Frames of self-presentation in constructing persuasive messages: A study of Polish and American political discourse

Keywords: persuasion, frames, self-presentation, communication

Abstract: This paper is devoted to a study of self-presentation by a Polish politician and an American politician, Jarosław Kaczyński and Newton Gingrich. In the first part, the explanation of the concept of frames is presented. Frames and self-presentation theories are also implemented in analyzing speeches, and therefore they are discussed in this paper. The second part focuses upon illustrating how the concept of frames is exploited with reference to the concepts of persuasion and manipulation.

Introduction

Politicians use persuasion as a tool in their activities. The product they sell is themselves. A gifted politician is able to convince people to accept their opinions, beliefs and views. Politicians realize that the power of persuasion is enormous. Almost all of them use some types of persuasion techniques, with greater or smaller success. Cialdini [2001] believes that people make certain decisions automatically and certain behaviors are programmed. The process is generally very useful as in certain situations one needs to make up one’s mind very quickly, however sometimes, when we use the frames in an unsuitable situation, the strategy can turn against us. The process of making decisions automatically is called ‘taking a shortcut’. Generally, people are not able to think carefully about all decisions they make in life, that is why decisions like buying certain products, voting or doing someone a favor are usually made automatically, based on one’s previous experience and opinions. In the view of this paper, the most important heuristics are used to decide if someone is truthful or not. The opposite of heuristic thinking is controlled reaction, which is taken after carefully analyzing all available data. Master persuaders prefer heuristic thinking to controlled reactions as it makes it possible for them to cause certain behavior changes favorable to them.
The concept of frames

Relevant research is founded on a constructionist approach towards reality, where discourse is perceived “as a language act through which symbolic constructs are made real” [Reese, Gandy & Grant, 2001, p. 7]. The concept of frames was employed by Piaget in 1954. Then it was applied in psychiatry [Bateson, 1972], in the work of the sociologist Erving Goffman [1971] and in Minsky’s work on Artificial Intelligence [1975]. But proper frame analysis developed in the early 1980s. Then it was employed to examine political discourse as well as media discourse [Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford, 1986].

Frames are said to comprise sets of beliefs, images or symbols shared by people in a given society [http://onlineqda.hud.ac.uk/methodologies.php]. Each society organizes a limited amount of such interpretive schemes which are employed to make sense of the world [ibid.]. According to framing theory, one has a tendency to order experience by relating it to an already known pattern. Fritz Heider [1958] asserted that people identify reality as well as formulate expectations with regard to it by connecting momentary attitudes with pre-existing established patterns of behavior. Thus, new elements are connected to ones already known, serving as a point of reference for the individual [ibid.]. The role of frames as a means of attracting attention and selectively highlighting the importance of objects or events was indicated in studies dealing with media discourse, and ‘news making’ especially by Gaye Tuchman [1978].

Conversely, collective action research emphasizes the function of frames “as accenting devices that either underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable” [Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 137]. Collective action frames intend not only to identify a problem but also to attribute responsibility or causality [Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 200].

Furthermore, the prognostic function of frames was investigated, as it is considered that frames have the capacity to propose specific courses of action. It was assumed that frames have mobilizing potency as they initiate a call for action and also suggest a rationale for it [Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 202]. Frames are considered to be cognitive shortcuts that people employ to help fit in complex information [ibid.]. Frames facilitate interpreting complex phenomena putting them in coherent, understandable categories [ibid.]. When a phenomenon is labeled, the meaning is given to some features of what is perceived, while suppressing other features that seem to be inappropriate or counterintuitive [ibid.]. Therefore, frames provide meaning through selective simplification, by filtering people’s perceptions. They seem to significantly influence the intractability of communication by generating unharmonious interpretations of actions [Lewicki & Litterer, 1985, p. 300]. Frames are built upon underlying beliefs, values and experiences, and disputants frequently generate frames that differ considerably [Winter, 2008, p. 8]. Therefore, individuals are separated not only by differences of interests, beliefs, and values, but also by the way in which they recognize and comprehend the world at a conscious as well as pre-conscious level [Elliott, Gray & Lewicki, 2003].
Framing concerns both the formation of interpretive frames and their clear presentation to others [Tannen, 1990, p. 255]. Individuals may employ framing not only as a device to interpret events, but also to support strategic advantage [Kaufman & Smith, 1999, p. 167]. Entman [1993, p. 52] perceives the process of framing as a selection of some features of apparent reality and making them “more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”

Framing seems to be a helpful device for various purposes, e.g. for convincing a broader audience or offering preferentiality to specific outcomes. Many factors have an effect on how people frame a situation, which, sequentially, influences the direction of the talk [Elliott, Gray & Lewicki, 2003]. As a result, there are also numerous frames whose recurrence cannot be explained solely by descriptive fidelity or experimental credibility.

These mostly common frames can be organized by means of a taxonomy that makes a distinction between “structural schemes” and “generic frames” [Vreese, 2003, p. 27], where the focus is more on the ‘content’. The taxonomy recognizes the following frames: generic frames [ibid.], masterframes and metanarratives [Gamson, 1995, p. 220].

Frames are always rooted in cultural codes [Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 2; Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 204]. Conversely, it should not be disregarded that framing can be perceived as a constantly ongoing process, as questions such as when the framing activity will “occur and how it will be sustained” [Jenness, 2004, p. 159] imply taking into account these statements.

Snow et al. [1986] recognize four processes that frames can undergo, namely frame amplification, frame extension, frame transformation and frame bridging.

Minsky’s comprehension of frames

Marvin Minsky [1986, p. 355] perceived a frame to be “a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation.” It can be assumed that Minsky considered frames to be mental representations of our knowledge of the world. According to him, a frame is “a network of nodes and relations” [ibid.] organized at various levels; can be divided into fixed top levels as well as lower ones. Fixed levels are responsible for components of situations that are always true while “lower levels consist of numerous terminals or – slots that must be filled by specific instances of data” [ibid.]. These instances can otherwise be referred to as assignments and can constitute smaller sub-frames [ibid.]. Their task is to meet specific conditions given by terminals, and this is achieved through ‘markers’ [Bednarek, 2005, p. 689]. Minsky also states that frame terminals are filled up with assignments which seem to be default [Minsky, 1986, p. 356]. George Lakoff [1987, p. 117] states that Minsky’s model of frames involves propositional models but lacks “imaginative models – metonymic, metaphoric and image schematic.” Moreover, it has a single representation for each category [ibid.]. Lakoff [2004], in “Do not think of an elephant!”, suggests his view concerning frames. Discussing them, he offers four morals, namely:
Moral 1. Every word evokes a frame.
Moral 2. Words defined within a frame evoke the frame.
Moral 3. Negating a frame evokes the frame.
Moral 4. Evoking a frame reinforces that frame.

Goffman’s concept of frames

Frame analysis tends no longer to be perceived to be Erving Goffman’s frame analysis, and is often only loosely associated with the original formulation. Attention is given to aspects that seem prominent in frame analysis since Goffman, namely: management and organizational studies [cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979], social movement studies, as well as media studies [Iyengar, 1991]. Each of these areas concentrates on various aspects of the framing theory and investigates the matter with different methods. Goffman [1971, p. 10], in his initial definition, characterizes frames in the following way: “I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events [...] and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify.” Taking this point of view into account, it can be concluded that frames are perceived to be simple cognitive structures which facilitate perception as well as representation of reality. Moreover, frames are not consciously created but are subconsciously accepted in the process of communication. Goffman [1971, p. 21] states that cultures generate so-called ‘primary frameworks’, which suggest “what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful” [ibid.].

According to Goffman [1971, p. 22], each culture creates two sorts of primary frameworks, namely: natural frameworks, that are recognized to be ‘purely physical’ experiences which are understood to be due entirely, from start to finish, to “natural determinants,” [ibid.]; and social frameworks that include “the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being” [ibid.]. He also points out that people tend to key frames as well as re-key keyings for various causes, for instance, to reaffirm cultural knowledge concerning the world through rituals, facilitate reflection concerning various items, and to deceive – with deception divided into two categories, namely ‘fabrications’ that involve the process of cheating or being cheated; and ‘illusions’ as people can delude themselves. Goffman’s framing theory continues to offer new insights to successive generations of researchers.

Language and framing

Teun van Dijk [1977] categorizes frames as ‘discursive structures’. He states that language, discourse and social behavior occur because of “the cognitive processes by which people perceive, interpret, [organize as well as] represent their knowledge of the world, that is, the way people [create] a ‘social reality’” [Dijk, 1977, p. 99]. Van Dijk assumes that framing processes may happen at both the macrostructural and
superstructural levels, however the possible function of the latter seems dubious [ibid.]. He implies that if superstructural framing occurs, then it works independently of discursive structural framing [ibid.]. Van Dijk [1987, pp. 46–47] claims that discursive structures are responsible for:

(1) allowing the receiver of a language message to choose certain components for interpretation as well as to disregard others as not appropriate for the overall meaning of the message;

(2) enabling receivers to systematize components of messages hierarchically, and to underline those elements involving ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ deletion or selection;

(3) permitting receivers to simplify the meaning of the message; and

(4) enabling receivers to obtain a universal fact from the message conveyed.

The fourth task can be achieved because discursive structures comprise frames, or structures which describe the basic elements of a category of objects, concepts, or action-event sequences. To illustrate, van Dijk [1977, p. 146] proposes that the sequence I bought wood, stones and concrete; I laid foundations; I erected walls, I made a roof... may for example be subsumed under a proposition like ‘I built (a house)’ – or a house frame.

Discursive structural frame analysis compromises two main ideas which ought to be taken into account while creating an effective and workable discourse. First, the frame ought to be identified. It is done by identifying the most important components of the text as well as by bearing in mind the vantage point, or ‘point of view’, from which the elements are examined by the speaker [Dijk, 1987, p. 3]. The frame itself is considered to be the smallest shared component that includes all of the main elements [ibid.]. Secondly, one organizes the elements of the text as they are organized by the frame in reference to the four tasks of discursive structures [ibid.].

Having recognized the frame, the person conducting a discursive structural frame analysis on the given text could then initiate the following steps, namely map the text segments in terms of that frame. Discursive structural frame analysis, as suggested by van Dijk [ibid.], enables the analysis of the way that individuals create individual texts to accomplish a particular communication goal. Van Dijk implies that a subsequent framing process may be activated at the super-structural level, which is defined as a “schematic form that organises the global meaning of a text” [Dijk, 1987, pp. 108–109].

Superstructures are believed to “further organize the macrostructure of a text, by assigning sequences of macro propositions to schematic categories”, however they also “play a role in the formation of macrostructures themselves” by limiting – the application of the macro rules [Dijk, 1987, p. 128]. He explains that superstructures can be perceived as instances of typical frames or scripts that describe stereotypical knowledge of individuals that use the given language. He also argues that cultural frames can alter superstructures [Dijk, 1987, p. 131].
A case study

This section is a critical discourse analysis of the speeches of Jarosław Kaczyński and Newton Gingrich (see the link for full text). It aims at indicating how the concept of frames of self-presentation can be exploited.

Self-presentation frames are culturally pre-formed pieces used to construct ‘face’, in the sense of the self-image that speakers try to project to their audience – this is the foreground-conscious desire to present oneself to others in the best way possible.

This part can be called a critical discourse analysis sequel to Pamela Morgan’s [1997] analysis of the inaugural speech of Newton Gingrich upon his election as Speaker of the House of Representatives of the American Congress. She distinguished seven frames of self-presentation in his speech.

Frame 1: The Professor
Frame 2: Just Plain Folks
Frame 3: The Spokesman for Traditional American Values
Frame 4: The (Authoritarian) Leader
Frame 5: The Fighter
Frame 6: The Cooperator
Frame 7: The Visionary

Self-presentation frames are culturally pre-formed pieces used to construct ‘face’, in the sense of the self-image that speakers try to project to their hearers/listeners/audience. According to O’Driscoll, this is the foreground-conscious desire to present oneself to others in the best possible way.

The self-presentation frames used by politicians are necessarily widely shared in the general culture, in order to serve the social role and political functions of appealing to present and potential supporters, both as a ‘good’ prototypical American politician and as a ‘good’ individual.

In interviews and speeches, Gingrich often called himself a professor of history or an historian. In the early 1970s, he really taught for a few years in the history department of West Georgia College in Carrollton, Georgia, with an emphasis on futurism, and then transferred to the geography department. Later he taught a course on the American character and future, first at Kennesaw State College in Georgia and then at Reinhardt College, a private business college in Waleska, Georgia, after the Georgia Board of Regents’ ruling that “a public office holder could not teach at a public university such as Kennesaw” and after considerable criticism that the course was primarily ideologically political in intent.

Frame 1: The Professor

Pamela Morgan mentions linguistic mechanisms evoking Gingrich’s Frame 1: The Professor, such as lexical choice (direct reference, e.g., “intellectual,” “vague”; frame-evoking words, e.g., multisyllabic and/or latinate words) – references to classic books or authors and/or to modern analytic studies; more formal register (syntax, lexical choice), classroom lecturing style, extensive detail of content or citation that may
often be interpreted (by non-specialists) as violating the Maxim of Quantity (over-wording).

Although the use of frame-evoking multisyllabic or latinate words is a frequent feature of Frame I talk, which is often intended to impress others or to establish authority as well as to convey information and instruct, Gingrich does not use such words in this speech.¹

It is much more important for the leader of a self-labeled ‘ populist’ political movement to emphasize Frame 2, Just Plain Folks. However, because he is also claiming authority, and because his frequent use in interviews and statements of the self-label of ‘ professor’ indicates that it is important to him, he evokes Frame 1 in ways that are less likely to provoke the immediate criticism that he is ‘ talking over people’s heads.

Gingrich quoted from de Tocqueville, but as he admitted, the phrase had been read to him by Brian Lamb of C-SPAN. He said he had been reading Remini’s biography of Henry Clay which does not suggest that he had read it. The image of ‘ professor’ also fades somewhat when Gingrich mentions this: Steve Gunderson today gave me a copy of the ‘ Portable Abraham Lincoln.’ He suggested “there is much for me to learn about our party, but I would also say that it does not hurt to have a copy of the portable F.D.R.” Although Pamela Morgan writes that these words serve “to reinforce the Professor frame,” they might be doing the opposite.

Frame 2: Just Plain Folks

P. Morgan writes that by far the most common reference to this frame involves register, including colloquialisms – especially but not restricted to the American colloquial impersonal “you” – and other lexical, syntactic, and/or pronunciation markers of informality. For example, she continues, “in delivering the speech Gingrich often pronounced – let me as – lemme; other contractions were common: and at one point (316) the written version has isn’t,” but as delivered it was even more colloquial, as well as emphatic: “that ain’t enough.” (notice also – gimme).

She cites some more markers of the informal register supposed to be invoking Frame 2:

I am sorry, guys, it just did not quite work out (8) It is a little strange if you are from a dictatorship to explain you are called the whip but you do not really have a whip. (125–126)

So, leave on the first bell, not the second bell. Okay? (163–164)

There is still uncertainty as to whether Gingrich used those forms consciously so as to invoke Frame 2.

¹ In fact, that can be viewed as flouting the Gricean maxim of manner, or, as Fairclough [1985] calls it, overwording.
Frame 3: The Spokesman for Traditional American Values

P. Morgan was of the opinion that it was not necessary to spend much time on this frame, since as a major frame for all American political speeches it consists of several easily recognizable elements.

From the point of view of CDA exactly this frame is important, because Gingrich pays a lot of lip service to ‘family values’ by mentioning almost every member of his extended family, yet it is known that he pressed his first wife to sign divorce papers when she was recovering from cancer surgery.

In his inaugural speech Gingrich lavished praise on Marianne (cf. Wikipedia), his second wife, but one can learn that in an amazing act of hypocrisy he was dating Callista Bisek all during the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, even if he proclaimed family values and bitterly criticized the President for adultery.

Obviously incompatible with ‘family values’ was the ‘orphanage project’. Before becoming Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich suggested that unwed teenage mothers should be denied welfare: if they could not support their children, America should tell them, ‘We’ll help you with foster care, we’ll help you with orphanages, we’ll help you with adoption’ – moral consideration aside, the Treasury would save more continuing to provide the cash that might keep mother and child together.

Commenting on this, Hillary Clinton told a New York audience that the ‘idea of putting children in orphanages because their mothers couldn’t find jobs’ was ‘unbelievable and absurd’.

Let us see the relevant part of Gingrich’s speech:

“I have seldom been more shaken than I was after the election when I had breakfast with two members of the Black Caucus. One of them said to me, ‘Can you imagine what it is like to visit a first-grade class and realize that every fourth or fifth young boy in that class may be dead or in jail within 15 years? And they are your constituents and you are helpless to change it?’ For some reason, I do not know why, maybe because I visit a lot of schools, that got through. I mean, that personalized it. That made it real, not just statistics, but real people. Then I tried to explain part of my thoughts by talking about the need for alternatives to the bureaucracy, and we got into what I think frankly has been a pretty distorted and cheap debate over orphanages.”

The last paragraph shows that Gingrich ignored the criticisms. In what followed he used the red herring tactic:

“Let me say, first of all, my father, who is here today, was a foster child. He was adopted as a teenager. I am adopted. We have relatives who were adopted. We are not talking out of some vague impersonal Dickens ‘Bleak House’ middle-class intellectual model. We have lived the alternatives.”
Frame 4: The (Authoritarian) Leader

Clearly, one role of the Speaker of the House is to lead, so it is not surprising that Gingrich explicitly presents himself as a leader of his fellow Representatives:

> Our challenge should not be anything that is just legislative. We are supposed to, each one of us, be leaders. I think my challenge has to be to set as our goal. (317–318)

Gingrich’s view of leadership is authoritarian. From the beginning of the speech, he offers in close proximity both the Cooperator (Frame 6) stance that is a strongly traditional element of the ‘Speaker’s inaugural speech’ genre and the Authoritarian Leader position that seems to be his own.

Authority figure vs Cooperator

The clash between the two is clear from these words uttered by Gingrich:

> I will listen to each of you. I will try to work with each of you. I will put in long hours; and I will guarantee that I will listen to you first. I will let you get it all out before I give you my version. (341–343)

Gingrich’s extensive use of the first person singular pronouns (‘my’ and especially ‘I’) is also very noticeable in comparison with the inaugural speeches of the other Speakers, and gives the speech a strong sense of egocentricity.

Frame 5: The Fighter and Frame 6: The Cooperator

In specifically political terms, references to ‘bipartisanship’, in its usual political-talk reading of ‘cooperation’, are built into the genre of the ‘Speaker’s inaugural’ speech, just as they are into the presidential State of the Union address, and for much the same reason: they are delivered by a government official who is supposed to represent the whole of the American people, not just one political party. In practice, of course, in the American two-party electoral system, this Frame 6 Cooperation between political parties that is conventionally represented by the term ‘bipartisan’ is set within an underlying adversarial framework. Gingrich’s speech is no exception.

Gingrich opposes the “welfare state” to the “opportunity society,” as he has long done elsewhere, in a rather lengthy passage (lines 209–304) that includes the explicit statement of the intent:

> We must replace the welfare state with an opportunity society. (251, also 209–210)

Frame 6, The Cooperator, can also be seen as representative of the Traditional American Values (Frame 3). As Benjamin Franklin put it at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, “We must indeed all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.”
After repeating a number of times that he would conduct ‘by-partisan’ policies and referring three times to ‘my friends in the Democratic Party’, Gingrich slips to: “I would say to my friends on the left” (297–300).

This is a very partisan equating of all Democrats with ‘leftist’ politics and a much more damaging label than the usual Republican collocation of ‘liberal Democrat’.

‘Leftist’ is a very negative term for most Americans of both parties; Pamela Morgan finds little evidence for this frame but mentions it, having in mind his interest in futurology.

Example:

This ought to be the goal that we go home and we tell people we believe in: that there will be a Monday morning when for the entire weekend not a single child was killed anywhere in America; that there will be a Monday morning when every child in the country went to a school that they and their parents thought prepared them as citizens and prepared them to compete in the world market; that there will be a Monday morning where it was easy to find a job or create a job, and your own Government did not punish you if you tried. (319–324)

Another possible example:

I want to read just a part of the Contract With America. I don't mean this as a partisan act, but rather to remind all of us what we are about to go through and why. Those of us who ended up in the majority stood on these steps and signed a contract, and here is part of what it says:

On the first day of the 104th Congress the new Republican majority will immediately pass the following reforms aimed at restoring the faith and trust of the American people in their government: First, require all laws that apply to the rest of the country also to apply equally to the Congress. Second, select a major, independent auditing firm to conduct a comprehensive audit of the Congress for waste, fraud or abuse. Third, cut the number of House committees and cut committee staffs by a third. Fourth, limit the terms of all committee chairs. Fifth, ban the casting of proxy votes in committees. Sixth, require committee meetings to be open to the public. Seven, require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a tax increase. Eight, guarantee an honest accounting of our federal budget by implementing zero baseline budgeting.

The above might suggest that Gingrich wanted to imply that he was a person of integrity. Yet, he had been involved in a tax fraud (www.brooknews.com). It was also reported that he had received donations from businesses. Nicols (articles.lastime.com) had sent him a letter in which he asked Gingrich to show his appreciation of J.C. Nicols Co. financial support and do something about the asbestos regulations.

Whether Pamela Morgan was trying to be politically correct or not, she just mentions frame clashes and the fact that Gingrich's speech was much longer than those of his predecessors without trying to find out why, which is exactly what CDA does.

The self-presentation frames used by politicians are necessarily widely shared in general culture, in order to serve the social role and political functions of appealing
to present and potential supporters, both as a ‘good’ prototypical Polish politician and
as a ‘good’ individual.

The reference to the aforementioned frames can be visible in some political texts
that can be found in Poland and they aim at indicating potential ways of exploiting
frames in relation to persuasion and manipulation.

Jarosław Kaczyński prefaces his speech with the statement that he does not want
to talk about trivialities.

\[
\text{Nie chcę w tym wystąpieniu zajmować się tym wszystkim, co jest banalem.}
\]

(I do not want to deal with all that is banal in my speech.)

As it turns out, he did not intend to discuss such serious problems as the economic
crisis, unemployment, corruption, crime, and inadequacies of the health service and
the system of education. He begins with equating the criticism of his party and of his
own policy as the leader of that party with an attack on the greater part of the nation.

[M]amy w Polsce do czynienia z potężnym atakiem, nie na jakąś partię politycz-
ną. Oczywiście ten atak jest, ale jego sens jest dużo głębszy. To jest atak na wielką
część społeczeństwa.

(In Poland we have to deal with a powerful attack, not to a political party.
Of course, this attack is present, but its meaning is much deeper. This is an attack
on a large part of the population.)

He invokes the frame which can be called, with some simplification, Equality or
Equal Rights. The purpose behind this is to imply that if his party is attacked (criti-
cized), and many supporters of his party live in the rural area and are very religious,
then it is farmers and religious people who are being attacked.

To jest atak na ludzi, którym się w gruncie rzeczy odmawia praw obywatelskich.
Ciągłe odwoływanie się do tego, że na jakąś partię, moją partię, głosują ludzie
ze wsi. Czy ludzie ze wsi nie mają praw obywatelskich? Ciągłe pokazywane jest, że
elektorat naszej partii bardziej praktykuje niż elektorat partii innych. Czy ludzie
wierzący w naszym kraju mają być pozbawieni praw obywatelskich?

(This is an attack that is to people who, in fact, have been denied civil rights. Con-
stant reference is made to the fact that it is a party, my party, that people from the
countryside vote for. Do not people in the village have civil rights?)

Still it is shown that the electorate of our party has more practice than voters of
other parties

Do people who believe in our country to be disenfranchised? He mentions the
fact that Radio Maryja is constantly accused of anti-Semitism, and tries to exploit
the concept of truth, pretending that those accusations have not been supported by
evidence, and are, therefore, false.

(I once was in the Deputies’ Ethics Committee. There it was often that they [...] suggested proposals to punish those who attacked the Radio Maria. And every time think about it, it was an attack on anti-Semitism. I repeatedly suggested that tapes should have been shown, that tapes that show anti-Semitism. Somehow I have never said that tapes were not shown. Just because they do not exist.)

Then he tries to present Radio Maria as the voice of the nation.

Ja apeluję do państwa, którzy w tej chwili podnoszą tę sprawę, te okrzyki o Radiu Maryja, żeby może przez kilka dni posłuchali. Możecie się radykalnie nie zgadzać z narodową postawą, wiem, że pojęcie „naród” jest dla was trudne, ale proszę państwa, tam nic poza tym nie ma.

(I appeal to all who are to discuss this matter, these words concerning our Radio Mary, you can listen to it for a few days. You can disagree radically with the national attitude, I know that the concept of “nation” is difficult for you, but ladies and gentlemen, there is nothing else there apart from that.)

When talking about equal rights, he never mentions women, the social group that constitutes at least half of Poland’s population and whose rights (e.g. the right to abortion) his party refuses to recognize. Jarosław Kaczyński resorts to insinuation to present the plane catastrophe near Smolensk as conspiracy:

Czy ten podział musi prowadzić do takich napięć, które kończą się katastrofami, kończą się wystawianiem prezydenta na niebezpieczny lot zamiast wspólnego lotu, wspólnego wystąpienia w tej sprawie prezydenta i premiera, czy tym mordem?

(Must this division lead to the tensions that end in a disaster, and end with the issuance of President of the hazardous flight instead of the joint flight, a common occurrence in the case of the President and the Prime Minister, or the murder?)

Kaczyński wants to be perceived as a redeemer of the country:

Nadziei niewiele, ale mimo wszystko próbujemy jednak zmienić Polskę.

(There is little hope, but despite the fact, let’s try to change Poland.)

The whole speech can be said to rest on the dichotomy Good Guys vs. Bad Guys, where those who are critics of his party are Bad Guys. Although it is not so evident from the speech under analysis, overwording is a characteristic feature of Kaczyński’s discourse.
Conclusion

The political speech studied in this paper presented persuasive techniques used by Jarosław Kaczyński and Newton Gingrich to create a positive image and convince people to their points of view. Moreover, the speech showed that the frames evoked seem to present universal values, since they need support from both female and male voters. It has been found out that they did not eschew manipulative tactics. Secondly, it should be emphasized that the interpretations concerning these particular speeches cannot be generalized onto the respective political climates. Thus, certain limitations should also be taken into account while analyzing the some excerpts from the political discourse. It should also be taken into account that these two samples cannot be considered as representative units to all politicians within given cultures. Yet, it needs to be realized that this analysis can be perceived to be an attempt to show how frames can be exploited to analyze verbal communication.

REFERENCES


**APPENDIX**
