O pewnej anomalii w ludzkim działaniu. Wolna wola w epoce znaturalizowanej świadomości

Free Will: an Anomaly in Human Action

Free will has never been a particularly atractive notion, but currently it has found itself under a particularly vicious attack coming from the natural sciences’ camp. It is claimed that this attack could be prevented if we could reject the tacit assumption that free will is a common, everyday phenomenon. Four important components of the concept of free will are distinguished and it is argued that if we conceive of free will as of an anomaly, or even a kind of a “natural miracle,” it would become possible to defend it. In the process, we can also gain better insight into what free will in fact is.

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