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Tonally moving forms – Peter Kivy and Eduard Hanslick’s ‘enhanced formalism’

Ruchome formy dźwiękowe – Peter Kivy i „ulepszony formalizm” Eduarda Hanslicka

Summary

In this paper, I argue for an implicit version of ‘enhanced formalism’ in Eduard Hanslick’s aesthetics, usually misread as ‘extreme’ formalism devoid of any positive account of emotion and music. I outline ‘enhanced formalism’ in its contemporary incarnations (Davies, Kivy), explore certain common features with Hanslick’s approach, and finally explain why Hanslick ultimately abandoned the concept of expressive properties as intrinsic properties of musical structure as the basis of objective aesthetics.

Keywords: Eduard Hanslick, Peter Kivy, musical aesthetics, enhanced formalism, music and emotion

Streszczenie

W artykule staram się pokazać, że w estetyce Eduarda Hanslicka, zwykle błędnie odczytywanej jako skrajny formalizm pozbawiony jakiegokolwiek pozytywnego opisu emocji w muzyce, implicit zawarty jest „ulepszony formalizm”. Przedstawiam „ulepszony formalizm” w jego dzisiejszych wersjach (Davies, Kivy), badam jego wspólne cechy z podejściem Hanslicka i na koniec wyjaśniam, dlaczego koncepcja własności ekspresywnych jako inherentnych własności struktury muzycznej została przez Hanslicka ostatecznie porzucona.

Słowa kluczowe: Eduard Hanslick, Peter Kivy, estetyka muzyczna, ulepszony formalizm, muzyka i emocje
1. Introduction – Eduard Hanslick and Analytical Aesthetics

Eduard Hanslick’s aesthetic treatise Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (‘On the Musically Beautiful’, Weigel, Leipzig 1854)\(^1\) still forms an essential component of musical discourse in various academic fields such as music history and music theory, or in current debates on vital terms such as ‘work’, ‘structure’, or ‘autonomy’. Apart from musicological considerations, Hanslick’s reflections have been most creatively employed by modern analytical philosophy in order to clarify the emotional expression, content, and impact of ‘pure’ music.\(^2\) Hanslick’s sceptical attitude towards theories of emotional ‘expression’ and affective ‘arousal’ of music alone is practically omnipresent in recent debates on this very topic.\(^3\) Thus, Philip Alperson correctly remarks that “the shadow that Hanslick casts over contemporary philosophical discussions of music is so long that his views can be fairly regarded as a template against which contemporary views of music can be situated”.\(^4\) Alperson’s assertion was recently seconded by David Huron, who explicitly maintains that Hanslick’s treatise has “defined the principal parameters in debates concerning musical aesthetics” and that “all major philosophers in the aesthetics of music have start-

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\(^2\) I use this term without normative, ontological, or metaphysical implications to refer to instrumental compositions without a program, title, or text.

\(^3\) For the whole extent of Hanslick’s influence on analytical philosophy see my Eduard Hanslicks Rezeption im englischen Sprachraum, Dissertation, University of Vienna 2016, p. 226–280.

ed by engaging with Hanslick’s ideas.” Hanslick’s compelling description of emotion, strikingly reminiscent of modern cognitive emotion concepts (OMB, p. 9; VMS, p. 43–45), as well as his emphasis on the dynamic aspects of emotive musical ‘content’, have given rise to numerous theoretical approaches in twentieth-century aesthetics, from Susanne Langer and Leonard Meyer to Roger Scruton and Nick Zangwill. Most notably, however, Stephen Davies and Peter Kivy have carefully converted Hanslick’s seemingly ‘rigorous’ formalism into so-called ‘enhanced formalism’, thereby defining emotive features of ‘pure’ music as perceptual properties “of the music itself”.

2. Modern Versions of ‘Enhanced Formalism’ – Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies

Even though the late Peter Kivy had eventually distanced himself from his own concept of ‘enhanced formalism’ and ultimate-

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6 For a recent survey of Hanslick’s analytical reception see: S. Srećković, “Eduard Hanslick’s Formalism and his Most Influential Contemporary Critics”, Belgrade Philosophical Annual 28 (2014).


ly regarded musical expression as a “black box”, his model has been particularly successful in capturing emotive properties as an objective musical element, thereby rejecting the standard versions of ‘arousal theories’ and ‘expression theories’ of musical emotion in accordance with Hanslick’s argument. Kivy’s highly original approach utilizes Alan Tormey’s distinction between two frequently equated terms: to ‘express’ and to be ‘expressive of’. Whereas ‘expressing’ something always relies on the intentional affectivity and the occurrent emotions of the respective individual, to be ‘expressive of’ something focuses solely on the external features of specific emotion states. Davies and Kivy illustrate the essential difference between these terms via related examples of a Saint Bernard (Kivy) and a Basset Hound (Davies): Thus, to say ‘the dog has a sad face’ does not refer to the actual affective condition of the dog, but rather points to specific outward properties of the dog’s facial features such as its furrowed forehead, saggy flews, or droopy eyelids. In Kivy’s words: “what we see as, and say is, expressive of φ is parasitic on what we see as, and say is, expressing φ; and to see X as expressive of φ, or to say X is expressive of φ, is to see X as appropriate to expressing φ, or to say that it is appropriate to such expression. It is in this way that the expressiveness of music is like the expressiveness of the Saint Bernard’s face.” In Kivy’s view, ‘pure’ music “resembles our expressive behavior”

and displays intrinsic features such as momentum, dynamism, melismata, gestures, contour, etc. that readily suggest analogies to genuine human emotion.\textsuperscript{14}

Stephen Davies similarly proposes that emotional expression of music is based on the phenomenological commensurability “between the dynamic character of music and human movement, gait, bearing, or carriage”\textsuperscript{15} or rather on “emotion characteristics in appearances” that supply music’s affective ‘content’.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, ‘pure’ music can be reasonably described in terms of specific emotions as part of musical structure without referring to real-life feelings of the composer or the listener: “The claim is not that music somehow refers beyond itself to occurrent emotions […]. Rather, the claim is that the expressiveness is a property of the music itself.”\textsuperscript{17} However, as Derek Matravers correctly observes, musical dynamism generally no more resembles emotional expression than it does many other things such as “the waves of the ocean” or “the rise and fall of the stock market”.\textsuperscript{18} In order to justify the required priority of an analogy between musical structure and human emotion, ‘enhanced formalism’ has to fall back on psychological assumptions that aptly clarify this cross-modal perception.\textsuperscript{19} To see the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{14} P. Kivy, \textit{The Corded Shell...}, p. 52.
\item\textsuperscript{15} S. Davies, \textit{Musical Meaning...}, p. 229 and p. 239.
\item\textsuperscript{16} S. Davies, “The Expression of Emotion in Music”, \textit{Mind} 89 (1980), p. 68.
\item\textsuperscript{17} S. Davies, “Philosophical Perspectives...”, p. 181. For Kivy’s identical position see his \textit{The Corded Shell...}, p. 64–66.
\item\textsuperscript{19} On this pressing problem see for example: V Howard, “Kivy’s Theory of Musical Expression”, \textit{Journal of Aesthetic Education} 27/1 (1993),
\end{itemize}
wooden branch on the forest track as a snake, not snakes as wooden branches,\textsuperscript{20} or to see the front of cars as faces, not faces as fronts of cars apparently indicates an ‘animation tendency’ that “seems inherent to our mode of experiencing the world”, which could by extension be equally applied to musical listening.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, the supposed perceptual precedence of human agency partially diverts criticism directed towards cross-modal experience at the expense of subverting the objectivity of music’s emotive ‘content’ that now is ultimately dependent on the human psyche. However, musical emotion is still defined as an intrinsic property of music itself that does not build upon former concepts of ‘arousal’, ‘expression’, or ‘representation’: “The music itself is the owner of the emotion it expresses.”\textsuperscript{22}

3. Tonally Moving Forms – Musical Dynamism and Emotional Expression

Contrary to the common reading of his ‘rigorous’ aesthetic formalism, Eduard Hanslick advocates a similar position. Even though he opposes crude theories of musical expression by insisting on the cognitive component – the “conceptual essence” (\textit{OMB}, p. 9; \textit{VMS}, p. 45) – of specific emotions that music simply cannot portray,\textsuperscript{23} he openly allows for an indirect relation

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item P. Kivy, \textit{Introduction…}, p. 41.
\item S. Davies, \textit{Musical Meaning…}, p. 228.
\item Ibidem, p. 199.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
via the dynamic properties of music alone: “music can, with its
very own resources, represent most amply a certain range of
ideas. These [...] are simply all those ideas which relate to audi-
ble changes in strength, motion, and proportion” (OMB, p. 10;
VMS, p. 45). In contrast to specific affective readings of musi-
cal structure (happy, angry, sad, etc.) that have to be regarded
as figurative metaphors (OMB, p. 21, 32; VMS, p. 63–64, 81),
‘pure’ music can be reasonably described in concrete emotive
terms as long as they rely on music’s dynamic qualities: “it
would be possible for the aesthetical expression of a piece of
music to be called charming, soft, impetuous, powerful, del-
licate, sprightly. These are pure ideas24 which have their cor-
responding sensuous manifestation in musical tonal relation-
ships” (OMB, p. 10; VMS, p. 45). Thus, the central question,
which specific component of human emotion can be expressed
musically, becomes purely rhetorical and is answered as fol-
lows: “It can reproduce the motion of a physical [in editions
1–7: psychic]25 process according to the prevailing momentum:
fast, slow, strong, weak, rising, falling” (OMB, p. 11; VMS,
p. 46). According to Hanslick, the “concept of motion”26 has
been noticeably neglected in musical aesthetics, even though
it is the most “fruitful concept” (OMB, p. 11; VMS, p. 47–48).
Hanslick’s assertion is supported by his subsequent reception
as a positivist formalist that was largely focused on his idea
of form, thereby ignoring his ‘tonally moving forms’ and his

24 The term ‘pure’ does not occur in the German original at this point.
25 It is unclear whether Hanslick modified the wording or simply
missed a typing error in the last three editions. Given Hanslick’s argu-
ment, the latter seems more likely, therefore coinciding with his occa-
sionally negligent editing. Cf.: D. Strauß, Eduard Hanslicks Schrift in
26 Emphasis in the German original. Unfortunately, Payzant largely
ignored Hanslick’s italicized passages. I will always provide the original
emphases in order to clarify Hanslick’s thought process.
theory of musical dynamism that was – quoting Lydia Goehr – “smothered by the terms inside which it was sandwiched”.  

According to Hanslick, who – ever since the second edition of his book (1858) – explicitly recognized that “the ultimate worth of the beautiful is always based on the immediate manifestation [‘Evidenz’] of feeling” (OMB, p. XXII; VMS, p. 10), the representation of musical emotion has to be conceptually distinguished from perceptual analogies between musical structure and specific feelings. This important distinction is illustrated by a revealing comparison that promptly suggests the core idea of ‘enhanced formalism’: “The rose is fragrant, but we do not say that its ‘content’ is the ‘representation of fragrance’; the forest diffuses shady coolness, but it does not represent the ‘feeling of shady coolness’”, because to ‘represent’ something “always involves the notion of two separate, dissimilar things, of which one must be intentionally related to the other through a particular mental act” (OMB, p. XXII; VMS, p. 16). However, according to Peter Kivy, Hanslick ostensibly repudiates the additional inference that “expressive properties are some of the musical properties that musical structure can possess”, thereby denying that these expressive properties could be intrinsic features of music itself. Even though Davies and Kivy willingly admitted their notable reliance on Hanslick’s aesthetics, they also believed that the ‘rigorous’ character of Hanslick’s formalism – seemingly opposing any meaningful connection between emotion and ‘pure’ music – constitutes the essential difference to modern accounts of formalist aesthetics: “What ‘enhanced formalism’ is, then, is an enhancement of Hanslick’s formalism, allowing it to include emotive properties as perceptual properties of the

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This common ‘analytic’ approach to Hanslick’s aesthetics, however, seems to be unduly reductive. In my opinion, Hanslick’s nuanced outlook includes some form of ‘enhanced formalism’ that goes beyond Kivy’s limited account and allows for a revised reading of Hanslick’s ‘extreme’ position.

Nevertheless, Kivy already noticed that Hanslick’s formalism was not as strict as is usually assumed by drawing attention to Hanslick’s analogy quoted above, whereby he chiefly argues against the widespread sentiment that ‘pure’ music is supposed to represent feelings. Again: “The rose is fragrant, but we do not say that its ‘content’ is the ‘representation of fragrance’.” Kivy rightly states that this observation anticipates his own important distinction between ‘express’ and to be ‘expressive of’ something, thus capturing the essential foundation of his ‘contour theory’ of musical emotion. Hence, in this vivid analogy, “Hanslick has exactly the property-ontology of modern enhanced formalism staring him in the face”, but – in Kivy’s view – sadly failed to “recognize the possibility for a more successful formalism than his own” that defines expressive properties as intrinsic musical qualities. Consequently, Kivy’s theory of musical expression “is much indebted to Hanslick’s extreme formalism, and embodies many of his conclusions”, but directly opposes Hanslick’s severity by positing expressive properties as “phenomenological properties of the music that we hear in it as we see the redness of the apple and smell the fragrance of the rose”. In the end, Kivy judges Hanslick’s analogy to be “an interesting anomaly, a missed opportunity, perhaps, and nothing more” that has to be regarded as an “afterthought clearly inconsistent” with Hanslick’s formalist mindset. Had Kivy known the second edition of

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30 Ibidem, p. 65 and p. 64.
31 Ibidem, p. 64 and p. 65.
32 Ibidem, p. 65.
Hanslick’s treatise – the available renditions of OMB are based on the seventh (Cohen) and eighth (Payzant) German edition – he would possibly have drawn different conclusions. Here – and only here – the passage referred to by Kivy ends with the following statement: “‘Emotion’ has to reside in the music, just as the fragrance resides in the rose, but it does not rest upon her, like the mask rests upon the actor” (VMS, p. 10).34

Regardless of historical impossibility, this idea reads like an immediate paraphrase of Oets Kolk Bouwsma’s celebrated aphorism “the sadness is to the music rather like the redness to the apple, than it is like the burp to the cider”.35 Kivy himself named Bouwsma’s principle, directed against ‘arousal theories’ of musical emotion, as an important precursor to ‘enhanced formalism’ on numerous occasions.36 Given the merely temporary inclusion of this important qualification that strikingly intensifies the aforementioned correspondence with Kivy’s view, one could assume a slip of the pen, promptly rectified in the third edition (1865). However, Hanslick’s treatise comprises various remarks that indicate a similar strand of thought. In all ten editions printed during Hanslick’s life-

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33 While Cohen chose the most recent edition of his time (1885), Payzant’s choice seems completely arbitrary. A new translation by Lee Rothfarb and Christoph Landerer – to be published by Oxford University Press in 2018 – is based on the tenth edition of Hanslick’s treatise.

34 “Gefühl’ muß der Musik innewohnen, wie der Duft der Rose, aber es liegt ihr nicht auf, wie die Maske dem Schauspieler.” As far as I am aware, the preface to the second edition, including this statement, has not been translated up to this point and therefore was inaccessible to Kivy, Davies, and other analytical philosophers, who mostly rely upon Payzant’s rendition.


time, for example, he bluntly states that ‘pure’ music – being a “work of mind upon material compatible with mind” that “readily absorb[s] every idea” of its creator – is the lively product of “spontaneous activity” of the composer’s imagination that directly shapes “the product as character. Accordingly, as the creation of a thinking and feeling mind, a musical composition has in high degree the capability to be itself full of ideality and feeling” (OMB, p. 31; VMS, p. 80). In contrast to former theories of musical artworks arousing or referring to human emotion, however, this ideal content “is to be found only in the tone-structure itself […] and not in any other aspect of the work” (OMB, p. 31; VMS, p. 80). Thus, musical emotion is construed as an inherent property of music itself, completely conforming to modern versions of ‘enhanced formalism’, supposedly expanding upon Hanslick’s ‘extreme’ position: “Concerning the place of ideality and feeling in a musical composition, our view is to the prevailing view as the notion of immanence is to that of transcendence” (OMB, p. 31; VMS, p. 80).


In keeping with the analogy quoted above – which Kivy judged to be an inconsistent afterthought strangely looming in a much later preface – Hanslick had always argued chiefly against a representational relationship between music and emotion. Hanslick never denied that music could arouse emotional responses in the listener, calling the “intense feelings which music awakens in us”, one of the “most beautiful and redeeming mysteries” of the art (OMB, p. 7; VMS, p. 37). Even though numerous scholars assumed that Hanslick’s treatise suspends any relevant connection between emotion and ‘pure’ music,37

37 For three recent instances see for example: N. Zangwill, “Against Emotion: Hanslick Was Right About Music”, British Journal of Aesthetics
it merely excludes musical arousal from an *aesthetic approach* directed towards musical objects. The charge of disregarding the emotive impact of musical artworks is as old as the book itself and was already mounted by its earliest critics such as Friedrich Stade, who said that Hanslick “disallows emotional arousal via works of music”, or Hermann Lotze, who similarly assumed that *OMB* would refuse to “music the capability and purpose to arouse emotion”. However, Hanslick distinguished exclusively between the “essence” and “effect” of music, thereby opposing the “unscientific exploitation” of emotive musical perception in the realm of objective aesthetics, which must adhere to the essential principle “that the primary object of aesthetical investigation is the beautiful *object*”, not the perceiving individual (*OMB*, p. 2; *VMS*, p. 24). Indeed, Hanslick states from the second edition onward: “Ardent opponents have accused me […] of mounting a full-scale ‘polemic’

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40 At this point, Payzant’s translation (“feelings of the subject”) is patently inaccurate. As Gustav Cohen (p. 17) correctly translates, Hanslick rather refers to the “perceiving subject” (’empfindende Subjekt’), thereby rejecting aesthetic concepts of German (Kantian) idealism. For this issue also see my “Hanslick, Kant, and the Origins of *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*”, *Musicologica Austriaca – Journal for Austrian Music Studies*, www.musau.org/parts/neue-article-page/view/47.
against everything that goes by the name of feeling, whereas every impartial and attentive reader can easily see that I protest only against the erroneous involvement of feeling in science” (OMB, p. XXII; VMS, p. 9–10).

It is extremely important to see that Hanslick’s treatise does not attempt to present an exhaustive definition of music itself but rather carves out the methodical principles of a new scientific approach by radically restricting aesthetics to the intrinsic, objective properties of the musical artwork. To give a related example: Hanslick denies that historical information regarding the creator, genesis, or setting of the work is in any way essential to objective aesthetics because aesthetic research “hears and believes only what the artwork itself has to say”. (OMB, p. 39; VMS, p. 93). Contrary to an established interpretation of OMB, however, this methodical statement does not fully apply to music itself, the beauty and material of which is always treated as historically contingent. Since certain musical elements such as modulations or cadences wear out over time and lose their aesthetic appeal, we may say “of many compositions which were outstanding in their own day that once upon a time they were beautiful” (OMB, p. 35; VMS, p. 86–87). Thus, Hanslick’s insistence on the methodological differentiation between ‘aesthetics’ and ‘history’ does not entail an ahistorical conception of music itself or its ‘eternal’

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beauty – later called a “pretty figure of speech” (OMB, p. 40; VMS, p. 95) – but recognizes the historical dependency of particular instances of the musically beautiful. Aesthetics, however, established as an objective approach that takes natural science as its operational benchmark (OMB, 1; VMS, 24), was considered an ahistorical enterprise, entirely detached from issues of music history. Therefore, historical concerns are not altogether ignored but merely shifted to another, equally legitimate scientific discipline (“art-historical” investigation) for the simple reason that “for aesthetic judgment nothing is available which is not in the work of art” (OMB, p. 37; VMS, p. 89). The case of musical arousal is treated similarly as an appreciated occurrence located beyond aesthetic concerns.

5. Hanslick’s ‘Enhanced Formalism’

However, Hanslick goes beyond allowing for the psychological phenomenon of emotive musical effects by acknowledging that specific emotive terms (e.g. “arrogant, peevish, tender, spirited, yearning”) are entirely applicable to musical structure as

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43 This phrase, included in an extensive footnote, was belatedly inserted in the sixth edition onward and originally appeared in the preface of Hanslick’s anthology Die moderne Oper. Kritiken und Studien, Allgemeiner Verein für Deutsche Litteratur, Berlin 1875, p. VII.

44 As Christoph Landerer (“Eduard Hanslick’s Ästhetikprogramm und die österreichische Philosophie der Jahrhundertmitte”, Österreichische Musikzeitschrift 54/9 (1999), p. 16) correctly observes: for Hanslick, “the beautiful is a historic subject matter, aesthetics an ahistorical enterprise”.

45 For this very reason, I exclude Hanslick’s musical criticism from this paper. While OMB establishes a distinctly objectivist approach to music – scientific aesthetics – that forms the basis of Hanslick’s aesthetic argument, this method does not apply to his critical reviews that are saturated by emotive metaphors, biographical information, or art historical observations. Thus, to pit OMB against Hanslick’s criticism and vice versa is – although frequently practiced – a simple category mistake that loses sight of Hanslick’s definition of scientific aesthetics. For this issue also see my “Gefühl und Musik bei Arthur Schopenhauer und Eduard Hanslick”, Musik & Ästhetik 66 (2013) and Hanslicks Rezeption..., p. 61–86.
long as no representational relationship is assumed. Admittedly, expressive ‘metaphors’ are “only one source among others” for the verbalization of musical features, but one “may use such epithets to describe music (indeed we cannot do without them), provided we never lose sight of the fact that we are using them only figuratively and take care not to say such things as ‘This music portrays arrogance,’ etc.” (OMB, p. 32; VMS, p. 81). If there is such a thing as ‘objective’ expression in music alone, it has to be construed as an intrinsic musical property, completely independent of external features: “the powerful [recte: passionate] effect of a theme comes not from the supposed augmentation of anguish in the composer but from this or that augmented interval, not from the trembling of his soul but from the drumstrokes, not from his yearning but from the chromaticism” (OMB, p. 33; VMS, p. 82–83). By choosing musical elements with specific expressive properties, however, the musical artwork “absorbs” the composer’s affective intent. From an aesthetic perspective, however, these absorbed emotions are treated entirely as musical qualities, “i.e. as the character of the composition, not of the composer” (OMB, p. 47; VMS, p. 106). Emotional expression is therefore established as an intrinsic feature of musical structure: since specific musical elements possess “characteristic expressiveness”, the predominant characteristics of the composer (“sentimentality, energy, serenity [recte: gaiety]”) are revealed “through the composer’s consistent partiality toward certain tonalities, rhythms, transitions” (OMB, p. 47; VMS, p. 106). Hanslick’s approach, astoundingly reminiscent of Kivy’s theory, is captured vividly in the following paragraph:

It is not the actual feeling of the composer, as a merely subjective emotional state, that evokes the corresponding feeling in the hearer. If we do concede so coercive a power to music, we thereby acknowledge its cause to be something objective in the music, since only something objective can coerce in any kind of beauty. In the present instance, this something ob-
jective is the *musical* determinants of a particular piece. In a strictly aesthetical sense, we can say of any theme at all that it *sounds* noble or sad or whatever. We cannot say, however, that it is an expression of the noble or sad feelings of the composer (*OMB*, p. 47; *VMS*, p. 107).

Disregarding Hanslick’s potentially ‘enhanced’ formalism is by no means an exclusively Anglophone phenomenon. Peter Rinderle, for example, who is entirely conversant with analytical concepts of musical emotion, similarly observes an “irreconcilable dichotomy between the formal design of music and its emotional expression”,46 thus paradigmatically representing the majority opinion on Hanslick’s position. Not until Peter Kivy’s emphasis on Hanslick’s analogy of the rose does he take into consideration the possibility of a nascent ‘contour theory’ in Hanslick’s treatise, without ever quoting the intriguing qualification in the second edition of the book (1858).47 Werner Abegg, on the other hand, explicitly deliberates on Hanslick’s statement that ‘pure’ music, “as the creation of a thinking and feeling mind […] has in high degree the capability to be itself full of ideality and feeling” (*OMB*, p. 31; *VMS*, p. 80) and correctly concludes:48 “Thus, music contains emotions that cannot be detached from the specifically musical but rank among its immanent substance. […] Music is the carrier of emotions, which – along with mind [‘Geist’] – form the composition’s immanent substance and are of vital importance to aesthetics.”49 Considering Hanslick’s repeated insistence on emotion-

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al expression as an inherent property of musical structure, one can read OMB as an immediate antecedent to ‘enhanced formalism’ that displays central features of Kivy’s theory. In contrast to Stephen Benson, who simply dubbed Peter Kivy a “latter-day Hanslick”\textsuperscript{50}, or Matthew Pritchard, who wonders whether “Peter Kivy’s neo-Hanslickian propositions” have shed 
\textit{any} new light on musical expression,\textsuperscript{51} I do not propose or even suggest that Hanslick’s ‘enhanced formalism’ – only covertly present in his aesthetic treatise – renders obsolete the much more nuanced positions of modern analytical theorists. I do suggest, however, that their conceptual similarities go far beyond anything that Davies and Kivy are willing to concede.

Richard Klein has recently observed the debt ‘enhanced formalism’ owes to Hanslick’s theoretical framework, reading Kivy’s concept as a modern attempt to re-write OMB, while simultaneously eliminating its remnant romantic and idealistic convictions.\textsuperscript{52} The apparent parallels between Hanslick and ‘enhanced formalism’, although repeatedly mentioned in scholarly literature,\textsuperscript{53} have been explored primarily by Nicho-
las Cook. As early as 1998, Cook deemed Davies and Kivy to operate within a Hanslickian framework, consequently addressing the peculiar situation that modern debates regarding ‘objective’ expression in ‘pure’ music is based on an author who seemingly disavowed any such idea. For him, the perceived oddness of this fact rests upon a “widespread misreading of Hanslick, whose essential argument was not that music cannot occasion profound feeling, but that such feeling is not the proper subject-matter for aesthetics”. Since Hanslick rejects former models of affective ‘arousal’ or emotional ‘expression’ and similarly “locates the core of musical expression in its kinetic qualities, which […] reproduce the dynamic properties” of emotive conditions, Hanslick’s treatise covers “the essentials of the Kivy/Davies approach to musical expression”. 54 Thus, OMB not only anticipates cognitive theories of human emotion, still held by many anglophone philosophers, it also presents crucial elements of ‘enhanced formalism’, which seems to be “a position much closer to Hanslick’s own views” than usually assumed, “one that does not reject music’s meaningfulness but rather inscribes meaning within the musical text”. 55 After briefly outlining the ‘contour theory’ of musical emotion, Cook gives the following summary, coinciding with my own reading of Hanslick as an ‘enhanced formalist’ avant la lettre:

For Kivy, the idea that music can in this sense possess sadness – that sadness is therefore an intrinsic property of the music – is what separates his own conception of musical expression (and Davies’s, of course) from Hanslick’s. This thesis, he says, ‘is of fairly recent vintage, the product mainly of contemporary analytic philosophy’. All the same, Hanslick got remark-

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ably close to such a formulation: ‘We are perfectly justified in calling a musical theme grand, graceful, warm, hollow, vulgar’, he wrote, ‘but all these terms are exclusively suggestive of the musical character of the particular passage’.  

Thus, in the final analysis, a closer reading of Hanslick’s treatise reveals an undertheorized, phenomenological conceptualization of musical emotion, anticipating ‘enhanced formalism’ in crucial respects. If my assessment is correct, one must wonder why Davies or Kivy did not build upon Hanslick’s insights in order to bolster their innovative approach to musical expression. I do not believe that their reductionist interpretation of Hanslick’s treatise was caused by some misguided urge for utmost theoretical originality. It instead conforms to the general reading of Hanslick’s treatise by analytical philosophy as a book “which is at once a caustic polemic against the view that music ‘has to do’ with the emotions and an attempt to advance a thorough-going formalist account of the nature of music”.  

Kivy is entirely correct in his related reading that, for Eduard Hanslick, musical expression does not form the “sole or primary purpose” of ‘pure’ music, the “defining function” of which does not include the representation, expression, or arousal of so-called ‘garden-variety’ emotions. He is wrong, however, in the specific reason he gives for Hanslick’s conviction: Hanslick never states that “music, as an art, cannot” arouse the garden-variety emotions – see my preceding argument – but rather adheres to the classical concept that beauty simply does not have any “purpose of its own beyond itself” (OMB, p. 3; VMS, p. 26). As Geoffrey Payzant correct-

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56 N. Cook, Analysing Musical Multimedia..., p. 89.
58 P. Kivy, Introduction..., p. 22.
60 P. Kivy, Introduction..., p. 22.
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ly observes, Hanslick “by no means claims that music cannot arouse, express, or portray feelings; obviously it can do all these things. He merely says that to do so is not the defining purpose of music” (OMB, p. XVI). Hanslick’s cognitive theory of emotion rejects a representational relationship between feelings and ‘pure’ music as well as the interpersonal universality and objective necessity of emotive musical effects in regard to scientific aesthetics, without claiming that music itself cannot arouse or portray emotive properties:

the connection between a piece of music and our changes of feeling is not at all one of strict causation; the piece changes our mood according to our changing musical experiences and impressions. [...] Thus the connection between musical works and specific feelings does not apply always, in every case and necessarily, as an absolute imperative. [...] Thus the effect of music upon feeling possesses neither the necessity nor the exclusiveness nor the constancy which a phenomenon would have to exhibit in order to be the basis of an aesthetical principle [!] (OMB, p. 6–7; VMS, p. 35–37).

In regard to the general concept of ‘pure’ music, the “immediate manifestness of feeling” (OMB, p. XXII; VMS, p. 10) is as important to Hanslick as it is to many other theorists. He simply doubts that expressive properties and their emotive effect could be universally objectified, thus excluding musical emotion from his severely positivist approach to musical aesthetics, “striving for as objective as possible a scientific knowledge of things”, not from music itself in all its relevant contexts. If musical aesthetics is to be conducted seriously, it “will have to approach the method of the natural sciences, at least to the point of attempting to get alongside the thing itself” (OMB, p. 1; VMS, p. 22). In Hanslick’s original wording, the phrase including “the thing itself” reads as “den Dingen selbst an den Leib rücken” (‘to grasp the core of things’), therefore clearly alluding not to the Kantian ‘thing-in-itself’ but rather indicat-
ing a proto-phenomenological stance, strikingly reminiscent of Edmund Husserl’s idea that we have to ‘return to the things as such’ (“auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen”). In this context, it is also extremely important to keep in mind that Hanslick did not attempt to establish an inductive, empiricist aesthetics à la Gustav Theodor Fechner but was concerned exclusively with methodical parameters, even directly rejecting the possibility of an “‘exact’ science of music after the model of chemistry or of physiology” (OMB, p. 35; VMS, p. 85). Hard empirical sciences (physiology, neurology, acoustics) can guard against factual fallacies and are “of the utmost importance for our comprehension of auditory impressions as such”, but are not part of musical aesthetics (OMB, p. 56; VMS, p. 123). Since empirical sciences examine the physical elements of music and the sensory apparatus of listening and processing, thereby missing the constitutive intellectual aspects of musical artworks as well as their holistic perception, they have to be regarded as ancillary disciplines, detached from genuine aesthetic research (VMS, p. 123).

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63 Again, Payzant’s rendition is extremely misleading. Payzant’s translates: “The double requirement of a strictly scientific framework and the most elaborate casuistics makes the task a very formidable but not quite insurmountable one: to strive for the ideal of an ‘exact’ science of music after the model of chemistry or of physiology.” However, Hanslick holds the opposite opinion: this task can be achieved unless (‘es wäre denn’) the goal is an “‘exact’ science of music”.
64 In the first edition of VMS, Hanslick clarifies that empirical research can merely guard against fallacious arguments but does not contribute positively to aesthetics. The passage was deleted from the fourth edition onwards (1874) and has thus not been included in Cohen’s or Payzant’s translations, which are based on later versions of Hanslick’s treatise.
6. ‘Silhouettes’ – Hanslick’s Conception of Indefinite Expression

Bearing in mind these essential distinctions, it is easy to see why Kivy’s notion that Hanslick’s treatise “must be seen as entirely ruling out the relevance of emotive descriptions to our characterization of absolute music as an art” is only partially accurate.\(^{65}\) Whereas Hanslick’s strict model of scientific aesthetics indeed negates that emotive descriptions of musical artworks can ever attain general validity, his overall concept of music itself – in contrast to Kivy’s reading – does not detach music from human emotion in any “art-relevant way”.\(^{66}\) Kivy’s idea that Hanslick “denied to music even the most minimal power to embody the garden-variety emotions”\(^{67}\) directly opposes Hanslick’s numerous remarks on expressive elements as part of musical structure. Stephen Davies, however, supports Kivy’s reductive approach to OMB, declares ‘enhanced formalism’ an immediate expansion of Hanslick’s position, whose rigorous formalism had to be amended by the inclusion of emotive features, and equally denies that Hanslick conceives of emotional expression as “a property directly attributable to musical materials […]. I am inclined to concur with Kivy.”\(^{68}\)

Hence, neither Davies nor Kivy – due to an extreme reading of Hanslick’s treatise – realise that Hanslick openly embraces musical emotion as an intrinsic property of musical elements. Later on, I will briefly explore why Hanslick did not pursue this issue to its fullest extent, primarily motivated by his theoretical conviction that emotive ‘content’ of music alone only ever results in \textit{indefinite} expression. As the dynamic aspects of emotion that ‘pure’ music can portray directly constitute only “\textit{one} attribute, however, one moment of feeling, not feeling it-

\(^{65}\) P. Kivy, \textit{Antithetical Arts…}, p. 55.
\(^{66}\) P. Kivy, \textit{Antithetical Arts…}, p. 56.
\(^{67}\) P. Kivy, \textit{New Essays…}, p. 95.
\(^{68}\) S. Davies, \textit{Musical Meaning…}, p. 221 and p. 204.
self" (OMB, p. 11; VMS, p. 46–47), the expressive properties of music cannot be objectified completely. For now, we have to remain with the ‘extreme reading’ of Hanslick’s aesthetics.

Hanslick’s argument regarding the qualified autonomy of music and words in vocal pieces is an excellent example for the continuous overstatement of his ‘extreme’ position. Hanslick proposes that musical beauty in a given vocal piece can remain intact even if the original literary content is changed, naming Bach, Gluck, and Handel as familiar instances of this common practice, who used the same music for different artworks in various stylistic genres (OMB, p. 19; VMS, p. 59–60). Thus, he primarily indicates the essential vagueness of musical expression that fits multiple literary contexts and does not say that “any music is suitable to any expressive text”, as Kivy commented mistakenly.69 The dynamic features of music itself can correspond to several emotion states, the dynamic impetus of which is often similar, and are ultimately specified by the words used for the given piece: “In an operatic melody, e.g., one which had very effectively expressed anger, you will find no other […] psychical expression than that of a rapid, impulsive motion. The same melody might just as effectively render words expressing the exact opposite, namely, passionate love” (OMB, p. 17; VMS, p. 55). However, Hanslick’s hypothesis regarding the qualified autonomy of words and music simultaneously acknowledges individual gradations of expressive adequacy, illustrated by his famous example of Christoph Willibald Gluck’s aria “Che farò senza Euridice”: the emotive ‘content’ of Gluck’s music, as perceived by Hanslick, does not fit the dramatic situation since “music certainly possesses far more specific tones for the expression of passionate grief” (OMB, p. 18; VMS, p. 57). Hanslick’s assertion has puzzled various scholars who shared Kivy’s notion that music and words are

69 P. Kivy, Antithetical Arts..., p. 9.
completely arbitrary, according to Hanslick’s formalism.\textsuperscript{70} However, Hanslick’s actual theory is situated between these extreme opposites: On the one hand, the dynamic aspects of emotion and music do not stand in any \textit{necessary} relationship, objectively determining the concrete meaning of ‘pure’ music with general validity. On the other hand, however, the elaborate connection between emotional expression, music, and text is not considered \textit{entirely} random. Hanslick simply argues for an \textit{open range} of expressive musical meaning, an unfixed spectrum of indefinite \textit{expressivity}, which positively excludes particular emotive readings without positing any \textit{causal} nexus between musical structure and precise feelings.\textsuperscript{71} As Sanja Srečković recently observed: “Hanslick takes musical elements to be indefinitely expressive.”\textsuperscript{72} The most vivid explanation of Hanslick’s position is given in a passing remark: Detached from their texts, even the most expressive passages of vocal music will “at best only allow us to \textit{guess} which feelings they express. They are like silhouettes whose originals we cannot recognize without someone giving us a hint as to their identity” (\textit{OMB}, p. 18; \textit{VMS}, p. 57). Hanslick’s evocation of ‘silhouettes’ completely conforms to my proposed reading of his nascent version of ‘enhanced formalism’. Whereas a circular silhouette ‘portrays’ many circular objects – a ball, a planet, a cake viewed from above –, never allowing for any \textit{single} ‘correct’ reading, it


\textsuperscript{71} Hanslick’s approach therefore resembles Susanne Langer’s theory, who similarly declared: “music at its highest, though clearly a symbolic form, is an unconsummated symbol. Articulation is its life, but not assertion; expressiveness, not expression.” \textit{Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art}, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1951, p. 240.

\textsuperscript{72} S. Srečković, “Eduard Hanslick’s Formalism…” , p. 131.
does preclude particular unsuitable interpretations. Hanslick’s aesthetic approach therefore recognizes emotional expression as an indefinite property of musical structure, but does not endorse objective accounts of specific musical emotions, necessarily recognized by every perceiving individual. Thus, ‘enhanced formalism’ – although clearly present in Hanslick’s account of ‘pure’ music and its intrinsic expressive properties – cannot satisfy his severe criteria for scientific aesthetics and was not pursued any further.

7. Conclusion

In summary, Eduard Hanslick recognized the possibility of expressive properties as part of musical structure, therefore anticipating the core idea of ‘enhanced formalism’, but he was not entirely convinced that these expressive properties could ever be objectified completely, thus ruling them out as a viable basis for scientific aesthetics. His primary concern – known today as ‘argument from disagreement’ – is the interpersonal universality of musical features that does not apply to musical emotion. Imagine asking a concert audience to describe the emotive ‘content’ of a certain theme they just have listened to: “Who will come forward and venture to declare that some specific feeling is the content of one of these themes? One person will say ‘love’. Possibly. Another thinks ‘yearning’. Perhaps. A third feels ‘piety’. Nobody can refute any of them. And so it goes. Can we call it the representation of a specific feeling when nobody knows what feeling was actually represented?” (OMB, p. 14; VMS, p. 51–52). As I have argued above, this idea does not en-

73 Kivy and Davies, who – given their ‘animation tendency’ – need emotional descriptions of music alone to be somewhat consistent, dismiss Hanslick’s argument: P. Kivy, Sound Sentiment..., p. 203–204; S. Davies, “Artistic Expression and the Hard Case of Pure Music”, in: Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, ed. M. Kieran, Blackwell, Malden / Oxford 2006, p. 183. However, Kivy (Introduction to a Philos-
tail the absence of expressive properties in ‘pure’ music. It does only mean that music’s emotive ‘content’ – although inherent to musical structure – is inevitably indefinite. Since dynamic qualities are “one attribute, however, one moment of feeling, not feeling itself”, a one-to-one correlation between a specific musical theme and particular emotions simply does not exist. Thus, even though Hanslick conceived of musical emotion as an intrinsic property of music itself – based on the shared dynamic features of emotion and music – expressive elements lack objective reliability and do not present a viable option as an aesthetic principle. As Hanslick clarifies in regard to Moritz von Schwind’s painting of Beethoven’s Choral Fantasy, op. 80:

Just as the painter extracts scenes and figures from the tones, so does the listener classify them as feelings and events. Both interpretations have some kind of connection with the tones, but not a necessary one. And scientific laws have to do only with necessary connections (OMB, p. 37; VMS, p. 89).

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*phy of Music…, p. 26* once again distorts Hanslick’s reasoning by saying: “The claim is simply that listeners are in complete [!] disagreement in any given case about what emotive term or description correctly characterizes the music.” The point of Hanslick’s conjecture is not complete disarray, but rather the absence of complete agreement. For a more detailed discussion of this issue also see my *Hanslicks Rezeption…, p. 273–279.*
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