A Critique of the Moral Optimism of Sam Harris. Polemical Comments

Konrad Szocik
Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania w Rzeszowie

Abstract
Sam Harris, one of the new atheists, believes that science is an authority in moral issues. Science can help us understand what our moral duties are, and what is right and wrong in a moral sense. However, the cultural and historical diversity of human behaviours, especially the history of wars and conflicts, suggests that it is difficult to show one, common and universal kind of morality. Here we show that Harris’s moral theory is a particular project which could not be “scientifically” justifiable.

Słowa kluczowe: nowy ateizm, moralność, etyka, wartości, konwencjonalizm
Keywords: New Atheism, Morality, Ethics, Values, Conventionalism

Science, especially biology, on the one hand offers important materials for philosophical reflections about morality, ethics and religion. On the other hand, it provides new tools for their study (neurobiology, evolution). Sam Harris, one of the new atheists, believes that science explains all moral topics. However, scientific research referring to morality may be interpreted ambiguously. Look at two cases. In the 17 October 2014 issue of *Science*, Sarah F. Brosnan and Frans B.M. de Waal showed that “the sense of fairness did not evolve for the sake of fairness per se but in order to reap the benefits of continued cooperation.”¹ In the next issue of the journal (24 October 2014), we can read that “in the course of evolution, some animals have overcome the fear and stress they feel when encountering humans or unfamiliar members of their own species and become less aggressive.”² In this article I show that the moral optimism characteristic

of Harris is not justifiable, and science cannot offer an unequivocal answer to moral questions. However, while this question of the is/ought distinction is well-known in the history of philosophy, it is important to underline that it continues to apply today, independently of scientific progress (in the case of Harris, especially of neurological research). This paper is a kind of polemical response to Harris’s moral theory. I do not refer to Harris’s critique of religion, which does not include the recent research in the cognitive science of religion, especially Scott Atran’s research on the complex impact of religious beliefs on both prosocial cooperation (“ingroup trust”) and conflict situations. Harris’s approach assumes an ideal situation of simple consequentialism between religious beliefs and practical effects. I think that, following the response of Atran, we can deem Harris’s critique of religion to be debunked.

According to Sam Harris, science can explain and show our moral duties. It can guarantee achievement of the best possible life. Harris thinks that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, like in physics or biology. He argues that universal morality can be defined with “reference to the negative end of the spectrum of conscious experience,” which he calls “the worst possible misery for everyone.”

Harris writes:

As it is possible for individuals and groups to be wrong about how best to maintain their physical health, it is possible for them to be wrong about how to maximize their personal and social well-being.

This is a good example not of the impact of science, but of logical erroneous inference. Nature and knowledge about one element does not provide knowledge about another one.

Harris calls his moral theory “moral realism” (“moral claims can really be true or false”) and “consequentialism” (“the rightness of an act depends on how it impacts the well-being of conscious creatures”). Religious morality and the religious kind of reasoning are rather connected with deontologism than consequentialism. Despite his realism, he sees an incompatibility between particular notions of happiness. He quotes Patricia Churchland:

No one has the slightest idea how to compare the mild headache of five million against the broken legs of two, or the needs of one’s own two children against the needs of a hundred unrelated brain-damaged children in Serbia.

---

5 Ibidem, p. 62.
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem.
9 S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., p. 68.
It seems better, in this context, to define moral values in terms of other moral obligations, not in terms of facts about the world. Harris’s criterion of morality, especially “the problem of demarcation between the moral and non-moral spheres,”\(^\text{11}\) is the concept of welfare.\(^\text{12}\) For him, nature is not morally neutral, and science can discover moral good and evil.

Harris dogmatically defends moral realism (moral truth)\(^\text{13}\) independently of the philosophical deconstruction made by Immanuel Kant.\(^\text{14}\) Kant showed that basic philosophical questions (the existence of God or of free will) may be the same – true and false – and we cannot justify any of them.\(^\text{15}\) We can assume their truth, but that is a regulative, not constitutive idea. In Europe, before Kant’s critique of metaphysics, came the collapse of the Church monopoly. This collapse abolished the homogeneity of the scientific kind of interpretation of the world and initiated many kinds of philosophical and scientific explanations.\(^\text{16}\) The main question is, referring to rejection of dogmatism, the conviction of the self-supporting morality. I think that, philosophically speaking, it is impossible to justify this kind of morality.\(^\text{17}\) We are able to accept the sceptical Kantian paradigm in regard to metaphysical and epistemological issues, but much less to apply the same scepticism to questions of morality and values. Similarly, we can say about moral scepticism or neutralism:

> Morality ceases to have any definite content, and there can be no meaningful distinction between correct and mistaken use of moral predicates, as long as they are sincerely used. Any type of action or a state of affairs with any set of objective features can become morally relevant through the performative process of endorsement.\(^\text{18}\)

Harris’s moral theory is based on the assumption that desire of happiness and welfare is common and universal and should be the basis for morality. I think that this noble project is the result of good intentions and is one of the various moral theories, especially incompatible with history of wars and conflicts.

Harris represents the conviction, typical of both Christianity and the Enlightenment, of the universal nature of morality. Possible universal features connected with our psycho-physical groundwork, especially concepts of suffering and happiness, cannot justify objective morality. We cannot accept these human states as an ethical basis, as Harris would,\(^\text{19}\) because we can refer to other values (life, freedom) for which it is sometimes necessary to suffer. Happiness and suffering are too individual

---


\(^{12}\) Harris presents some kind of utilitarian perspective which is against hedonic tradition.

\(^{13}\) S. Harris, *The Moral Landscape....*, p. 62.

\(^{14}\) *Ibidem*.

\(^{15}\) However, Kant may be interpreted as a moral realist, I mean by this his scepticism referring to true knowledge about external reality.


\(^{19}\) S. Harris, *The End of Faith....*, p. 185.
and not objectively measurable enough to be able to serve as the basis for objective morality. The religious alternative is offered by William Lane Craig\textsuperscript{20} or Kerry Walters, who claim that without God any basis for morality vanishes.\textsuperscript{21} We need some arbitrary idea or phenomenon, secular or religious, to create so-called objective morality (rather belief about morality than morality itself). A good example is Atran’s study of the morally inspiring role played by “sacred values.”\textsuperscript{22}

Why should we identify morality with welfare, virtues and pleasure?\textsuperscript{23} We can say that morality should be referred to other aims, and a unique criterion could be only our conscience. In this approach, to do something morally means to be consistent with own conscience. Harris believes that every man should be good to others. Consider the behaviours of chimpanzees, which often use lethal aggression to achieve particular aims, and such behaviour has an adaptive nature.\textsuperscript{24} Look too at the research of Atran, who showed that “people making judgments about whether to oppose or to support war use the logic of deontology rather than the logic of instrumental rationality.”\textsuperscript{25} Atran points to the compatibility between “ingroup altruism” and “intergroup violence.”\textsuperscript{26} In this context, Harris’s belief that moral norms are connected with facts seems incompatible with the complexity of human perspective, which includes not only happiness and suffering but also ideas, ambitions and other nonmaterial, “sacred” values.

Morality refers to individual conscience and depends on the emotional state shaped by personality, nature, tendencies, circumstances, and conditions. We can violate others’ moral norms (moral convictions), but if our action is compatible with our morality and incompatible with ethics, we violate only ethics, not our morality. In the public sphere, a “common” base is conventional ethics, which usually cannot be congruent with all individual moralities. Ethics in some sense is based on some kind of interpretation of morality, but is subordinated to some group interests, not to individual conscience. We could prefer, in the same way, to destroy the life and welfare of another or take satisfaction from cruelty, which was an important part of the European culture in the context of public executions and of the mistreatment of children, servants, patients or prisoners, and the cruel nature of punishments.\textsuperscript{27}

We can evaluate human behaviours by referring to particular ethical systems, such as the Bible, the state constitution, the penal code, the Universal Declaration of Hu-


\textsuperscript{22} S. Atran, J. Ginges, Religious and Sacred Imperatives...

\textsuperscript{23} S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., p. 68.


\textsuperscript{26} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{27} F. Nietzsche, Z genealogii moralności [The Genealogy of Morals], transl. G. Sowinski, Kraków 1997, pp. 72–73.
man Rights or the code of Hammurabi. We cannot say which human behaviour is good or bad itself in a moral sense. We may compare some behaviours and actions and refer them to particular ethical standards. We can claim that it would be better if people were good and compassionate to others. Harris mistakenly compares the scientific search for morality with medicine, biology or physics. These disciplines seek to describe some parts of the world and to show facts. Morality says what ought to be on the basis of various, often mutually contradictory human actions. That is difficult to derive moral norms from observed facts. If we derive some norms we create a particular ethical system useful for some aims, but we do not create and do not uncover universal moral norms that are obligatory for all people.

Morality is a phenomenon compatible with the private conscience, which theoretically refers to the whole human species, at least as a philosophical postulate. Morality may exist without any ethical systems, as believed, for instance, by Pierre Abelard: ethics has social and political functions, and should concern one universal morality which is the basis for all ethical norms. Harris does not distinguish between morality and ethics. Something moral theoretically should be always good or bad, and something ethical has a specific nature. This distinction is significant in the discussion on religion, which to today is considered one of the basic sources of morality. Harris is not right that people share a similar “ethical insight.” We have many various ethical systems, also contradictory. In the American public ethics, the death penalty is accepted, but not in the European public ethics. Ethics is a kind of aesthetics of public life, which specifies what does and what does not correspond with a particular imagination of the public order. Ethics is relative, and depends on particular interests and aims. We can call this social and political utility of ethics an “aesthetic” activity which serves to eliminate all actually phenomena or states of affairs that are “ugly” for some society. Morality may be understood as universal and common to all mankind, independently of the dominant “aesthetic” kind of ethics which serves to organise society.

I think that we cannot justify the common nature of values, despite their social utility. We can postulate the leading importance of values of life or freedom, but this approach may be equally justifiable as the primacy of power, as underlined by Friedrich Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals. Since 1948, we have based Western civilisation on the concept of human rights, but three years earlier the US army used nuclear bombs against other people. This example shows the nature of ethics which is subordinated to some aims and interests. It is not important, according to Harris, whether an attitude has a religious or irreligious motivation. The background is a person’s point of view, psychophysical condition and political, social, psychological or economical aims, for which one may sometimes use the nuclear bomb, but sometimes may be merciful and compassionate. We can say that the Holocaust was

---


30 S. Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation..., p. 14, 16; S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., p. 56.

31 S. Harris, The End of Faith..., p. 45.
ethical within Nazi ethics, just as the use of nuclear bombs was ethical in American war ethics and the burning of heretics was ethical in the ethics of the Church, which wanted to defend Church order, that is some kind of public aesthetics. We usually evaluate these three acts as morally wrong, and probably we refer to some kind of intuitive, natural morality which is not universal for all people – or at least was not universal for the Nazis, for Americans when they used nuclear bombs and for Church figures who persecuted others for their beliefs. So-called right moral beliefs are not common for all people who decide to make so-called morally wrong acts.

Harris believes that the basic human obligation is to avoid the worst misery for others.\(^{32}\) I prefer the approach of Craig, who underlines that the idea of authority is a unique and necessary base for the concepts of obligation and prohibition.\(^{33}\) For Harris, human happiness is the main criterion of morality. We can evaluate the moral nature of actions regarding the happiness of their agents. We could therefore justify actions forbidden by public law because they have caused the happiness of their agents. In judicial practice, accepted as morally good are the same behaviours which are criticised as morally wrong if they are made by persons outside the law.

Perhaps we should admit that morality understood as universal human tendencies evaluated as good or bad does not exist? Maybe we are morally neutral, just as nature is neutral? Are various concepts of religious ethics, similarly to state, professional or other types of ethics, forms of aesthetic of our public life? We want to define what is beautiful and what is ugly in ethical terms. For various societies in various times, different behaviours were and continue to be beautiful and ugly. Our contemporary moral imagination may be only a temporal and historical form characteristic of the Western civilisation developed after the Second World War. Perhaps in future we will return to other moral and ethical concepts in which not the idea of freedom or equality, but other ideas, opposed to them, will be the new basis for “objective” morality. How can we conclude what kind of human behaviour should be exemplary if we can observe in the history of humanity various forms of behaviours, from charity to mass murders and even the Holocaust, made several dozen years ago in Western civilisation which, formally, draws “inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.”\(^{34}\)

Only society or political authority decides, referring to its interests and aims, what kinds of behaviours may provide to achieve these aims (these actions are then morally good) and what behaviours preclude them (they are considered as morally bad).

For Harris, morality is part of scientific disciplines.\(^{35}\) Science is unable to say anything about human morality, as Harris would like.\(^{36}\) If science is about facts and

\(^{32}\) Sam Harris vs William Lane Craig – The God Debate II, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nebLvSnS-ne 38:00 [accessed: 08.06.2014].

\(^{33}\) Ibidem, 56:00 [accessed: 19.06.2014].


\(^{35}\) S. Harris, The Moral Landscape..., p. 2.

\(^{36}\) Ibidem, p. 25.
not about norms (in accordance with Hume’s is/ought distinction), how could we extract any moral and ethical norms from these observed facts? Science may show what kinds of behaviours in chemical, medical, psychological or cultural contexts may be used for human life, but these explanations will not say anything about moral norms. If the same behaviour were harmful for others, we would say that it is not ethical, but we do not have any basis to say that it is not moral, especially if this behaviour is a source of happiness for its agent and is compatible with its conscience. Knowledge about human welfare does not create moral norms. We know today as well as several thousand years ago that man wants happiness and wants to avoid suffering. Independently of this knowledge, mankind will realise its aims: social, economic, political or psychological and, depending on actual interests, may protect or destroy the life of others. The history of mankind is a good example of this conventional and historical nature of moral norms. The state of welfare and happiness understood psychologically and physically does not imply moral obligations. What should we do if happiness of one requires suffering of other? Today in the European Union the value of life is the highest and the most important value, but this is absolutely not the case in the USA, where in some states the death penalty is accepted. In this case, a more important value than life is the idea of public order, justice or revenge. Similarly, in cases of self-defence we can kill the attacker, deciding that our life and happiness, “welfare,” is more important than his welfare. The attacker probably thinks the same. Society decides that we have rights to freedom and property and the right to life. This is not obvious intrinsically, and in the “state of nature,” like in the world of animals, the right to life is contractual and the property of the one who is stronger, faster crafter.

Harris claims that the correlation between brain states and real facts enables an indication of false theories.\(^37\) Brain states correlated with feelings of goodness, welfare or benefits may be caused by different factors. One person is happy as an atheist, and another as a theist. The state of happiness and subjective welfare has various causes for different people. Moral norms and models were developed by particular groups in certain conditions, not by mankind. We cannot compare, as Harris would suggest, morality with logics or medicine, because morality refers to a particular idea and feeling of welfare and happiness and does not have an objective background to give universal criteria and justifications.

We can say, following Nietzsche, that the law itself does not exist. The law must be arbitrarily enacted, and we cannot acknowledge some kinds of behaviours and actions as morally wrong themselves, because life is also expressed by aggressiveness and brutality. In the context of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, the law is artificial and the unnatural limit of the will of power and life.\(^38\) In Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s point of view, the notion of truth expresses and realises the power.\(^39\)

---

\(^37\) *Ibidem*, pp. 187–188.

\(^38\) F. Nietzsche, *op.cit.*, p. 82.

Harris repeats the view of the philosophers of the French enlightenment, for whom human happiness and suffering were the basis of morality. One’s happiness may involve suffering of others, and these categories depend on the particular approach. In Nietzsche’s deconstruction of morality, the instinct for compassion is needed for weak and helpless people, who subjugated morality and made it useful for their awkwardness. Perhaps the so-called morally good man is really a bad man, and vice versa? Why can we not accept as morally good some values and behaviours which we interpret as bad? Maybe these bad human beings express the real or correct form of humanity? According to Nietzsche, true morality was shaped by the aristocracy, whose actions were identified with good. This aristocratic group was not limited by moral norms, but they created norms. However, the morality of the weak thus destroys the morality of the strong. Morality expresses the human mind and nature, and may not be understood as a finished set of norms which must be accepted a priori. If we create norms and choose kinds of actions that are the best for us, we do not have a basis to think about the universal morality of mankind.

I think that we cannot give a basis to so-called universal, common and objective morality. These attempts, secular as well as religious, express particular points of view, actual aims and interests of individuals or groups. Science, which is a new hope for Harris’s idea of universal morality, also belongs to this kind of particular explanation. Knowledge about brains does not give advice for moral theory because various people feel the same good or bad feelings under different stimuli. This difficulty of scientific explanation of morality is, in some sense, similar to the question of qualia in cognitive science. We can know everything about brain function and the neuronal correlates of, for instance, our sensations of colours, but still we do not know how and why the same subjective conscious experiences appear when we see the same kind of objects. It is worth recalling Thomas Nagel’s maxim about qualia: “an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism.” Regarding morality, perhaps we can do neuroimaging and register the functioning of the nervous system, but we could probably not derive from this knowledge about neuronal facts any normative claims and knowledge about welfare in a moral sense.

We should also differentiate explanation from justification. Harris speaks about explanation. His descriptive explanation does not give a basis for justification of his moral postulates. We can create some kinds of ethics, but regarding morality we have an irremovable difficulty in defining what kinds of behaviours and actions are standard and obligatory for man. Maybe every kind of behaviour is natural and “moral” if we are part of nature, and every one of our behaviours expresses and realises our natural possibilities and potential. I think that this topic is some kind of Kantian antinomy. Maybe we cannot justify philosophically, similarly as in metaphysical and epistemological questions, good and evil, and perhaps Haidt and Bjorklund are right.

---

42 *Ibidem*, p. 35.
to say, “If you are able to honestly examine the moral arguments in favor of slavery and genocide, then you are likely to be either a psychopath or a philosopher.”

References


---

44 A. G. Zavaliy, Saving Morality..., p. 49.