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PLATO’S PHAEDRUS 253E5–255A1 REVISITED. A REAPPRAISAL OF PLATO’S VIEW ON THE SOUL*

Unter Philologie soll hier, in einem sehr allgemeinen Sinne, die Kunst, gut zu lesen, verstanden werden.
Nietzsche, Antichrist 52

Abstract. The paper is a reconsideration of the second part of the chariot allegory (Phdr. 253e5–255a1). After presenting a rationale and status questionis I analyse what Plato says about the lover’s soul when he meets his beloved. As a result a new interpretation is offered. It departs from orthodox and common readings because I suggest that (i) the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse stand not only for, respectively, reason, spirit and appetite, and that (ii) thinking, feeling and desiring should be ascribed not only to, respectively, the charioteer, the good and the bad horse. It is rather that each element of the psyche contains a kind of rationality, a kind of affectivity, and a kind of appetite, and, each of the three functions belongs to each of the three elements of the soul. The inward differentiation of kinds of functions should be understood by means of hierarchy.

Keywords: Plato, the Phaedrus, Plato’s conception

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* I had started working on what has now become this paper over 20 years ago. Some elements were contained in my PhD thesis (Warsaw 1998) and in several works published since then (e.g. R. Zaborowski, Rozumienie logos, esp. pp. 104–106 (with an Abstract in English, p. 113) & R. Zaborowski, Sur le sentiment chez les Présocratiques, pp. 140–144). The research during which the paper was written in Vandœuvres (2007, 2013, 2017), Edinburgh (2008, 2011), Cork and Dublin (2010, 2011), Cambridge (2011), and Utrecht (2012), was funded, respectively, by the Hardt Foundation, the British Academy, the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the Royal Irish Academy, the De Brzezie Lanckoronski Foundation, and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Various elements of this paper were presented in Edinburgh (2008), Madrid (2009), Glasgow (2011), and Cagliari (2012). The paper as it is published here is the second part of what has become too long to be published in one piece. For the first part see R. Zaborowski, Two Neglected Details in Plato’s Chariot Allegory. I am grateful to Tadeusz Kobierzycki, the late Jacques Brunschwig, Douglas L. Cairns, the late Scott Austin, Purificación Sánchez Zamorano, Josh Wilburn, and, last not least, Anthony W. Price and Kostas Kalimtzis for their useful comments and stimulating remarks.
of the soul, tripartition of the soul, Plato’s chariot allegory, hierarchical approach.

1. Preliminary remarks

This paper concentrates on the *Phaedrus* 253e5–255a1, which is a description of the lover in his meeting with a beloved. The description is worked out by Plato by means of an allegory of a chariot composed of a charioteer and two horses. Plato introduced the allegory and developed it earlier. At 253c7–d1 we are explicitly told that the allegory started with the division of the soul – by way of approximation – into three forms, i.e. at 246a3 ff. I have analysed the context in view of the allegory of the soul in another paper which is why the introduction to this paper is short. This is also why what follows will be better read together with the first paper. The importance of the passage is exceptional insofar as it is used to form an opinion about Plato’s view on the soul generally and the relation between rationality and affectivity in particular, with corollaries concerning the human being, personality and several other themes. Since I consider that the common reading is a misreading, I find necessary to discuss the passage in detail. Because of my claim I need first to discuss a number of other readings to show how far they are erroneous. If I happen to overload my paper with references to the secondary literature I beg the reader to be excused. I believe the issue to be of such importance that I don’t wish to be neglectful or incomplete in my argument. As it is, the purpose of my work is twofold: critical insofar as I discuss downsides of a widespread interpretation and positive insofar as I urge a new reading. I shall suggest how it may help understand not only the passage itself but also, and this is equally if not more important, its multi-layered conception of a human being. Thereby, it also contributes to current discussion about the relation between thinking (reason) and feeling (emotion).

An important proviso is required. This paper is about the *Phaedrus* and is limited to the *Phaedrus*. What I mean is that I pass over the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, where Plato has a lot to say about the soul as well. I was told that such an approach is very strong, and rests on strong presuppositions, and have a great deal of consequences. I do not say that the arguments of the author are flawed – in fact, there is, indeed, a difficulty – but positing this thesis, without facing it with *Republic* and *Timaeus* seems [...] quite misleading. It is maybe not Phaedrus’ scope to give a clear account of the nature of the tripartite soul; but it does not entail that some solutions could be provided by the Republic and Timaeus. I was told that such an approach is well grounded. The difference

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1 See R. Zaborowski, *Two Neglected Details in Plato’s Chariot Allegory*.

2 An anonymous reviewer for another journal in 2015.
between the *Phaedrus* on the one hand and the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* on the other in what concerns Plato’s claims about the soul is so enormous that I don’t know how to explain them. What is more, any resort to a developmentalist view fails because the *Phaedrus* is almost unanimously – with exception of Owen and Robinson – regarded as later than the *Republic* but earlier than the *Timaeus*. What is at stake is that almost unanimously and too often the three forms, functions, aspects or parts are interpreted according to one element/one function ascription in the following way: the charioteer as the reason (or the rational), the good (or the white) horse as the spirited (or the emotive/affective), and the bad (or the black) horse as the desiderative (or the appetitive).

In my view, as I hope to prove, such an interpretation flies in the face of the description Plato offers. But let me first point to the extent of the misreading – I refer only to Platonists but it should not be forgotten that this interpretation is taken up by many others who, most probably, did not read what Plato says in his dialogue. The impact of this interpretation of the *Phaedrus’* account is so strong that it is observable also outside the scholarship in the fields of Plato or ancient philosophy. It goes far beyond it and has been accepted as such by

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1 The *Phaedrus’* approach (i) is allegorical, (ii) gives the description of the soul in process and, last not least, (iii) in the *Phaedrus* – and only there – the soul is said to be unoriginated in its entirety (246a1–2: ἐν ἀφρόνιστον τὸ καὶ ἀδήπτως τοῦ ἐνι, see also 245d1 and d3). For more see R. Zaborowski, *Two Neglected Details in Plato’s Chariot Allegory*, pp. 192–197. However, I don’t want to give the impression that the pictures in the *Republic* and in the *Phaedrus* are insolubly incompatible. The conclusion I arrive at is partly similar to what several scholars dealing with the *Republic* reach. See Appendix 1 below.

2 If G. E. L. Owen, *The Place of the Timaeus in Plato’s Dialogues*, p. 95 – and Robinson (see note) – were right that we [should] set the *Phaedrus* after the *Timaeus*, then it would make no more sense to say that at the end of his life – in the *Timaeus* – Plato abandoned the tripartition and, more importantly, the opposite would be true: the *Phaedrus* would be, together with the *Laws*, Plato’s last word on the structure of the soul. But my wishful preference plays no role in this paper.

3 See T. M. Robinson, *Plato’s Psychology*, p. 63, n. 20: [...] I tentatively follow G. E. L. Owen [...] in seeing it [the *Timaeus*] rather as the crowning work of the Republic group, followed closely by the *Phaedrus*.

4 Plato’s word is εἰδόν (Phdr. 253c8). See J. Moline, *Plato’s Theory of Understanding*, p. 53: These parts have been termed “faculties,” “principles,” “activities,” “aspects,” “instances,” and “levels” of the psyche. I suppose those who speak about parts take too literally that Plato makes a division (Phdr. 253c7, ἐνόμως) – but the division does not have to result in parts: Plato speaks simply about a division into three (Phdr. 253c7: τρίον). As I shall suggest, *stratum* is a better term since it presupposes a qualitative distinction by involving a vertical (hierarchical) perspective.

5 Some are skeptical as to whether the allegory is compatible with the tripartition of the soul Plato presents and discusses at length in the *Republic*, e.g. P. Natorp, *Dottrina platonica delle Idee*, pp. 562–563: I due corsieri del cocchio dell’anima (non possono affatto essere interpretati come l’ανθρωποκλητικ e il θεοκλητικ della Repubblica. [...] nel Fedro non è dato mai trovare la più fissa allusione a un θεοκλητικ e a un ανθρωποκλητικ come parte autonoma dell’anima [...] (but the reason of this may be that he places the *Phaedrus* before the *Republic*, see P. Natorp, *Dottrina platonica delle Idee*, p. 565: [...] quella [classificazione] del Fedro può essere intesa come rotonda prefigurazione della tripartizione della Republica). See also A. W. Price, *Parts of the Soul in Plato’s Phaedrus*, p. 2, also skeptical about identifying the *Phaedra’s* allegory with the tripartition of the Republic. What I wish to do here is to read the psychology of Socrates’ second speech in a way that relates it to the Republic, but despairs of any one-to-one mapping between the soul-parts that are distinguished there, and the elements of the chariot of the soul here [...] and most explicitly L. Gerson, *A Note on Tripartition and Immortality in Plato*, p. 93: [...] the charioteer and horses, on this model, cannot represent tripartite, incarnated, vicious and acratic individuals, whose selves are, as we have seen, acutely divided.
scholars who do not look into Plato’s text instead simply relying on those whom they considered authorities in the matter.

2. Status questionis

This is about what I would call an orthodox interpretation. Obviously, one could hardly refer to all interpretations so huge is the secondary literature on the Phaedrus’ allegory. I hope that the selection below is representative and will speak for itself. I tried to check as many works as possible without going into excess. However, if my selection may seem partial, I only am to blame. What has surprised me the most is that while translations of the passage are characteristically correct, this is not so for the interpretation of the charioteer and both horses. It means that not only those who read the Phaedrus in Greek but also Greekless readers are, it seems to me, able to read the passage correctly but, curiously, they do not do so. Plato’s technical terms he put forward in the Republic – to logistikon, to thumoeides, to epithumetikon – are absent in the Phaedrus, so there is no issue of rendering Plato’s technical terms into modern language. Instead there is a description rich enough to let us build a conception of what the three actors symbolize.

I wonder if the reason why the features of the charioteer and of the two horses are not so often taken into consideration correctly in the analysis of the passage is not as old as the tradition of conceiving the human psyche by means of the reason – emotion dichotomy. But this tradition cannot be outlined here.

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1 Or even worse. Moreover, this kind of picture is spread out far beyond Platonists and philosophers of mind. To give one example, albeit an extremely influential one, see J. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, p. 24: For him [i.e. Plato], emotions were like wild horses that have to be reined in by the intellect, which he thought of as a charioteer, with no reference given. J. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, p. 24 & p. 107, makes another two claims: Plato, for example, said that passions and desires and fears make it impossible for us to think, and: Plato proclaimed that the passions are wild beasts trying to escape from the human body. In both cases his reference is the Phaedo (undetermined page) indicated after: A. Flew, Body, mind and death, Macmillan, New York 1964, which is a series of Readings, Selected, Edited, and Furnished with an Introductory Essay. But what is even more unexpected is that, as we will see at the end of this paper, the core of Plato’s view, in the way I reconstruct it here, resembles several of LeDoux’s statements (see below). For more examples see R. Zaborowski, Some remarks on Plato on emotions & R. Zaborowski, On the Relevance of Plato’s View on Affectivity … As I see it, Plato is charged with a (very) negative view of the emotions or is believed to be the first who developed it. But the reality is that this is not Plato who misrepresents human nature but interpreters who misrepresent his view. I have tried to do justice to Plato’s view on affectivity in several papers and chapters. See R. Zaborowski, Emotions et liberté dans la paideia, R. Zaborowski, Feeling–Thought Linkage and its Forms …, R. Zaborowski, Some remarks on Plato on emotions, R. Zaborowski, Plato and Max Scheler on the Affective World & R. Zaborowski, On the Relevance of Plato’s View on Affectivity ….

2 On the opposition (or distinction?) of ἐλογος versus νίθος in Plato and afterwards see below. P. A. Vander Waerdt, Peripatetic Soul–Division …, p. 373, speaks about a dichotomy between reason and emotion that Plato’s elevation of θυμός to independent status was meant to modify. In my view this is anachronistic. I hope that this paper will prove that, at least as for the Phaedrus, the dichotomy between reason and emotion is not yet set. Accordingly, it would be more appropriate to speak about an elaboration of integrated view by Plato (see below).

3 P. A. Vander Waerdt, The Peripatetic Interpretation … & P. A. Vander Waerdt, Peripatetic Soul–Division …, may be right that it begins with the peripatetic interpretation of Plato’s tripartite psychology. However, as P. A. Vander Waerdt, Peripatetic Soul–Division …, p. 381, indicates, it is Clement who attributes the Peripatetic doctrine to Plato and in doing so he uses the chariote allegory’s elements. The relevant passage from Clement is from his Stromata 5.8.53.1.1–3: ὀνάσις καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Περί νησίς [i.e. the Phaedrus] τὸν τι ηγούμεν καὶ τὸν ἐπιστευτικόν ἵππον (τὸ ἀλόγον μέρος, ὃ δὴ ὅχι τέμπτια, εἰς θυμόν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) κυνηγήσαν δεινών. Το με it looks like a total deformation (a horse distanced from the charioteer, meaning τὸ ἀλόγον and divided into two!) rather than a Peripatetic interpretation.
So let me start with an example from Marsilio Ficino’s comment:

*In the soul joined [to the body], the soul agitated by corporeal passions [passionibus corporeis], he means the reason [rationem], as it participates in the understanding, to serve as the charioteer, and the irascible and concupiscible powers to serve as the horses [...].*

And this is what we read again and again since then. What I have found can scarcely be a prosaic mishap since most of my checks give the same, or a very similar, result. I begin with two explicit claims about the commonality of this interpretation:

*It is generally agreed that [...] the charioteer symbolizes reason*,

and:

*In the charioteer and good and bad horses respectively we can discern, as is commonly agreed, at least an approximate correspondence to the reasoning, spirited and appetitive parts of soul (to give them their usual labels) familiar from the analysis in the Republic [...] the charioteer, the voice of reason in the soul.*

As McGibbon and Ferrari describe it, this way of interpreting is general and it could be said without exaggeration, I think, that the interpretation of the *Phaedrus*’ charioteer as reason has become a kind of official or orthodox doctrine. Here you are a selection of examples of interpreting the charioteer as reason (my underlining):

*the charioteer represents the reason*,

*the charioteer represents the reason*,

*[the charioteer is clearly reason]*,

*The charioteer represents reason*,

*the charioteer – the intellect – is troubled by his horses*,

*[the charioteer is reason (and the accompanying desires, as in Republic, Book 9, 580d)]*

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1 Marsilio Ficino and the *Phaedrus* Charioteer, pp. 184–185 (underlining is mine). How much Ficino’s reading is biased can be seen from the following, pp. 186–187: *The nature of desire, on the other hand, in the meanwhile drags the reason down towards sexual intercourse and procreation [coitum atque genus] – the latter being absent from Plato’s passage.*

2 D. D. McGibbon, *The Fall of the Soul in Plato’s Phaedrus*, p. 56 underlining is mine).

3 G. R. F. Ferrari, *Listening to the Cicadas*, p. 185 & p. 186 (underlining is mine).


6 D. A. Rees, *Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy*, p. 112. For him, p. 113, *it is plain that the three constituents of the myth are the parts of the soul figuring in the Republic.*


8 A. W. H. Adkins, *From the Many to the One …*, p. 133.

la raison étant le cocher¹,  
the charioteer, reason²,  
The charioteer represents reason³,  
the soul (= reason) as a charioteer⁴,  
correspond[s] [...] the driver to the faculty of reason⁵,  
the charioteer, reason⁶,  
The Reasoning part of the soul is the charioteer⁷,  
a charioteer representing reason⁸,  
la plus haute [partie de l’âme] [...] à savoir la raison [...] Ici le cocher symbolise la raison⁹,  
Whatever passion there is in true Platonic love has to be supplied by the charioteer, reason itself¹⁰.

And so on and so forth. The same in a recent commentary:
The chariot image is compatible with the tripartite soul of the Republic: charioteer equivalent to reason.¹¹

And to end, let me remark that in a recent volume Plato and the Divided Self we meet a similar identification in three contributions:
charioteer (reason) [...] The image of the charioteer expresses (better than the image of the farmer in the Republic) reason’s two functions: to manage the other

¹ J. de Romilly, Les conflits de l’âme dans le Phèdre de Platon, p. 104.
² R. Bett, Immortality and the Nature of the Soul in the Phaedrus, p. 20.
³ C. L. Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 96. However, his approach is more nuanced. Compare pp. 109–110: Neither here nor elsewhere in the palinode, indeed, are we offered a conception of the soul in which reason, emotion, and desire are simply indifferent to one another. [...] The doubt here concerns an opposition not between reason and emotion but between one kind of complex of reason/emotion and another (true reason and genuine satisfaction versus opinion and false satisfaction).
⁵ S. Lovibond, Plato’s theory of mind, p. 52.
⁷ C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast … , p. 298. Bobonich is unambiguous as far as he consider[s] in more detail the ways in which Plato restricts both lower parts in the Phaedrus and the Timaeus. See also p. 300: […] the Spirited part […] is fundamentally more similar to the Appetitive part than to the Reasoning part. And although the myth does not employ analytic terms, it makes it clear that the fundamental point of similarity between the lower parts and of dissimilarity between them and the upper part is epistemological.
⁸ M. F. Burnyeat, The Truth of Tripartition, p. 6. Likewise in the French version: M. F. Burnyeat, La vérité de la tripartition, p. 42: l’âme est un composé figuré par un cocher qui représente la raison. His position is more complex in M. F. Burnyeat, The passion of reason in Plato’s Phaedrus, a paper that for a long time had been known to those who had attended Burnyeat’s lecture, and which had been referred to as an unpublished version. We meet there a series of expressions such as the charioteer of pure reason which is said to be simplicity (p. 247), then an idea that there can be desire and thought on both sides of the conflict (p. 253, also p. 254: movements of thought and desire), next the non-rational and unreasoned types of desire represented by the two horses (p. 255), and finally changes of thought and feeling on either side (p. 254). Nonetheless, no systematic treatment of how these concepts are set out within the soul and/or its elements is provided (all underlining is mine).
⁹ L. Mouze, Introduction to: Platon, Phèdre, p. 81.
¹⁰ C. J. Rowe, The charioteer and his horses … , p. 146.
¹¹ H. Yunis, Commentary, p. 138.
parts and to know the truth, 
the white horse helps the charioteer [...] Spirit should still come to the assistance of reason, 
the activity of reason (viz., dianoia/the charioteer).

The point I disagree with and I am going to confront is the identification of the charioteer with the reason only and, on the other hand, of the reasoning faculty with the charioteer only. And the same is, mutatis mutandis, true of two other elements and two other mental functions traditionally ascribed to them. But before I pass on to what Plato writes, I have to mention alternative analyses and interpretations. They propose a different identification of the charioteer. However, since they are ambiguous, I cannot consider them as anticipatory of mine or can say that they are so only to a limited degree.

First comes Ioannidi’s paper where we read that: 

Le cocher est bien l’instance «hégémonique», mais comment l’appeler «raison» étant donné que les bêtes n’ont pas de raison et que les âmes déchues du ciel, qui est leur lieu originel, s’incarnent sur terre en hommes [...].

This is ambiguous because although she expresses a doubt about the chariot being the reason, she doesn’t give the charioteer any label and, also, the reason of her doubt is unclear: the chariot is not, after all, an animal. More complex is the case of A. W. Price. Here is what he says in his Mental Conflict: 

It is the charioteer who ‘catches sight of the light of his beloved’, which fills him ‘with tickling and pricks of longing’ (253e5–254a1). Here a cognitive experience is itself intensely felt: indeed the feeling is integral to the cognition, guaranteeing that (as the charioteer has yet explicitly to comprehend) to look at the boy’s face is to recollect the Form of Beauty (cf. 250c8–251a7).

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1 R. Kamtekar, *Speak with the same voice as reason*, p. 85 & p. 96. She goes as far as to say (p. 97) that representing reason as the charioteer leads us not only to identify with reason, but also to regard the behavior (and presumably also the condition) of our appetites and emotions as our responsibility, just as a charioteer is responsible for his horses (underlining is mine).

2 T. Brennan, *The nature of the spirited part of the soul and its object*, p. 119 (underlining is mine).

3 C. Sheffield, *Eros before and after tripartition*, p. 227 (underlining is mine).

4 H. Ioannidi, *Contribution à l’étude de la doctrine platonicienne du thymos*, p. 181 (underlining is mine).

5 But this is to be treated with caution all the more since this is only the first part of the paper with the second to be about une autre composante de ce concept platonicien (H. Ioannidi, *Contribution à l’étude de la doctrine platonicienne du thymos*, p. 182), which was never published (as I have learnt from L. Brisson, H. Ioannidi died prematurely). However, in this 15–page long published paper no more than one page is devoted to the *Phaedrus* and, last not least, the paper aims at *thumos*, not reason, so the role of this claim is secondary.

6 A. W. Price, *Mental Conflict*, p. 78 (underlining is mine, italics for felt is Prize’s). See also M. F. Burnyeat, *The passion of reason in Plato’s Phaedrus*, p. 258: [...] what gives the philosopher the emotional strength to overcome his lower impulses is the gradual growing of his wings, which means: the recovery of knowledge from within. [...] intensely felt, understanding of what the life of the soul is really like (underlining is mine).
So far so good. Yet on preceding pages Price subscribes to the common opinion since he writes:

*the charioteer of the soul, namely reason* [...] *The charioteer is the emblem of reason*. 1

What is more, he makes the same identification in several papers of his, published both earlier and later, e.g.  

*the driver (that is, reason)* [...] *the cognition is reason’s, the benefit the whole soul’s*. 2

or

*the charioteer of reason, assisted by the horse of spirit* [...] 3

and:

*the charioteer of the soul, that is reason*. 4

And in his more recent paper on this topic I am aware of he says:  

*in the Phaedrus he* [i.e. Socrates] *ascribes anti–rational anger that confronts reason to the bad horse (254c7)* 5.

All this is equivocal since I cannot judge how much we deal here with an isolated remark of Price as opposed to his opposite claim restated several times. More particularly, I don’t know to what extent Price anticipated what I will suggest in my paper and to what extent he shares the common interpretation of the charioteer as reason, which I will argue against.

The third author, Palumbo, is ambiguous for a similar reason. In fact, when she speaks about the whole soul, she writes:

*un’anima innamorata [...] quella certa forma di pensiero, che rappresenta la seconda componente dell’emozione [...] una sensazione, un sentimento o un pensare [...] L’insieme di queste tre componenti, un insieme strutturato nel modo descritto*, 6

yet on the next page she states explicitly that:

*l’auriga corrisponde all’ intelletto* 7.

As it is, I was unable to find an interpretation of characterization of the charioteer and both horses being in accordance with a detailed description elaborated by Plato. None, however strange may it seem, is correct because none takes into account the whole description, i.e. all details Plato places in his description. Before I embark on my analysis of *Phdr. 253e5–255a1*, it is fair to devote also some remarks on Ferrari’s observations. This is because although I

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1 A. W. Price, *Mental Conflict*, p. 71 & p. 74 (underlining is mine).
3 A. W. Price, *Plato and Freud*, p. 265 (underlining is mine).
4 A. W. Price, *Reason’s New Role in the Phaedrus*, p. 244 (underlining is mine).
5 A. W. Price, *Parts of the Soul in Plato’s Phaedrus*, p. 8 (underlining is mine). In his last book, A. W. Price, *Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle*, he practically does not use the *Phaedrus*.
6 L. Palumbo, *Eros Phobos Epithymia*, p. 48 (underlining is mine).
7 L. Palumbo, *Eros Phobos Epithymia*, p. 49 (underlining is mine).
have quoted him above among supporters of the common interpretation\(^1\), he is, in another point, quite close to what I am going to arrive at. Ferrari published a paper on the passage in question and then he revisited it in two sections of his book\(^2\). Ferrari focuses on

\[\textit{a curious feature of the give–and–take between two of the figures, the charioteer and the bad horse [...] namely, that although the charioteer seems to stand for the control of reason and the bad horse for brutish, uninhibited lust, in the struggle between the two it is the bad horse who adopts persuasive language and the methods of reason, while the charioteer maintains control by sheer strength and wordless violence. [...]\] \(^3\)

What is unprecedented in his comment is to see that

\[\textit{the charioteer and bad horse in their respective attempts to realise their desires, each adopt methods more appropriate (given the content of those desires) to the other.}^4\]

And, as far as I can say, he is right when he writes that this is:

\[\textit{a feature which, so far as I can discover, has as yet passed without adequate remark among scholars}^5\].

This looks promising. Yet Ferrari, first, limits his analysis of the passage to the two elements only instead of three. Since

\[\textit{the good horse does not take part in this exchange of roles}^6\],

Ferrari does not take it into account. This shows that he is interested in \textit{the exchange of the roles} only, rather than – as will be the case in this paper – in the meaning of the chariot as a whole and in the way it is described and characterized in action. Since most of his analysis is set in dichotomic terms, e.g.

\[\textit{‘reason’ and ‘desire’ are symptomatic of their \textit{[i.e. the chariot’s elements’} behaviour\(}^7\]

most often my interpretation will differ from his. For just as Ferrari ascribes two functions – reason and desire – to each of the two different characters, so I

\(^1\) See G. R. F. Ferrari, \textit{Listening to the Cicadas}, p. 186: the charioteer, the voice of \textit{reason} in the soul (underlining is mine).

\(^2\) See G. R. F. Ferrari, \textit{Listening to the Cicadas}, section \textit{The Struggle in the soul: sheep’s clothing} (pp. 185–190) and \textit{The struggle in the soul: philosophical madness} (pp. 186–203).

\(^3\) G. R. F. Ferrari, \textit{Listening to the Cicadas}, p. 186 \(\approx\) G. R. F. Ferrari, \textit{The Struggle in the Soul} ..., p. 1. J. Wilburn, \textit{Courage and the Spirited Part of the Soul in Plato’s Republic}, puts stress on the relation between reason and the spirited element – which is rare – but he analyses the \textit{Republic} in his article and says nothing about the \textit{Phaedrus}.

\(^4\) G. R. F. Ferrari, \textit{Listening to the Cicadas}, p. 190. The charioteer’s desires are explicitly denied by T. Irwin, \textit{Plato’s Moral Theory}, p. 238: \textit{No desires are ascribed to the rational part, but all belong in the non–rational part} [...].

\(^5\) G. R. F. Ferrari, \textit{Listening to the Cicadas}, p. 186.

\(^6\) G. R. F. Ferrari, \textit{Listening to the Cicadas}, p. 270, n. 53.

\(^7\) G. R. F. Ferrari, \textit{Listening to the Cicadas}, p. 201.
myself will ascribe three functions – reason, emotion (that I call feeling) and desire – to each of the three different characters. As far as I understand Ferrari I am going in the same direction as he does. But, if I may say so, he has stopped halfway. From my perspective it looks as if Ferrari understands that – though without using such words – there are several kinds of reasoning. However, I am not sure how he exactly applies these principles – i.e. a principle of several kinds of the same function and a principle of these functions being hierarchical – to desire. Certainly he does not apply it to the spirited insofar as he is silent about it. Ferrari surely notices correctly a resemblance of the charioteer and the bad horse when he says: [...] the charioteer and the bad horse are contrasted (in the matter of reason) not as the rational to the irrational part of the soul but rather in terms of the level at which their reasoning takes place.

Yet he limits himself to apply this principle of homogeneity to two elements only and only because of this one function, reasoning, while I will argue for a homogeneity of all three elements and for their homogeneity being composed by three functions. My thesis is that according to Plato’s allegory there are three levels of different, hierarchically unfolded sets or linkages, actually inseparable inwardly. The concepts such as reason, emotion, and desire may be used only for the sake of conceptual analysis of these sets, which are literally indivisible into them.

3. What does Plato say in Phdr. 253e5–255a1?

At the present time please read the text of the Phaedrus 253e5–255a1 (ed. J. Burnet). I am underlining elements pertaining to several psychic functions of the three characters, representing the lover’s soul and portrayed as one human being and two animals and described by Plato thus:

ὅταν δ’ οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἴδων τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄµµα, πᾶσαν αἰσθήσει διαθερήνας τὴν ψυχήν, γαργαλισμοῦ

1 If I am not mistaken he alludes to all three functions only once, G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, p. 200: say: reason, emotion, desire. But he does so in a paragraph where he relies on the Republic (see below Appendix 1).

2 See G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, p. 190: display [of] the limitations of the only kind of reasoning.

3 Although G. R. F. Ferrari, The Struggle in the Soul …, p. 1, alludes to a certain complexity in each of the soul’s parts, he limits himself to an analysis of the relationship between the charioteer and the black horse – thereby excluding the white horse – which is a conflict between [the desires of the charioteer and of the bad horse and their exchange of roles (p. 2).

4 G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, pp. 191–192 (underlining is mine).

5 In one passage, G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, p. 200, ascribes two functions to all three elements: Quite clearly, however, these labels have only limited application to the conduct exhibited by the charioteer and horses. These allegorical figures are actual characters […] each with his own appetites and capacity for deliberation. On another occasion, G. R. F. Ferrari, The Struggle in the Soul …, p. 8, n. 23, points out that both thought and feeling are correspondingly represented in the charioteer and black horse (he informs us that this is also acknowledged by M. Burnyeat, Recollection in the Phaedras (unpublished), p. 32).

6 See also C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast …, p. 329 – if yet there is a question of allowing the lower parts to have a rich variety of beliefs, there is no mention of affectivity involved in the upper element.
A remark. The fact that this is about a meeting of the lover with the beloved – and not another kind of event – is surely not without importance for the type of
mental repertoire we find in the description. Should it be another event, we will have different acts of thinking, feeling and desiring. I think, however, that even if the event Plato chose is particularly rich – please try to think about another similarly or more rich – this is still a single and specific case without Plato’s stating general claims as several commentators have done and I am going to do about classes, genera and species of mental acts. The Republic (see Appendix 1) is more explicit in this regard, yet it is poorer in presenting complex connections between the three elements of the soul and between their functions, especially in their dynamic aspect.

Now, let me classify all acts set forward by Plato in the description as they are ascribed to their subjects, be it single, double or triple.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>subject/function</th>
<th>single</th>
<th>dual</th>
<th>all 3</th>
<th>the whole</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ὁ ἡνίοχος</td>
<td>ὁ μὲν [ἐπειδή ηνίοχος τὸν ἄριστον] = ὃ μὲν ἄριστον</td>
<td>ὁ ἡνίοχος + ὃ μὲν</td>
<td>ὁ ἡνίοχος + ὃ ἄριστον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perceptions</td>
<td>ἐδειν [...] ἴδον καλὸν</td>
<td>see tutti</td>
<td>see tutti</td>
<td>see tutti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sensations</td>
<td>διαθερμάνει τὴν ψυχήν, γαλαγμόν τὲ καὶ πόθου κέντρωσιν</td>
<td>ἱδήτι θάνατον ἄφρον ἀφρός ἀφοίρητος ἐνθρέπτεται</td>
<td>ὁ ἡνίοχος + ὃ μὲν</td>
<td>ὁ ἡνίοχος + ὃ ἄριστον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emotions</td>
<td>πόθου + συνέχεια</td>
<td>ἐδεικνύει τὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεις τὲ καὶ ἄσθι διαθερμάνει</td>
<td>ἔργη [...] ἀθανασίαν ἄριστος [...] ἀπάθη τῆς ὕπνου [...</td>
<td>ἐκτάσει [...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 For more see 251a1–b7 & 251c2–b2, see below p. 181, n. 2.
Plato’s Phaedrus 253e5–255a1 Revisited

Remarks:

1) From 253e5 to 255a1 the dual number is used 13 times in total, 11 of them in relation to the charioteer and the good horse and 2 in relation to the good and the bad horse (and never for the charioteer and the bad horse).

2) I consider the minimum of functions and only the mental ones and touch upon neither spatial movements (e.g. μὴ ἔπηθαν, ἴναι τε πρὸς τὸ παιδικὰ, ἀντιτείνετο) nor transitive verbs of acting upon, esp. forcing (e.g. ἀναγκάζει ἴναι, ἀναγκαζόμενο, τὸ κελεύοντο, ἠνεχθη, ἠναγκάσθη εἰς τοὐπίσω ἑλκύσαι, προσιέναι ἀναγκάζων, βιαζόμενος, ἡνίοχον ἴππων, ἠναγκάσθη), to the beloved’s black horse (256a1: ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἴππων) and to the beloved’s white horse and his charioteer (256a5–6: ὁ δὲ ὁμοίως αὐτῷ τῷ ἡνίοχῳ πρὸς ταῦτα μετ’ αἰδοὺς καὶ λόγου ἀντιτείνει). This passage confirms that the division of the soul is valid and that, crucially, it is valid for both the lover and the beloved. The mental state and behaviour of the beloved’s soul would fill another Table, even if a more modest one.
4. Analysis

It could be pointed out that within the allegory of the chariot the character of the charioteer is less allegorical than the characters of the two horses, since anything ascribed to the charioteer (human being) is as it may be, while some or a majority of actions of the good and bad horses (animals) cannot but allegorical insofar as these are personifications. But remember, three characters are not strictly two horses and the charioteer, but they possess these forms: horse-like and charioteer-like. And this fact – an unequal degree of allegorizing the charioteer and the two horses within the allegory – might complicate an interpretation which should – if one wants to insist on this fact – view the chariot and the horses on different levels. If so, in the case of the two horses we deal with a second–degree allegory, their faculties being allegorical, which is not the case of the allegorical charioteer, whose faculties have nothing of allegorical. The charioteer is a human being and there is nothing weird in his capacity for reasoning, feelings, sensations, memory, etc., which is not obvious at all as regards the two horses. The question is then: in what sense these animals share thinking, emotions, memory, and will? It seems that they hardly do, yet we have their description in front of us and we see what kind of mental functions they are given by Plato.

Maybe I should not insist on this too much and only suggest that this fact of an unequal degree of allegorizing explains, in my view, why a confusion of the lover with the charioteer is made so often. It is plausible that the deformation of reducing the charioteer to the reason alone stems from the distinction between the human and the animal: given that the two horses are animals and as such are devoid of reasoning, they are taken by many to symbolize anything but reasoning. Therefore the charioteer happens to be a natural recipient of anything that is not inherent to the horses, i.e. of the rationality, since other faculties are inherent to the horses or are more easily believed to be so, esp. their impulses, drives, needs, reactions etc. However, as we see, several non–intellectual faculties are ascribed to the charioteer and some of intellectual or at least non–non–intellectual functions are ascribed to the horses in Plato’s description. According to the Table this is done in such a detailed way that it hardly can be a simple coincidence. Hence the allegorical distinction in Plato’s Phaedrus between the charioteer and the two horses is not to be taken literally as an opposition between the human being and the animal, or even as opposition at all.

Moreover, the above kind of objection would suggest that in order to satisfy the proposed interpretation – but also several others – Plato should have conceived a three–element set composed of three human beings, discriminated by a hierarchy of their functions. This would be odd. Plato used a model which is about one element superior and two others inferior. They are superior and inferior by definition. At least they are supposed to be so, because in fact,

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1 See 253c8–d1: ἅπαξ λόγος μὲν δῶρον τοῖς ἐλέουσιν, ἡμιονικὸν δὲ ἔλεος πρῶτον, καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ ἣμᾶς τᾶτα μενέστη.

2 Maybe not entirely: it would be something in–between if we think about the lover’s soul of the Phaedrus and the state of the Republic, composed of classes (ἐἴδη, e.g. Rep. 580d3: ὅσπερ πόλις, ἦν ὁ ἐγώ, διήγησαν κατὰ τρία εἴδη) of individuals.
however, there are troubles with the coordination of what is inferior by what is superior within one soul. The superior needs the help of one of inferior elements – the one which is obedient and autonomous – against the other. Why then does the charioteer not replace the second, reluctant horse by another one? This is probably because the issue is not related to the horse itself but to its position that makes (any?) horse within a human being to be so\(^1\). And here, I think, the distinction between human versus animal is lessened by the description of the pretty human communication of both horses with the charioteer\(^2\).

Now, in order to see how much the orthodox interpretation of the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse as, respectively, reason, spirit and appetite is inaccurate, please consider the two following perspectives: (i) subjects in their relation to functions (vertical order in the Table) and (ii) functions in their relation to subjects (horizontal order in the Table)\(^3\).

If (i) we catalogue subjects in their relation to functions (vertical order in the Table), the following obtains:

- (1) the charioteer sees (253e5: ἤδον τὸ ἔρωτικόν ἄμμα, 254b5: ἤδοντος δὲ τοῦ ἡνίοχου, and also he sees through his memory – 254b5–7: ἢ μνήμη [...] ἤδοσσα, 254b6 & 254b7: εἴδεν [...] ἤδοσσα δὲ), has a perception (this is a general way of speaking, seeing being a species of a genus perception, 253e6: αἰσθήσει), experiences bodily sensations such as warming (253e6: διαθρεμής τὴν ψυχήν) and tickling (253e6: γαργάλισμοῦ). He has emotions that can be unfolded on more than one level: on the one hand, there is a longing (more precisely goads of longing, 253e6–254a1: πόθου κέντρων – which is a set of bodily sensation and a psychic longing), on the other hand he – through his memory – experiences fear (254b7: ἔδεισε) and holy awe (254b8: τέ καὶ σωφροσύνα). The charioteer has a memory (254b5: μνήμη) as well as a foresight (254e7: προνοεῖ). Finally he is said to experience an experience (254d7–e1: ταύτων πάθων παθών). See also duality 2 for anger (254b1: ἁγανακτοῦντε) & the whole for seeing (254b4: εἶδον).

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1 This is because in gods both horses – i.e. the white and the black – are good horses. See 264a7–8: θεῶν μὲν οὐν ἦσαν τι καὶ ἤγιοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι τις ἁγάθος καὶ ἐξ ἁγάθῶν. Also, in gods both horses are not put into opposition as is the case of the horses in human beings: ἐπὶ τῶν ἦσαν μὲν αὐτὸ καλός τις καὶ ἁγάθος καὶ ἄγαθος τοιοῦτοι, ὁ δ’ ἐξ ἐναντίων τις καὶ ἐναντίος (246b2–3).

2 Again, this is but an allegorical image of a moving set within which elements are human–like and horse–like.

3 For the reason of room I omit a presentation from the dynamic point of view of the narrative as it is structured in subsequent stages of the encounter. Broadly, I would divide it into eight stages as follows: 1st step at 253e5–254e7: the charioteer’s view of the beloved, 2nd at 254a7–254b3: the charioteer’s & the white horse’s responses as opposed to the black horse’s, 3rd at 254b4–5: all three elements’ view of the beloved, 4th 254b5–254c1: the charioteer’s memory is acting, 5th at 254c2–254d1: both horses’ different responses, 6th at 254d1–7: more on the black horse’s action, 7th at 254d7–e5: the charioteer’s response, 8th and the last that ends at 254e9 where Plato comes back to the entire soul of the lover (254e5–8: the black horse’s being tamed). I must recognize, however, there is a difficulty: are ἐστιν δ’ οὖν ὁ ἄγιος ἦσαν τὸ ἔρωτικόν ἄμα τούτου in 253e5 and ἤδοντος δὲ τοῦ ἡνίοχου ἢ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἤγισθη at 254b simultaneous and the same moment of the event is just presented by Plato twice or are they two distinct stages of the event, first ἦσαν δ’ οὖν ὁ ἄγιος ἦσαν ... and then ἤδοντος δὲ τοῦ ἡνίοχου ἢ μνήμη ...? If the latter, which may seem to be implied by the passage, how then to explain both horses’ responses and involvement at 254a1–b? 4 The word is difficult to render. See e.g. LSJ. perceiving beforehand, foresight, foreknowledge [...] foresight, forethought [...].
(2) the good horse has a sensation of sweating (254c4: ἰδρότη), feels several emotions, e.g. respect/fear/shame (254a2: αἰδοῖ), shame and amazement (254c4: σαίσκήνης τε καὶ θάμβους). It is able to control itself (254a2: ἐκατέχει), and it stops willingly (254c2: ἐκόντυ). See also dual1+2 for anger (254b1: ἄγανακτούντε) & the whole for seeing (254b4: εἶδον).

(3) the bad horse is perceiving the beauty (254e8: τοι), experiences pain (254c5: τῆς ὀδύνης, 254e5: ὀδύνας) as well as such emotions as pleasure (254a6−7: τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος), anger (254c7: ὀργῇ), and fear (254e8: φόβῳ). It is also said to experience the same experience several times (254e5: ταύτων πολλάκις πάσχουν). It is certainly a subject of memory (254a6: μνεῖαν ποιεῖσθαι, 254d4: ἄναμμηνεσκον), also because it blames the charioteer and the good horse for their breaking an agreement (254d1: ὁμολογίαν). Unlike the good horse it is not willing to retreat (254c3: ἀκόντα). Yet it must also be capable of understanding the charioteer’s orders and intention and their content, since it ends by following the charioteer’s intention. See also the whole for seeing (254b4: εἶδον).

Before I comment on the next group of subjects, i.e. double subjects for which Plato uses a dual number, please remember that in Plato’s times the dual number was nearly anachronistic*, which means that Plato was keen on pointing out to the closeness of two elements. Although in the Table there are only two of them, both in relation to the charioteer and the good horse when considered as a team, the total number of dual forms in the passage in question is 13, only two of them being used in relation to both horses†. As for the range of words presented in the Table this proportion is similar: two cases for the charioteer and the good horse and none either for both horses or for the charioteer and the bad horse. It looks as if the good horse is much closer to the charioteer than to the bad horse‡.

(1+2) the charioteer and the good horse taken together get angry in the same time and for the same reason (254b1: ἄγανακτούντε) and they are united first in agreeing (254b3: ὁμολογήσοντε) and then in pretending that they forgot about the agreement (254d3−4: ἄμυμνοεῖν προσποιομένου). Because they break the agreement (254d4: ὁμολογίαν), they are qualified by the bad horse as acting out of cowardice and lack of manliness (254c8: δειλία τε καὶ ἀνανόρίζῃ). See e.g. LSJ who give a huge range of meaning: as a moral feeling, reverence, awe, respect for the feeling or opinion of others or for one’s own conscience, and so shame, self-respect [...] sense of honour [...] sobriety, moderation [...] regard for others, respect, reverence [...]..

* See e.g. J. Humbert, Syntaxe grecque, p. 16: Il semble qu’il ait été possible, au temps de Platon et d’Aristophane, d’employer le duel pour désigner des objets qui sont par paires; mais la tendance la plus courante, représentée par Platon, favorisait nettement le pluriel [...].

† See 254c2−3: τὸ ἄνακτον [... ἀκατέχετε. There are two other terms one would be eager to add as referring to the closeness of both horses: τὸ σύζυγον (at 254a5, LSJ: yoked together, paired, united) and τὸν ὁμόζυγον (at 254c8, LSJ: yoked together). But these two terms refer to nothing but their physical position within the chariot.

‡ See H. Ioannidi, Contribution à l’étude de la doctrine platonicienne du thymos, p. 181: [...] le cocher n’a pas besoin d’exercer de contrainte-châtiment sur le cheval blanc, inaltérablement généreux et docile [...].

To say that they are acting in a similar way is not to say that they are indistinguishable. As the Table shows, they are distinct for more than one aspect. But this is what is denied by R. Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 107: The fact is that in the case before us the desire of the good horse cannot be discriminated from that of the
They are also united by other duals referring to their being in opposition to the bad horse when approaching the beloved. Moreover, a common feature of both is the impact they produce by their sensations – the charioteer’s warming and the good horse’s wetting – on the whole soul (or on their own souls).

1. (1+3) the charioteer and the bad horse taken together. There is no dual form applied to the charioteer and the bad horse. However, there is one feature that is attributed to both: experiencing an experience, though obviously, the content of these experiences is unidentical (for more see below).

2. (2+3) the good horse and the bad horse taken together. There is no dual number in the Table above. The two dual forms in the passage refer to their moving backward, yet both of them are doing so for different motifs and with different phenomenologies.

Next, we have a triple subject:

1. (1+2+3) the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse taken together are considered grammatically together only once: we are told that when they approach the beloved they perceive his illuminating face (254b4: καὶ πρὸς οὖν τῷ ἔγνέντο καὶ εἶδον τὴν ὀψιν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν ὀστράτουσαν),

and, finally, a united, i.e. internally undifferentiated subject:

2. (1–2–3) the whole soul, i.e. the lover’s soul. (I cannot discuss here what is, if any, the difference between the lover and the lover’s soul in the passage.)

At this stage of the narrative (254e9) Plato abandons the soul as considered in its division into the charioteer and the two horses and comes back to the entire soul of the lover. The entire soul considered as a whole is said to follow the beloved person with awe and fear (254e9: οἰστραξάσθην τι καὶ δεδιουδεύναι). This way of behaving results from all what has been said from 253e5–255a1, where Plato pictures the internal conflict of the soul’s several elements in their approaching the beloved person, and more especially from 254e2–254e8, where we are told how this conflict is solved by training and taming the bad horse.

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1 See 254a7–b3: [...] τὸ [...] ἄντειξε, ὁ ἀγωγόμενον ἀναγκαζόμενον, τῷ [...] ἀναγκαζόμενον ἀναγκαζόμενον, καὶ ἀγωγόμενον, ἀγωγόμενον. Moreover, a common feature of both is the impact they produce by their sensations – the charioteer’s warming and the good horse’s wetting – on the whole soul (or on their own souls).

2 For a background compare 251a1–b7 & 251e2–252b2 where the lover’s (whole and undifferentiated) soul is described in similar words, e.g. perception (251a3: ὁją, 251a7: ὁδόντα, 251c3: ὑδόσα, 251c6: ὀφθαλμοῦ), sensation (251a4: ἀφρός, 251a7:b1: ἐκ τῆς φυσῆς μεταβολῆς τε καὶ ἱδρώς καὶ ἀμφίβολης, 251b2–3: ἐπιθυμήσεις [...] ἀναγκαζόμενον, 251d1: ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὑδόσαν), emotion (251c7: ἡμαρρός, 251d1: γέγηθην, 251d4: ἦμαρρός, 251d6: ὁδόντα, 251e2: καθοδένος, 251e3: ἦμαρρός, 251e5: ἠδονήν, 252a7: πάθος, 252a7: σπάζομεν), as well as experience (252a2: τόσο οὖν τὸ πάθος), and memory (251d6: μνήμη). With such ascriptions one could better complete the above Table’s last column.
At present, one could wonder if a solution of the internal conflict is a matter of taming the bad horse rather than of coordinating the entire soul which, to be sure, includes taming of the bad horse. In reality, it looks as if the whole soul’s three elements are coordinated in one respect but not in others. It is characteristic how the whole soul’s being and behaving are determined by one of its elements, the one which is, we are often told explicitly or implicitly, the least valuable. The fact that taming of the bad horse affects the entire soul rather than this very element of the entire soul only is significant. Plato is explicit that this is the entire soul, now no longer with reference to its division, that is experiencing awe and fear. Here again the charioteer and the bad horse are closely related, which proves how much the bad horse matters in this story.

Now (ii) I list functions in their relation to subjects (horizontal order in the Table). They can be distinguished according to their genus, species or subspecies:

- perception (genus), and more particularly seeing (species), is shared by: 1 and 1’s memory (call it 1’s), 3, and 1–2–3. There is no other species of the perception genus (though we can suppose an acoustic perception).
- sensation (genus) is shared by: 1, 2, yet the subspecies are different, i.e. warming for the charioteer and wetting for the good horse. The common point is that in both cases this sensation is transferred, depending on the reading, either to the whole soul or to their own souls.
- emotion (as genus) is shared by: 1 & 1’s, 2, 3, 1–2–3, which makes this category the best represented both for each level and for all levels taken together. Moreover, it is represented by species as well as by subspecies. As for species, longing is experienced by: 1, fear by: 1’s, 2, 3, 1–2–3, shame by: 2, amazement by: 2, pain by: 3, anger by: 3, 1+2. Now, in two cases we deal with the same species of emotion shared by more than one subject, with different subspecies however. More precisely, 1’s, 2, 3, and 1–2–3 experience different kinds of fear, while 3, and 1+2 experience different kinds of emotion.

See ἤπειται ἠδητῇ τοῦ ἱππότου τρονίνχου προνοίᾳ (254e7, the black horse’s following the charioteer’s intention) being a sine qua non of τοῦ ἱππότου τρονίνχου προνοίᾳ τῇ ἁπαθεῖᾳ τοῦ βουλευτή (254e9–255a1, the lover’s whole soul’s following the beloved so and so).

Surely one can ask why the bad horse is needed at all. Ultimately the question turns out to be nonsensical, since, one may answer, such is the structure of the soul, such is the soul as a whole, such is the lover, or to use modern language, such is the ontic structure of a human being. See C. L. Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 95: the control of unreasonable desire by reasonable desire [...] the black horse is enormously important in determining human nature, R. Bett, Immortality and the Nature of the Soul in the Phaedrus, p. 21: they [the lower, changeable parts] are just as important as reason itself to the soul’s fulfilling of its final destiny, & R. Burger, The Thumotic and the Erotic Soul, p. 67: [...] but without his persistent demands to advance toward the beloved, the upward journey would not be initiated at all. Contra J. Moravcsik, Noetic Aspiration and Artistic Aspiration, p. 46: the “bad” horse is described as unqualifiedly bad, not helping in the ascent at all, and not being necessary to the healthy functioning of a human [...].

Let a genus be affectivity (versus thinking or willing), a species – a modal group of affectivity (e.g. joy versus sorrow) and a subspecies – a particular kind of an affective group (e.g. terror versus anxiety).

For more on this see R. Zaborowski, Two Neglected Details in Plato’s Chariot Allegory, pp. 199–215, where 253e5–254a1 and 254c4–5 are discussed.
anger. Not every translation makes this explicit enough. But the Greek words given in the text leave no doubt about it. As for fear, the lexemes we find are the following: ἑδοκεῖ τε καὶ σφθείσα for the charioteer’s memory, αἰδοὶ for the good horse, φόβῳ for the bad horse, and αἰδουμένη τε καὶ δεδιυῖαν for the lover’s soul and, on the other hand, as for anger, these are ὀργῇ for the bad horse, and ἀγανακτοῦντε for the charioteer and the good horse experiencing it together. What is consequence is that fear’s as well as anger’s subspecies differ depending on the kind of subject.

An interesting thing is that – as we know from Homer for instance– φόβῳ is a more physical and less psychological fear than ἑδοκεῖ and, on the other hand, σφθείσα has a more spiritual character than αἰδοὶ. If we accept these distinctions, we have to agree that the order of fears extraordinarily conforms to the order of the soul’s elements: the most physical fear for the bad horse representing the lowest element of the soul, then the psychological fear for the middle element of the soul and, finally, the spiritual (or religious fear) for the highest element of the soul doubled by another kind of fear (ἐδοκεῖ), less physical and more psychological than φόβῳ. And, as Plato says, the whole soul, i.e. the lover’s soul, is described in terms of αἰδουμένη τε καὶ δεδιυῖαν, which means that the fear (or fears) experienced by the whole soul—after it has got coordinated — are of similar kind to those of the charioteer (ἐδοκεῖ but not σφθείσα) and of the good horse (αἰδοὶ). The same can be claimed as regards anger: ὀργῇ, the bad horse’s anger, is more physical and less psychological (or intellectual) than ἀγανακτοῦντε, the charioteer and the good horse’s anger. The charioteer and the good horse are opposed to the bad horse as much as ἀγανακτοῦντε and ὀργῇ are opposed as two subspecies of anger.

• integral experience is ascribed to 1 (ταύτον πάθος παθών) as well as to 3 (ταύτον πολλάκις πάθην). As for its contents, it is not the same experience, though it is caused by the same event: the conflict between the lover’s soul’s elements. The first is followed by the second in the subsequent sentence (respectively 254e1 and 254e6). Both pertain to the training and taming of the bad horse. I call the experience integral because in both cases it has a neither purely intellectual nor purely affective character. If at this point one is willing to still

1 This is at least the case in Homer, see R. Zaborowski, La crainte et le courage dans l’Iliade et l’Odyssee.

2 See also M. F. Burnyeat, The passion of reason in Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 257: [...] the bad horse can be humbled, its desire for sexual possession replaced by fear of it (254e): a fear which corresponds to moral shame in the good horse (aïduomenen with 254ac) and to the charioteer’s reverence for the divine (deduim with 254b) (underlining is mine). Alas, Burnyeat says nothing about the lover’s whole soul’s fear.

3 It is awkward that L. Palumbo, Platone e la paura, p. 292, considers only δεδιυῖαν ένεργη at 254e9–255a1, given that she speaks about la molteplicità di valenze semantiche dei termini che esprimono il sentimento della paura (p. 296) in Plato.


5 I am well aware that my interpretation flies in the face of many others. Suffice it to look at translations of the words in question that vary a lot, see e.g. Jowett (in: Introduction to Phaedrus): charioteer is worse off & this has happened several times | Ritter (in: Platon, Phaidros): Bei dem Lenker wiederholt sich in gesteigertem Mafe
interpret the charioteer as (symbolizing) reason he will have to explain how the reason experiences sensations, feelings and emotions. More particularly, if one identifies the charioteer with to logistikon, he should admit that to logistikon experiences πάθος, or, more probably, several πάθην¹, not to speak of an involuntary reflex², if Yunis is right in ascribing it to the charioteer.

- foresight is ascribed to 1 only. This is logical and again complies with the order of the soul’s elements of which some are higher and equipped with higher cognitive functions than others.
- memory and calculation (also because of όμολογίαν) are ascribed:

1. 2. 3. 1+2³

While we are explicitly told the charioteer has a memory – and this memory is being described as a subject of seeing as well as of fear⁴ –, both, the charioteer and the good horse share the same behaviour of simulating their lack of memory. This, of course, presupposes a memory of theirs and also a kind of calculation. On the other hand, the bad horse must keep what has been told and agreed between both parties since, otherwise, the charioteer and the good horse would not have needed to simulate their forgetfulness. This is also confirmed verbally by Plato: the bad horse keeps in mind a memory of pleasure and, this is why it pressures the charioteer and the good horse by reminding them of their agreement⁵.

I extend the label of this function from memory to calculating because for the process of simulating a minimal amount of calculation is needed in order to fake an attitude. On a more internal level one needs to compare what has been promised with what is or is not in progress. A comparison of past data with the

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¹ See also M. F. Burnyeat, The passion of reason in Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 257: [...] two memories compete within him, the charioteer’s memory of Beauty and Temperance and the bad horse’s memory of sexual pleasure [...]. Alas, again, as for the lover’s whole soul’s fear, Burnyeat says nothing about the good horse’s memory and the charioteer and the white horse’s feigned forgetfulness either.

² For memory being a subject (254b5–c1) see R. Zaborowski, Two Neglected Details in Plato’s Chariot Allegory, pp. 215–219.

³ See esp. 254d2: μάγις συνεχώρησε διομένων εἰς πάθης ὑπερβολότηθα.
present is required and this is what I understand here as a calculation, more especially because it is not an easy task to deceive the bad horse, which would not have been the case if the bad horse had been only a primitively reacting animal. One could always say that instincts can become violent without being credited with any calculation whatsoever, yet in the passage in question Plato depicts the bad horse in other than purely reactive and mechanical terms. For similar reasons a degree of calculating occurs in the good horse and in the charioteer as well.

At this juncture it is useful to point out that, unlike emotion and its species and subspecies, we have here no wording for species and subspecies — if there are any involved in the event described — of memory and calculation. However, this is not because Plato did not know any. It is not wrong then, I think, to infer that the passage in question focuses on emotion–related acts rather than on thought–related ones. In the same vein, almost nothing is said about will. Apart from the good horse’s unwillingness to refrain (254c2: ἥκοντα) and the bad horse’s unwillingness to refrain (254c3: ἄκοντα) the passage is mute in this regard.

5. Interpretation

If the above analysis is accurate, then it seems that the general interpretation of the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse as, respectively, reason, spirit and appetite is not correct or, better, is not entirely correct. In a word, it is fragmentary and, as a result of that, reductionist. As a matter of fact, the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse stand for, respectively, reason, spirit and appetite but they stand not only for, respectively, reason, spirit and appetite and, on the other hand, reason, spirit and appetite can be ascribed to, respectively, the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse, but they should be ascribed not only to, respectively, the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse.

I mean that, on the one hand, the charioteer is not only rational, the good horse is not only affective and the bad horse is not only desiring because they do possess also other psychic functions. On the other hand, reasoning is ascribed by Plato not only to the charioteer, affectivity not only to the good horse and the desire not only to the bad horse because each of the three elements repre-

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1 One of the best known passage in this respect runs thus: καὶ μοι ἐπὶ τεῖς τέτταρες τιμήμας τέτταρα τοιαῦτα παράμετρα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γνωρίσας μελετήσας, γόνον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀντίστατῳ, ἀνοίγων δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ διευθέτῃ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πιέσων ἀπόδοσιν καὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἐκκατέχων, καὶ τῶν οὖν αἰτίων λόγων, ὑπὸ ὑς ὅ ὡς ἂν ὑπαθήσεις μετέχης, οὕτω τοιαῦτα συνφημιῶσα ἡγούμενος μέτεχεν. (Rep. 511d4–e4, transl. Shorey. Now take these four functions which are found in the soul in addition to these four segments — understanding at the highest level, thought at the second, belief at the third, and apprehension by images at the bottom — and put them in proportion according as you think each contains a measure of clarity to the degree that its objects contain a measure of truth. Two points are to be made quickly: (1) the four thought–related acts are called all experiences (ἀνθίγνωμα) in the soul, (2) the hierarchy is manifest and its verticality is explicated by the τῷ ἀντίστατῷ (= what is the highest).

2 It is now more clear why I said above that Ferrari is going in the same direction as I but he stops halfway. He goes further than many others but not as far as I do in this paper because he corrects the general interpretation only as to the charioteer and the bad horse and only in one respect.

3 See A. W. Price, Emotions in Plato and Aristotle, p. 130, n. 19: According to the Phdr., reason itself is subject to passions that prepare it for a fuller rationality; see Price (1995 [= Mental Conflict]: 80–2, 1997 [= Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle]: 63–7). Compare J. M. Rist, Plato says that we have tripartite souls, p. 105: That does not mean that the Guardians cannot fight: it only means that soldiers cannot be wise — not, of course, that they cannot think at all.
sented by, respectively, the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse has three functions ascribed to it.

The Table above shows that the ascription of functions to their subjects has anything but exclusiveness and if it is read vertically the same is true: to all three subjects multiple functions are assigned. Ascription in both senses is intricate, even if the degree of this intricacy varies from less to more functions being ascribed to a subject and even if they are now simpler, now more complex functions.

According to Plato’s description the charioteer shows, especially because of his unique feature – i.e. an inward distinction of his memory as a subject of perception and of two subspecies of fear – more functions than either of the two horses. As the Table shows, two configurations are not represented (non-existent?). These are two duals, the charioteer and the bad horse as well as the good and the bad horses. This can be surprising because this means that the bad horse is the most isolated element of the three, though, on the other hand, as a single subject it has some functions (taken as genera, not as species) in common with the charioteer and the good horse. First, it has a peculiarity of experiencing an experience – this is what is said also about the charioteer (but not about the good horse). Second, it feels fear. It means that the bad horse has in common with the charioteer and the good horse the same genus (emotion, and also memory), but also it has in common a species of emotion, i.e. a particular emotion such as fear. But because this is another sub-species of fear we must acknowledge the difference at the level of sub-species between the bad horse, the good horse, the charioteer and, finally, the lover’s entire soul.

What is commonly known is that there are three elements within the soul. What is known and accepted less is that each of the three elements is a set of several functions such as visual (and probably acoustic) perception, sensation, memory, desire/will, foresight, thinking and feeling. Hence, it is more appropriate to say that there is a variety of functions within each of the three elements of the lover’s souls. And it is more appropriate to say that the three elements are intrinsically heterogeneous as to their functions rather than to say that they have each only one function. This is a general claim and because of the allegorical character of the description it is hard to decide whether their functions are just and only as those represented in the allegory or whether the described functions are only examples of what the charioteer, the good and the bad horse are subjects of without the list being exhaustive.

The model may be therefore best interpreted as follows:

(I) (1) there are three elements within the soul (this is generally known), (2) they are not simple but painted with several functions, (3) the functions are homonymously similar.

1 Compare Descartes’ list of components included in cogito (though, of course, in Descartes there is no question of partition of the soul), see below Appendix 2.

2 Rather not for the reason mentioned above, i.e. the individual character of the event in our passage. Would it not be queer if all mental events were reducible to or accountable for by means of the same repertoire? But maybe Plato’s allegory’s meaning is more modest. Josh Wilburn suggested to me that perhaps the Phaedrus is capturing something about the phenomenology of erotic experience, rather than presenting theoretical claims about the nature of each soul part (May 9, 2018, a personal communication per nuntium electronico).
Next, (II) (4) within the soul the three elements are unfolded vertically as levels, and (5) their homonymously similar functions differ according to the level they belong to.

Finally, (III) there are two important corollaries, in fact inseparably linked to one another with the first resulting in the second: (6) the functions do not exist in isolation but in groups, (7) within a group there is no strict, clear-cut distinction between its members, which are distinguishable only approximately.

Now, of great help is a suggestion made by Moline of replacing the modern term of functions by symbols, although he does not have the *Phaedrus* in mind:

> Given their history in faculty psychology and in interpretations influenced by it, the terms “Reason,” “Spirit,” and “Appetite” unfortunately do exhaust or limit the capacity of anything to which they are applied in our context. It will be prudent, then, to let the parts go incognito for a time, labeling them uncontroversially as A, B, and C, and noting the things Plato says and suggests about the desires, capacities, and activities of each in their names and descriptions. [...] It suggests a minimal capacity we might call “cognitive” even in part C. [...] That Plato assigns a minimal level of cognitive capacity to B and C is indicated in a number of ways [...] On familiar intellectualist interpretations of the “it” in question here – part A – we would not expect it to want anything at all, for it is a mere faculty for learning, inquiring, and calculating. Yet we have seen that part A cannot be such a faculty. Such intellectualist readings are shown to be untenable by Plato’s serious isomorphism of polis and psyche and by his describing each part – this one included – as a lover.¹

As for the *Phaedrus*’ allegory I would suggest to label by symbols functions and instead of speaking about reason (or thinking), spirit (or feeling), and desire, to speak henceforth about, say, respectively t(hinking)–, f(eeling)–, and d(esiring)–function. Accordingly, on the more general scale, it could be said that the three elements of the soul, A (the charioteer), B (the good horse) and C (the bad horse) are ascribed homonymously and modally similar but materially different functions such as t, f, and d. To give a full picture I would say that the vertical perspective may be presented thus:

\[
A = A_t + A_f + A_d, \\
B = B_t + B_f + B_d, \\
C = C_t + C_f + C_d,
\]

while a horizontal one in the following way:

\[
t = t(A) + t(B) + t(C), \\
f = f(A) + f(B) + f(C), \\
d = d(A) + d(B) + d(C).
\]

Both are about the functional structure of the soul but each privileges one approach over another.

The major anthropological issue is, of course, to know what causes what: is, e.g. d(A) different from d(C) because they belong to different levels of the psyche or are A and C different levels of the psyche because they are characterized by materially different desires (d)? The issue is huge and it cannot be hoped that I solve it here. But my intuition would be that it may be said that the answer to the question what causes what? is indifferent or that the question is badly asked. The issue is not about causality but about constitution, which means that one is another (and not one is because of another). To say that thought/feeling/desire–constituents of one set differ from those of another insofar as these sets are of different levels and to say that the two sets are of different levels insofar as their thought/feeling/desire–constituents are different amounts to the same because the components irreducibly and essentially constitute strata sets while strata are unavoidably constituted by their components2.

If an analogy with Plato’s state is permitted, it would be as to ask whether similar characters form one class or, rather, a class is formed of similar characters3.

Accordingly, there are three sets and, to use the Republic’s labels, they may be called the logistikon set (including logistikon thinking, logistikon feeling, and logistikon desiring), the thumoeides set (including thumoeides thinking, thumoeides feeling, and thumoeides desiring), and the epithumetikon set (including epithumetikon thinking, epithumetikon feeling, and epithumetikon desiring). From the point of view of function they may be called thus: thinkinglogistikon, thinkingthumoeides, thinkingepithumetikon, feelinglogistikon, feelingthumoeides, feelingepithumetikon, desiringlogistikon, desiringthumoeides, desiringepithumetikon, or if you are still reluctant to map the Republic’s vocabulary on the Phaedrus’ allegory, then call them: thinkingcharioteer, thinkinggood horse, thinkingbad horse, feelingcharioteer, feelinggood horse, feelingbad horse, desiringcharioteer, desiringgood horse, desiringbad horse.

Important is to notice that while there is a clear–cut divide in what concerns the elements of the soul (the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse, or, if one agrees to graft them on the Republic’s terminology, to logistikon, to thumoeides, to epithumetikon), there is no such clear–cut divide as for functions. In our passage of the allegory there are no such words as reason, emotion and will, but only examples of functions which we are used to putting into boxes labelled with such tags. Consequently, it is not surprising that it is not easy to explain the Greek model with our vocabulary, especially because a huge gap between Plato’s and our terminological approaches exists. But we should not

1 Think also about different objects of the charioteer’s memory (noetic) and the bad horse’s memory (physical).
2 This looks as another exemplification of the Euthyphro dilemma. Compare also Aristotle’s EE 1220a24–25: οἷον πόνος τι ἄριστος καὶ τροφὴ ἄρ εἶναι εὐεξία, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς εὐεξίας κονοῦσθαι ἄριστον [...].
3 Similarly, if some claim, as does T. Penner, Thought and Desire in Plato, p. 104, that [w]e can also see from 582a8–86 that Plato felt confident that the money–lover (he in whom appetite reigns), had he experienced the pleasures of learning the truth itself, would instead have been a lover of wisdom, it may be asked on what it depends that the money–lover could experience the pleasure of learning the truth itself – is it a result of an accident or of another factor, e.g. his constitution, that is at issue? Plato would certainly have an answer to that (also in the Phaedrus) but to me it looks like a problem of (moral) luck.
treat Plato as a child who talked bad English or German instead of as a grown-up man who talked good Greek [because] the modern classification, whether it is adequate or inadequate, proceeds upon an entirely different principle from the Greek.¹

Now, it is crucial to see that a single act (if there is such thing at all) has, therefore, two characteristics:

formal: being e.g. t– rather than f– or d–function, and
material: being of e.g. 1st rather than 2nd or 3rd level.

We have high desire (but not isolated from high thought and emotion) and low thought (linked with low emotion and low desire). All in all, we may schematically identify three kinds of acts of three levels, that is: nominally nine categories. But the material aspect is conceptually more discrete than the formal one. The formal one relies on the proportion of constituents an act includes². We call an act different from another one because of the proportion of t–, f– and d–function in its content. For instance, of two, an act x and an act z (and to better compare them I speak about acts of the same level, for they are more easily comparable having a common denominator), act x is more intellectual and less affective, while act z is more affective and less intellectual, because the former has an analytical composition of, say, 70% t+25% f+5% d, while the latter of 19% t+54% f+27% d. Now, both of them can occur at the level of to logistikon, to thumoeides, or to epithumetikon, or to use the Phaedrus’ image, of the charioteer, the good horse, or the bad horse. And this is what we see: the charioteer calculates and so does the black horse, but the nature of both calculations is different, while on another occasion the charioteer and the black horse experiences fear, but the nature of their fears is different.

6. Conclusion
In my paper I have focused on what is known as Plato’s chariot allegory. The analysis of Phdr. 253e5–255a1 clearly shows that the most common interpretation, i.e. the one in which the charioteer is the reason, the good horse the spirit, and the bad horse the appetite is incorrect insofar as it is fragmentary. In point of fact, it reduces the content of the allegorical picture in what regards the structure of the soul – to take it quantitatively – to 1/3 of the whole³. As I understand it, the tripartition of the soul in Plato’s Phaedrus does not follow –

¹ J. L. Stocks, Plato and the Tripartite Soul, p. 216 (underlining is mine).
² I would say that the same is valid for species, e.g. an act is love rather than joy but it is not pure love. It is rather love with some ingredient of joy.
³ Compare J. Moss, Appearances and Calculations ..., p. 37, n. 6, for whom this is a kind of a face-value reading, since, as she says, [it is worth noting that the Phaedrus’s description of the non-rational parts makes all of these attributions completely explicit (see especially 253 d–254 e [i.e. our passage under analysis]), and while the Phaedrus’s tale of horses and charioteer is allegory, unless Plato conceives of the lower parts as capable of fairly sophisticated cognition it is very misleading and unilluminating allegory indeed, to what she added: the Phaedrus’s description of the non-rational soul very strongly implies that these parts are capable of sophisticated cognition (conceptual thinking, propositional thinking, belief, using evaluative concepts). [...] It would be a pretty pointless allegory if Plato didn’t think the non-rational parts of the soul can do these things. A better interpretation is: Plato DID think the non-rational parts of the soul can do these things, and he chose to illustrate that idea with the Phaedrus’s allegory (Mar. 7, 2018, a personal communication per nuntium electronicum).
as it has been suggested constantly – the division into three functions but rather is meant to ascribe each of the three functions to each of the three elements of the psyche. This is, in my view, to support the hierarchical model of the internal structure of the soul already displayed in the *Republic* (see below *Appendix 1*).

In my interpretation the claim about the inward complexity of all three elements of the soul is decisive: the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse are, respectively, *not only* reason, spirit and appetite, but they are, to use the common labels, sets of reason–cum–spirit–cum–appetite. Alternatively and more precisely I suggest reading them as three sets of a number of heterogeneous functions as in the Table above, say sensing–cum–perceiving–cum–thinking–cum–feeling–cum–remembering–cum–calculating. The essential point in my interpretation is that functions of sets are formally similar but they differ because of the material character of their functions. By material character I mean the kind (= level) of thinking, feeling or desiring each of the sets experiences. If my reading is pertinent, then I suggest replacing one usual interpretation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phaedrus</th>
<th>a common (?) interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the bad horse</td>
<td>desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the good horse</td>
<td>spirit (emotion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the charioteer</td>
<td>reason</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

with a new one:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phaedrus</th>
<th>my (1)interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the bad horse</td>
<td>thinking–cum–feeling–cum–desiring of the basic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the good horse</td>
<td>thinking–cum–feeling–cum–desiring of the middle level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the charioteer</td>
<td>thinking–cum–feeling–cum–desiring of the highest level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

or, alternatively, if some want to insist on the primordially reflective, affective and appetitive character of, respectively, the charioteer, the good horse and the bad horse:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phaedrus</th>
<th>my (2)interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the bad horse</td>
<td>desiring–cum–thinking–cum–feeling (= the low level psyche)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the good horse</td>
<td>feeling–cum–thinking–cum–desiring (= the middle level of the psyche)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the charioteer</td>
<td>thinking–cum–feeling–cum–desiring (= the high level of the psyche)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this model there are three structural oppositions:

1. elements of the soul (*to logistikon, to thumoeides, and to epithumetikon*) are complex, i.e. they are sets, but their components (thinking, feeling, and
As coordinated or not, and its being coordinated on several levels.

At the pre-

horse being (always) bad but about how well the three elements are coordinated. This is an issue emerging already (p. 36) in their hierarchical set up. The issue is therefore not about the charioteer being (always) good and the black horse being (always) bad but about how well the three elements are coordinated. This is an issue emerging already at the pre-incarnate stage: only those souls who are badly coordinated fall. Compare R. Ingarden, \textit{Wykłady z Etiki}, p. 392 & p. 400, for his conception of a system composed of relatively isolated systems and its functioning either as coordinated or not, and its being coordinated on several levels.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Hence no homunculi dilemma. Even if we read literally and take the charioteer’s memory, the charioteer’s soul and the white horse’s soul as subjects (see R. Zahorowski, \textit{Two Neglected Details in Plato’s Chariot Allegory}), we arrive at a threefold structure since only at the third level components are simple. I have found a curious parallel in J. H. Jackson, \textit{Croonian Lectures on Evolution …}, p. 661: There are really subdegrees or subdepths of the second depth, and no doubt of the first and third depth […] and J. LeDoux, \textit{The Emotional Brain}, p. 76: And the visual cortex itself is a complicated structure, being composed of many subregions and subsystems that each contribute in unique ways to the act of seeing. There is no homunculus dilemma because the vertical perspective (higher vs lower) is not repeated in higher or lower sets of what we distinguish and call as thinking and feeling. See also J. Moline, \textit{Plato’s Theory of Understanding}, p. 75: It is important to recognize here that not just any internal conflict in a part will be sufficient to start an infinite (and hence vicious) regress. […] But there is not the slightest evidence that Plato regarded any of the parts of the psyche as isomorphic in structure to the entire tripartite psyche. There is evidence that he recognized conflicts within part C, and hence that he was committed to regarding at least that part as having subparts. I think that they may be said isomorphic formally but not materially.

\item If they are inseparable ontically, the modern labels such as \textit{thought} and \textit{feeling} are but names for various aspects – inseparable by their essence – of a mental act and the Greek words (νοησις and θυατηθησις as well as to λογισμος, to θυατησις, and to ὑπερθυατησις) are more appropriate to render the integral character of such acts.

\item Compare R. Robinson, \textit{Plato’s Separation of Reason from Desire}, p. 47: Plato’s desire is itself a heterogeneous collection […]. For a striking parallel in neuroscientific research compare J. LeDoux, \textit{The Emotional Brain}, p. 102: Implicit in such a view is that emotion is a single faculty of mind and that a single unified system of the brain evolved to mediate this faculty. While it is possible that this view is correct, there is little evidence that it is. A new approach to the emotional brain is needed […] there may not be one emotional system in the brain but many (underlining is mine).

\item M. Woods, \textit{Plato’s Division of the Soul}, p. 31, is right when he speaks about different desires, but he fails to see that there is more to the distinguishing of three elements in the soul than the distinguishing of three aspects (p. 36) in their hierarchical set up. The issue is therefore not about the charioteer being (always) good and the black horse being (always) bad but about how well the three elements are coordinated. This is an issue emerging already at the pre-incarnate stage: only those souls who are badly coordinated fall. Compare R. Ingarden, \textit{Wykłady z Etiki}, p. 392 & p. 400, for his conception of a system composed of relatively isolated systems and its functioning either as coordinated or not, and its being coordinated on several levels.
\end{enumerate}
Their inward differentiation of functions is hierarchical. I believe that the suggested interpretation is vital not only for the sake of historical reconstruction. I think that, because of avoiding the reason/emotion dichotomy, it also makes Plato’s approach helpful to a conceptual advancement in thinking about the soul (or the mind) and its functions and inner conflicts. Consequently, Plato should not be held responsible, as we learn again and again from academic and non–academic books, for the dichotomization of feeling (or emotion) and thought (or reason) and for what results from this dichotomization, namely a negative view of affectivity. As such the new reading commits us to giving Plato a new place, especially because he turns out to be relevant for current discussions, mainly both about the relation between rationality and affectivity and the essence of affectivity.

Since it happens that the above interpretation coincides with several rare interpretations of the Republic in what concerns the issue of the elements of the soul and their functions, I add Appendix 1. Since I find some similarities of Plato’s approach with those of subsequent philosophers, I illustrate them in Appendix 2. They concern the complexity of mental functions and/or the nature of communication between them. If what I present there is correct, Plato turns out to be a forerunner of a good number of philosophers without, however, being recognized by them as such. Furthermore, if I am right to interpret Plato’s view as above, there are – it seems to me – striking parallels in modern neuroscientific research concerning integration of functions and a hierarchy of three integrated systems:

Functions are mediated by interconnected systems of brain regions working together rather than by individual areas working in isolation.

 [...] The brain can be divided into three divisions along the vertical axis, the hindbrain, midbrain, and forebrain. As we ascend from hindbrain to forebrain, the functions represented go from psychologically primitive to psychologically elaborate.

 [...] There exists, so to speak, a hierarchy of three–brains–in–one, or what I call, for short, a triune brain. [...] The triune brain thus puts the limbic system into a broader evolutionary context to account for behaviors and mental functions of all levels of complexity.

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1 The only commentator who, to the best of my knowledge, read it this way is C. L. Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus, p. 93: The image indicates that this unity [i.e. the unity of the human soul] should be hierarchical. See also K. Kalimtzis, Taming Anger, who repeatedly speaks about a determinate hierarchical relationship that has been forged between the parts of the soul (p. 44) and Plato’s hierarchy of a plethora of psychological elements (p. 61), although he doesn’t mention the Phaedrus.

2 For examples see R. Zaborowski, Some remarks on Plato on emotions, pp. 142–143.

3 J. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, p. 77, p. 82 & p. 98. See also e.g. I. A. Strigo & A. D. Craig, A neurobiological view of pain as a homeostatic emotion, p. 103: [...] each hierarchical level of the nervous system.
As I understand it, Plato’s approach is integrated and hierarchical in what regards united and inseparable functions, homogeneous in form but heterogeneous in content insofar as functions of several strata have different values as their objects. These functions are organized in (three) sets unfolded on three layers.

**Appendix 1**

My paper is about the *Phaedrus*. Yet since the implications of my interpretation coincide with, to some extent, implications of some earlier interpretations of the *Republic*, I list them shortly below. By no means would I like to decrease their importance. Yet I don’t want either to make any confusion about the fact that:

(i) they concern the *Republic* and never, as far as I may tell, are related to the *Phaedrus*,

(ii) they are not as comprehensive as mine, that is they recognize some elements which I underline in my interpretation but they never, again as far as I may tell, contain all the elements I take to be crucial nor, not less importantly, are they linked with one another.

I wish to include this *Appendix* also because one of the discussants in Edinburgh pointed out to me that there is nothing new in my paper. He told that I am just restating the points made by Kraut¹. Yet Kraut in his paper does not refer to the *Phaedrus*. Since he does not discuss the tripartition of the soul either, I do not include him in the below list.

I think that if what is so universally neglected in the *Phaedrus* is sometimes recognized in the *Republic*, this may be because, while the context in the former is complex and allegorical, in the latter it is put straightforwardly, though succinctly, by Plato himself, e.g. at 580d7–8:

> Τίνα ταύτην; Τήνδε, τριῶν ὅντων τριτταί καὶ ἤδοναί μοι φαίνονται, ἐνός ἐκάστου μία ἱδία· ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὑπαύξαντος καὶ ἀρχαί. ²

What visibly comes out of this passage is that just as there are three forms of the soul (580d3–4: διῄρηται κατὰ τρία εἴδη, οὕτως καὶ ψυχὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τριχῇ), so there are three pleasures or kinds of pleasure, and three desires or three kinds of it. Moreover, the three kinds of pleasures and desires are ascribed to the three forms of the soul. Therefore, any attentive reader of this passage can be aware of the phenomenon of the relation between pleasures and desires on the one hand and forms of the soul on the other. This is more explicitly put than in the allegory of the *Phaedrus* but poorer in content since it concerns only two species of mental acts: desires and pleasures.

It is worthwhile to mention J. L. Stocks who makes the point about the difference between ancient and modern ways of viewing the relations of mental functions and this in the context of the *Republic* (with no word about the *Phaedrus*). He writes this:

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¹ See R. Kraut, *Reason and Justice in Plato’s Republic*.

² Shorey’s transl.: “What is that?” “The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls.”
one activity is supreme, but the other two persist as strictly subordinate activities in a residual form. [...] they are all present together [...] In what sense does this doctrine involve us in the assertion of ‘parts’ of the soul? The treatment of this question is commonly confused and prejudiced by the modern psychological classification of the elements of consciousness under the three heads of Denken, Fühlen, Wollen – Thought, Feeling, Desire – Cognition, Affection, Conation. [...] [...] It is at once evident from the fact that our psychologists are careful to inform us that their triad is in simultaneous occupation of consciousness; all three are present in every ‘psychosis’ though in varying proportions; while the Greek triad is often represented (as we have seen) as a triad of alternatives, each excluding the others, and each striving on occasion to supplant whichever of the other two is in possession. [...] No direct comparison, therefore, is possible between these two classifications.  

As it seems to me, while Stocks correctly grasps the essence of the two classifications, he is entirely mistaken in his attribution. The moderns have a tendency to separate mental functions and to make a plea for separateness of thought, feeling, and desire – should it be only because of their language, which not only makes it possible but, also, at the same time does not allow them to think about indivisible sets –, while early Greeks and Plato too think of the mental as unified and inseparable (again a linguistic argument is solid). Plato’s chariot allegory is, in this context, further strong evidence, and I wonder why Stocks didn’t mention the Phaedrus in his paper. 

To mention other modern commentators, I refer to R. W. Hall, who remarked:

Not only is the soul as a whole a complex whole, but each part appears to be differentiated. Like the spirited (θυμομυθικός) and appetitive (ἐπιθυμητικόν) parts, the rational part “enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best,” although its pleasures are absolutely the

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1 J. L. Stocks, Plato and the Tripartite Soul, pp. 214–216 (underlining is mine). O. Renaut, Platon. La médiation des émotions, p. 165, commenting on Stocks speaks about des motivations qui sont le reflet de l’organisation hiérarchique composée de ces trois fonctions – but the word hiérarchique is Renaut’s and is used, again, in the context of the Republic.

2 Whether they are epistemically indistinguishable or ontically inseparable is impossible to know. Compare an analogy with Aristotle’s convex and concave of a curve in EN 1102a: καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κύρτον καὶ τὸ κοιλὸν or better, because of ἄνωγρός, in ἘΕ 1219b33–34: ὡς ἐν τῇ καμπυλώ τὸ κόλον καὶ τὸ κυρτόν ἄνωγρός. But Greek wordings is different and we have such words as νοῦς, θυμός, ὀργή etc. Attention to this has been drawn, among others, by T. Zieliński, Homeric Psychology [1922] & M. J. O’Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind, pp. 45–55. See also J. Moline, Plato’s Theory of Understanding, p. 21: That intellect, emotion, and conation were not distinct for early Greeks is clear not merely from the evidence about the uses of the term νοῦς already cited but from evidence on the uses of the term θυμός [...]. More recently in respect of early Greek philosophy see R. Zaborowski, Sur le sentiment chez les Présocratiques.
best. To each part of the soul then, there are its appropriate pleasures and desires. [...] not only is the soul as a whole divided into three parts, but each part is complex [...]\(^1\).

then mention G. Vlastos writing that:

practical reason – a reason which is not only calculative (as his term, logistikon, might unfortunately suggest) but passionate [...] it engages the heart no less than the intellect, it involves love for ideals of conduct [...]\(^2\),

then point to N. P. White who writes that:

[[...] does not regard the "appetitive" part of the soul as the only part that may be said to have "appetites" or "desires" [...] Both the reasoning part and the spirited part have them too. [...] the appetitive part of the soul is not regarded by him as a genuinely unitary part, but as a heterogeneous collection of various desires and impulses [...]\(^3\),

and next go to J. Annas claiming that:

It is important that for Plato reason is not conceived as aiming at academic, drily intellectual discoveries; it wants [...] cares [...] Spirit also, however, involves reasons and reason–giving [...] In both these respects spirit is like reason, and may indeed seem to be doing the same job as reason [...] 'the desiring part' [...] is said to 'agree' to being ruled (442c, d) so it cannot be completely unreasoning [...] can indeed perform some reasoning about what it wants [...] this part is thought of as being able to reason out how to obtain its desires, and valuing means to this end\(^4\),

and end with M. Burnyeat:

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1. R. W. Hall, Ψυχή as Differentiated Unity in the Philosophy of Plato, p. 69 (underlining is mine). But he seems to deny this as regards the Phaedrus, since he says, p. 75: The Phaedrus represents a continuation of the differentiated unity of immortal soul although the individual soul includes the spirited and appetite parts, whereas in the Republic the immortal soul was a differentiated unity composed of the rational part of the soul and its appropriate pleasures and desires. Although such pleasures and desires fitting for the rational part of the soul are not mentioned in the Phaedrus myth, it is reasonable to assume that mention of them was not necessary for what appeared to be at least one of Plato's purposes in the myth, the imaginative account of the fall of the soul, its bodily incarnation, and the conditions and nature of its subsequent deliverance. On the other hand, in his conclusion, p. 82, he says that: Consequently it seems possible to maintain that in the Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Laws grounds exist for construing the nature of the individual immortal soul as a differentiated unity composed of those pleasures, desires, and other affections appropriate to the cognitive or rational faculty, and the division of that faculty into reason proper and opinion (underlining is mine). So, unlike myself, he does not extend this characteristic to the two other elements of the soul.

2. G. Vlastos, Justice and Psychic Harmony in the Republic, pp. 520–521 (underlining is mine).

3. N. P. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic, p. 226. White grasps that appetite belongs to all three elements – but he does not do so for the two other functions; he also grasps the heterogeneous character of the appetite but, again, only of this one element and he understands the heterogeneity in a narrower way than I do.

In the divided soul reason has desires and pleasures of its own, while appetite has conceptions of what is pleasurable and can reason how to get it; the middle, spirited part is devoted to honour and has a network of beliefs about what that requires.¹

In 1987 Ferrari summarized the issue in the following way:

[...] the reasoning, spirited and appetitive components of the tripartite soul most fully described in the Republic. Quite clearly, however, these labels have only limited application to the conduct exhibited by the charioteer and horses. These allegorical figures are actual characters (even if of a rather vaudevillian sort), each with his own appetites and capacity for deliberation. But the correspondence with the Republic is not disarmed; for interpreters have long found that these labels do not adequately apply even to that work’s description of the behaviour of the parts. There are two main camps over this issue. Many have been influenced by the assumption that each ‘part’ of soul ought to stand for a single faculty (say: reason, emotion, desire) [...] Other interpreters, in response, have worked from the assumption that Plato was never aiming at a theory in which (to put it baldly) reason simply reasons and desire desires; that the parts of soul are better construed as a type of agent rather than faculty [...].²

As I have tried to show in my paper, first, other interpreters do not make use of the Phaedrus for their claim, next, they are, Ferrari included, Annas excluded, more keen on dichotomy of functions (reason simply reasons and desire desires) than on their trichotomy and, as a result of that, they omit the third element³ I do not cease to focus on, and, finally, they are much less explicit and holistic than I am about the structure and the essence of the exact ascription of functions to the elements of the soul.

Optimistically, also among those who do not deal with Plato directly several scholars are not overwhelmed by the common interpretation. It is relieving that without being expert in Plato it is possible to read him correctly. Let me give two examples of philosophers working on affectivity and its relation with rationality and mentioning Plato only by the way. So does Macmurray in the following words:

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¹ M. Burnyeat, Culture and Society in Plato’s Republic, p. 227 (underlining is mine). See also J. Moss, Pictures and passions in the Timaeus and Philebus, p. 260: the desires, pleasures, and emotions of the rational part – again no relation to the Phaedrus and the remark is left undeveloped.

² G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas, pp. 200–201 (underlining is mine).

³ Likewise in C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast ..., p. 295: Both the Phaedrus and the Timaeus divide the soul into three parts and freely attribute beliefs and desires to these parts. There is, again, a shouting silence about the third, affective function (emotion/feeling).
The only one of the great philosophers who recognized this parallelism between thought and feeling, and who maintained that our feelings could be true or false, was Plato. He insisted on it both in the Republic and in the Philebus. This view of Plato has usually been treated by commentators as a forgiveable eccentricity in Plato’s thought [...] It seems to me not merely true but of much more profound significance than Plato himself recognized. It is not that our feelings have a secondary and subordinate capacity for being rational or irrational. It is that reason is primarily an affair of emotion, and that the rationality of thought is the derivative and secondary one. [...]¹,

and, much more recently, M. Stocker:

[...] Plato suggests in the later parts of the Phaedrus (253ff.), Symposium (205ff.), and Republic (580ff.) [that] reason is said to require for its perfection its own proper desire, pleasure and feeling².

As it is, he mentions the Phaedrus, and more precisely, it seems, the part of the dialogue I analyse in this paper. However, his remark is short, general, put in the footnote and not developed elsewhere.

I would like to end my list of examples with P. Aronoff. The reason for that is that this is a surprising case insofar as Aronoff makes a claim extremely similar to mine, yet he does so concisely and without pointing to any dialogue:

In the tri-partite soul, each part has its own reason, emotion, and desire [...].³

This important statement is not developed and it could have hardly been otherwise, given that the quote comes from a review of W. W. Fortenbaugh’s book. More surprising is that when one checks, as I did, what exactly Aronoff refers to, he will discover that Aronoff’s remark is, so to speak, independent of what Fortenbaugh says, who, as Aronoff tells us:

believes that bi–partition is a significant advance on tri–partition. [...] in the bi–partite soul, emotion and desire are grouped together and clearly separated from reason.

I am not sure whether in his second sentence Aronoff is contrasting Fortenbaugh’s claim about a significant advance, or rather commenting on Fortenbaugh’s interpretation. Aronoff is not so explicit nor gives any page numbers of the book of Fortenbaugh which he is reviewing, but, it seems to me, he must have in mind the following passages from Fortenbaugh’s work:

[...] In fact the Republic is quite explicit that each of the three psychic parts has its own desires. [...] in the

¹ J. Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, pp. 25–26 (underlining is mine).
² M. Stocker, Psychic Feelings, p. 5, n. 1 (underlining is mine).
³ P. Aronoff, [a review of:] W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (underlining is mine).
Republic [...] the two lower parts of the tripartite soul include phenomena that are not emotions [...] in the Republic. By assigning emotions to all three psychic parts, tripartition fails to make clear a fundamental distinction between emotional response and reasoned deliberation.¹

As it is Aronoff says more than Fortenbaugh whose book he has under review but still not enough to let us know what the basis is for Aronoff’s claim. Since I cannot pursue this issue any further, let us admit that Aronoff’s observation is exceptionally important but because of its terse character it cannot be adequately exploited.

Appendix 2

This historical overview is evidently too short and underdeveloped. However, I hope, it is acceptable here since it forms an Appendix to a paper of considerable length.

Plato’s view on the soul – as I reconstruct it in this paper by way of reading the allegory of the chariot, that is, that:

(i) the elements of the soul are functionally complex,
(ii) all three main functions are ascribed to each of the three elements of the soul, and, finally,
(iii) the distinction between elements which are formally similar is to be understood in terms of hierarchy of these functions,
– is philosophically and psychologically promising since it explains how the mental dynamics operate. This view takes for granted that if the soul’s elements may be in conflict, this is because they can communicate, which, in turn, presupposes that they are comparable. And comparability is a kind of homogeneity, be it a common denominator or a common numerator, so to speak. If all three elements of Plato’s soul are, as I propose to see, complex by being composed of homonymously similar components, they can be in accord or in discord. This situation could be compared to that of, say, three persons speaking in the same tongue. If one of them does not speak this tongue, they cannot communicate any longer. And this is what we risk happening, if we reduce the three elements of the soul, the charioteer and the two horses to, respectively, the pure reason, the pure emotions and the pure desire, as the common interpretation is used to doing.

In his allegory of the chariot Plato anticipates this principle and so avoids the problems entailed by feeling–thought dichotomization. If two, or as in the chariot case three, forces have to be compared and opposed in conflict, they have to have some similarity in their nature which is such: the three elements are homogeneous when compared with each other because they are heterogeneous (complex) in the same way, i.e. composed of three inseparable functions. Hence, they can communicate with each other.

An interesting fact is that in the course of history a stream of thinkers who advocated a similar view to what I suggest accepting as Plato’s and that I call the principle of homogeneity can be identified. For the most part, they did not refer to Plato. Quite often and most probably, they – maybe with the exception of Aristotle – even were not aware of being Plato’s followers or sharing the same stance.

I start with Aristotle who is quite explicit about a homogeneity being necessary in order to make communication possible, since he tells us that:

 [...] the reasoning faculty is a principle controlling not reasoning but appetite and passions; therefore he must necessarily possess those parts (transl. H. Rackham).

It looks as if three types of acts were intricate, not simple, functionally.

I turn to Plutarch. What is impressive is that Plutarch is the most explicit about feeling and thought being inseparably related, employing, at his time, no longer synthetic words as those used by early Greeks, such as νοῦς, θυµός, and φρήν (see above), but words that are much closer to modern affective experience and calculation. For he writes:

it is not easy to grasp any feeling [πάθος] of man entirely freed from calculation [λογισµοῦ] nor any motion of thought [διανοίας κίνησιν] to which no desire, or ambition or joy or sadness is added.

Now, in Plutarch’s previous passage (Q. IX) Plutarch is commenting on the allegory of the chariot. However, how we understand his comment depends on whether we follow the original text or read it in translation. This is because a translation may obscure the issue treated here, insofar as it renders untranslatable Greek concepts by words which are their inaccurate equivalents. For instance, if we read the text translated as suggested by Goodwin & al.:

Plato himself, after he had compared the form of the soul to a pair of horses and a charioteer, likened (as every one knows) the rational faculty to the charioteer, and the concupiscent one to one of the horses, which was resty and unmanageable altogether, bristly about the ears, deaf and disobedient both to whip and spur; and the irascible he makes for the most part very obsequious to the bridle of reason, and assistant to it.

we could think, especially if still having in mind Plutarch’s previous passage about inseparability of feeling and thought, that Plato is a representative of

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1 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1219b40–1220a2: ἄρης δ' ὁ λογισµὸς οὐ λογισµοῦ ἄλλη ὀρέξεως καὶ παθηµάτων, ἀλλ' ὃς τὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὑποµίκτης (underlining is mine).

2 That homogeneous elements may be opposed only if they are of different levels is confirmed in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1111b15: καὶ προαιρέσει µὲν ἐπιθυµία ἑνώτυτον, ἐπιθυµία δ' ἐπιθυµία οὐ (transl. H. Rackham: desire can run counter to choice, but not desire to desire (underlining is mine)).


4 Plutarch, Plutonic Questions, pp. 442–443.
distinctness of feeling and thought. We may want to know why Plutarch, a Platonist himself, has an opposite view to Plato. But this is not the case. In fact, the words Plutarch uses for translating Plato’s allegory are Plato’s own words from his Republic. Therefore, what we may be sure of is that for Plutarch the Phaedrus’ allegory is another version of the Republic’s trichotomy of the soul. In the light of On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus 1025D3–7 just quoted we should read Plutarch’s gloss as a support for an integrated view. Let us therefore translate:

kai Platon [Phaedr. 246a] autōs eikásas symbōto
zeugêi kai hýnýcho to tês psuchês, eîdos, hýnôgon mēn, òde
pantì dêlon, apêfîne to logistikôn: ton te 'îpou to
mēn peri tês épithumias āpeithêes kai anâgygon pantâ-
pasai peri õsta láston, koyrôn, màstigì metat kêntro-
ôgos úpeïkon [253e], to òde thumoeîdes eînun tâ
poulla to logismô kai sýmamaçon. (Plutarch, Platonicae
questiones, (ed.) C. Hubert, 1008C5–11)¹

in the following way:

Plato himself, after he had portrayed the form of the
soul as a pair of horses and a charioteer, showed the
charioteer, as it is obvious, as being to logistikon, and
of two horses to men peri tas epithumias being disobe-
dient and completely unmanageable, "with thick hair
in the ears, deaf and hardly submitting to whip and
spurs": and to de thumoeides cooperative with to
logistikon and its ally.

where I leave the three technical terms – to logistikôn, to thumoeîdes, and to peri tês épithumias² – untranslated because I have no words which could ade-
quately mirror the explicitly heterogeneous character of each of them. We have here a significant example of what can reinforce the interpretation which I argue
against but only because it presupposes already what, as I argue, is incorrect,
that is, it renders the three technical terms by reason, spirit/emotion, and
appetite/desire, each of which is homogeneous. This is then but a vicious circle.

One may argue that the sharp opposition between thinking and feeling
come out with Aristotle and was developed by the Hellenistic philosophers³.
But we should not forget that Descartes whose cogito is often translated and

¹ It is a strange thing that P. A. Vander Waerdt, Peripatetic Soul–Division ... , pp. 377–380, refers to this
passage as a part of his argument about collapsing the thumikon and épithymata into a single õlogon.

² Unlike at 1007E8–9, 1008A4–5, A10, D9, D10, and 1009A4, here Plutarch uses to peri tês épithumias
instead of to épithymata.

³ I know about only one opposition of lógos versus pâthos in Plato. This is Rep. X, 604a9–10: to mēn ánti-
tênâi diakelénumen lógos kai nómos épîn, to òde êlkon õpi tês lóseis kûtô to pâthos (in Shorey’s transl.: what
spurs him on to hold out against this is reason and convention, while the actual experience draws him towards
grief). In Aristotle see e.g. Eudemian Ethics 1215a2–3: õtopon õpar prosphèron lógon tois lógon muthn dêmounôs,
âllê pâthos, even though in this context lógos may mean proof or argument. P. A. Vander Waerdt, The Peri-
patetic Interpretation ... , p. 290, speaks about a revision of Aristotle’s doctrine on the relation between the pâth
and lógos by the author of Magna Moraalia and, p. 291, about different relations between the pâth and lógos, but
gives reference neither to Plato nor Aristotle.
interpreted as (purely) intellectual understands it as an integrated function. He is quite emphatic about it when saying, for instance:

Res cogitans. Quid est hoc? Nempe dubitans, intel-ligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, & sentiens.\(^1\)

It is clear that Descartes’s cogito includes several functions, as different as doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, wanting, refusing as well as imagining and, last not least, sensing. It is awkward that few people have it in mind when referring to the Cartesian cogito. My point is that if we take reason to be as complex a function as this is in Descartes, then we could translate and understand the charioteer and τὸ λογιστικὸν as reason\(^2\). But who does so?\(^3\) It seems to me that very rarely do readers have in mind such a broad, rich and complex meaning of reason when speaking about the charioteer (or τὸ λογισ-
tikόν). The evidence that most often (i) the charioteer and τὸ λογιστικὸν are not apprehended in this way and (ii) reason is understood as a simple function is that the charioteer and τὸ λογιστικόν are read in these interpretations in func-tional opposition to the good horse and τὸ θυμοειδὲς as well as to the bad horse and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

What comes out from the above interpretation, i.e. that only functions similar in character, that is homogeneous in being similarly heterogeneous, has been

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\(^1\) Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia II, 28 (compare also Descartes, Meditationes metaphysiques II, 22: *une chose qui pense est une chose qui doute, qui conçoit, qui affirme, qui nie, qui veut, qui ne veut pas, qui imagine aussi, & qui sent*). This is not accidental since Descartes reiterates this point in Principia philosophiae 1, 9: *Cognitionis nomine, intelligo illam omnia, quae nobis consciis in nobis sunt, quatenùs eorum in nobis conscientia est. Atque ita non modō intelligere, sed etiam sentire, idem est hic quod cogitare* (compare also Descartes, Les principes de la philosophie 1, 9: *Par le mot penser, j’entends tout ce qui se fait en nous de telle sorte que nous l’apperecevons immédiatement par nous–mesmes: c’est pourquoi non seulement entendre, vouloir, imaginer, mais aussi sentir, est la meme chose icy que penser*), and, again, even more explicitly, Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia 29: *hoc est proprue quod in me sentire appellatur; atque hoc præcise sic sumptum nihil aliud est quàm cogitare* (compare also Descartes, Meditationes metaphysiques II, 23: *ce qui en moy s’appelle sentir, & cela, pris ainsi précisément, n’est rien autre chose que penser*).

\(^2\) The same is valid for νοeίς of ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης μόνῳ θεατῆ νῦ (in Phdr. 247c7–8): νοείς is not a simple function, e.g. reason, but includes several functions. Some scholars seem to link, even to identify, the charioteer with νοείς κυβερνήτης [… νῦ (247c7–8), e.g. B. Woyczyński, O rozwoju poglądów Platona na duszę, p. 92, also C. Sheffield, Erōs before and after tripartition, p. 227: *the dianoia of the philosopher becomes winged* (249c4–8). This seems unfounded to me insofar as (1) νοείς κυβερνήτης occurs at another stage of the narrative where there is no explicit mention of tripartition, (2) because of the next sentence (247d1: *et οὖν θεόδου διάνοια νῦ τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὴ* […] it looks as if νῦ is used in relation to god’s only, especially since the paragraph is summarized by καὶ οὖν εἷς μεν θεοῦ βιος (248a1; moreover it is a part of a description of the ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τόπου), (3) κυβερνήτης is a hapax in the Phaedrus, what is not the case of θεοὺς (the charioteer that can be understood as the commander of the tripartite soul); at no other place ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης and θεοὺς are put in relation with one another. But even if we admit that the charioteer is equal to νοείς, νοείς, according to my interpretation, should be described in a similar way as the charioteer, i.e. it should not be limited to the pure intellectual function/power either.

\(^3\) A rare example is G. Klosko, The “Rule” of Reason in Plato’s Psychology, p. 351 whose manoeuvre is to distinguish this aspect of reason [i.e. the calculative function] from its other components, especially its inherent desires. […] the conative and calculative sides of reason […]. On the other hand, Klosko speaks, p. 347, about Plato’s attribution of reasoning faculties to all parts of the soul […] the faculty of calculative reason present in one of the other parts. This makes his and my interpretations similar because of taking reason as complex and faculty of calculation as not exclusive to one element only. Yet he (i) limits himself to one faculty and one elements only, (ii) makes no mention of a hierarchy of faculties, (iii) focuses on the Republic IV, VIII and IX.
remarked by several philosophers, such as Spinoza¹, Hume², and Nietzsche³, to give well–known names.

Let me end this Appendix with an intriguing case of how much deformation of Plato’s view is inherent to the history of philosophy. Max Scheler is one of most self–declared⁴ and recognized supporter of a multilayered approach to affectivity on the one hand and of inseparability of feeling and thinking on the other⁵. Yet what he says about Plato’s view about affectivity is patently inexact:

 Plato, too, fell victim of the deception of the ancient and historically very effective division of spirit into "reason" and "sensibility".⁶

This shows us how much the common interpretation is widespread. Its existence and impact are so powerful that even those whose share a view similar to Plato’s are either replicating it without going to Plato’s dialogues or reading him badly.

References

¹ B. Spinoza, Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, transl. J. F. Bennett, Part IV, Prop. VII: An affect can’t be restrained or removed except by another affect that is opposite to it and stronger than it (underlining is mine).
² D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature II, III, III, (eds.) L. A. Selby–Bigge & P. H. Nidditch, pp. 415–416: Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse: and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, this latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act of volition […] as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany’d with some judgment or opinion […] (underlining is mine).
³ F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, transl. W. Kaufmann, p. 276: The will to overcome an affect is ultimately only the will of another, or of several other, affects (underlining is mine).
⁴ E.g. M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics …, p. 332: I find this phenomenal character of the “depth” of feeling to be essentially connected with four well–delineated levels of feeling that correspond to the structure of our entire human existence.
⁵ E.g. H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p. 293: Scheler’s main effort here was to use phenomenology for the purpose of breaking down the rigid disjunction between reason and emotion […] (underlining is mine).
⁶ M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics …, p. 166. For more on that see R. Zaborowski, Plato and Max Scheler on the Affective World.


