence for your own unit in a world in which the large combination does not exist or in a world in which the large combination does exist without you. I will say only that I can understand why the Athenians, after the history of the past hundred and fifty years, did let Demosthenes persuade them.

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