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Education Management as an Exact Science (Russia, First Half of the Nineteenth Century)¹

The author reveals an essence of bureaucratic knowledge by means of which the nature of educational management (of schools and universities) in the Russian Empire in the 1830s was changed. The article shows the difference between bureaucratic and scientific knowledge. The author proves that the organization of regular and universal data collection (in the form of reports and references) has created a system of collective responsibility, general employment, vertical circulation of information. At the same time, the content of the created knowledge did not influence the decisions of the Ministry of Public Education. Disciplinary and representative aspects of this practice – humility of professors and teachers participating in it, timely implementation of the instructions coming from above, the consistency shown in tables and the text of digital indicators were much more important for bureaucrats. Collected data were used by the Ministry to showcase the efficiency of control it exercised.

Keywords: Russian Empire, 19th century, history of education, bureaucratic knowledge, history of science

Słowa kluczowe: Imperium Rosyjskie, XIX wiek, historia oświaty, biurokracja oświatowa, historia nauki

In the mid-nineteenth century, Russian professors clamored that over the preceding two decades, universities had taken a turn for the worse. As a result of Sergey Semionovich Uvarov's administrative system overhaul, not only did universities lose independence (which no one regretted at the time), but also academic research and education began to suffer from the "excessive focus on statistics that had lately come to prevail in every part of civilian government."² These gloomy statements notwithstanding, academic boards considered it essential to recognize records management and scientometrics

1 The article was prepared within the frame project No 16-06-00467 supported by Russian Foundation for Basic Research.

2 TsGAM, f. 459, op. 2, d. 1741, p. 52–52r (list of abbreviations is given at the end of the article).

(then known as statistics) as academic disciplines and include them in the university curriculum.³ Educational reforms of the first half of the century must have made these previously purely bureaucratic preoccupations so vital for higher education and simultaneously made education management so complex and professionalized as to compel professors to accept them as “special knowledge,” or science. How and why did that happen? How did bureaucracy manage to achieve that, and what was this special knowledge?

Many historians concur that a new type of bureaucracy emerged in Russia in the second quarter of the 19th century in connection with growing institutionalization, legal codification, university education of civil servants, and the development of public service ethos.⁴ All these factors could not help but make bureaucratic work a more widespread and professionalized occupation than before. In and of itself this does not yet make management “new”. Max Weber’s concept suggests a change in the nature of “knowledge” that served as a basis for truly bureaucratic governance. Weber believed that modern bureaucracy exercised control by means of bureaucratic knowledge gained through familiarity with records and work experience.⁵ The records and experience are not, however, exclusive to a modern state. In the last decade, historians turned to studying Russia’s imperial knowledge, including managerial knowledge.⁶ But the history of ideas failed to explain why modern state management had formed in Russia at precisely that point in time, in the second quarter of the 19th century. What exactly could Russian officials in the Ministry of Public Education have learned and experienced that would transform them into a modern tool and agent of management?

Back in 1999, in his comprehensive study on Russian bureaucracy, Leonid Efimovich Shepelev noted that administrators’ language adapted to the transformations in the nature of civil service in the first half of the 19th century, but he never explained how and why these changes, which seem independent of the wishes and actions of individual persons, took place.⁷ Meanwhile, the process he described was not abstract in the least. In the early 19th century even professors expostulated with their school boards that “business correspondence is no literature, but a clerical idiom, which requires no extra skills on top of general literacy.”⁸ They refused to use bureaucratese in their official mail and reports. Some 25 years later their successors made a point of asking the Ministry of Public Education to send them to the Senate and other governing bodies (for an internship, as this would be called today) in order to “study the spirit and requirements of management and the right way and fine turn of phrase to keep records.”⁹ Thus the language of administration changed along with the development of scholarly approach to running educational

3 TsGAM, f. 459, op. 2, d. 835, p. 13–17.

4 See W.B. Lincoln, *In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia’s Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825–1861*, DeKalb 1982; A.S. Senin, *Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba v «zolotoy vek» Rossiyskoy imperii*, [in:] *Istoriya gosudarstvennoy sluzhbi v Rossii XVIII–XX veka*, ed. by T. Arkhipova, M. Roumyantseva, A. Senin, Moscow 1999, p. 104–110.

5 M. Veber, *Khozyaistvo i obshchestvo. Ocherki ponimayushey sociologii*, vol. 1, Moscow 2016, p. 263.

6 One of the latest examples: *Information and Empire: Mechanisms of Communication in Russia, 1600–1854*, ed. by S. Franklin, K. Bowers, Cambridge 2017.

7 L. Shepelev, *Chinovnii mir Rossii: XVIII – nachalo XX veka*, Moscow 1999, p. 54.

8 M. Magnitskii, *Kratkoye rukovodstvo k delovoy i gosudarstvennoy slovesnosti dlya chinovnikov, vstupayushih v sluzhbu*, Moscow 1835, p. 13.

9 TsGAM, f. 459, op. 2, d. 777, p. 1r.

organizations, in complete accordance with Weber's model of bureaucratization as rationalization of management.

The above example of professors and universities has been chosen for a reason. It allows pushing the limits of sociological approach and the history of ideas, moving into the sphere of unmediated interaction between ideas, practices, and institutions, and tracking down the elusive connection between the production of knowledge and the new political culture of state administration. This essay will examine how the process of government's interaction with Russian imperial universities in the first half of the 19th century brought about the bureaucratization of universities' activities and the rationalization of education management¹⁰.

The Beginning of Interaction

Having founded six universities (or, rather, five universities and the Main Pedagogical Institute) in the early 19th century and having granted professors privileged working conditions, the governmental reformers applied themselves to tackling other urgent problems, leaving it to the staff of the Ministry of Public Education to iron out the details. Up until 1817, an organ within the Ministry responsible for the strategic development in the sphere of education was the Principal Directorate of Educational Institutions. This consisted of six trustees selected from among high officials and several statesmen appointed by the Emperor (Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, Friedrich Maximilian von Klinger, Severin Osipovich Potocki, Nikolay Nikolayevich Novosiltsev, Yakov Semyonovich Rumovsky, Theodor Ivanovich Iankovich de Mirievo, P.S. Svistunov, N.I. Fuß, Nikolay Yakovlevich Ozeretskovsky, later Pavel Alexandrovich Stroganov, L.K. Plater de Broel, Royal Physician P. Frank, Kirill Alexeevich Razumovsky, Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky). Of course, these people were not directly involved in transforming general ideas into administrative practices, regulating standards of records management and responding to reports from academic institutions – in other words, in doing any of the things usually associated with “bureaucracy.” For this, the Ministry employed a pool of clerks, such as secretaries, translators, a journalist, and an archivist. Under Alexander I, the number of these professional bureaucrats remained insignificant. In 1827, archivist P. Baleman prepared a memo stating that between 1802 and 1818, the workforce of the Department of Public Education consisted of 12 clerks only. These few processed the constantly growing flow of documentation from universities and colleges, dealt with the mail and translations, recorded and archived files. The volume of reports and memos grew especially in 1810, when the Ministry took over the supervision of the Medical Board, two medical surgical academies, the Białystok Institute for Midwifery, the Academy of Arts and the Academy of Sciences, the Public Library, the Imperial Lyceum in Tsarskoye Selo, scholarly associations, private Jesuit colleges, as well as the affairs of the Vilnius university, which had earlier not reported to Saint-Petersburg.¹¹ The Ministry's clerks' workload increased also due to local trustees' frequent

10 Part of this essay was included in the article: E. Vishlenkova, *Nauka upravlyat': gospodstvo cherez znanie i reforma upravleniya rossiiskim obrazovaniem v pervoi polovine XIX v.*, “Ab Imperio” 2017, no 4, p. 65–108.

11 RGA, f. 745, op. 1, d. 107, p. 69r–70.

trips abroad or sick leaves, or their unexpected resignations in the absence of a successor (this was especially typical of the Vilnius and Kazan district school boards). In all of such cases, petitions and preliminary reports from schools were sent directly to the Ministry, skipping the local trustee's office.

These clerks were not an autonomous group of "bureaucrats": they were more of the "servants of the state" in the literal sense of the term. Judging by the state of paperwork, in 1810 the few clerks in the Department of Public Education were practically swamped with the daily growing pile of mail and couriered documents. They had it especially hard in January and February, when annual reports were due. During this period, the Department's employees did not have enough time even to sort through and record incoming mail, let alone open it and scan through voluminous manuscripts, such as "historical notes" of school boards on the state of educational institutions in their district. Work overload did not allow ministerial clerks to ensure that subordinate institutions submitted every requisite report. They had no time to see university registrar offices to cover cash shortages, or to insist on timely submissions; besides, correspondence was very costly.

While the few ministerial clerks desperately tried at least to sort through incoming mail, university professors viewed texts they produced for the Ministry as an exercise in rhetoric (a specific instance of a qualifying paper, which was an inevitable burden of an academic career), and this interaction between the two parties did not have any effect on either of them. Moreover, the very vague regulation of local academic communities by means of university statutes (1803–1804) left it up to the professors to develop specific norms of academic life for a specific location. As a result, just a decade later the Ministry encountered a variety of rules governing universities, which were hard to coordinate and regulate.

In this context, criteria for awarding academic degrees were one of the first issues to arise. This topic was all the more relevant because at the time, every ministry was busy working out the norms of promotion. Professors were civil servants, but their academic degrees proved to be an additional hindrance to simplifying and standardizing an already complex system of promotions based on a seemingly universal principle of seniority. Academic titles allowed their holders to skip steps up the promotion ladder and fast-track their way to the next rank. This annoyed the experienced, but untitled functionaries in every department and made them suspect universities of granting degrees arbitrarily and without merit. "Knowledge" clashed with "management". The Ministry ended up temporarily suspending all promotions, requesting written descriptions of the rules used to confer degrees at every university, and in 1816 striking an interdepartmental committee to discuss the issue.¹²

This episode marks the moment when universities' idiosyncratic administrative policies came into conflict with the government's notions of a centralized system of state governance. This structural conflict played out in the context of annoyance caused by the angered professors' missives to district school board trustees, as well as fear that lack of regulation in education is fraught with political destabilization. This was exactly the time when liberal nationalist movement began to take hold among the students of old Ger-

12 E. Vishlenkova, K. Ilina, *Ob uchenih stepenyah, i o tom, kak dissertacia v Rossii obretala prakticheskuyu i naučnyu znachimost*, "Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye" 2013, no 4, p. 91.

man universities, culminating with the first Wartburg festival and an attempt to form an all-German student association (1817), with students harassing the Russian Ambassador Alexandru Sturdza (1818–1819), and student Karl Sand murdering a conservative German dramatist in the Russian service August Friedrich Ferdinand von Kotzebue (1819).¹³

In the eyes of Russian officials, the university founded in 1810 in Berlin had an advantage over the old university corporations in that it was more liable to cooperate with bureaucracy and obey the state. Russian universities were not, however, much older than the one in Berlin, and were state foundations rather than keepers of medieval traditions of corporate autonomy. Nothing would have prevented placing them under the state's strict control right from the outset – except for the fact that governmental reformers had no idea about what modern state control should look like. By borrowing from different sources and improvising, M.M. Speransky and his colleagues tried to design a new system of society management operating through superindividual and universal schemes for self-regulation, such as standardized procedures for promotion in rank, a transparent network of departmental interconnections, and rationalized records management. It took more than one try and quite some time for departments and offices to join together in a network connected by streams of circular letters on official letter-headed paper, request-response relationships, and regular collection of information through reports. According to the author of the *General Establishment of Ministries* (1811), activities of government agencies were to be regulated by controlling how promptly incoming requests were considered, while their productivity was measured by the number of issues resolved versus requests received. The minister's annual report to the State Council would demonstrate how smoothly all structural parts of the department were running.¹⁴ This was the plan for creating in the Russian Empire of the early 19th century a universal infrastructure to support the vertical system of power, or the state.

In order to rationalize management and determine the various departments' staffing needs, ministers started requesting that they submit statistical data and personnel rosters. This new work led to developing methods for primary data collection. In the early 1810s, the Ministry of the Interior, the military, and the police invested a lot of effort into creating document templates and questionnaires, articulating general guidelines for promotion in rank, and establishing "ground rules".¹⁵ Russia was apparently missing the most basic prerequisites for creating a modern state and transforming officials into rational bureaucracy. A total "cataloguing" of reality and its "re-coding" into universal categories (rationalization) was the first step on the way to this goal. It is all the more notable that the sphere of education with its staff that was, in theory, best prepared for the rationalization of the system of management, was initially excluded from this process.

13 R. Haazer, *Ot bratstva po oruzhiyu k ideologicheskoy vrazhde: politizaciya universitetskoj zhizni v Germanii i obraz Rossii v nacionalnom dvizhenii 1813–1819 godov*, [in:] *Istoria i istoricheskaya pamyat*, Saravot, Stavropol, 2012, vol. 6, p. 31–63.

14 S. Chibirayev, *Velikii russkii reformator: Zhizn, deyatelnost, politicheskii vzglyadi Speranskogo*, Moscow 1989.

15 To see how this work was done in the Ministry of Police, see Z.S. Gatina, *Vrachebnaya ekspertiza v sisteme upravleniya Rossijskoi imperii pervoi polovini XIX veka*, Moscow 2017.

Rationalizing School Board Management

It was only in 1817 that the Ministry of Public Education got the “special dispensation” for particular departments as had been promised already by the 1811 Manifesto. This took place in conjunction with the Ministry’s merger with the Chief Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Orthodox and Foreign Faiths, to become a single Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education under Alexander Nikolayevich Golitsyn.¹⁶ The number of employees in the Department of Public Education grew exponentially. The Department, now divided into sections, was headed by an experienced bureaucrat D.I. Iazykov, who had served in the Ministry since its foundation. Workforce expansion and specialization led to a more rigorous control of regularity in records management, more detailed record processing, and a transition from random data collection to data presentation. An Academic Committee (originally reporting to the Principal Directorate of Educational Institutions) quickly gained independence and undertook checking and standardizing curricula and textbooks as devised by different professors and monitoring teaching practices and academic degree certification. This Committee developed the first state standard defining the requirements for candidates for academic degrees (1819).

The logic of the new ministerial structure’s functioning exhibited certain early signs of modern bureaucracy, but the question remained: how should this rudimentary bureaucratic control – unified and impersonalized, mediated by a standardized information exchange – be made compulsory for the lower echelons. Another problem proved to be just as essential. Formulating a consistent course of actions, or a policy that would guide key job holders in discharging their duties and responsibilities is an important aspect of management rationalization as a foundation of contemporary bureaucratic system. Reformers of the Russian system of governance did not expect standardization and regulation of service hierarchy to lead bureaucracy to developing a standalone “collective will.” At least formally it was not stipulated anywhere what course an individual department would have to follow in the absence of a detailed program of actions provided by the superior authority.

This new, not yet ironed-out wrinkle in the only just forming bureaucratic system proved useful to A.S. Sturdza upon his return from Germany. As a new member of the Academic Committee, Sturdza, who was convinced of the subversive nature of modern universities, pushed this governmental agency to adopt a program intended to clericalize education (as per Sturdza’s 1818 *Instructions for the Academic Committee*). As a result, the “technical” process of extending modern bureaucratic control onto the lower echelons was intrinsically connected with the “ideological” component – a certain political course that left an imprint on the process of modernizing university management. For some, the ideological element was just as, if not more important, than the organizational one; at any rate, it served as a proof of their statesman-like thinking and political significance.

As an example of such a view on bureaucratization as rationalization of management (both administrative and political), let us consider Mikhail Leontyevich Magnitsky’s actions

16 S. Rozhdestvenskii, *Istoricheskii obzor deyatelnosti Ministerstva narodnogo prosvesheniya: 1802–1902*, Saint-Petersburg 1902, p. 48.

in 1819–1826 in his capacity as trustee of Kazan district school board. While auditing Kazan university in 1819, he uncovered a lot of irregularities in the running of academic activities. Magnitsky decided to use the weak university as a guinea pig to demonstrate the benefits of applying a rational management scheme. His administrative creativity was probably inspired by his years of service in the Russian embassies in Austria and France, the Ministry of the Interior, the legal department of the State Council, the Committee for Military Regulations and the Committee for Military Rosters and Regulations of the Ministry for Military Affairs – that is, at the forefront of modern state building.¹⁷ Magnitsky adapted his accumulated skills and observations to this particular sphere, as yet unfamiliar to him, while at the same time keeping his own long-term political career goals in mind.

The documents preserved in the archives of Kazan University and the district school board office help reconstruct the measures Magnitsky took to “bureaucratize” the university’s work in keeping with a certain political course.¹⁸ Having been appointed to remedy the shortfalls uncovered during the audit, the trustee began by teaching professors the right language and way of thinking. To this end, he composed a corpus of texts (“instructions”) with an obvious ideological bias.¹⁹ These instructions clearly delineated professors’ duties and responsibilities: to produce scholarly knowledge, to perfect teaching methods, to publish books, to raise successors for their departments and civil service, to manage the district. All the above listed “technical” obligations had a rational basis, rather than being just commands given by a superior authority. Rationalization meant incorporating the discharge of one’s job responsibilities in a certain general worldview, of which modern state was an integral part.

A formal description of business activities and an articulation of their ideological premises served a specific purpose of helping create a modern system of state governance (rather than just rationalizing as an end-in-itself). Thus some of the trustee’s instructions were worded as commands. In combination with attempts to micromanage both students’ and professors’ conduct (“rationalization”), this format annoyed professors and made them feel humiliated.

Magnitsky managed Kazan district school board from Saint-Petersburg: a modern bureaucratic system of management does not require a particular official’s physical presence, but runs with the help of impersonal mechanisms of administrative control. Magnitsky aimed to exert his authority over the institutions within his jurisdiction through clerks of his office and university administrators. They constantly worked on improving the collection of information on the state of schools and the university. In addition to semi-formal letters describing the goings-on at the university, Magnitsky stipulated that the secretary of the academic council should manage official records “perfectly” and forward excerpts from them to Saint-Petersburg.²⁰ Members of the council and the executive board (just

17 Yu. Minakov, *Mikhail Leontiyevich Magnitskii*, [in:] *Protiv techeniya: istoricheskii portreti russkikh konservatorov pervoi treti XIX veka*, Voronezh 2005, p. 268–271.

18 Originally, these two archives had different purposes and were kept in separate locations. See K.A. Ilina, *Arkhivii popечitelei uchebnykh okrugov v Rossiiskoi imperii*, [in:] *Biographii universitetskikh arkhivov*, ed. by E. Vishlenkova, K.A. Ilina, V.S. Parsamov, Moscow 2017, p. 165–184.

19 *Instrukcia direktoru Kazanskogo universiteta*, 17th January 1820, “Sbornik postanovlenii po Ministerstvu narodnogo prosvesheniia” vol. 1, 1864, no 374, stb. 1199–1220.

20 NART, f. 92, op. 1, d. 599, p. 72r.

like civil servants elsewhere in the Empire) were now obligated to compose and send to the trustee monthly memos (short summaries) based on the minutes of their meetings, as well as bi-monthly “newsletters.” The regularity of reports and the necessity to independently determine their contents (what exactly constitutes “news”) served as an extremely important disciplinary practice that integrated local employees into the structure of modern bureaucratic relations.

Magnitsky also strove to make professors write reports in bureaucratese.²¹ Formalization of records management bespoke an aspiration to turn professors into the people they were not, that is, bureaucrats (at least for the time being, while they were using the bureaucratese, however foreign it was to them). Magnitsky pushed for the language switch not only in the “learned estate’s” communication with the outside world, but also on the inside. For instance, Kazan professors were to give up their practice of evaluating students’ knowledge and abilities by means of narrative characterizations. Following in the footsteps of military training schools, Magnitsky made formalized marks a standard for the schools in his district.²² The trustee’s office summarized these marks in tables,²³ which then offered statistical arguments for the evaluation of teaching success and personnel decisions. In practice the new, more detailed knowledge symbolically made professors and students bow to the invisible state authority even in their everyday interactions, outside of the immediate contact with bureaucracy, due to their inclusion in the imposed system that rationalized their perception of one another.

Magnitsky considered himself to be not just a practitioner, but also a theoretician of state governance. In his letters and special writings he spoke about the constructivist opportunities of a document and the results of his Kazan experiment (which he touted as “the radical change in Russian education management”).²⁴ He called for an application of the experiment to other school districts.²⁵

This was how Magnitsky succeeded in bolstering the trustee and limiting the power of the academic council without Emperor’s decrees and ministerial directions, without institutional reforms, simply by introducing weekly changes into routine records management. It was under his leadership that the university campus was built, library catalogued and cabinets of curiosities described, the level of teaching went up, the periodical *Kazan-sky vestnik* began to be published, and academic internships for adjunct professors were launched. All these achievements notwithstanding, contemporaries remembered Magnitsky as a social climber, obscurantist, and a suppressor of education.²⁶ This reputation

21 K. Levinson, *Nekotore nabludeniya otnositelno yazika gosudarstvennogo deloproizvodstva v gorodakh Svyash-ennoi Rimskoi imperii v Ranneye novoye vremya*, “Arkheographicheskii yezhegodnik” 2006–2007, p. 124–146.

22 RGIA, f. 733, op. 40, d. 205, p. 13.

23 RGIA, f. 733, op. 39, d. 354, p. 6r.

24 RGIA, f. 733, op. 39, d. 354, p. 7.

25 *Sobstvennoruchnoye vsepoddaneisheye pismo deistvitelnogo tainogo sovetnika Magnitskogo, s podneseniyem zapiski o narodnom vospitanii*, [in:] *Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov, izvlechennih iz arkhiva I-go Otdeleniya S.E.I.V. Kantselyarii*, Saint-Petersburg 1876, vol. 1, p. 363.

26 P.A. Viazemsky’s epigram in: *Pisma raznih lits Ivanu Ivanovichu Dmitrievu*, “Russkii arkhiv” 1866, p. 1710–1711; Gundurov’s epigram in: *Vospominaniya Panaeva*, “Vestnik Evropei” vol. 4, 1867, p. 97–98 (footnote); A.F. Voyeikov, *Dom sumasshedshih*, Moscow 1911, p. 12–13; I.I. Lazhechnikov, *Kak ya znal M.L. Magnitskogo*, “Russkii vestnik” vol. 61, 1866, p. 121–146; *Vospominaniya Panaeva*, chapter III, “Vestnik Evropei” vol. 4, 1867, p. 72–121; F. N. Fortunatov, *Pamyatnie zametki vologzhanina*, “Russkii arkhiv” vol. 12, 1867, p. 1646–1708; [P.A.

was obviously strongly affected by the burden of new disciplinary practices, which placed students and professors under such a strict supervision of modern bureaucratic system as no despot on a throne would ever be capable of.

Perhaps, success in building a modern bureaucratic system was what ultimately ruined Magnitsky who failed to properly learn the rules of the anonymous power he had personally established. The trustee was well aware that “paperwork” may serve as evidence either of diligence or crime, depending on whose hands it falls into (during the 1819 audit he actually made use of the university office records to bring about resignation of the university rector). Having been appointed school board trustee, Magnitsky took great care to preserve evidence of his administrative activity. At the time, most universities had files from their offices simply taken to an archive, bundled together, and piled up on the floor for storage. The Kazan trustee went so far as to ensure archival files were systematized and even audited.²⁷ The archive of his own office (which followed the trustee everywhere he went) he left uncensored, so as to be able to pull up any (especially negative) useful evidence at a moment’s notice.

This decision backfired, as Magnitsky had failed to realize that information is an independent force that does not depend even on its commissioner. Judging by the materials of the 1827 audit, the trustee had not purged his archive before falling out of favour. After Magnitsky’s detention, auditor P.F. Zheltukhin and ministerial official V.I. Panayev used his archival holdings to accuse him of misdemeanor in office. In particular, they were able to demonstrate that funds that the treasury had allotted for the upkeep of the trustee’s office were actually kept at Magnitsky’s home and spent at will, on oral command. The office kept no receipts and payment logs whatsoever (in stark contrast with petty regulation of records management that Magnitsky tried so hard to impose on the university).²⁸

Choosing a New Strategy and the Systematization of Management

In 1826 Magnitsky was exiled to Revel (Tallinn) and left the forefront of political change, but his Kazan school board experiment had laid the foundation for the Ministry’s subsequent interaction with educational institutions. In 1820, the contingent of ministerial employees underwent significant changes. Aristocratic trustees gradually left the Principal Directorate; clerks with university education and administrative experience appeared in departments, offices, and on committees. Some university-trained writers (N.F. Ostolopov, P.I. Sokolov) entered a working partnership with the Ministry to launch the *Journal of the Department of Public Education*, later known as the *Journal of the Ministry of Public Education*.

Vyazemskij] *Iz staroi zapisnoi knizhki*, “Russkii arkhiv” vol. 1, 1874, p. 173–202; *Mikhail Leontiyevich Magnitsky. Novije dannie k ego kharakteristike. 1829–1834*, “Russkaya starina” vol. 1, 1875, p. 478–491; P.T. Morozov, *Moe znakomstvo s Magnitskim*, “Russkii arkhiv” vol. 3, 1875, p. 241–250; *Iz odesskih vospominanii Morozova*, “Russkii arkhiv” vol. 3, 1877, p. 324–330; L.S. Matseevich, *Odesskie zametki o Magnitskom*, “Russkii arkhiv” vol. 1, 1898, p. 223–230; *O pozhtvovanii protoiyereem M. Pavlovskim knig dlya biblioteki duhovnoi seminar-ii. Prilagaetsa perechen knig*, “Khersonskiy eparkhialniye vedomosti” vol. 14, 1874, p. 461–465; A.S. Sturdza, *Vospominaniya o Mikhaile Leontiyeviche Magnitsom*, “Russkii arkhiv” 1868, p. 926–938.

27 ORR NBL KFU, No 7831, p. 10–10r; RGIA, f. 733, op. 40, d. 116, p. 204r.

28 NART, f. 92, op. 1, d. 2393, p. 13–14.

New bureaucrats in charge of the main departmental report increased the number of ways to collect information from educational institutions. A growing stream of records was justified by the Ministry's concern with future civil servants' "moral health" and the quality of their preparation for service. The manifold increase in work flow could not help but institutionalize the modern "rational" bureaucratic power, which obligated employees to collect information about their activities, process it according to the imposed criteria, and regularly forward it to the superiors for assessment.

No longer was there a discussion on whether Russia needed universities and might not they be dangerous, for the sphere of education was no longer perceived as exempt from the state's control. Some felt that this control left a lot to be desired. A.S. Shishkov, who became Minister of Education in 1824, also believed education management to be erratic. Two years later the new Emperor Nicholas I, who knew from his father-in-law King Friedrich Wilhelm III about the Prussian experience of unifying educational institutions, reproached the Ministry of Education for their inability to achieve "the required and necessary uniformity" in education.²⁹ To remedy the situation, a Committee for the Organization of Educational Institutions was struck in 1826 that included S.S. Uvarov, M.M. Speransky, and S.G. Stroganov in addition to the Minister.³⁰ The committee members were supposed to evaluate activities of their predecessors in school management, exchange knowledge and experiences, and discuss advantages of other European educational systems, including those in the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austrian Empire, which by then had introduced mandatory primary education and established a state examination to evaluate school children's knowledge (Abitur). The introduction of the Abitur followed the development of a single educational standard and a respective support system. Not only Prussia's neighbors to the east, but also French and American observers showed a keen interest in and fascination with these reforms. Members of the Committee for the Organization of Educational Institutions analyzed the condition of schools and developed an algorithm to create a universal curriculum and standardize teaching.³¹

In 1832 Vice-Minister S.S. Uvarov submitted for the Emperor's consideration a report arguing that Russian education was still in disarray.³² The Ministry's policies did not have a specific end goal, educational institutions were unnecessarily varied, teachers' training far from uniform, and universities took too many liberties.³³ Uvarov insisted that the solution lay in "systematic consistency." This was exactly what helped Prussian government succeed in spreading literacy and boosting the country's economy.³⁴ Systematic consistency was seen as a means to an end, but also an end goal of management (whether for a particular institution or the state as a whole). In fact, what Uvarov was envisioning

29 *Zapiski, izdavayemiye ot Departamenta narodnogo prosvesheniya*, Saint-Petersburg 1827, vol. 2, p. 7; *Ob uchrezhdenii komiteta dlya slicheniya i uravneniya ustavov uchebnih zavedenii i opredeleniya kursov ucheniya v onih*, 14th May 1826, "Sbornik postanovlenii po Ministerstvu narodnogo prosvesheniya" vol. 10, 1864, stb. 22.

30 *Ibid.*, stb. 23.

31 O. Popov, *S.S. Uvarov i podgotovka obshego ustava rossiyskikh universitetov 1835 goda*, [in:] *Rossiyskiye universiteti v XVIII–XX vekah*, Voronezh 1999, vol. 4, p. 18–28.

32 S. Uvarov, *Iz zapiski "O sredstvakh sdelat narodnoye vospitaniye specialnym, ne otstupaiya ot obshih vidov onogo"*, [in:] *Universitetskaya ideya v Rossiyskoi imperii XVIII – nachala XX vekov: antologiya*, Moscow 2011, p. 125.

33 *Ibid.*

34 H.G. Good, J.D. Teiler, *A History of Western Education*, London 1970, p. 348.

was building a modern state as an autonomous superindividual management mechanism based on rational knowledge.

A degree of systematic consistency could be measured with numbers and presented in tables.³⁵ The latest European craze of using statistics as the basis for the organization of state management³⁶ affected also the Russian Ministers of State Property and the Interior, who inventoried the Empire's resources.³⁷ Uvarov's proneness to classification, cataloguing, taxonomy conformed to the intention of Nicholas I to "redevelop" the Russian Empire based on rational considerations.³⁸

Later on, whenever Uvarov spoke or wrote about the "system of education," he mostly had his own Ministry's policies in mind. To create or develop such a system meant to establish an efficient control over local academic communities and related school boards. Uvarov's understanding of control was closer to Magnitsky's than to an old police term: control was to be exerted through employees' self-supervision and self-censorship within the framework of a clear ideological program.

Practices of Self-Reporting and Self-Control

Having been appointed, after an audit of Moscow University, first a Vice-Minister (1832), then manager (1833), and later on Minister of Public Education (1834), Uvarov began by building his own team within the Ministry, then proceeded to compose and distribute ideological texts to school districts. Almost all organizational initiatives during his long reign originated from the Department of Public Education, the activities of which starting from 1833–1834 were determined by P.A. Shirinsky-Shikhmatov (Director) and his assistant P.I. Gayevsky (manager; Vice-Director since 1837).³⁹

The Minister did not have a clear idea of how to provide the Empire with the latest in science and education, so he kept experimenting. In 1833 he believed the science of management to hinge on the knowledge of human and material resources and their balanced distribution.⁴⁰ He thus strove to achieve "concinnity" of all the elements of school network ("a perfect division of educational institutions") and to have schools evenly spread across

35 See W.B. Lincoln, op. cit.; I. Khristoforov, *Sudba reformy: Russkoye krest'yanstvo v pravitel'stvennoy politike do i posle otmeny krepostnogo prava (1830–1890)*, Moscow, 2011.

36 T. Porter, *The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900*, Princeton 1986.

37 RGIA, f. 1290, op. 1, d. 135, 141. About this see Khristoforov, *Sudba reformy*.

38 S. Uvarov, *Desyatilet'ye Ministerstva*, p. 368.

39 P.A. Shirinsky-Shakhmatov was brought to the Ministry of Public Education by A.S. Shishkov (1824). Under Shishkov, Shirinsky-Shakhmatov managed the Minister's records, that is, stood at the helm of his office. He then managed affairs of the Committee for the Organization of Educational Institutions, and in 1830 chaired the Committee for Foreign Censorship. In 1833, as soon as S.S. Uvarov became Minister, Shirinsky-Shakhmatov was appointed to direct the Department of Public Education, and in 1842 became Vice-Minister; after Uvarov's resignation in 1849, Shirinsky-Shikhmatov took his position. For a more detailed biography see N.V. Yelagin, *Ocherki zhizni knyazya Platona Aleksandrovicha Shirinskogo-Shakhmatova*, Saint-Petersburg 1855. Uvarov's second closest associate was P.I. Gayevsky, who started his career in 1819 at the Department of Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education. In 1825 he was transferred to the position of head of the 2nd desk in Minister Shishkov's office. In 1826 he became censor in the Chief Censorship Committee, in 1828 senior censor in the Censorship Committee of Saint Petersburg. In 1834, after Shirinsky-Shikhmatov was appointed Director of the Department of Public Education, Gayevsky took the position of manager, and after 1837, Vice-Director of the Department. In 1844 he became Director.

40 Uvarov, *Iz zapiski*, p. 126.

the country. Later on, Uvarov gave up trying to distribute funds equally and switched to prioritizing just three universities (in Petersburg, Moscow, and Kiev) and gathering there all reputed professors and scholars of the realm.

In this study I do not dwell on the ideological content of Uvarov's concept, but rather focus on its pragmatic aspect, that is, on the formation of a knowledge-based system of management (as the actual content of this knowledge is secondary). The Minister claimed that by means of his "circular letters" he endeavored "to convey the above thoughts to my colleagues in the matter of public education."⁴¹ These instructions were not meant to regulate the employees' conduct, but to modify their imagination, which was a prerequisite for the creation of modern bureaucracy. By making departmental leaders and trustees read circular letters and explaining to them his ideas, the Minister solved the problem of educating officials of higher rank who would be fluent in both the "civilian" and "learned" languages, would think "like the state," and be capable of promulgating the government's agenda.⁴² In all these texts the Minister spoke in the voice of a collective subject – a modern state embodied in bureaucracy. Further down the line, the executives he had groomed ensured that Uvarov's ideas were broadcasted to schools and a "system" was established, wherein constant collection of information served as the underpinning of power and inventorying turned into an important public and professional occupation.

As mentioned earlier, in the early years of Alexander I's reign, academic councils, gymnasium principals, and teachers used to compose informal reports to tell the government (or the Department of Educational Institutions) how they facilitated the dissemination of sciences and spent the funds assigned by the treasury. Uvarov's predecessors' proved unsuccessful in their attempts to make schools and universities report annually (except for Kazan district school board). In the 1830s, the situation changed radically. Officials of the Ministry of Public Education began to create a system to control and influence academic life and teaching based on discursive disciplinary practices, rather than a formal service hierarchy. Professors were compelled to collect information about their own activities, systematize it according to the Ministry's criteria, and regularly send on to the Ministry. In doing so, they no longer felt themselves subject to specific officials in Saint-Petersburg, but more so to a system of information exchange that was suprapersonal and "objective." To this end, the Department of Public Education developed universal document forms and mechanisms to control the promptness of submissions. By combining the experience of old collegiate administrative bodies with M.M. Speransky's new model of statehood, Uvarov, Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, Gayevsky, and their aides strove to focus the university system on the task of preparing civil servants of a new type – bureaucrats in a stricter sense of the term.

In modern bureaucracy understood as rule through knowledge, documentation plays the role of the most important tool of social engineering. Thus the amount of attention that Uvarov's colleagues paid to every little detail of document flow organization and language formalization (like Magnitsky did ten years previously) come as no surprise. For example, they distributed templates for service track records based on the 1798 model. In

41 *Idem, Desyatiletie Ministerstva*, p. 348.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 421.

contrast to earlier self-reporting, these forms were filled out by clerks, rather than faculty themselves. Bureaucratic mediation ensured that the same type of data was included for everyone and proper language was used. Signatures of the university rector and the employee in question confirmed the validity of information. Every year, personnel files were bound into a single volume, complete with an alphabetized staff roster.⁴³ Thus professors' *curricula vitae* turned into registration forms for a certain category of employee (a "human resource" of the administrative system). No random data went into these, only that which the Ministry had requested. The Ministry clerks were looking for the parameters of a typical Ministry of Education employee. Consequently, every professor was judged against the preset norms of the form and acquired a new social persona (at least in their official capacity), fully dependent on the "system." Everything outside of the template was classified as marginal (e.g., membership in any kind of associations, including the secret ones"). It is another matter that the range of topics of interest to the Ministry expanded over the years, and the form made public what just a few years previously had been a teacher's private matter (such as religious affiliation, matrimonial status, children, or property).⁴⁴ Now, whenever a professor submitted any data about themselves, it was only in the form of a certificate issued by another official. It was not by employee's declarations and actions (an oath, or the performance of official duties) that the Ministry determined their loyalty, but by a written testimony of a third person (e.g., a priest's affidavit). Behind the sociological abstraction of modern statehood defined as a "rule through knowledge" stands a historical process that refashioned civil servants' subjectivity.

Students underwent a similar metamorphosis. Early in the 19th century, university offices updated trustees with annual reports that included their students' age, background, place of secondary education or homeschooling, selected specialization, and academic achievements. In these reports, each young man had individual cultural, psychological, and intellectual features. It was impossible to determine how good the teachers were based on the students' personal qualities. In the 1830s registers, students had no individual features and were sorted according to depersonalized statistical categories.⁴⁵ These categories were then complemented with the students' numeric exam marks (a six-point scale was introduced in 1837; the marks were given by examination committees).⁴⁶ Thanks to this analytical procedure, individual students were included in a single informational and administrative space as an impersonalized management factor or, rather, a criterion to evaluate how efficiently professors as civil servants performed their duties.

This was also when a new form of annual report, of three chapters and eight rosters,⁴⁷ was imposed on universities (it remained in force until 1860).⁴⁸ Filling this out forced

43 *Tsirculyarnoye predlozheniye o svoeyvremennom predstavlenii formulyarnih spiskov i svedeniy o peremenah chinovnikov*, 21st December 1834, "Sbornik rasporyazheniy po Ministerstvu narodnogo prosvesheniya" vol. 1, 1866, no 510, stb. 985-987.

44 G.I. Shetina, *Posluzniye spiski kak istoricheskii istochnik o sostave professorov v poreformennoy Rossii*, [in:] *Istoriya SSSR*, 1977, no 1, p. 84-96.

45 N. Zagoskin, *Istoriya imperatorskogo Kazanskogo universiteta za sto let ego sushestvovaniya. 1804-1904*, vol. 1, *Vvedenie i chast pervaya. 1804-1814*, Kazan 1902, p. 528.

46 E. Vishlenkova, R. Galiullina, K. Ilina, *Russkiye professora*, Moscow 2012, p. 126-127.

47 TsGAM, f. 418, op. 2, d. 234, p. 1-157; NART, f. 92, op. 1, d. 3823, p. 1-131.

48 For an analysis of this report see L. Bulgakova, *Otcheti popechiteley po uchebnym okrugam i universitetam kak istoricheskii istochnik*, [in:] *Vspomogatelnye istoricheskiye disciplini*, vol. 10, Leningrad 1978, p. 246-248.

academic councils to undertake a labor-intensive task of inventorying and accounting for the university property and summarizing the institution's academic activities. Charts presenting data from the report and other documents were to be appended to the narrative part of the report. Every staff member had to be involved. Numerical values were to be matched up to the Ministry's standards (as per the personnel roster) and data in the previous reports, and inconsistencies to be exposed. Thus part of the ministerial officials' work was done for them at the local level, so that they would not have to analyze the text and tables of the report in their entirety, but could focus exclusively on deviations from the preset norm. The new disciplinary practice delegated a significant part of coercion (as the basis of state rule) and control over its efficacy to the lower echelons, now involved in anonymous relations of power through the "system," not personal subordination.

Rationalized records management turned university into a kind of properly set up government agency (officials actually called it the "university department"). The bureaucratized (rationalized) image of university as produced by information exchange ignored professors' communication with students and colleagues outside of the classroom and disregarded their corporate conflicts and scholarly debates, as well as any educational activity in the city and the district that had not been stipulated by the *General Guidelines*. All of this was either forbidden or relegated to the sphere of private life. Annual reports left no room for professor's personal opinion, student's individuality, or a variety of opinions and emotions. These texts blurred individual learners first into faceless "students," and then a homogeneous "student body."

The virtual reality of information exchange facilitated professors' inclusion in the new bureaucratic system of state governance, but to maintain these relations, professors had to be involved in an endless document exchange. The value of information thus collected played second fiddle to the maintenance of "bureaucratism" as an actual disciplinary practice, which explains the constantly growing amount of paperwork universities were expected to fill out.

Making academic communities meet deadlines and produce expected volumes of records proved rather easy. Auditors checked annual reports for a correlation of requests "fulfilled, incoming, outgoing, and unsatisfied." Were unsatisfied requests to prevail, the Ministry would consider this to be a sign of poor records management and, therefore, poor management overall, which would lead to personnel changes. Over the course of the year, a rector had to review the documents in the offices of the academic council, board, and faculties, and make sure they did not keep fulfilled requests for longer than three years.⁴⁹ Precise observance of the forms and times of reporting, as the Minister assured his subordinates, helps solve issues quickly and "reduce the workload of office clerks." In reality, the workload of all employees, including ministerial clerks, grew exponentially.

49 RGIA, f. 733, op. 95, d. 787, p. 149.

An Alternative Reality

Thanks to the new document flow system, all public education employees became members of a single political “community” bound by mutual dependence. Participation of every staff member and their mutual responsibility were indispensable for the regular collective preparation of the Minister’s “comprehensive” report to the State Council and the Emperor. Failure to submit data destabilized the entire power vertical, with lower officials letting down their immediate bosses, and all together disappointing the supreme authority and undermining the Ministry’s reputation. This formed a new social identity and service ethos: everyone was but a cog in an impersonalized rational machine that was the state.

The success of subjecting universities to modern bureaucratic authority by means of new “information-based” disciplinary practices is best seen in how limited universities’ autonomy had become (even more so than the 1835 Statute stipulated). As university’s self-governance kept losing its significance, so changed the correlation between the meetings of the academic council and board. Every year, the councils (organs responsible to making strategic decisions) became progressively more passive and had fewer meetings,⁵⁰ whereas executive boards gained the upper hand and were overwhelmed with tasks.

The mounting complexity of academic life and the formalization of everyday support for university activities caused new structures within the university to emerge along with the responsibility for collecting information about them, and increased the rector’s workload.⁵¹ In 1838, 129 meetings of the Building Committee took place at Kazan University, 48 meetings of the Department of Philology, 41 of the Department of Mathematics, 16 of the Department of Jurisprudence, 29 of the Department of Medical Sciences, 9 of the Publishing Committee, 5 of the Admissions Office, 20 of the Examination Committee for Homeschooling Teachers.⁵² Since a rector was supposed to attend at least the meetings of the Building Committee, his own faculty council, executive board, and the academic council, within a span of one year an exceptional mathematician N.I. Lobachevsky must have taken part in and prepared documentation for 300 meetings. This work could not help but paralyze his teaching and research activities. What sociologists call “knowledge” in the system of modern bureaucratic power has little to do with scholarly knowledge and its augmentation.

The Ministry nevertheless justified the swelling of bureaucracy by an aspiration “to raise learning to a rational form.”⁵³ The rationalization of management, imposed by the Department of Public Education (first under Iazykov, then Shirinsky-Shikhmatov) onto the teaching process, manifested itself in the professionalization of teaching or, at least, in the institutionalization of service in this department. For instance, jointly with academic councils, the Department developed universal criteria to evaluate a professor’s

50 “Up to now,” complained, for example, in 1855 a Kazan professor O.M. Kovalevsky, “meetings of the academic council and faculties were limited almost exclusively to the administrative business, formalities, while frequently forgetting the essential, that is, the scholarly: the purely academic life conducive to the glory and value of the learned estate” (OR RNB, f. 531, no 390, p. 2r–3).

51 RGIA, f. 733, op. 95, d. 195, p. 25.

52 RGIA, f. 733, op. 95, d. 528, p. 109.

53 Uvarov, *Desyatiletije Ministerstva*, p. 355.

scholarly output and knowledge. But the nature of science remained largely independent from this rationalization, and, as expected, the institutionalization of the teaching and learning process did not start to function properly right away. For several years it required manual adjustments behind the scenes by the Ministry's representatives, or even remained within the purview of informal practices left outside of the scope of administrative control.

It would be wrong to say that modernization of the university system was only successful on paper, but just as important it is to note a growing structural gap between reality as recorded in bureaucratic practices and that remaining outside of the information exchange. Through their annual "comprehensive" report, the Ministry informed the monarch and all compatriots about increasing enrolment, the number of foreign study placements, new buildings, young professors, academic degrees conferred, new books in university libraries, collections of the curio cabinets, and publications in periodicals. Gymnasium and college principals, university rectors, and district trustees bore personal responsibility for their reports, but hundreds of teachers and professors contributed to their compilation. Since the Ministry evaluated their performance based on these texts, everyone was invested in painting a positive picture with dynamically growing numbers and no mishaps. Mutual interest compelled everyone to "optimize" statistics (not necessarily through falsification, but simply by choosing a more propitious calculation method), to show off achievements and to sweep problems under the rug.⁵⁴

Since a teacher's career depended only and exclusively on good reports, the actual carrying out of teaching duties appeared to be useless or superfluous. The anonymity of statistical reports guaranteed that disciplinary practices binding all teachers together by mutual responsibility were universal, but it also let some of them off the hook in their daily work, since their career aptitude was tested not by the quality of instruction or students' interest, but by general enrolment and grade averages, teacher to student ratio, the number of beds in hospitals, instructional time, amount of publications, meeting frequency, and the presence of records in the office archive. This was what made teachers appear successful in the eyes of the "highest authority."

In Saint-Petersburg, information from all over Russia landed on the desks of employees of the Department of Public Education. They left few notes on the margins of the reports.⁵⁵ Judging by these remarks, self-calculations were checked for errors and compared to previous year's tables. Columns of calculations on the margins bear witness to rechecks of data on personnel numbers, gym equipment, herbs in herb repositories, medical preparations, minerals.⁵⁶ Once in a while, clerks paid attention to inconsistencies in dates.⁵⁷ They also worried about proper data distribution into categories and tables.⁵⁸

54 Researchers of German school reforms are also not sure how credible the numbers in the Prussian ministers' reports are and use them only to judge about general tendencies (A. Ellis, R. Golz, W. Mayrhofer, *The Educational System of Germany and Other European Countries of the 19th Century in the View of American and Russian Classics: Horance Mann and Kostantin Ushinsky*, "International Dialogues on Education: Past and Present" vol. 1, 2014, no 1).

55 RGIA, f. 733, op. 95, d. 226, p. 3.

56 RGIA, f. 733, op. 95, d. 226, p. 22r, 29r, 33; *ibid.*, d. 237, p. 27r; *ibid.*, d. 522, p. 50.

57 RGIA, f. 733, op. 95, d. 226, p. 38r.

58 RGIA, f. 733, op. 95, d. 587, p. 4r; *ibid.*, d. 612, p. 4–7r; *ibid.*, d. 237, p. 2.

Therefore, no sophisticated “power of knowledge,” usually expected from modern management practices based on the literal interpretation of M. Weber and especially M. Foucault’s models, is to be found in Russia. The huge mass of collected information ended up in the capital on the desks of ordinary clerks. Standardized tables allowed them to combine information received from various educational institutions into a single numerical map reflecting universities’ and schools’ differences in terms of student and instructor numbers, course offerings, curio cabinets, books, etc. But these data did not determine the Ministry’s policies, as they had no significance of their own. They could equally well be used for balancing resource distribution as for prioritizing support of particular institutions. The situation of information-based rule occurred due to the impact of the system on the whole, rather than specific qualities of highest levels of administration. Moreover, the level of “knowledge-based power” hinged on the intellectual qualities of the subordinates (who composed a formal description of their own activities for reports), rather than those of headquarters officials. The Ministry lacked the competence to spot even the most basic system glitches, such as, for example, when, after the Ministry’s instructions on professor rotation (1835) had been misplaced, academic councils up to the 1850s kept following the old local and highly disparate norms for elections.⁵⁹ This led to glaring disproportions in age representation among faculty members, but none of the clerks reviewing the reports noticed how ubiquitously their instructions were being disregarded.

In 1843, Uvarov gave the Emperor the gift of a velour-bound ten-year Ministry report. In it, he argued for the creation and development of a Russian imperial education system and relied on dynamic rows of numbers to help him highlight the difference between the chaotic governance of the past and the rationalized management of the present. In terms of educational institutions’ successful integration into a bureaucratic control system this was probably true. But, as mentioned earlier, the aggregate data (preserved in archives and used by present-day historians as their main source) were not identical to the actual system of education. All they did was more or less truthfully record the system’s political and administrative component. Many knowledgeable contemporaries expressed their skepticism about the level and nature of educational activities in Russia, as, for instance, head of the secret police warned that, “Uvarov’s noisy, loud rule notwithstanding, we still have no decent educational institutions.”⁶⁰ After Uvarov’s resignation even participants of the “system” – school district trustees – told his successors about the appalling state of education concealed behind the dazzling façade of formal reports. For example, a Moscow trustee V.I. Nazimov lamented that “statistical rosters, tables, lists, and forms constitute the principal preoccupation of our offices.”⁶¹ Kazan trustee V.P. Molostov informed Minister A.S. Norov about the low quality of teaching, stagnant research, and staff shortages.⁶² They essentially pointed out the distance between the reality of a rationalized management system and that of education process as such.

59 T. Kostina, *Kak universiteti Rossiyskoy imperii 20 let zhili po raznym zakonam, ili o poteryannom chinovnikami Ministerstva narodnogo prosvesheniya postanovlenii*, “Sociologiya nauki iologii” vol. 8, 2017, no 3, p. 50–55.

60 *Nravstvenno-politicheskiy otchet za 1839 god*, [in:] *Rossiya pod nadzorom. Otcheti III otdeleniya 1827–1869*, ed. by M.V. Sidorova, E.I. Sherbakova, Moscow 2006, p. 211.

61 TsGAM, f. 459, op. 2, d. 1741, p. 52–52r.

62 RGA, f. 733, op. 47, d. 74, p. 1–2.

The newly constructed bureaucratic machine could only be maintained through constant production and dissemination of new documents. Just like clerks from the capital bombarded the institutions they administered with multiple requests for information, so did trustees, in a bid to play it safe, duplicate and forward to the Ministry all their commands and all responses from subordinate institutions and asked the minister's approval for every little thing. Professors, now used to being micromanaged and involved in a disciplinary practice of self-control, kept Saint-Petersburg abreast of even the littlest of occurrences. All employees accounted to the Ministry about the orders they received and sought a written approval for their actions. In the late 1840s, the Ministry was swamped with unopened mail and unsettled cases.

Successful bureaucratization solved the problem of subjecting the sphere of education to state control. Even professors were now made an integral part of a single network of information exchange, and so also of information-based governance. That said, the actual education process was almost wholly left out of the equation, and the manageability of the newly formed bureaucratic system left a lot to be desired. Bureaucratization made the "cogs" of a modern state machine feel apprehensive about one another and try to shift the blame down the power vertical. The established vertical power structure guaranteed participants' political loyalty, but was too rigid to react to individual problems and adapt to changing circumstances.

The whole point of the escalating and accelerating document exchange seemed to be that any educational institution (whether a gymnasium or university) it involved would function as part of an anonymous administrative "system" (in Uvarov's interpretation), wherein people transformed into new bureaucrats, small self-controlling cogs driving the large machine of the state.

In this new political and administrative space structured by information flow as much as by one's job title, not only did ministerial clerks organize, count, and restructure professors, but also the latter exerted influence on the Ministry through self-reporting. One could even argue that, thanks to integration into Uvarov's system, teachers consciously projected onto the state the proverbial scholastic obsession with self-improvement as regards both training new generations of civil servants and learning the skill of "statesman-like thinking." This may well account for the peculiarity of the intelligentsia's position surfacing as early as in the 1860s: they had a claim to knowing a better, more rational way to run the state.

Abbreviations

NART – Nacionalniy arkhiv Respubliki Tatarstan, Kazan.

ORRK NBL KFU – Otdel redkih rukopisey i knig Nauchnoy biblioteki imeni N.I. Lobachevskogo Kazanskogo Federalnogo Universiteta, Kazan.

OR RNB – Otdel rukopisey Rossiyskoy nationalnoy biblioteki, Saint-Petersburg.

RGIA – Rossiyskiy gosudarstvenniy istoricheskiy arkhiv, Saint-Petersburg.

CGAM – Tsentralniy gosudarstvenniy archiv Moskvyy, Moscow.

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