The Aegean Islands in the Politics of the Attalid Dynasty

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Abstract: The article discusses the contacts between the kings of Pergamon and the Greek states of the Aegean Islands. The problem should be considered both in the context of the Attalids’ situation in Asia Minor and their policy in the Aegean as well as in the broader context of their policy concerning Greek poleis. Philhellenism, euergetism, and cultural patronage became an important part of the dynasty’s propaganda, and in the case of the Aegean Islands Delos became the centre of such activities. An important aspect of the Attalids’ political activity was war, and their participation in conflicts in the Aegean world and continental Greece was very active. This activity had to awaken the Attalids’ interest in the Aegean Islands both for strategic reasons and as a place for recruiting mercenaries for their army and navy. Therefore, we cannot explain all the activities undertaken by the kings of Pergamon in the Aegean Sea only in terms of propaganda and building their image. Attalos I entered the stage of great politics, exceeding the local problems of Asia Minor. He managed to mark his presence in the Aegean and win bases on the islands which could work as footholds for further political activity in the Greek and Macedonian world.

Key words: Attalids, Aegean Sea, Aegean Islands.

The Aegean Sea region was the heart of the Hellenistic world. This was where the interests of powerful states focused; the Greek cities located there were a reservoir of personnel and a military supply base. As a result, the region became the object of rivalry among all the prominent states at the time, and Hellenistic kings attached so much importance to emphasising their presence in this area. The world of the island poleis played a substantial role in these political games. The Aegean Islands became the focus of interest of the most powerful states in the world at the time and an important arena where their interests clashed. Almost the entire third century was dominated by the rivalry between the Lagids and the Antigonids, but other states were also active in the area, including the Kingdom of Pergamon under Attalid rule.

The Attalids slowly built their influence in the western part of Asia Minor; they also gradually freed themselves from Seleucid rule, under which Pergamon had found itself after the Battle of Koroupedion in 281. Philetairos gained considerable independence, but he remained in the position of a dynast, subordinate to Antiochos I, as reflected,
for example, in the iconography of the coins he issued. Philetairos’ territorial ambitions were limited to the valley of the Kaikos River. Fundamental changes were only introduced by his successor, Eumenes I, and the turning point came with the reign of the next ruler, Attalos I. The former started the territorial expansion, annexing the rest of the Kaikos Valley to his state and, importantly, his influence reached the shores of the Aegean Sea, where he conquered the Elaïtic Bay with the port of Elaia. The period of his reign also marked the beginning of a conflict with the Seleucids, which was inevitable when the Attalid ambitions exceeded being a subordinate dynasty. Eumenes I, similarly to his predecessor, was very cautious in his dealings with the most powerful dynasty in Asia Minor. Even after his victory over Antiochos II in a battle near Ephesus ca. 261, he did not assume a royal title. This step was taken later by his successor, Attalos I, in the wake of a successful campaign against the Galatians near the Kaikos source and in a different geopolitical situation (a “fratricidal war” in the Seleucid state).

In the 220s, internal conflicts in the Seleucid state and Ptolemaic successes during the Third Syrian War led to an almost complete collapse of the Seleucid rule in Asia Minor, and the most important beneficiary of these events was Attalos I. Despite, or perhaps because of this, the Seleucids remained the main rival and threat to the kings of Pergamon. Heavy fighting against Achaesus, representing the authority of the kings of Syria in Asia Minor, brought Attalos a loss of the majority of his acquisitions, and even later Antiochos III’s ambition was to rebuild the state within the boundaries set by the dynasty founder, which meant that, regardless of tactical agreements, a conflict between the two monarchies was inevitable. The rivalry against the Seleucids was undoubtedly the main problem of the foreign policy of the kings of Pergamon until 188 and significantly impacted their activities in other regions.

The contacts of the rulers of Pergamon with the Greek communities from the Aegean Islands should be considered in the context of the events which were the most vital for the dynasty’s interests, taking place in Asia Minor, as well as their political activity in the Aegean, and in the broader context of the policy concerning the Greek poleis. What is interesting and characteristic is that, from the very beginning of their history, the Attalids showed an understanding for building close, friendly relations with the Greek poleis, not

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1 The obverse showed an image of Seleukos I, and the reverse Athena, the protector of Pergamon: Newell 1936, 1–34; Westermark 1961, 20–21. All dates are BC. This paper was completed thanks to support from the Polish National Science Centre (grant: UMO-2012/07/B/HS3/03455).

2 According to Strabo’s account (13.1.67; 3.5), the Elaïtic Bay with its port was in Pergamon’s sphere of influence from a very early stage of the dynasty’s history. Epigraphic sources, however, indicate differently, at least in the times when Antiochos I occupied the Seleucid throne (cf. OGIS 335). Therefore, it was most likely Eumenes I, not Philetairos, who seized power over the city – cf. Magie 1950, II: 734, note 18; Allen 1983, 25–26 (who connects the capturing of Elaia with taking control over nearby Pitane) contra Grainger 2010, 118.

3 However, coins with Philetairos’ portrait – rather than Seleukos’, as before – probably issued soon after this victorious battle do attest to Eumens emphasising his independence from the Seleucids. The inscription concerning Eumenes I’s agreement with the revolting mercenaries from Philetaireia and Attaleia has a similar tone. For this topic, see Westermark 1961, 12–13; Allen 1983, 23–25; Kosmetatou 2001, 111–114.


5 For the situation in Asia Minor in this period and the rivalry between the Attalids and the Seleucids, see Ma 2000, 43–73; Chrubasik 2013, 83–96.
only those in their immediate neighbourhood. The great deal of attention paid to relations with the Greek poleis was in fact the most characteristic feature of the politics of the first Attalids. Both Philetairos and Eumenes I based their political activity aimed at strengthening their power in Pergamon and expanding their sphere of influence in western Asia Minor on cooperation with Greek cities. Philhellenism, euergetism, and cultural patronage also remained an important part of propaganda and political strategy in later years. The most important tool they used to this end was acts of euergetism. The kings of Pergamon constructed buildings in the cities and sanctuaries of continental Greece, offered valuable gifts, and readily supported the poleis with money and grain. Already Philetairos generously supported poleis outside of Asia Minor: Kyzikos, the largest city of the Propontis, Pitane in Aeolis, or Mysian Aigai, but also Boeotian Thespies and Oropos or Kyme.6 This policy was continued by Eumenes I and the successive rulers. The Attalids also willingly acted as benefactors of sanctuaries, including the Delphi temple, so important to all Greeks, and one of their successes was gaining the status of Delphi’s proxenoi.7 This was an excellent instrument, which allowed them to maintain their ties to Greece and to build the prestige of the new dynasty. As a result, the Attalids managed to promote their image as peaceful rulers, focused on matters of culture, art, and economy.

This element of the Attalids’ politics, usually highlighted in academic studies, cannot obscure the fact that war was at least an equally important aspect of their politics. The image of the kings of Pergamon would not be complete without taking their military activities into consideration. War, as in the case of other Hellenistic monarchs, was an indispensable part of the existence of the kings of Pergamon.8 The goals and character of the wars fought by the Attalids were various, and changed depending on the position they occupied on the international arena. After the Treaty of Apamea in 188, which brought an end to Rome’s war against Antiochos III, Pergamon became a regional power and the strongest state in Asia Minor. Apart from defensive conflicts, such as the fights against the Galatians or the battles fought against various members of the Seleucid dynasty (e.g. Achaeus or Antiochos III), the Attalids waged a number of aggressive wars, both local (against smaller centres, such as Selge, and stronger states of the region like Bithynia and Pontus) and outside their direct sphere of interest. Attalos II conducted military operations in Thrace.9 He was also involved in dynastic disputes within the Seleucid monarchy, where he helped the usurper Alexander Balas to seize the throne.10 After 188, the kings of Pergamon found strong footholds on the coast of the Thracian Chersonesus.11 Finally, the Attalids’ military activity reached continental Greece, where, among others, they supported the Romans in several wars. Generally, it has been noted

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7 Holleaux 1938, 9–16.

8 Ma (2013, 55) calculated that in 277–133 the Attalids took part in 24 wars. During this period, military campaigns took up approximately 50 years, in which the kings usually participated personally.

9 SEG 49, 875; see Sayar 1999, 245–251.

10 Diod. 31.32a; Iust. 35.1.6–7.

that the Attalids’ involvement in wars overseas was surprisingly intense. The Attalid units supported the Aetolians and the Romans during the First Macedonian War. In 200, Pergamon gave its support to the Athenians against Philip II, and later Pergamon’s soldiers and vessels actively opposed Philip during the Second Macedonian War. In 195 and 192, Pergamon sent two expeditions to Greece in connection with wars against Nabis of Sparta. Finally, the Attalid soldiers fought in Greece in Rome’s war against Antiochus III, and during the Third Macedonian War they participated in fights in Thessaly, Thrace and Greece. In the 140s, Pergamon’s vessels and soldiers took part in Rome’s wars against Andriskos in Macedonia and the Achaean League in Greece; they also conducted a campaign in Thrace against Diegylis, who supported Pergamon’s traditional enemy, the Bithynian King Prusias II. This activity continued until the end of the dynasty. As we can see, the kings of Pergamon pursued a very active policy in the Aegean Sea region, and such great activity on the European continent must have aroused their interest in the Aegean Islands. In order to pursue such a policy, it was of course necessary to own a strong navy, suitable back-up facilities, and naval bases.

Information about the Attalids’ interest in the Aegean Islands in the earliest period of the dynasty’s history is rare. We do need to keep in mind a lack of historiographic sources about this period and the fragmentary epigraphic sources which have survived. We could, however, risk the statement that because the first Attalids had to direct their energy to Asia Minor, their interest in the Aegean Sea was relatively small. These early testimonies of contacts with the islands should be seen in the context of the kings of Pergamon’s policy concerning the entire Greek world and the typical tools they used in politics and propaganda, which were supposed to build their image among the Greeks. Eumenes I established – perhaps the first member of the dynasty to do so – relations with Delos. In any case, his statue is the oldest one attested on the island out of Pergamon’s rulers and, more importantly, it was probably he who founded the festival of Philetaireia in Delos in 263 or 262, in honour of the founder of the dynasty. This was an element of Eumenes’ skilful propaganda; he strongly promoted Philetairos as the founder of the Attalid dynasty and wanted to emphasise his independence from the Seleucids in this way.

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12 Ma 2013, 57.
13 Plb. 10.42; 16.2–8, 24, 25, 34; Livy 31.14–16, 45, 46; 32.16, 19, 23, 33.
14 IPerg. 60–63; Livy 34.26.10–11; 29.2–5; 40.2. Eumenes II’s personal participation in the campaigns against Nabis is all the more telling since it was at that time that Antiochus III was besieging Smyrna, Lampsakos, and Alexandria Troas in Asia Minor – the region where the king of Pergamon had the most vested interests.
15 Plb. 27.18.1; 28.14–15; Livy 36.42.6; 42.55.7–8, 58.14, 60.3, 67.2–8.
16 IPerg. 247; SEG 48, 530; Paus. 7.16.1.
17 It cannot be ruled out that Attalos III conducted military activities in Thrace: OGIS 339; see Hopp 1977, 111, note 25; Ma 2013, 55.
18 IG XI 2.224A; XI 4.1107 = Durrbach 1921, no. 33; see Bruneau 1970, 570–572 (the remaining testimonia were also collected there); Kosmetatou 2001, 112. The first known vases dedicated on the occasion of this festival come from 262. McShane (1964, 43) believes that the festival was established already by Philetairos, but its name does not necessarily mean that Eumenes could not have been its author, especially in the light of Philetairos’ position in his propaganda. It is quite likely that Eumenes I also finished the construction of the so-called southern portico on Delos; see below.
The festival of *Philetaireia* organised in Kyzikos was supposed to play a similar role.\(^{19}\) It was probably also Eumenes who placed a statue of Philetairos on Delos.\(^{20}\) The choice of Delos was certainly deliberate. The Greeks believed the island to be the birthplace of Apollo and Artemis, and it was the home of one of the most important sanctuaries in the Greek world, the temple of Apollo. Delos also played an important role in the region’s trade and life. The city was an exceptionally busy port, which merchants from the entire Mediterranean world passed through. Therefore, Delos was an ideal place for the kings of Pergamon to emphasise that they were part of the Greek world.

Delos was also the centre of the League of Islanders, a federation which was one of the main tools of the Ptolemies’ Aegean policy. However, Eumenes’ activity on Delos should not be examined in terms of close cooperation with the Lagids. During this period, even during the Second Syrian War, there is nothing to indicate such cooperation.\(^{21}\) It cannot be ruled out, however, that the aim of Eumenes’ activity on Delos was also to get closer to the kings of Egypt. This was still a period when the Ptolemaic navy was the biggest one in the Aegean Sea. Eumenes, having captured Elaia, could have started more lively naval activity, and should have attempted to start up a friendship with the Lagids. Commercial reasons may have been another reason to do so.\(^{22}\) What is telling, anyway, is that it was probably on Delos that the first Attalid statues outside of Pergamon were erected.

The capturing of Elaia by Eumenes I opened the door to the Aegean Sea for the rulers of Pergamon and must have given their policy a new impulse. The political situation on the north-western coast of Asia Minor was not conducive to expanding the dynasty’s possessions in this region, however. The presence of strong *poleis* such as Kyzikos, Ilion, Lampsakos, or Abydos successfully impeded the Attalids’ north-bound expansion in the coastal region. Further south, on Samos and in Ephesos, there were bases of the Ptolemaic navy, which remained the strongest one in the Aegean Sea, while the Rhodians also had a strong naval position. This increased the significance of Elaia, which became the main port of Pergamon.\(^{23}\) It is very likely that it was Eumenes I who started the programme of building a Pergamon navy, although the first mentions in the sources about its activity refer to the period of Attalos’ reign, specifically to the First Macedonian War. However, the lack of references in the sources is not necessarily surprising. Ancient authors became interested in the navy of any state when it commenced military activities in conflicts on a larger than local scale. Regular, everyday tasks provoked no emotions. In the initial period, the navy was probably mainly a means to improve transportation and communication with the coastal cities of Asia Minor, and most importantly with the *poleis* of continental Greece.

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\(^{19}\) For the *Philetaireia* in Kyzikos, see *OGIS* 748; McShane 1964, 37; Robert 1966, 199–201; Hansen 1971, 453.

\(^{20}\) *IG* XI 4.1105.

\(^{21}\) Cf. Magie 1950, II: 733, note 16; McShane 1964, 41; Allen 1983, 22; Grainger 2010, 119. Hypotheses about such cooperation between Ptolemy II and Eumenes I, or even about an alliance between the two rulers, were put forward by Cardinali 1906, 13; Beloch 1925, 593, note 4; Rostovtzeff 1941, I: 555.

\(^{22}\) Cf. McShane 1964, 44.

\(^{23}\) It kept this position until 188, when the Treaty of Apamea gave the Attalids Ephesus, which took over the role of the most important port of the Kingdom of Pergamon. For Elaia, see Pirson 2004; 2014.
Eumenes I did not pursue more ambitious activities in the Aegean Sea region. Such activities were started by Attalos I, and in his politics the navy was indispensable. The scattered information given by ancient authors describing various military operations in which Pergamon’s navy participated indicate that the Attalids had quite a considerable naval force. Their navy may not have been the largest in the Mediterranean Sea, but it consisted – in accordance with the tendencies of the Hellenistic era – mainly of large, heavily-armed vessels. Its strength was comparable to that of Rhodes’ navy. It was a force which not only could have played an important role in local wars, operating in the coastal waters of Asia Minor, but also could have been an important instrument of the Aegean policy.

In 216, Attalos I signed an agreement with Antiochos III, who was going to deal with the rebelling Achaios. The Seleucid accepted the sovereignty of the Attalid, although it is difficult to determine which territories Attalos kept under his rule. However, regardless of the specific territorial agreements, the treaty with Antiochos III normalised Pergamon’s situation in Asia Minor. On the one hand, it meant abandoning the plans for expansion in Asia Minor, at least for a while, but on the other hand it allowed Attalos to focus his attention on other areas. As early as 210, the king of Pergamon joined the war between Rome and Macedonia. How far did the Attalid’s ambitions reach? According to some historians, Attalos wanted to compensate for his failures in Asia Minor and attempted to build an empire in the Aegean, and perhaps even planned to take over control of the territory which had once been ruled by Lysimachos. There have also been hypotheses, albeit not based on very solid foundations, that Macedonia was Pergamon’s natural enemy, due to the alliance between Philip V and Prusias I, King of Bithynia, one of the Attalids’ main rivals in Asia Minor. Philip V’s ambitions in Asia Minor have also been mentioned, but the Antigonid entered the sphere of Pergamon’s interests only after the end of the First Macedonian War. The ambition and involvement of Attalos I in Rome’s war against Macedonia have also been minimised or reduced to the intention to protect trade routes. Regardless of how far Attalos’ ambitions reached, it remains a fact that for the first time Pergamon became so directly involved in Greece and the Aegean Sea in the diplomatic and military spheres. This increased the significance of the Aegean

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26 Eumenes II’s navy, for example, blockaded the entrance of the Hellespont during the war against Pontus (Plb. 27.7.5).
27 Plb. 5.107.4. Attalos lost the majority of his conquests during the war against Achaios. For this agreement and Pergamon’s situation during this period, see Schmitt 1964, 264–267; Allen 1983, 58–65; Ma 2000, 54–60. It is difficult to determine what territories Antiochos left to Attalos (Mysia and Hellespontine Phrygia according to Schmitt, Mysia and Aeolis according to Allen. Ma believes that almost the whole of Mysia went to Antiochos III, and Attalos was left with only those territories which he managed to save during the war against Achaios).
28 Holleaux 1921, 204–205. Kreuter (1992, 91) also attributes the intention to expand the territory in this area to Attalos.
29 Wilcken 1896, 2163; De Sanctis 1907–1964, III, 2: 146. For convincing counterarguments, see Allen 1983, 67.
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Islands for Attalos, as they could become an area from which to recruit experienced seamen. The king of Pergamon also needed bases for the navy operating in the Aegean Sea.

It is worth noting an increase in Attalos’ activity in Greece and on the islands even before 210. The king made sure to maintain good relations with the Boeotians, and was active in Athens. He also skilfully took advantage of the fame that the wars against the Galatians brought him and promoted his image as a defender of the Greeks and the Hellenic civilisation: around 228, he placed on Delos a statue of the Pergamene general Epigenes, of whom we have no further information, and another one of himself, on which the inscription directly referred to the victory against the Galatians. The Attalid also initiated closer contacts with the Aetolian League. The federation, at the time one of the strongest states of continental Greece, was undoubtedly a desirable partner, particularly since it was the Aetolians who dominated the council of the Delphic Amphictyonic League, which continued to be a prestigious Panhellenic institution. The Attalids and the Aetolians had similar propaganda accents in common, which they used for building their image in the Greek world. They both emphasised their role in defending the Greek world against the barbarian Celts. Another factor which drew Attalos’ attention to the Aetolians could have been their activity in the Aegean Sea. In the 250s and 240s, the Aetolian League became connected to many communities of the Aegean Islands and coastal Asia Minor, such as Chios, Delos, Tenos, Miletos, Smyrna and Abdera. The Aetolians’ activity increased in the coming years. Starting in the 220s, their interest in Crete became visible, which resulted, for instance, in an alliance with Knossos. At that time the Aegean Sea also witnessed many pirate raids carried out by Aetolian commanders on their own. For Attalos, who was joining the great politics in the Aegean Sea, cooperation with the Aetolians may have had tangible benefits. We do not have to attribute large-scale expansion plans to the king of Pergamon, but his interest in the Aegean Sea

31 I. Orop. 107; Plb. 16.26.1–6, cf. Bringmann/von Steuben 1995, no. 26; Allen 1971, 2, note 8. An inscription from Oropos with a decree giving *proxenia* to Menippos of Pergamon is most likely from the period immediately before 210. The king of Pergamon mentioned in the inscription is probably Attalos I, and since the Boeotians were allied with Philip V, the decree must be from the period before Attalos joined the war against Macedonia. We know from Polybius’ account (10.42.2) that in 208 Philip V even had to send soldiers to Boeotia, because there was danger of the Attalid attacking this land. Cf. also Paschidis 2008, 307. Attalos also funded a new place for learning in the Athenian Academy, named the *Lykadeion* after the scholarch (Diog. Laert. 4.60).

32 IG XI 4.1109-1110; Bringmann/von Steuben 1995: no. 173, 174. Cf. Schalles 1985: 60–64. The details of the context in which Epigenes’ statue was built are unknown, but it is valid to think of it as a form of commemorating Attalos’ victory against the Galatians.


34 IG IX 1² 1.185; 1.191; ISE II 78; FD III 1.482; 1.483; Schmitt 1969, no. 564; cf. also Benecke 1934, 17–23. The Aetolians also offered Chios a place in the council of the Delphic Amphictyonic League.

35 IG IX 1² 1.31; Plb. 4.53.8; 55.5; see Scholten 2000, 193–194.

36 SIG3 520–521. Such raids brought in enormous profits. This period saw an increased number of private dedications in Delphi, sometimes very costly and grandiose (IG IX 1² 1.181; 185; 200; 202–203; SIG3 514). One Aetolian, Nikolaos of Proscheion, even followed in the footsteps of Hellenistic kings by founding a festival named after himself on Delos (*Nikolaiaia*).

37 Schalles (1985, 67); Scholten (2000, 194, 209) believe that the Aetolians and the Attalids became closer as a result of the common threat posed by Doson, who organised an expedition to Caria in 227. However, this campaign was probably not an act aimed against Pergamon.
was a fact. The political situation in the region was also conducive to the Attalid’s activities in the Aegean Sea. The Ptolemaic navy’s defeats against the Macedonians near the coast of Kos and Andros put an end to the period of the former’s unquestionable domination. On the other hand, the kings of Macedonia, entangled in the affairs of continental Greece, were unable to take full advantage of their naval successes. This opened up new opportunities for smaller states, such as Rhodes or indeed Pergamon. The chaos was also conducive to thriving piracy, including the Aetolian one (since not all Aetolian activities in the Aegean Sea should be treated as the federation’s official dealings). One testimony of the closer Pergamon-Aetolian relations in the 220s was an impressive stoa founded by Attalos in Delphi, controlled by the Aetolian koinon. The king also funded the construction of fortifications in Aelaos in western Aetolia.38

It was the Aetolian League, which signed an alliance with Rome in 211 and started a war against Philip V, that played an important role in Attalos I also joining the conflict. The Aetolians offered the king the honorific title of the league’s strategos for 211/209 and recently captured Aegina.39 The island, sold off to Attalos for the relatively low price of 30 talents, was to become a base of Pergamon’s navy. One inscription seems to suggest that Pergamon’s units participated in the capturing of the island.40 However, it is more likely that Attalos and his forces only appeared in Greece in 209.41 It was on Aegina that the king, together with the proconsul Publius Sulpicius Galba, conducting the military activities on the Roman side, agreed on the principles of cooperation. The Attalid vessels and soldiers took part in an unsuccessful attempt to capture Lemnos and in a fight at Lamia; ravaged the island of Peparethos, located near Euboea; participated in the capturing of the cities of Oreos on Euboea and Opous in Opuntian Locrid, as well as in removing a Macedonian garrison from Phocian Lilaia, where Pergamon’s contingent later secured the city. It was also the activities of Attalos’ navy that largely

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38 SIG 3 523; CID 4.85; Plb. 4.65.6; cf. Bringmann/von Steuben 1995, no. 91. The beginning of the close relations between the Attalids and the Aetolians can be dated to the mid-220s, cf. Scholten 2000, 193. It cannot be ruled out that the Ptolemaic diplomacy played a certain role in this friendship. The Lagids had already started cooperation with the Aetolians, who became valuable partners against Macedonia. On the other hand, the Ptolemites and the Attalids had animosity against the Seleucids in common; cf. Scholten 2000, 194–195; Grabowski 2010, 212–213. The re-foundation of one of the Aetolian cities under the name of Attaleia may have been a form of honouring the king by the Aetolians; cf. Allen 1983, 70; Cohen 1995, 111.

39 Plb. 22.8.10; Livy 27.29.10; 0.1. The sources do not provide information about the title which the Aetolians offered Attalos. It may have been hegemon (Allen 1983, 69) or strategos autokrator. The latter option seems more likely by analogy to the title which Antiochos III received from the Aetolians in 192 (App. Syr. 12; cf. Livy 35.45.9; Larsen 1968, 201, 414; Grainger 1999, 319). According to Valerius Antias, whom Livy cites (33.30.10–11), Attalos received Aegina from the Romans in 196 as a result of a treaty which ended the Second Macedonian War. This is an obvious error on the part of the annalist, since Attalos had been dead for a year at that point. In the same place Livy, citing Valerius, also gives other erroneous information about territorial clauses of the peace treaty, see Holleaux 1957, 104–120.

40 OGIS 281. The text of this inscription talks about offering Athena spoils from Aegina in her temple on Pergamon’s acropolis. This is the conclusion of Hansen (1971, 47), for example. Holleaux (1921, 218) followed the same line of reasoning; according to him, without the help of Pergamon’s navy, the Aetolians would have been unable to capture and control the island. It seems, however, that indications of Pergamon’s participation in the capturing of Aegina are too weak; cf. Cardinali 1906, 178; Flacelière 1937, 300, note 2; McShane 1964, 107 (who believes that selling the island to Attalos was the joint idea of the Aetolians and the Romans); Allen 1971, 1–6.

41 Livy 27.29.10; cf. Allen 1971, 1.
forced Philip V to march from Thessaly to Euboea in order to protect Chalkis, the most important Macedonian base in the region. The directions of the attacks carried out by the Roman and Pergamene allies do not necessarily indicate that it was an implementation of Attalos’ plan, which would have assumed the capture of ports and islands in the northern part of the Aegean Sea. The adopted strategy resulted from the king’s consultations with Galba and stemmed from the military situation during the war to a decisive extent, and an attack on Euboea was a natural step; it was where the main base of the Macedonian navy was located. However, we should also not underestimate Attalos’ involvement in the war against Macedonia. It is a fact that the king quite quickly returned to Asia Minor, but he was forced to do so by an attack of the king of Bithynia on his kingdom. Obviously, Pergamon’s safety was a priority and it is difficult to use this decision to draw the conclusion that Attalos had no intention of taking a more active part in the Macedonian war from the very beginning. The necessity to keep a watchful eye on the affairs in Asia Minor was a factor that the king of Pergamon always had to be mindful of. Attalos, we can conclude on the basis of his political and diplomatic activities, was too experienced a politician to believe that the alliance with Antiochos III was a permanent one, especially in the light of Antiochos’ open ambitions to rebuild the state within the boundaries marked by Seleukos I.

The brief episode of direct involvement in Greece enabled Attalos to enter the world of great politics, exceeding the local problems of Asia Minor. It seems that this was the reason for his involvement in the First Macedonian War. He managed to demonstrate his keen interest in Greek affairs and to manifest, more clearly than before, the dynasty’s presence in the very heart of the Greek world. We do not know whether the handing over of Euboea came about on the Aetolian initiative or whether it was the price dictated by the king of Pergamon in exchange for joining the war. The latter seems more likely, since Attalos was in a position to dictate terms. He had such naval forces at his disposal that it was worthwhile to fight for his support. The king arrived in Greece with a navy of 35 tetrereis, which meant that the naval forces he brought in exceeded those of the Romans, who operated a navy of 25 quinqueremes in the Aegean Sea. The events which took place at sea also indicate that the Aetolian League was not a considerable naval force. In any case, the 30 talents were well invested. Attalos gained a valuable base for his navy and a foothold for developing his Greek policy. The island, located in the Saronic Gulf at the crossroads between Attica and north-west Peloponnese and the Cyclades and Crete, had a considerable strategic importance. It was a particularly valuable pos-

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42 ISE 2.81; FD 3.4.132–135; Livy 28.5.1, 7, 10, 17–18; 6.1; 7.3. For the participation of Pergamon in the First Macedonian War, see McShane 1964, 105–109; Hansen 1971, 47–49. As for the subject concerning the specific relationships between Pergamon and Rome, see Allen 1983, 67–69; Gruen 1984, 77; Eckstein 2008, 88–89; Burton 2011, 84–87.
43 As McShane (1964, 108) believes.
45 Allen (1983, 74) assumes, too arbitrarily, that the island was handed over to Attalos without any move on his part.
46 The Pergamene presence on the island is confirmed by inscriptions: SIG 642; OGIS 329. Even though its golden days were in the past, the island still had some prestige in the Greek world. The memory of its naval role lived on in the poetry of the still-popular Pindar, who exalted the naval victories of the Aeginetans and praised the island as the “queen of the seas” (Pind., Paeon 6. 123–126; cf. Allen 1971, 2).
session due to the short distance separating it from Athens, which occupied a prominent place in the Attalid political activity. The capturing of Aegina was also a new experience for the rulers of Pergamon in terms of administration and, we can assume, the principles worked out in this case later served as a model for at least some territories captured in the second century by Eumenes II and Attalos II. The island was administered on behalf of the king by an epistates with broad prerogatives, and the royal prostagmata played an important role in governing the island.\footnote{OGIS 329. The office of epistates is attested in the times of Eumenes II and Attalos I, but it is almost certain that it functioned from the very beginning of the Attalid reign on the island, cf. Allen 1983, 74–75. For the administration of Aegina by the Attalids see Allen 1971.} Inscriptions confirm that a Pergamene garrison was stationed there.\footnote{ISE 36.1.84–85; I.Per 13 = OGIS 266; I.Per 29 = OGIS 280; FD 3.4.132–135; SEG 25, 320. As the surviving tombs indicate, the garrison consisted mainly of Hellenised Thracians, Mysians, and Bithynians, cf. IG IV 98b, 112, 154; SEG 11, 11–12; Figueira 1993, 390. The Attalids also gained Aeginetic works of art, used for example in the reconstruction of the temple of Athena Nikephoros in Pergamon by Eumenes II. A statue plinth with an inscription (I.Per 48) was found there, attesting that its author was Onatas, one of the main representatives of the Aeginetic school of sculpture in the fifth century (probably from a bronze statue of Apollo, cf. Paus. 8.42.7). Another plinth, of a sculpture by Theron of Boeotia, has the inscription "from Aegina" (I.Per. 49a; 49b). See Figueira 1993, 90.} Attalos I also tried to strengthen his position on Aegina by means of propaganda and religion, and the island also played a role in the development of the cult of the Attalids. One inscription tells us about the foundation of a statue of the king, who is described as Aiakos’ \textit{synnaos theos}.\footnote{IG II² 885. The stone with the engraved decree was found in Athens, but as Allen (1971, 6–7) convincingly showed, owing to palaeographic reasons, the type of marble used, and the content, it should be linked with Aegina. Cf. also Robert 1973b, 93; Schalles 1985, 111, note 671; Schmidt-Doumas 1993–1994, 78–79.} In this way, the king of Pergamon was promoted to the role of the city’s \textit{neos ktistes}.\footnote{The cult honours for the Attalids can be observed from the very beginning of their reign. Festivals in honour of Philetairos are attested already during his lifetime, e.g. at Kyme (cf. Manganaro 2000, 403–414). The deceased rulers were deified, and even the living ones received numerous cult honours from Greek cities, also those located abroad (cf. Habicht 1956, 124–126; Schmidt-Doumas 1993–1994, 78–79). It is debatable whether Attalos I was the first representative of the dynasty to experience the full form of the cult as \textit{synnaos theos}. This is what Allen (1983, 147) believes; he cites the example from Aegina and Sycion, where, according to Polybius’ account (18.16), his statue was placed “next to Apollo” (a statue, or rather a temple; cf. Walbank 1967–1979, II: 571), \textit{contra} e.g. Hopp 1977, 7–9. Eumenes II introduced the office of archiereus, probably imitating the Seleucid model, after the Treaty of Apamea at the latest (SEG 47, 1519). He was probably in charge of the organisation and control of the dynastic cult, perhaps also of the living members of the dynasty. For the cult of the Attalids, see Hansen 1971, 453–470; Allen 1983, 144–158; Schwarzer 1999; Müller 2000; Gauthier 2003; Hamon 2004.} Aiakos was the mythological king of the island, the son of Zeus and the nymph Aegina, which presented an opportunity to develop the dynastic legend and religious propaganda of the Attalids. What the rulers of Pergamon had to achieve was to build a mythology and genealogy which would enable them to compete with the other Hellenistic dynasties in the field of religious policy. They declared their descent from Zeus through Dionysos Kathegemon and Heracles. In building the second theme, they used the figure of the Arcadian hero Telephos, whom they considered to be their legendary ancestor. According to myths, Telephos was the son of Heracles and an Arcadian princess who, banished by her father, gave birth to her son in Mysia. This way, the
Attalids gained a purely Greek ancestor, and one who descended through Heracles from Zeus, the king of the gods himself. Through Heracles, they also built a thread connecting them to Alexander the Great.\textsuperscript{51} The inscription from Aegina is the first undisputed testimony of Telephos used by the Attalids and the Greek world accepting this genealogy.\textsuperscript{52} Some donations of the rulers of Pergamon to Greek cities should be considered not only in terms of typical euergetism, but also in the context of presenting their conception of the Attalid family’s descent. Towards the end of the 230s, Attalos I founded an impressive building complex at Delphi, which occupied a special place in Apollo’s sanctuary. The entire architectural layout included a terrace on which a number of statues and a stoa were placed. This was the only building which interrupted the temenos wall. It was situated directly next to the tomb of the hero Pyrrhus-Neoptolemos, the son of Achilles and the father of Pergamos, the eponymous hero of Pergamon and one of the Attalids’ ancestors. This was probably the first manifestation of the Attalids’ syngeneia.\textsuperscript{53} It proves that Attalos I had a well-prepared propaganda and religious programme. The entire complex must have made an enormous impression on the pilgrims visiting the temple of Apollo.

Delos became an important place where such themes in the programme of the kings of Pergamon’s self-presentation were manifested. Attalos I founded a cleverly designed monument there, which represented a rather rare type of statue in Hellenistic art, namely a familial one. The monument, called the Teuthrania offering, consisted of a group of five or six statues. The statues of Eumenes I and Attalos I were accompanied by images of local Mysian heroes: Midios, Phaleros, and Teuthras (stepfather of Telephos, an ancestor of the dynasty). The statue was probably completed by a sixth figure, of which not a trace has survived, showing Philetairos. Inscriptions on the plinths of the statues referred to the genealogy of the presented persons. The surviving fragments of inscriptions do not allow us to determine with certainty whether the monument showed an argument for the direct genealogical ties between the Attalids and the heroes. In any case, Attalos was portraying the dynasty’s ties to Mysia, posing as Teuthras’ successor and, assuming that a statue of Philetairos was indeed a part of the monument, he manifested the continuity of the dynastic line. The Kingdom of Pergamon was represented by rulers, heroes, and river deities and the monument created a harmonious image of the Attalids, who formed an integral whole with their territory.\textsuperscript{54}

The choice of Delos as the location of this structure resulted first of all from the fame and respect its sanctuary of Apollo commanded in the entire Greek world. However,

\textsuperscript{51} An additional link to Alexander the Great was Pergamos, chosen by the Attalids as their legendary founder. Pergamos was supposedly the king of the Epirote Molossians. Invited by Telephos’ grandson, he came to Mysia. There, he took over power and changed the name of the capital city to Pergamon. In this way, the Attalids were supposed to be related to the Epirote royal family, i.e. for instance Olympias, Alexander’s mother. For the Attalid mythology and other possibilities which Telephos and Pergamos offered (e.g. including the Attalids in the oldest Hellenic tradition through references to Homer’s epic stories and the Trojan War), see Scheer 1993, 71–73, 127–128; 2003, 221–226; Gruen 2000, 22–27; Kosmetatou 2003, 167–168. For Dionysos Kathegemon, see Michels 2011, 125–139.

\textsuperscript{52} Scheer 2003, 223.

\textsuperscript{53} Paus. 10.2.6; cf. Strab. 9.421. For Attalos’ stoa see Schalles 1985, 104–126; Hintzen-Bohlen 1992, 122–127; Bernhard 1993, 136–144; Scheer 2003, 222.

Attalos’ decision also shows the extent of his interest in the insular world of the Aegean Sea. The construction of this monument is dated to the last two decades of the third century.\(^{55}\) Additionally, roughly at the same time, in 216 at the latest, the king established the festival of *Attaleia* on the island.\(^{56}\) In 209, it was on Delos that Attalos dedicated a *phiale* as a votive offering for gaining Aegina.\(^{57}\)

As we can see, the source material from Delos confirms Attalos’ interest in the Aegean Islands and his readiness to compete for influence in this area with Philip V. Delos was a natural arena for the propaganda rivalry between the two dynasties, and Attalos made it the centre of his efforts to win the favour of the Greek world, including its insular part. Delos was also one of the most important places where the Antigonids were promoted. They liberated the island from the Athenian domination in 314 and chose it as the centre of the League of the Islanders. Although the federation’s ties to the Antigonids did not last long, because the Ptolemies took over the island, the kings of Macedonia made efforts to maintain contacts with the island. Inventories from the sanctuary of Apollo are a testimony to these efforts. They also sponsored several of the festivals celebrated annually there. Additionally, architecture became an area of rivalry with the Attalids. Antigonos Gonatas made sure that no one who arrived on Delos could miss the impressive portico on the northern side of the sanctuary and its giant plinth, on which stood the statues of real and mythical ancestors of the king.\(^{58}\) The monument built by Attalos was, therefore, undoubtedly a challenge issued to Philip V. The king of Macedonia was also very active on the island. His statue was placed there, and several years later he established the festival of *Philippaea*.\(^{59}\)

The rivalry between the two dynasties also left its mark on the buildings along the road which the pilgrims travelled on their way to Apollo’s sanctuary. On the eastern side of the *dromos*, the so-called southern *stoa* (*Portique Sud*) was built. Due to the location of the monuments of Epigenes and the Galatian one, founded by Attalos I, which flanked the *stoa* from the north and south, a hypothesis was put forward that its founder was also Attalos.\(^{60}\) However, as epigraphic material shows, as well as some of the statues placed by the *stoa* (older than the Pergamene ones) and the lack of architectural cohesiveness of the building, the construction of the portico, perhaps commenced by the Delians themselves, was interrupted and finally completed by the Attalids. The completion of the works should probably be connected not to Attalos I, but to his predecessor, Eumenes I.\(^{61}\) Regardless of which of the Attalids finished the construction of the southern portico,
Philip V’s next architectural project was a direct challenge issued to the kings of Pergamon. The king of Macedonia built a portico on the western side of the *dromos* which cleverly obscured the view from the sea of the one completed by the Attalids.\(^{62}\) The two porticos closed the sanctuary’s *dromos* like a clasp, so that processions organised during festivals had to pass in the middle between both stoas.

After the completion of the First Macedonian War, Philip V turned his attention towards the east, the Aegean Islands and the coast of Asia Minor. His activities coincided with a crisis in the Lagids’ state after the death of Ptolemy IV and with the triumphant return of Antiochos III from his eastern campaign. The previous political order in the East collapsed. Philip and Antiochos, intending to take advantage of the ready opportunity, made a secret agreement concerning the division of the Ptolemies’ foreign dominions.\(^{63}\) The combination of these factors would ultimately, within the next several years, lead to the involvement of the Romans in the region’s affairs, and irrevocably change the political situation in the Hellenistic world.

Philip’s expansion ruined the distribution of forces in the region; it was particularly harmful to the interests of the Attalids and the Rhodians. In the case of Pergamon, the Macedonian activity in the area of the Hellespont posed the biggest threat.\(^{64}\) From the very beginning of the state, it was the cities of the Hellespont and the Propontis that played a significant role in their politics.\(^{65}\) As a consequence of Philip’s actions, Pergamon and Rhodes became friendly. From the scant sources we can gather that the relations between the Attalids and the Rhodians had previously not been very amicable. Rhodes was the most powerful insular *polis*; it had a strong navy, and political, commercial, and economic influences in the entire Greek world at the time. This could have been a point of contention, but the conflict probably had a political subtext. The interests of the two states clashed mainly in the region of the Hellespont. The support given by the Rhodians to the Seleucids and the Antigonids during the Second Syrian War was also definitely not to the Attalids’ liking.\(^{66}\) It is also telling that Attalos was not among the kings and states which supported the Rhodians after the disastrous earthquake in 227.\(^{67}\) Finally, in 220 Byzantion tried to get Attalos’ support in the war it was fighting against Rhodes. According to Polybius, the conflict resulted from Byzantion raising the customs tax levied on the ships which passed through the Hellespont. Supposedly, they were forced to take

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\(^{62}\) The exact dating of Philip V’s building is impossible, but its construction took place in 221–201. Cf. Hintzen-Bohlen 1992, 144–145; Bringmann/von Steuben 1995, no. 136. In the older literature (e.g. Vallois 1923, 162; Hansen 1971, 52; Bernhard 1993, 117), the construction of the building was usually dated to the period after 211. Schalles (1985, 66–67) connects the beginning of the construction works with the end of the war with the allies in 217.

\(^{63}\) Plb. 3.2.8; Livy 31.14.4–5; App., *Mac.* 4.1; Just. 30.2.8; Porph., *FGrH* 260 F 45. For that topic, see Holleaux 1921, 312–315; McDonald/Walbank 1937, 182–184, 205–207; Magie 1939; Schmitt 1964, 237–261; Eckstein 2008, 129–180.

\(^{64}\) This is how they must already have interpreted Dicaearchus’ campaign in 204 (Plb. 18.54.8). For that topic, see Holleaux 1952a.


\(^{66}\) *Lind. Temp. Chron.* 37; Polyæn. 5.18.

\(^{67}\) Plb. 5.88.1–90.4. Polybius gives very specific information about the assistance given to the Rhodians. He must have used an official Rhodian document, either directly or through a work of one of the local historians, cf. Kobes 1993, 6–7. It is impossible that he accidentally overlooked Attalos I.
this step by the necessity to pay a tribute to the Galatian Kingdom of Tylis. It cannot be ruled out, however, that the reasons were deeper and there was in fact a trade war in which Byzantion tried to increase its share of the profits from trade with Black Sea cities. Rhodes, thanks to its strategic position, played a key role in the transit trade in the eastern waters of the Mediterranean Sea and gradually built its expansive trade contacts. Additionally, it tried to expand its dominions on the mainland and its influence on the Aegean Islands. The Rhodians also gained the support of Pergamon’s enemy, Prusias II, king of Bithynia, during this war. Consequently, Attalos had plenty of reasons to consider assisting the Byzantinians. In the end, however, he did not join the war, as he was too preoccupied with the conflict against Achaeus, according to Polybius. It cannot be ruled out that at that time the military conflict between him and Achaeus had already finished, but this does not change the fact that exhaustion from the war was indeed the main reason behind Attalos’ refusal. On the other hand, the Rhodians may have been worried about Attalos I’s involvement in the First Macedonian War, which could have brought him tangible benefits in Greece and in the Aegean Sea.

However, the feeling of being threatened by Philip V brought Attalos and the Rhodians closer together, and drew Attalos’ attention back to the Aegean Islands. Macedonia’s increased activity in the region is what should be attributed with the lively activity of the king of Pergamon concerning the Cretan poleis. The specific social, economic, and political conditions on Crete meant that, despite the constant wars its cities were conducting, there was never a lack of men ready to join the army of anyone who paid well. As a consequence, the island was one of the most important places for recruiting soldiers and an object of keen interest of Hellenistic rulers. Attalos I also used the human resources of the Cretan poleis. The Rhodians had interests on Crete as well. Already towards the end of the 220s, Crete became the stage of a conflict between Macedonia and Rhodes when the two states found themselves on two sides of the barricade during the war over Lyttos between Knossoss and Gortyn. Philip V managed to strengthen his influence mainly in the western part of the island at that time. Shortly after the end of the war he was even proclaimed the protector (prostates) of the Cretan League. In the last years of the third century another conflict broke out, the so-called Cretan War (ca. 206/205–201). The Cretan League clashed with Rhodes, and this was not just another in a series of wars against pirates, which the Rhodians often fought during that period. It cannot be

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68 Plb. 4.46.1–48.2.
70 Plb. 4.45.9–47.7; 49.1–5.
71 See Allen 1983, 37.
72 Wiemer (1992,109) sees the rivalry between the Attalids and Rhodes as the reason why the Rhodians, together with other states, arbitrated during the First Macedonian War in 209. In his opinion, they wanted to put an end to the war before the king of Pergamon came to Greece, so as to make it impossible for him to make acquisitions in the Aegean.
73 Livy 28.7.6; cf. also Griffith 1935, 175; Ma 2013, 64.
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determined whether Philip was behind the outbreak of the war, but in any case he backed
the Cretan *koinon*. The other side included Rhodes and some other Cretan cities, most
importantly Knossos, Hierapytna, and Olous. The situation was further complicated by
another conflict, which arose among some cities on the island. The Rhodian tactic, apart
from fighting, also included using diplomatic tools: signing treaties with individual cities
and in this way making them join the war, which strengthened the Rhodians’ influence.

The rivalry between Macedonia and Rhodes on Crete was another reason for Attalos
developing a closer relationship with Rhodes. However, Attalos’ involvement on Crete
cannot be analysed only in terms of counteracting the threat posed by Philip V and at-
ttempting to restrict Macedonia’s influence on the island. It was also a perfect opportunity
to gain new footholds in the Aegean Sea, and the actions taken by the king of Pergamon
show that he did not abandon his interest in the Aegean Islands at the end of his Greek
expedition of 209. Towards the end of the third century Attalos signed an agreement with
two Cretan cities: Latos and Malla. 76 The preserved text of the treaty with Malla talks
about the two sides pledging *philia* and *symmachia* to each other. Attalos promised to
provide assistance to his partners in the case of war and the treaty specified what form of
help would be given. The inscription is damaged in the place where the Mallans’ obliga-
tions were listed. Some phrases in the text indicate, however, that they were identical or
very similar to those of the king of Pergamon. 77 What is questionable is the translation
and meaning of the clause specifying the number of soldiers with which Attalos pledged
to support his partners. Generally, it was supposed to be 300 soldiers. It is unclear, how-
ever, whether the king guaranteed himself the right to lower this number depending on
the situation and his current capability, or, to the contrary, pledged to send a larger force,
depending on the circumstances. It has been noted that we know of no treaty signed by
the Cretan *poleis* with kings or states off the island imposing a larger obligation to fulfi l
on the other side than on the Cretan city. 78 We can therefore assume that Attalos pledged
to provide the assistance of a force which was proportionate to his capability at the time.
Another argument may be Rhodes’ treaty with Hierapytna signed at the same time
(ca. 201/200), which seems to have allowed a similar solution. 79 Attalos certainly tried to
phrase the text of the document so as to achieve his goal, which was to gain a foothold
on Crete and secure the possibility of recruiting mercenaries. Therefore the treaty provi-
sions most likely said that he vowed to send as many soldiers above the agreed number
as he could afford. The flexible terms of the treaty gave Attalos an additional advantage
as well. In this way, he could bring a larger military unit to Malla and ensure control over
the city without inviting accusations of unlawful behaviour. 80

The treaty signed by Attalos with the city of Latos was similar. Both Malla and Latos
were important footholds for Pergamon, especially the latter city, whose port could have
become a valuable base for Pergamonian ships. The text of the treaty with Malla shows
that the Pergamene diplomacy acted on a larger scale on Crete. Attalos maintained con-
tacts with other cities as well: Hierapytna, Priansos, and Arkades. In this way, the king

78 Kreuter 1992, 95.
80 Kreuter 1992, 96.
of Pergamon expanded his influence in the eastern part of the island and made it easier for himself to recruit Cretan mercenaries. He made it more difficult for the Macedonian diplomacy to conduct dealings on the island, but he may also have worsened his relations with the Rhodians, since he was moving in their sphere of influence.

However, at this point Attalos and the Rhodians had a common enemy, although perhaps it was due to their mutual distrust that they joined forces against Philip relatively late.\(^{81}\) Attalos, for example, did not participate in the battle fought by the Macedonian and Rhodian navies at Lade.\(^{82}\) Yet we should not greatly underestimate Attalos’ involvement in the war.\(^{83}\) As we know, Polybius, who is the main source, used the works of Rhodian historians,\(^{84}\) and perhaps this was the reason why his account mainly emphasises the vigour of the Rhodians. Undoubtedly, however, the Macedonian army ravaging the vicinity of Pergamon was a factor which must have increased Attalos’ enthusiasm for fighting. As a consequence, the joint Rhodian and Pergamene navy caused severe losses to the Macedonian navy in a battle near the coast of Chios.\(^{85}\) The battle marked the end of Philip V’s naval advantage, but not the end of the war and the allies’ problems. Philip’s next attacks on the mainland ultimately made the Rhodians and Attalos look for help in Rome. The decision in the city on the Tiber did not come fast, but finally, after failed attempts at arbitration, the Republic declared war. The Second Macedonian War began.

During these events, Attalos’ most important goal was to defend his possessions, but he was also able to take the opportunity to increase his possessions in the Aegean and, like during the First Macedonian War, gain new footholds in the Aegean Sea region. Andros was the most important acquisition. The island, located close to Attica and Euboea, on a sea route connecting continental Greece with the coast of Asia Minor, was of great strategic importance and in the Hellenistic period it was the object of attention of every state which aspired to the role of a superpower in the Aegean. Andros, as a member of the League of the Islanders, was under the Ptolemaic influence until the mid-third century and probably served as a base for operations conducted in Greece during the Chremonidean War.\(^{86}\) Towards the end of the 250s, the island was controlled by Antigonos Gonatas, and later, at the beginning of Ptolemy III’s reign, it may have briefly found itself under the influence of the Lagids.\(^{87}\) We have no information about the political history of the island in the following years until 201, when Philip V captured the Cyclades and stationed his garrison on Andros.\(^{88}\) In 199, during the initial stage of the Second Macedonian War,
the island was captured by the joint forces of Attalos I and Rome.\textsuperscript{89} The surviving epigraphic material enables us to reconstruct the relations on the island under the Attalid rule, especially the political system and methods of governing the island. It confirms the Attalids’ position (dedications to rulers and the cult of Eumenes II).\textsuperscript{90} It also attests to the revival of the contacts between the inhabitants of Andros and other Greek states.\textsuperscript{91} The Attalid rule was also conducive to close relations with Cretan cities, where the rulers of Pergamon also had strong influences.\textsuperscript{92} The island remained in the possession of the kings of Pergamon until the end of the dynasty.

Oreos on Euboea was a more ephemeral acquisition by Attalos. The king captured the city in 199, with the Romans’ support, but in the end, in the wake of the policy of the Romans’ returning freedom to Greek cities, promoted by T. Quinctius Flamininus, his successor, Eumenes II, lost it in 196. As a result of Flamininus’ intervention, the Roman commissioners organising the Greek affairs after the victory over Philip V also did not hand over to Eumenes II the other Euboean cities (Eretria and Karystos), which he was trying to gain.\textsuperscript{93} Consequently, the Attalids did not manage to capture very important bases on Euboea. Nevertheless, Attalos’ policy during the Second Macedonian War allows us to conclude that he tried to be quite consistent in implementing the plan of expanding his influences in the Aegean, started during the First Macedonian War. It was during the war against Philip that Aegina demonstrated its value. It proved itself as a base for Attalos and his navy, which was a major contribution to repelling Philip’s attack against Athens.\textsuperscript{94} From the point of view of the fundamentals of the politics of the Pergamene kings this was not only politically significant, but also had a great propaganda value.

Attalos’ achievements included gaining bases for the dynasty in the Aegean Sea, strongly manifesting his presence in the region, and establishing diplomatic relations with a number of Greek states and Rome.\textsuperscript{95} His successors tried to maintain these relations, despite the fact that after Rome’s war against Antiochos III (to which Eumenes II greatly contributed) and significant territorial acquisitions in Asia Minor, the Attalids had to become more involved in the Asian affairs than ever before.\textsuperscript{96}

Crete occupied a special place in Eumenes II’s politics. In the context of the wars against Bithynia and Pontus, he certainly needed the Cretan mercenaries, famous for

\textsuperscript{89} Livy 31.45. The city was ransacked and the population, on the basis of the capitulation treaty, relocated to Delion in Boeotia. However, Attalos soon convinced them to return.


\textsuperscript{91} SEG 58, 927; Petrochilos 2004–2009; 2014, 108.

\textsuperscript{92} Petrochilos 2010, no. 4, 26, 29, 44. For the inhabitants of Andros, it could have meant very tangible benefits, protecting them against the raids of Cretan pirates.

\textsuperscript{93} OGIS 288; Plb. 18.47.10–11; Livy 31.46.16.

\textsuperscript{94} Livy 31.25.1; 28.2.

\textsuperscript{95} A measure of the popularity he enjoyed in the Greek world is various attested forms of honours given to him by the cities of continental Greece and Greek islands; see Schalles 1985, 111, note 673; Kotsidu 2000, no. 28, 51, 81, 108.

\textsuperscript{96} The rule of the next Attalids saw a series of wars against Bithynia, Pontus, and the Galatians, as well as organising the administration of the expanded state. They even became involved in the Seleucids’ internal affairs. Eumenes II played a part in Antiochos IV taking over power in Antioch (App., Syr. 45), and Attalos II put Alexander Balas on the throne (Diod. 31.32a).
their military prowess. A treaty he signed with a number of cities, referred to as the koinon, dates back to 183. The treaty declared philia kai symmachia between the signatories. In total, 31 cities were named, some of which (Malla, Latos, Hierapythna, Arkades and Priansos) had formed bonds of friendship with the Attalids in Attalos’ times; for the remaining ones, to our knowledge, this was the first time they became allied. They included the strongest cities on the island: Gortyna and Knossos. The rival of these two and the third most important city at that time, Kydonia, did not participate in this agreement but was also allied with the king of Pergamon through a separate treaty. This was undoubtedly a great diplomatic success for Eumenes II. He strengthened his influence on the island; we know that he had recruited mercenaries there earlier. However, the relations on the island were too complicated for him to fully benefit from these agreements. The Cretan League probably lasted until ca. 170, but after that point there is every indication that it collapsed and during the Third Macedonian War the Cretans fought on both sides of the conflict. It is also telling that two important cities, Itanos and Olous, were not among the signatories of the 183 treaty. They were cities connected to the Ptolemies, and this was the main reason for their absence. It was also a sign of the rivalry between Pergamon and Rhodes on the island. It seems that Attalos II also successfully maintained relations with at least some of the cities.

After 188, the Attalids tried to act as peacemakers and Philhellenes towards Greek cities. In this regard, they continued the earlier directions of politics and diplomacy. Donations to cities and sanctuaries were a tried and tested tool. The poleis and sanctuaries of continental Greece were in the centre of their efforts, but islanders also enjoyed their generosity. The kings gave generous gifts to the Delian sanctuary of Apollos and continued the tradition of the Philetaireia and Attaleia festivals. Eumenes II supported Rhodes with grain and financed the decoration of a theatre. He and his successors were also benefactors to Samos and Andros. Eumenes II’s influence and popularity among the island states are also proven by a coin probably minted on Skyros, likely in connection

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97 Eumenes also used Cretan mercenaries during the war with Antiochos’ III (Livy 37.39.10; 41.9), in the expedition of G. Manlius Vulso against the Galatians (Livy 38.12.8; 21.2), and in the Third Macedonian War (Livy 42.57.7; 44.13.13).
99 Plb. 28.15.1.
103 A decree honouring a king by the name of Attalos comes from the city of Aptera (I.Cret. II 4c = OGIS 270). The identification is not certain, although Kreuter (1992, 105–110) gives convincing arguments for Attalos II. Cf. also Sion-Jenkins 2001, 31. As regards the relations between Ptolemeis and Itano. and Olous, see Spyridakis 1970, 69–103; Kreuter 1992, 17–45.
with one of the king’s Greek expeditions. The Attalids’ impact on Cos was particularly strong. A festival in honour of Attalos I, the *Attaleia*, was celebrated in the Coan gymnasium; there were also processions for both Eumenes II and Attalos II. Eumenes invited Cos to the Pergamene *Nikephoria* of 182/181. Finally, the state cult of the king is attested on the island. The cult of the Attalids established on Cos can be attributed directly to their patronage and euergetism on the island. In the period after the Peace of Apamea it was the key policy of the Pergamene kings towards Greek *poleis*, including island states.

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105 Cf. Hansen 1971, 219–220; Brun 1996, 165. Hansen (1971, 220) believes that this may mean that the island belonged to the Attalids for a short period. However, there are no other testimonies attesting Skyros’ connection to the kings of Pergamon.


107 A special place in this policy was occupied by Athens. Attalids were among the most active *euergetai* of Athenians. See Plb. 16.25.9; Livy 31.15.6; Bringmann/von Steuben 1995, no. 26–31; cf. Habicht 1990; Shear 2007.


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