PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES AS AN INSPIRATION
AND THE BASIS OF THE DIRECTIONS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATIONAL
SCIENCE IN POLAND (1918–1939)

Summary: The origins of educational science are tied to the anti-naturalistic breakthrough in the humanities and to the work of such authors as W. Dilthey, H. Rickert, J. Kerschenstein-
er, E. Spranger, or T. Litt. In Poland, the so-called ‘pedagogy of culture’ has enjoyed a broad, diverse and multi-threaded kind of development. A personal-creative role of values in the process of education lies at its core, while the pluralism of its directions stems from the different philosophical bases (along with religions affiliated with them) that became the constituents of its concepts. The paper identifies three main directions in the development of pedagogy of culture in Poland, referring to the philosophy of German idealism (Hegel’s objective spirit), the neo-Kantians of the Baden school, the Catholic direction with its philosophy of moderate realism (Thomism and neo-Thomism), and the direction rooted in Polish culture and philosophy: that of a secular and left-wing nature. The article presents the classification I made of the selected directions in the development of educational science. It brings out both their individuality and specificities (as shown by the discussed concepts of the selected authors). The chief aim is to present the panorama of directions within the ‘pedagogy of culture’ in Poland in 1918–1939 with their philosophical and educational foundations, also characteristic of the rest of Central Europe at the time.

Keywords: pedagogy of culture, Polish pedagogy in 1918–1939, philosophy of values, peda-
gogy of values

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Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that the anti-naturalist turn in the humanities (also known as the ‘new humanities’), which took place in the early 20th century under the influence of German idealism, Baden neo-Romanists and phenomenologists, contributed to the development of pedagogy. The direction of this development was described in Polish pedagogy as ‘the pedagogy of culture’ or, less often, ‘spiritual life’. In German pedagogy, it was referred to as ‘geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik’. This spirituality was based on an extended understanding of the Hegelian objective Spirit as the subject and content of history (Hegel referred to Spirit as ‘all morality, law, art, religion and philosophy that is a historical normative implementation of general values in cultural assets’). Wilhelm Dilthey’s conception and notions of: spirit, values and the ‘understanding’ of mental and spiritual worlds (the understanding of people and senses), which were contrasted with the positivist ‘explanation’, were direct and methodologically the most inspiring ideas for the pedagogy of culture. Understanding the spiritual reality (along with its methodological scheme) became the leading thesis of the new humanities and, at the same time, the pedagogy of culture, offering a type of cognition that was oriented on values and cultural assets.

The new humanities understood in this way and the pedagogy that was based on their foundations had their representatives in Poland (particularly Bogdan Nawroczyński and Sergiusz Hessen), but they were not popular between 1918 and 1939. Later, however, in communist Poland (1945–1989), the new humanities and the pedagogy of culture began to be discussed in academic textbooks, which were subjected to censorship, as foreign to the Polish Catholic culture and its humanism.

This interpretation of the sources and development of the pedagogy of culture is based on actual phenomena, yet it ignores the contribution of the philosophy of realism and theistic realism (Thomism and neo-Thomism) to the pedagogy of culture and, as such, must be regarded as one-sided. The opposite direction of development of the pedagogy of culture rooted in theistic realism did not have such

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3 Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die material Wertethik (Halle: Max Niemeyer 1916); idem, Vom Ewigen im Menschen (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist – Verlag 1923); Nicolai Hartmann, Ethik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1926); Siegfried Behn, Philosophie der Werte als Grundwissenschaft der pädagogischen Zieltheorie (München: Verlag J. Kösel & F. Pustet 1930).


a spectacular founding moment as the ‘anti-naturalist turn’ in its genesis (due to permanent distance to it), but it was continued no later than in St. Thomas’s work. In the inter-war period, concepts of the pedagogy of culture focused on values and cultural assets were significantly developed with the participation of theistic realism. As has been already mentioned, the development was stopped by the ideological terror in Poland after World War II.

In addition to these tendencies in the Polish pedagogy of culture between 1918 and 1939, there was a humanistic and pedagogical thought that preferred neither idealism nor theistic realism. It was Florian Znaniecki’s culturalism and socialist concepts sympathetic to Marxism, which set its leftist direction of development.

This – pluralistic in its essence – situation gave rise to three directions of development of the pedagogy of culture in Poland between 1918 and 1939:

1) the secular and idealistic direction – referring to the philosophy of German idealism, Hegel’s objective Spirit, Baden neo-Kantianists and phenomenologists. In Poland, it was represented primarily by Bogdan Nawroczyński and Sergiusz Hessen;

2) the Catholic and realistic direction – based on the philosophy of theistic realism (Thomism and neo-Thomism); critical of the philosophy of German idealism (particularly the Hegelian objective Spirit) and neo-Kantianism; and strongly striving to preserve Polish cultural and national identity. In Poland, it was represented by priest Jan Cierniewski, priest Zygmunt Bielawski, nun Barbara Żulińska CR, priest Henryk Weryński, Lucjan Zarzecki, Stefan Szuman, bishop Michał Klepacki, Witold Rubczyński, priest Jan Stepa and priest Tomasz Wąsik;

3) the leftist and cultural direction – rooted in leftist Polish philosophy and culture (Edward Abramowski, Stanisław Brzozowski) and Marxist ideology, represented by Zygmunt Mysłakowski, Władysław Radwan and Bogdan Suchodolski; there was also Florian Znaniecki’s culturalism, which was inspired by various philosophical and ideological sources.

As Catholicism was the dominant religion in Poland, the Catholic and realistic direction left the greatest legacy in the form of a wide range of pedagogical concepts. The openness of Poland also led to the development of other directions as shown by its pluralistic traditions.
Contexts of the philosophical and religious sources
of the pedagogy of culture

The philosophy of values played a significant role in the inter-war period\(^6\). Within theist realism and Catholic pedagogy, it was noticed that there was a struggle between Christian and non-Christian world views. The philosophy of life was considered the leading type of the philosophy of values. In the non-Christian version, life was opposed to spirit, with which Christian realists disagreed, claiming that spiritual functions also belong to life. The representatives of the non-Christian version (F. Nietzsche, W. Dilthey, T. Lessing) included conscious, rational cognition and rational will in the scope of spirit; life was supposed to include the irrational sphere of soul, i.e. drives, feelings, emotional and intuitive cognition and subconscious experiences\(^7\). The philosophy of life embedded in nineteenth-century German idealism, and Hegel's philosophy in particular, was to replace traditional religion (the concepts of objective Spirit and Idea replaced the concept of God). Belief in culture understood as values (assets) developed throughout history, was to be opposed to 'non-historical religious metaphysics and, at the same time, discipline man and master their individuality by pointing to objective developmental necessities\(^8\).

The new religion, the 'religion of culture' became a demanding tool of the historical spirit. The Hegelian heritage affected the further development of the pedagogy of culture which aimed – as Suchodolski writes – at closing man in the historical and social world, rejecting religion and superhistorical metaphysics and subordinating them to the interests of groups. In times of nascent Nazism, this idea directed the pedagogy of culture towards the ideas of state and totalism. This was reflected primarily in the pedagogy of G. Gentili, P. Petersen and E. Krieck. In Poland, it is believed that these people discredited the pedagogy of culture\(^9\), making it Nazi.

In response to these philosophical foundations of pedagogy, realists (neo-Thomists) pointed to other sources of the philosophy of values accepted on Catholic grounds; they indicated their origins in Plato, Aristotle and scholasticism. While the theory of values was not yet an independent and separate theory, the concept of value was included in the concept of good in 'perennial philosophy'. A value was believed to be that what is honourable and respectful, because it is useful, pleasant and beautiful\(^10\).

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\(^6\) Franciszek Sawicki, 'Wiara i filozofia współczesna', in: Księga pamiątkowa ku uczczeniu dziesięciolecia biskupstwa J.E. Księdza biskupa dr-a Stanisława W. Okoniewskiego biskupa chełmińskiego (Pelplin: Seminarium Duchowne 1936), 7–8.

\(^7\) Ibidem, 18–19.


\(^9\) Ibidem, 316.

\(^10\) Sawicki, 'Wiara i filozofia... ', 18. See e.g. Krzysztof Śleziński, Aretologiczne podstawy pedagogiki (Kraków–Cieszyn: Wydawnictwo “Scriptum” 2016).
In opposition to this approach to the value theory and geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik based on German idealistic philosophy (including neo-Kantianism), Franciszek Sawicki created its realistic and neo-Thomist variant. He outlined it in his work entitled Filozofia życia [The Philosophy of Life] (1936). He entered into a polemic with idealists, proposing a Catholic understanding of values and the philosophy of life. In this way, he questioned the fact that the philosophy of values was first introduced by the Neo-Kantian-Baden School and phenomenologists (M. Scheler, N. Hartmann, S. Behn). By unveiling the presence of values in Thomism, he confirmed the existence of Catholic sources of this variety of the philosophy of culture\(^{11}\) and pedagogy.

Sawicki had a negative approach to theories according to which values are deprived of objective meaning and made dependent on a human being. Consequently, subjectivism and relativism become cognitive, moral and aesthetic attitudes, and the world of values cannot become a higher order for a human being\(^{12}\). In this way, man is deprived of faith in the world of divine ideas of truth, goodness and beauty. Here, Sawicki agreed with Jaspers that man deprived of faith faces nothingness\(^{13}\). When distinguishing two basic groups of values: sensual and spiritual, Sawicki gave precedence to spiritual values – which is a constant feature of this philosophy. According to him, they include: logical, aesthetic, moral and religious values; sensual values include: sensual pleasures, useful (economic) values and vital values (health, physical strength). Values are independent of man and he should recognise them. Spiritual values are valid for all people at all times, regardless of class, nationality and other differences. These include: truth, justice, faithfulness and honesty. They are the reflection of the highest value which is God. They are manifested in natural laws, and all norms and principles of the practice of life originate in the sphere of spirit\(^{14}\). Sawicki's concept shows the distance between the spirit of Catholic realism (Thomism) and the spirit of the idealistic (Protestant) philosophy of values.

Sawicki notices that philosophers of values include thinkers who are close to Christianity. He accepts the statements of Windelbank, Rickert and Scheler in which they acknowledge the existence in the world of ‘the eternal values of truth, goodness and beauty, similar to the Platonic world of divine ideas’\(^{15}\), but he questions the antecedence of their views. He claims that this thought refers to the philosophy of Saint Augustine, who said that ‘all truth and all goodness is

\(^{11}\) Stefan Święzawski, ‘Uprawa intelektu’, Prąd 30 (1936), 250–269.


\(^{13}\) Karl Jaspers, Die geistige Situation der Gegenwart, 5 (Berlin: de Gruyter 1933), 13, as quoted in: Sawicki, ‘Założenia filozoficzne…’, 32.

\(^{14}\) Sawicki, ‘Założenia filozoficzne…’, 34.

\(^{15}\) Sawicki, ‘Wiara i filozofia…’, 19.
a reflection of the eternal truth and absolute goodness which is God’. He adds that Saint Thomas also took account of the value of earthly cultural assets, respecting the supremacy of supernatural assets.

The secular and idealistic direction

The secular and idealistic direction of the development of the pedagogy of culture was concretised between the 19th and 20th centuries due to the achievements of Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Theodor Litt, Sergiusz Hessen and Bogdan Nawrocyński. This is a traditional direction as it has been formalised by academic circles in the form of the pedagogy of culture. The pre-1939 chronological origin of the secular and idealistic thought should be associated with the beginning of the Reformation, Hegel’s works and Baden neo-Kantianists.

Bogdan Nawrocyński is the most outstanding representative of the Polish pedagogy of culture originating in the German idealistic philosophy.

The concept of Bogdan Nawrocyński (1882–1974). As an avowed representative of the pedagogy of culture, Nawrocyński stressed his intellectual relations with the aforementioned group of German humanists. On the other hand, he also had scholarly connections with the Lvov-Warsaw School. Declaring his support for the slogans of the French Revolution, he also emphasised his attachment to national culture and his own patriotism, stressed the importance of the nation and Polish affairs, and even took up the fight for the country. His national and patriotic views collided with his secular sympathies and references to the French Revolution.

Nawrocyński’s pedagogy and philosophy of culture is particularly expressed in his research subject, which is spiritual life. Its internal dimension could have inclined him to focus on an individual, but Nawrocyński concentrated on a group, humankind. In his opinion, in the development of culture, people

\[16\] Ibidem, as quoted in: Hedwig Minrath, Der Gottesbegriff In der modernen Wertphilosophie (Berlin: F. Dümmlers Verlag 1927). Sawicki points out similar works from the Thomistic philosophy of culture, e.g. Martin Grabmanna, Die Kulturphilosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin (Augsburg: Verlag bei Benno Filser 1925). The understanding of culture included here takes account of the dogmas of the Catholic religion and its Thomistic philosophy, linking the conditions for the development of culture and the philosophy of culture primarily with religion [ibidem; see also: Janina Kostkiewicz, Kierunki i koncepcje pedagogiki katolickiej w Polsce 1918–1939 (Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza “Impuls” 2013), 191–326].


\[18\] Idem, Życie duchowe. Zarys filozofii kultury (Kraków–Warszawa: Księgarnia Wydawnicza F. Pieczątkowski i S-ka 1947), 45. I include this work in the legacy of 1918–39, because the author wrote it during the German occupation (1939–1945).
aspire to increasingly ambitious goals and finally to absolute values. This is – he said – the ultimate goal of both man and humankind. He reached for absolute values which humanise the human species and expressed the hope that they would contribute to the creation of the idea of humankind. For him, this idea replaces the Absolute, something that is above everything; something that ‘has never been and is not. However, it is also something […] that should be’. Is this humankind ideal? As Nawroczyński wrote, this ideal is now possible in small groups of friends. Ultimately – referring to Edward Abramowski – he saw the future organisation of humankind in economic and cultural communities.

In Nawroczyński’s concept, and therefore his pedagogy of culture, spiritual life is associated with pursuing a goal (it is characterised by telehormity); this long-term perspective builds up tension – the more distant the target is, the more intense the tension becomes. It occurs:

 […] between being (that which exists) and the world of values (that which does not but should exist). Being, however, is immune to the world of values. It takes a lot of effort to adjust it to human purposes. This is also hindered by the objectivisation of cultural assets […] Decomposition of moral life is the most dangerous as it, sooner or later, leads to the decomposition of the entire culture.

The rescue lies in man himself and the strength of their character. Weak people cannot advance culture and fail to bear its message. Therefore, spiritual life – and thus education – is not an idyll; it becomes a ‘fight’ and sometimes a drama. Man should take this effort – with the help of education – for ‘future humankind’ and the wealth of their own spiritual life.

The Catholic and realistic direction

The Catholic and realistic direction is characterised by a different understanding of spirit and spirituality than the idealistic and Protestant one. Its conclusions on the grounds of the philosophy of culture, the philosophy of religion, the sociology of culture and the sociology of religion are positive for religion; the Catholic and realistic direction states that the presence of God does not close man to the reality of culture and to creativity within this culture. The basic condition for the existence and meaning of the pedagogy of culture is preserved here: relations between culture and the personality structures of a pupil are

19 Nawroczyński, Życie duchowe..., 223.
21 Ibidem, 115.
subject to development as the mutual interaction becomes deeper – and this fact is the main axis of educational processes in any concept aspiring to the pedagogy of culture.

It is worth pointing out which of the idealistic and Protestant assumptions could not gain acceptance in realist and Catholic thought. Selected anthropological assumptions are important for pedagogy. ‘In Protestantism (M. Luther), it was assumed that human nature is completely spoilt by the original sin’ and man is unable to repair it. On the other hand, God helps only those who he wants to help. Already this one element shows how much Protestantism differs from the Catholic approach, according to which human nature is good and only has a flaw (like ‘a crack on the glass’). The grace of Providence strengthens human aspiration for self-improvement, which encourages self-education. A pupil’s bad behaviour is not corrected through ‘condemnation’ (as in Victorian morality), but by promoting good behaviour. Moreover, the Hegelian concept of objective Spirit cannot be accepted in the Thomist conceptions of the philosophers of culture because:

[Hegel] incorporated the nature-culture opposition into his philosophical system. Nature is shown as [...] something alien to Spirit. On the other hand, Spirit contains culture (art, philosophy, religion) which manifests the return of the Absolute to oneself. Culture is not a complement to nature, but its opposition, and can only function in the domain of Spirit.

Meanwhile, in Thomistic philosophy and its continuations in personalism: ‘Culture must be open to religion because human nature is oriented on goals (the fullness of truth, goodness and beauty), which cannot be achieved only thanks to nature [...] or thanks to culture alone’. Religion makes the spiritual development of personality dependent on experiencing and creating values and relationships to God more consistently than, for example, art.

The concept of Jan Ciemniewski (1866–1947). This author presented the framework of his concept in his work entitled Nauka szkolna w zastosowaniu do psychiki i kultury polskiej [School Education as Applied to the Polish Psyche and Culture], which can be called his programme manifesto. He addressed it to the future creators of the Polish school in November 1919, in connection with the regaining of independence by Poland. He claimed that in order to maintain Polish statehood – which would best be done by the Polish home and school – it is

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24 Ibidem.
25 Ibidem, 139.
26 Wider in: Kostkiewicz, Kierunki i koncepcje..., 207–234.
27 Jan Ciemniewski, ‘Nauka szkolna w zastosowaniu do psychiki i kultury polskiej’, Polonia Sacra 3 (1919), 47.
necessary to bring up a free, independent and energetic man who, at the same time, thinks and feels as a Pole. The school should arouse the self-preservation instinct, teach living in freedom and decide for oneself under new political conditions. Ciemniewski based his programme manifesto on his outline of Polish culture.

He began its reconstruction from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At that time, the Polish nation 'based itself on the moral principle of humanity and not only discovered it as something permanent and unremitting, but even opposed this principle, as early as in the middle ages, to the Christian-German Europe'. The quality of Polish culture made itself known on the battlefields of Varna, Vienna and Cecora. It is based on the fact that:

Poland was a precursor of human rights and man’s self-determination. By the fifteenth century, it introduced the principle of the people’s self-determination and implemented it at home in the sixteenth century. The laws Nihil novi and Neminem captivabimus were introduced in Poland earlier than in other European countries. The king in Poland was only a guardian of the law and nothing more, and the state was not the goal but the means to realise the noble type of man, a free citizen of the country and the world. Poland was the only state in central Europe that was based on free and voluntary membership of citizens. Only Poland expanded its territories through unions [other countries did so through partitions].

In Polish culture, the tendency for the supremacy of moral power over established law and the glorious absence of ‘the cult of law’ guarded the country against phenomena that affected the West (including religious persecution). Ciemniewski repeats Artur Górski’s words: ‘Poland killed the ghost of statehood. It replaced the concept of the state with the notion of homeland […] it encompasses a religious approach to man’s attitude to the world; religious, that is, connected with the whole of being’. Polish culture of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was the leader among nations fighting for freedom and human rights.

Moreover, Poland often defended Christian principles to the detriment of its own interest. Western Europe was notorious for fanaticism, religious intolerance (the Inquisition) and religious wars. Poland did not know these phenomena and was characterised by religious tolerance. Cierniewski recalls Brückner’s statement that, during the Thirty Years’ War, Poland was the only country in Europe to have a different – ‘human and noble’ – position. At the Council of Constance, Poland was the first to speak against forced conversion. It preached respect for freedom in the sphere of religious beliefs before any other nation did. Earlier than other nations, it developed political freedoms and civil liberties. Poland came up with the idea that the world is trying to achieve today: the idea of the union of

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29 Cierniewski, ‘Nauka…’, 14.
national traditions based on the principles of freedom, equality and mutual aid, without exploitation – one example in the history of Poland was the Polish-Lithuanian Union (initiated in 1385, strengthened in 1569 and existing until 1795).

Against the background of these revived ideas, Ciemniewski strives to raise the value of work in education, emphasising economic skills, management and agricultural culture. He believes that education focused on aestheticism and shallow literature pushes it to the wrong path – the loss of economic skills limits the development of culture and undermines the basis of being. He perceives aesthetic culture as a harmony of beauty and form, linking its development with people’s emotions and creative imagination.

Ciemniewski defines intellectual culture as the flourishing of the nation’s creative abilities. He puts knowledge and philosophy at the top and reliable education at the base. According to him, a ‘moral sense’, which takes the form of a sense of duty indicated by conscience and reason, is the most important in the ethical sphere. It is not good when we let ‘foreign strangers infiltrate our land, and we force our compatriots to emigrate overseas to find a shelter and bread – is it healthy patriotism?’ Where is humanitarianism and equality before the law? – he asks. School is a place where the social dimension of religion is fulfilled and it is to be the foundation of education. There is no education without religion, it is only a drill or training because education is primarily spiritualisation; the spiritual sphere should be able to rule our senses to make us live beautifully and nobly and to serve God and our homeland. Educational influence consists of combining divine and human elements.

To support of this thesis, Ciemniewski conducts a critical analysis of Kant’s antinomies of pure reason. He writes that as the result of the ‘first and fourth antinomies: the world is finite and infinite at the same time, and God exists and does not exist at the same time’. According to Ciemniewski, Kant stood between ‘true philosophy’, which revives spirit, and ‘sceptic philosophy’, which overwhelms spiritual forces and distracts from action, agnosticism. Kant’s successors – he claims – went further and fell into extreme scepticism, from which there is no way out, unless through emotions (which, in Ciemniewski’s opinion, modernists did). Ciemniewski finds the idea of God in Kant’s considerations. He rejects it because something that is only an idea cannot be proved to exist. He states ironically that the idea of God indicates that there is no evidence for His existence. “The notion of a supreme being” – says Kant – “is in many respects a highly useful idea; but for the very reason that it is a idea, it is incapable of enlarging our

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31 Jan Ciemniewski, Budujmy Polskę wewnątrz (Lwów: Gubrynowicz i Syn 1917), 10–11.
33 Ciemniewski, ‘Nauka…’, 18, 31.
34 Ibidem, 31.
cognition with regard to the existence of things”36, he writes referring to Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover:

Saint Thomas’s apt argument against anthologists has been turned upside down here. It is true that the existence of God cannot be inferred from the idea of God, but how does Kant know that this notion is only an idea and nothing more? […] if the notion of a supreme being is only an idea, then God does not really exist, and no evidence […] will prove His existence37.

Ciemniewski’s considerations about Kant’s transcendental dialectics are also interesting. When summing them up, he claims that Kant remained faithful to the accepted principle, which is why he rejected the possibility of theological and philosophical knowledge. Ciemniewski does not reject this possibility, yet he suggests breaking with Kant’s agnosticism. Being a priest, he acknowledges the existence of God. Ciemniewski says that Kant’s transcendental dialectics does not indicate if there is a real God; it only states the existence of the idea of ‘a prime originator’ or ‘a first cause’, which, however, does not exist beyond our mind.

Meanwhile, writes Ciemniewski, religiousness is a feeling of admiration, worship, gratitude and adoration of God. This feeling precedes the knowledge of God. By referring to such representatives of contemporary modern psychology as J.F. Herbart, J.S. Mill, H. Spencer, Maine de Biran, A. Schopenhauer and W. Wundt, Ciemniewski enters a polemic between them and scholastics, taking account of Cardinal J.H. Newman’s views38. According to Ciemniewski, modernism opens up a path for subjectivism, relativism and, ultimately, to extreme individualism. This will lead to complete anarchy on matters of faith.

Feeling is always subjective and individual views are sometimes mutually exclusive so objective cognition is impossible under such conditions. Even internal experience will not help here, because we do not examine the subject anymore, but our personal, subjective impressions that are different in every human being39.

Like most pedagogues of culture, Ciemniewski is interested in character training. In the moral sense, to have a character means:

[…] to bring a certain ethical order to one’s conduct, a certain harmony and compliance with the law, and not to be guided by the changing impressions of the moment in relations with people, but to follow the voice of conscience and reason40.

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36 Ibidem, 25.
39 Ciemniewski, U źródeł…, 68.
40 Ibidem. These issues are characteristic of Catholic pedagogy; they were present in the Vatican programme of the Catholic Action and Ciemniewski also returned to them. See e.g.
What follows character has its meaning in social life. Ciemniewski agrees with Lucjan Zarzecki’s approach that character is a constant and visible organisation of all forces given to man (characterised by a comprehensive ability to learn, the power of will, growing self-knowledge) in order to actively participate, together with one’s nation, in the life of people and to serve the nation and the mankind\(^4^1\). He refers to people with character as the conscience of the nation\(^4^2\).

In Ciemniewski’s concept, the axis of education is the relationship between personality structures and culture as well as the current needs of the nation. This feature is the basic condition of its qualification for the pedagogy culture\(^4^3\).

The pedagogy of values of Barbara Żulińska of the Congregation of the Sisters of the Resurrection (1881–1962). The Catholic and realistic direction of development of the pedagogy of culture also included other apt approaches to education. Żulińska developed her own concept of the pedagogy of culture as the pedagogy of values. She considered it to be the science of ‘internal harmonisation’\(^4^4\), in which she referred to all areas of education, including the training of character and feelings. According to her, pedagogy also serves the function of evaluation – both in the initial and operational layers. It should evaluate ideals and educational measures, methods of their application and the conditions for achieving goals. Pedagogy is a science based on ethics – it teaches how to prepare the forces which moral acts depend on for action. Referring to Humboldt, Żulińska also pointed to the auxiliary roles of psychology, physiology, biology, sociology and history. She also emphasised the basic relationship of pedagogy with theology and philosophy. She supported her preferences with the examples of other authors: Plato, Adam Mickiewicz and his Paris lectures, as well as Georg Kerschensteiner. The latter assumes that: ‘A pedagogical act is not only an act of understanding and not only a social act, but it is a religious act’\(^4^5\). Żulińska creates clear axiological foundations of education, which is a lifelong process, and the art of creating and internally harmonising a human being.

Żulińska draws a joyful and optimistic vision of upbringing, happy childhood and a happy man without egoism, who lives a full life and develops, as well as

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\(^4^2\) Ciemniewski, Poznanie…, 31.

\(^4^3\) Cf e.g. Kazimierz Sośnicki, Rozwój pedagogiki zachodniej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku (Warszawa: PZWS 1967), 206.

\(^4^4\) Barbara Żulińska, Ku Zmartwychwstaniu. Zagadnienia pedagogiczne (Trenton–New York: Wydawnictwo Sióstr Zmartwychwstania Pana Naszego Jezusa Chrystusa 1950), 7 (the work was created earlier but could not be published).

provides and experiences goodness. According to her, the leading problems of educational activity are: character training, educational atmosphere, discipline, obedience and freedom. She asks questions about the legitimacy of punishment, recognises the meagre educational value of coercion and the short-lived nature of its influence. On the other hand, she says that coercion cannot be completely avoided in relations with small children because they cannot force themselves to do certain things and so they need our help. Educators act in the name of a future man in a child and only within these limits they are justified. Educators are not allowed to use their advantage, impose their whims, and coercion should be preceded by convincing in education. The precondition for achieving obedience is respect for the freedom of the child and the assumption that no one has the right to violate his or her free will. This respect manifests itself in a polite tone, courtesy free of agitation and nervous exaltation, kindness and gentleness alongside firmness, as well as seriousness – even with a dose of humour. A child’s obedience is gained through respect, faith and trust. She thinks that confidence is even more necessary than a categorical order.

Żulińska made a significant developmental step in the pedagogy of culture, which neither E. Spranger nor G. Kerschensteiner did. Namely, she combined Spranger’s and Kerschensteiner’s views. Spranger, ‘for whom “spiritual” assets are the main material of education, deals with psychology and educational problems in adolescence, and almost completely ignores the period of childhood’. He claims that pupils need to have more complex and abstract thinking skills and understand the meanings of spiritual cultural assets. For this reason, Spranger addresses his suggestions to young people. Kerschensteiner, however, also includes younger children in his pedagogy, introduces them to material goods, focusing not so much on the meaning of their material sense but on their non-utilitarian values, such as precision of workmanship, purity and aesthetics, to prepare children to understand the meanings of spiritual cultural assets. In turn, Żulińska suggests a parallel way of understanding the assets (values) of material and spiritual culture. Religion and its spiritual values, such as: love flowing from God, worship for God, Jesus’ teaching – the content of Revelation and dogmas are present in education in a way that is also available to young children. The experience of Catholic educators in this area made it possible to propose intuitive and pictorial methodology to understand the highest religious spiritual values. Children’s understanding of spiritual values manifests itself in their sublime way of experiencing the symbolic aspect of a given spiritual value [the organisational aspect of events revealing the meaning of a given spiritual value, e.g. life

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46 Żulińska, Ku Zmartwychwstaniu..., 227.
48 Sośnicki, Rozwój pedagogiki..., 194.
49 Ibidem, 194.
symbolised by the Resurrection Sunday – the symbol of the best educational results would be an experience analogous to the experiences of Resurrection Sunday, such as joy, victory over evil (in non-essential and essential senses), the victory of truth, release from all enslavements and happiness containing an eternal perspective]. The intuitive and pictorial methodology affects children through symbolic rituals (e.g. individual feasts, the atmosphere of songs performed during May services, vespers, etc.), as well as poetry, music and architecture. This involves understanding through experiencing, as well as understanding through feeling – this is why it is so important for Żulińska to teach a culture of feelings. This intuitive and pictorial methodology of understanding values also involves ‘nurturing’, i.e. physical and spiritual development. As it is assumed that the image of God is inscribed in children’s spirituality, the task of education is only (or perhaps as much as) to emphasise their talents, desires, feelings, imaginations and aspirations that require educational guidance.

Other representatives of the Catholic and realistic direction of development of the pedagogy of culture in Poland were: Bishop Michał Klepacz, Witold Rubczyński, Lucjan Zarzecki and Stefan Szuman (only selected works are mentioned here).

It is said that the pedagogy of culture has difficulty determining the main purpose of education – it is generally the development of personality. This difficulty does not arise in the Catholic and realistic pedagogy of culture. By identifying the goals of education with the goals of life, this direction bases their content and forms on the freedom of a human person and individual capabilities.

**Leftist culturalism**

The leftist profile of educational concepts is also present in the history of Polish pedagogical thought. It is represented by Z. Mysłakowski, W. Radwan and B. Suchodolski. Their concepts are the subject of many studies. Interpretations

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50 Michał Klepacz, *Kierunki organizacyjne oraz idealy wychowawcze we współczesnym szkolnictwie polskim* (Katowice: Księgarnia i Drukarnia Katolicka 1937); idem, *Duchowieństwo wobec nowoczesnych prądów w szkole polskiej* (Kielce: Drukarnia św. Józefa 1930).


of Znaniecki’s output from 1918 to 1939 can still be of interest today. Thus, when adopting the perspective of the pedagogy of culture (i.e. the relationship between personality structures and culture), we should answer the question of how the desired vision of a new civilisation can be achieved.

The concept of Florian Znaniecki (1882–1958). Znaniecki called his philosophy of social sciences, culturalism (a philosophy of cultural sciences). Its meaning boils down to the thesis that the humanities and social sciences require philosophical legitimacy. At this point, Znaniecki rejected naturalism and idealism as views on the living foundations of reality; he also rejected epistemological fundamentalism and positivism. Znaniecki’s culturalism combined four of his concepts: the theory of ‘concrete reality’ (the way in which the subject of cultural sciences exists); the concept of the humanistic coefficient regarding the way in which this subject is examined (subjects of research are ‘always someone’s, never anyone else’s’); the theory of action being a culturalistic concept of subjectivity – action is directed at values, it reveals the subjective aspect of a concrete reality and allows recognising the presence of consciousness in the empirical world; the concept of the sociology of knowledge regarded as a sub-discipline of sociology (but not a meta-theoretical reflection on cognition) and the knowledge of groups created by people. His project of the sociology of knowledge concerned the scientific community55. Znaniecki’s culturalism is not focused on contemplating values, but on incorporating them – ‘incorporation’ is an action and concerns, above all, man (the incorporation itself has a pedagogical nature) and, indirectly, the transfer of that which is embodied in the external sphere of culture.

In his work entitled Ludzie terazniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości [Contemporary People and the Future Civilisation] (1934), Znaniecki develops a concept of a new civilisation, which is regarded to be a humanistic utopia. Irena Wojnar points to its relationship with H. Bergson’s work L’évolution créatrice (1907), which she includes – referring to V. Cappalletti – in the trend of utopian tendencies that appeared in Europe in the 1930s. Moreover, she emphasises that the ‘new future civilisation’ is the educational instantiation of an ‘open society’56.

What is this new civilisation supposed to be? Znaniecki answers that it will be all-human and different from national civilisations, it will also be a humanistic civilisation with a predominance of spiritual culture. Its other features include: social harmony (no conflicts) and liquidity meaning a dynamic balance containing free creativity as a normal function of individuals and groups. Moreover, it will be free

from crises and created by new cultural systems. Only a humanistic, harmonious and liquid civilisation combining all these three features will be all-human\(^{57}\).

What is needed for the emergence of the new civilisation, the deepest essence of which is human creativity? – asks Znaniecki. It can be originated by the creative efforts of people still belonging to this existing civilisation. However, it cannot be developed at its own pace, and its formation must be consistent with its future essence. The new civilisation requires conscious development of cultural forces which are essential for its existence. Therefore, there is an urgent need to form people who are to be people of the future\(^{58}\).

The civilisation is to be new, all-human, liquid, humanistic… and nothing more? We know little about the living conditions of these new people – apart from creativity. Znaniecki does not give a description of life in the ‘future paradise’, but he treats his task seriously. He begins by making an extensive diagnosis of contemporary man and the cultural determinants of their formation. To create a new civilisation, a new man is needed and to create them, the present man must be known. In this creation, both present people and future people have their roles, and the circles of life (educational environments) are told who to shape: Znaniecki asks neither parents nor educators about it. Those who want the new civilisation know the answer – they will say how to act. The new civilisation cannot be created without the support of science and the resulting practice.

When dreaming about the new civilisation, Znaniecki has designed ways to prepare young people for the accelerated variability of the modern world to enable the next generations to consciously manage social evolution and protect civilisation against disasters. Evolution management is to be based on the ideals of culture, humanistic values and moral principles. For this to happen, they must be inscribed in the ideal of education.

Thus, the vision of the new civilisation is the criterion of content that makes up the ideal of education. Znaniecki tries to indicate the means to build it. He is creative, chooses values and develops a strategy – he acts like a pedagogue of culture. These means are as follows:

1. Personality. He formulates the concept of a cultural personality:

The cultural personality of an ordinary man, who lives from the cradle to the grave as a member of a cultural group and a participant in the civilisation of society, which is subordinated to this civilisation, is extremely rich and complex, even at the level of folk civilisations. It consists of all the activities that this person performs and all the data that they experience in their life, taking a significant part in cultural systems\(^{59}\).


\(^{58}\) Ibidem, 96–98.

\(^{59}\) Ibidem, 101.
Cultural systems are the food and ground for and the content of the personality. This fact is the main factor for understanding the educational process as it happens in culture. However, science lacks a cultural personality theory, so he attempts to develop it through creative exploration of psychology and the theory of culture. For this purpose, he looks for external inspirations and refers to E. Spranger (Lebensformen, Halle 1927) and E. Krieck (Menschenformung, Leipzig 1924), thus entering the main direction of development of the pedagogy of culture in Europe.

2. A teacher. According to Znaniecki, a pedagogue is not a guide to the world of values:

It is not possible to entrust the education of young generation only to ‘pedagogues,’ well-mannered people, and their social organisation to ‘activists’ [...] even the wisest ones [...] Only supernormal perverts, who have the necessary initiative and creative vigour, can prevail in joint action

Further, he writes about the need to create a new type of normality. A new type of man is to serve the new civilisation; the temporary and changeable role of all types of people (new and old, even those wise and good) is to be instrumental. This can be seen in the questions posed: ‘What should be the biographical type of these new people who will become the creators of the new civilisation in the next generations?’ In response to this question, Znaniecki points to the so-called centres of aspiration of particular types of contemporary people and the centre of aspiration of a new type of man:

[The centre of aspiration of a new type of man] must be the objective meaning of each of their roles in relation to the ideal of the new civilisation. Their whole life must be shaped by the constant influence of this consciousness [...] all that a human person experiences and does is valuable and important only as long as it is part of a great process of duration and growth of the objective world of culture, and the very existence of this human person as personality is socially valuable and has an ethical meaning only as long as it contributes to the unification and development of all humankind.

Therefore, when creating themselves, the new man should not start with themselves, but with this new civilisation, on the development of which all their interests will focus.

3. Environment. In this concept, the social circle receives the right to exert pressure that inhibits or inspires creativity to push the exuberant

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60 Ibidem, 358–359.
61 Ibidem, 359. Well-mannered people have a reflected self; working people – a social status; men of entertainment – moral activity; and perverts – a material task.
individuality in the most desirable direction and to make it a co-creator and companion for others. Admittedly, Znaniecki adds elsewhere that every group should be influenced by an individual, but again he precedes this statement with the following: an individual must be influenced by a group that expects specific creativity from him. He describes the properties of social circles that should surround an individual in childhood and youth. The most important issue is that the social and cultural functions of the circles should undergo significant modifications. For example, the family circle, while maintaining the functions of a physical care provider, should be only a circle of entertainment for an adolescent:

[This should be] socialising, rather than political or fighting entertainment, without a fight for power and without discipline. This is the only way to neutralise the cultural impact of the family [emphasised by the author] […] Let parents forget their full responsibility for the future of their children and leave the matter of their upbringing to other circles.

He also writes about moral solidarity and ethics, and states that the generation of the creators of the ‘new civilisation should unite all creative youth groups in one big, global youth society’ under the ideological guidance of the central team of these groups.

4. Context and conclusion. Znaniecki made a ‘suggestive attempt to categorise various types of “contemporary people” to show that they cannot be the creators of the ideal new civilisation outlined’.

He attributed a special role to the social personality, and not to the cognitive personality, and dedicated his theory to it – the social personality will determine man’s readiness for the new civilisation. To create his theory, he also used the ‘margins’ of the old theory and its category of supernormality (and subnormality). He reached for the phenomenon of supernormality, for people who deviated from the accepted norms, because the supernormal were always the creators of new qualities who broke the barriers. Now the supernatural ‘perverts’ must gain their creative vigour and independence without rebellion against the new order and without breaking the norms. Znaniecki did not notice that he expected change from them. They are to be pillars and the force that will sustain the new civilisation. According to him, the duration of its spiritual system will depend on the cultural fertility of its people.

64 Ibidem, 368–369.
65 Ibidem, 381.
66 Wojnar, ‘Floriana Znanieckiego…’, 45.
67 Znaniecki, Ludzie teraźniejsi…, 346.
Znaniecki considered the matter of directing changes to be a burning issue. According to him, the group that realised that the next generations would have to be able to consciously manage social evolution was the team from the Teachers College at Columbia University (Dewey, Kilpatrick, Russell, Bagley, Brunner and others)\(^\text{68}\). Not touching upon the deeper aspects of the proposed civilisation, he wrote, ‘we have to think about cultural ideals for the implementation of which we want to prepare the new generations’\(^\text{69}\). Not only this but also the previous thoughts put an individual in the background, making them subordinate. The comprehensive framework of the concept shows that Znaniecki’s vision results from the belief in social engineering, and its implementation is to be preceded by great educational engineering. Znaniecki joined the humanists who wanted to form a new, ‘better’ world by ‘creating’ a new man. He did not avoid utopia and he was not the only one to deal with this subject (the phenomenon of utopias was later debunked and criticised in George Orwell’s works).

**Conclusion**

The withdrawal from subjectivism in educational theory and practice is characteristic of the pedagogy of culture. The goals of education and their sources are external to pupils and constitute an objective reality in which they are to grow up. This cultural ‘material’ does not have to reflect the individuality of the pupils, yet the pedagogy wants to leave them with the maximum amount of freedom (which individual concepts do not always respect) to allow the internal development of their personality and enable them to achieve autonomy. Both freedom and coercion appear on the path of this development, and both of these educational measures are considered necessary. Getting to know culture and accepting its values (experiencing their related states), including them in one’s own axionormative system (with the postulate of autonomy), crowned with creativity in all areas of activity are the goals and the most general essence of the pedagogy of culture. They are present in the three directions discussed in this article. In these directions, however, the autonomy of man is not absolute (complete) as man stands before God… or the vision… developed by the creators of a ‘better’ world.

\(^{68}\) Ibidem, 5.  
\(^{69}\) Ibidem, 5–6.
(wraz z sympatyzującymi z nimi religiami) tworzących je koncepcji. W artykule wyłaniam trzy główne kierunki jej rozwoju w Polsce: nawiązujący do filozofii niemieckiego idealizmu (Heglowskiego ducha obiektywnego) i neokantystów badeńskich; kierunek katolicki z jego filozofią realizmu umiarkowanego (tomizmu i neotomizmu); kierunek zakorzeniony w polskiej filozofii i kulturze o laickim i lewicowym charakterze. Artykuł prezentuje wykonaną przeze mnie klasyfikację wyłonionych kierunków rozwoju pedagogiki kultury; wydobywa zarówno ich odrębności, jak i specyfikę (slużają temu przedstawione koncepcje wybranych autorów). Jego naczelnym celem jest prezentacja panoramy kierunków rozwoju pedagogiki kultury w Polsce lat 1918–1939 i ich filozoficzno-pedagogicznych podstaw, łącznie charakterystycznych zarazem dla ówczesnej Europy środkowej.

Słowa kluczowe: pedagogika kultury, polska pedagogika w latach 1918-1939, filozofia wartości, pedagogika wartości

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