Dlaczego reprezentacje nie trzymają się modeli dynamicznych?

Tomasz Korbak

Abstrakt

Why representations don't stick with dynamic models?

In this paper I investigate thesis, embraced by proponents of dynamicism in cognitive science, that mind is not representational and explanation of cognition can go without representations. This claim has received serious criticism from cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, who accuse dynamical explanation of being satisfying only for a narrow class of simple cognitive phenomena. Thus, genuine, representation-free explanation of cognition will always be incomplete. I espouse another strategy and present two arguments saying that the language of pure dynamical systems theory is not rich enough to define any nontrivial notion of representation. If I am right, then at least these phenomena dynamical explanation deals well with are not representational and representation talk can in no way help us understand them

Słowa kluczowe: philosophy of cognitive science, dynamical explanation, representation, cognitive models, Clark, van Gelder
References

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