Poznanie zabarwione emocjami jako norma ludzkiego funkcjonowania

Filip Gęsiarz


Cognition Finted with Emotions as a Norm of Human Functioning

There is a widely spread belief that rationality is the distinguishing characteristic of man. This study was intended to investigate whether our everyday cognitive functioning is really free from the influence of irrational factors such as emotions. It begins with an overview of research findings in the field of neuroscience showing the primacy of affect over cognition in perception. Limitations concerning conscious analysis of various activities are discussed and the ways emotions modify our cognitive processing are shown. Attention is paid to the informative function of emotions and the fact that ignoring affects allows autistic individuals to make more rational choices in specific situations than do healthy individuals. Finally, the somatic marker hypothesis is characterised as a conception that offers a holistic approach to the collaborating cognitive and affective systems.


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