ON “THE LONG MARCH THROUGH THE INSTITUTIONS”.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF POPULIST PHRASE USED
AS A BASE FOR SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to carry out a communicological analysis of a specific phrase: “the long march through the institutions”. The phrase was used by the leader of the ruling party, Jarosław Kaczyński, in January 2018. The author analyses who and in what circumstances used this *modus operandi*, and identifies reasons that make the phrase a tool of populist political communication. The analysed phrase also represents a starting point for considering how communication strategies are selected by the leader of Law and Justice. The text contains an overview and represents a contribution to in-depth research into political communication, populism and propaganda in the public sphere immersed in the media – MediaPolis. The author wishes to draw attention to interesting evolution of populism towards an important tool of political communication, and undertakes a case study of an utterance of the leader of Poland’s ruling party. The research questions put in the study aim to examine a convention characteristic of populism: interchangeable treatment of conceptual apparatuses of ethical (axiological) and pragmatic discourses. Those paradigms, though originating from different world views, coincide in one political reality. The metaphor of march becomes a perfect synonym of change without the need to precisely define its direction and necessity. The study contributes to initiating a wider debate on populist political communication in Poland.

**Keywords:** political communication, populism, propaganda, discourses of politics, the long march, MediaPolis
The phenomenon of populist political communication has been analysed in a number of research projects in media studies and communicology since the beginning of the 20th century. The phenomenon is particularly intensified (due to mediamorphosis and media convergence) in the 21st century. In the MediaPolis, the sender-recipient market is monopolised by this type of political communication. The following text contains an overview and represents a contribution to in-depth research into political communication, populism and propaganda in the public sphere immersed in the media.

The word “populism” origins from the Latin *populus*, i.e. people. Populism is defined as a type of political movements and thought promoting political, economic or social slogans that are readily accepted, have an emotional and anti-intellectual appeal, express yearning for simple solutions of difficult problems, and meet popular expectations. Populism in a contemporary definition (Leksykon politologii 1998, p. 312) is understood as a new phase of political and intellectual fight (d’Ancona 2018, p. 13). Considering the evolution of populism towards an important tool of political communication, the following research questions arise: is populism actually associated with a specific political ideology or should be considered as an emotional message that performs the phatic function?; Can we assume the existence of populist “winged words” that are suitable for using in any political reality, gaining political support, and consequently influencing popular beliefs?; What happens when the political categories, such as “social grassroots movement” and “ruling party” are replaced with one word: “WE” used interchangeably to define the above categories in the ethical and pragmatic discourse? I will consider the abovementioned questions in the light of a rhetorical *modus operandi*.

That *modus operandi*, the “long march” phrase, originated from the 19th-century Marxist theory, was used as a popular rhetoric tool by the communists, then became an intellectual motto of the New Left movement (particularly in the ideology of Rudi Dutschke, leader of the German protest movement), and one of communication strategies used by Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (in English Law and Justice) the ruling party in Poland at this moment in time. How does Kaczyński use the key slogan from left-wing ideological thought, turning it into one of the rhetoric tools in the right-wing discourse? The original theoretical approaches and attempts to grasp semantic differences that define the phenomenon of populism seem to lose their reasons to exist in the MediaPolis. Is it then worth

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1 The term MediaPolis is defined as public sphere that emerges at the junction of political activity and entertaining politics. It encompasses topics associated with the “boulevard” or tabloidized public and political space, and the “parliament”, providing a platform for active participation in political events. More on this subject, see: B. Pfetsch, J. Greyer, J. Trebbe (eds.). (2013). MediaPolis – Kommunikation zwischen Boulevard und Parlament. Strukturen, Entwicklungen und Probleme von politischer und zivilgesellschaftlicher Öffentlichkeit, München 2013, p. 11. See also: A. Walecka-Rynduch (2019). MediaEgo w MediaPolis. W stronę nowego paradymatu komunikowania politycznego. Kraków.

2 Populism includes two movements developing in parallel (Kitschelt, Taggart): the left-wing and the right-wing one. They differ in emphasis put on various topics and problems. In left-
while to address the topics of populist political communication and propaganda rhetoric?

“Word and Emotions” in Propaganda

Stanisław Kwiatkowski in the introduction to his study „Word and Emotions in Propaganda” stated that “it is the responsibility (...) of people who use words in public service to continually seek new linguistic means, as attractive and effective as to grab by their expression and potency. It is worrying then that many contemporary speakers underestimate emotional means of expression” (Kwiatkowski 1974, p. 9). Propaganda, although designed for a mass effect, is always received by individual people and for that reason must consider responses and feelings of a single recipient (Kwiatkowski 1974, p. 9).

Emotionally loaded phrases offer great opportunities for propaganda due to their persuasive power. This is because appeal to emotions “activates even tired listeners, encourages interest in the discussed topic, helps concentrate attention, links the popularized content with experience, stimulates imagination” (Kwiatkowski 1974, p. 22). A space opens for a political metaphor that is useful in constructing a multifaceted message. Mariusz Kolczyński observed that “the metaphoric aspect of propaganda communication is relatively frequently linked with a system of mythical values characteristic of each community” (Kolczyński 2008, p. 101). A political myth which refers to original events, is surrounded by a system of cultural, social and political forces in a community. Its purpose is to bond the group within the community and provide it with both historical and cultural identity (Kolczyński 2008, p. 101–102). Tadeusz Biernat treats a political myth as a specific type of information that plays an important role in the creation of man’s consciousness structures and is linked to monosemantic information (Biernat 1989, p. 76–79).

When associating the context of emotions stirred up in propaganda messages with populist political communication, it should be emphasised that the understanding of the latter concept has dramatically evolved over the last 3 decades, revealing its numerous semantic and methodological complexities. Right-wing populism, topics discussed include economic issues, originating from egalitarian thought. The semantic axis is provided by antagonistic rhetoric addressed to the people, groups, institutions, also social equality and ideological universalism. Right-wing populism is distinguished by anti-corporate activism and anti-statist attitudes: xenophobia, especially its anti-emigrant ethnic particularism, a respect for customs and traditional morality. This type of populism is also characterised by Euroscepticism in many European countries. See also: R. Markowski (ed.) (2004). Populizm a demokracja. Warszawa.

Interesting concepts are discussed by such foreign thinkers and academics as Ernesto Laclau, Paul Taggart, Peter Wiles, Peter Worsley, Alister Hennessey, Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Torcuato S. Drtella, Robert Dix, Chantal Mouffe, Margaret Canovan. Principal Polish researchers of populism include Maria Marczewska-Rytko, Radosław Markowski, Mirosław Karwat, Dominika Kasprówicz. Definitions of the term “populism” given from the beginning of the
Contemporary definitions associate populism with a political discourse and provide such synonyms as demagoguery and manipulation (Burda 2010, p. 105). Mirosław Karwat even describes populism as a union with certain stereotype and myth of the people (Karwat 2006, p. 9). Margaret Canovan describes populism as a democratic paradox: populism is the most inclusive and “mass” form of political activity on the one hand, but its complex nature makes it impossible for numerous potential participants to develop a clear vision of politics that would make it comprehensible on the other hand (Canovan 2004, p. 245) which brings populism closer to the communication phenomena and acts of speech indicated above.

A review of definitions of populism thus leads to the conclusion that the term usually denotes a style of political mobilization, social coalitions and a reformist political movement.

The first of the abovementioned meanings seems to be the most adequate one in the light of the following considerations. Thus, populism is understood as a style of political mobilization that uses repetitive rhetoric tools and symbols to bias a group of people against other groups defined as its oppressors/enemies. An important role is played by a charismatic, paternalistic leader whose appeals produce a response in masses (Marczewska-Rytko 1995, p. 21). The representatives of the “new populism” movement are particularly skilful in this type of communication (Nalewajko 2004, p. 34).

As can be seen, the definitions of populism differ and those differences result from the emphasis on various components of the definitions and the way the distinguishing aspects are understood. Ernesto Laclau accurately describes populism as a movement the characteristic trait of which are the attempts made by the masses/people, i.e. the populus, to create collective identities (Laclau, 2000, p. 116). Consequently, there is only one populism by definition (neither right-wing nor left-wing). Populism may not be divided, but must be associated with a specific ideology and policy, as convincingly demonstrated by Joanna Dzwończyk during a scientific seminar on populist political communication. As such, populism belonged and belongs to a specific area of communication. This collective identity (collective will) is created by people deprived of privileges. This statement should be emphasised as an axis of further considerations. It must also be added that populism (as a tool of communication) develops at present in an environment of creative activity termed post-truth. Those phenomena certainly cannot be considered separately, and even must be analysed systematically. Populism aims to simplify reality at any price, tailors unpalatable facts to maintain a pre-defined picture or completely ignores them (d’Ancona 2018, p. 48). According to d’Ancona, “we live in an age of institutional fragility. A society’s institutions act as guard-rails, the bodies that incarnate its values and

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4 J. Dzwończyk, a speech delivered during the seminar on populist political communication, 10–11 April 2018, Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań.
continuities” (d’Ancona 2018, p. 49). Post-truth needs new narratives to function. The architecture of public information has changed, and consequently the conditions for the functioning of both political parties and social movements have changed. Populism as a tool of communication proves very useful in these circumstances. Gdula emphasises (not as the first researcher) that it is much easier today than in the past to attract public attention and regularly appear in the mainstream media with a message (Gdula 2018, p. 43).

The Long March Phrase

Let us return to the potential modus operandi indicated at the beginning of this study, an emotional (in the area of propaganda) and populist phrase capable of penetrating various areas of populist political communication and producing in all of them a similar, at all times intended effect. “We set out on a long march”, Jarosław Kaczyński said in an interview published in Gazeta Polska on the 31st of January 2018:

In our reality, the areas which must be not only modernized, but built from scratch, are so numerous that not two, but at least three terms of office are necessary to make Poland a modern, citizen-friendly country, free from the burden of the past. So we set out on a long march and this is our goal (Gazeta Polska, 31.01.2018).

A march, a long march, march as a goal – these phrases have been used in populist discourse for almost a hundred years. What is their origin and what goals do they achieve for the speakers who use them? Let us begin with the latest historical connotations, and then identify other speakers who used this phrase as a populist tool of political communication.

“The long march” was a central concept of communication for the left-wing German Protest Movement in 1968. Rudi Dutschke, a prominent activist of the Movement, used this concept to map out an extensive strategy of social transformation after a successful revolution. The concept, in Dutschke’s interpretation, included a revolution understood as an outcome of the activities of aware masses rather than of a certain minority. Revolutionary awareness was to be a result of a “very long march” (Malinowski 1983, p. 296−297). The march was aimed to break up the monopoly of the establishment and lead to a revolution (Walecka-Rynduch 2010, p. 103−106; Kraushaar 1998, p. 24). The process of “long march” was to encompass all social strata and groups. Dutschke defined the process as winning in the areas of technology, economics and education.

The changes proposed by Dutschke were to take place in the following order: FAMILY→ LECTURE HALLS→ COURTROOMS. “The long march through the institutions” in Dutschke’s theory was a concept of creating a new society. He assumed that the transformation process must be preceded by “raising self-awareness among
participants”. This was a condition precedent for formation of “aware elites” that could resist pervasive manipulation used by the ruling elites. The “aware elites” would become a “new class” (Gilcher-Holtey 2003, p. 60)

The concept of “long march” was developed earlier as a strategy for complete transformation of the state by Antonio F. Gramsci, an Italian communist who probably inspired Rudi Dutschke. Also Gramsci defined his vision as “the long march through the institutions”. Gramsci identified an important mechanism in society’s functioning. “The long march through the institutions”, the media, universities, churches, centres of power and culture, was aimed not only to take over the institutions; Gramsci believed that the traditional moral foundations must be destroyed and replaced with new ones (https://publicystyczny.pl). He appealed to the citizens encouraging them to take over and transform schools, universities, newspapers and magazines, theatres and the arts. Opinion-forming centres had to be conquered to change predominating culture and create a new man and new society (Kołakowski 2009, p. 289–294). We cannot change the world by a single revolution, argued the Italian communist, we have to prepare for a long, but consistent march through the institutions of education and culture, to exercise there our growing influence and transform societies in line with the communist ideology or its future forms (Słownik Historii Doktryn Politycznych 1999, p. 311–314).

The “long march” initiated by Mao Zedong represents yet another earlier, characteristic use of the slogan that inspired Gramsci’s thought and Dutschke’s understanding of a revolution. Physically, the “march” meant a series of retreats of the Chinese army in 1934. The marches lasted for two years and raised Mao to the position of the unquestionable leader of Chinese communism and Chinese political revolution, both popular and cultural (Tokarczyk 1998, p. 233). The march actually involved complete transformation of Chinese society, culture, man and morality.

Why did the phrase, apparently of leftist origins, frequently used in left-wing populist rhetoric, find its new space in the political discourse of right-wing/nationalist populism?

**Populism as an Outcome of Applied Language Discourse**

Firstly, attention must be directed to the emotional quality of this populist phrase, inspiring the senders in the communication process for almost a century and attracting the recipients as a reliable concept of change in the institutional system. Consider the phrase as a language construct: a march, marching arouses strong emotions, and the populist language is founded on emotional appeal. The word has two meanings: moving along steadily with a rhythmic stride on the one hand, and moving fast in a chosen direction (Słownik języka polskiego 2018). Encouraging to

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march is a communication act of request, but also an act asserting the necessity to cover a distance. As such, it represents an electoral macro-act (Ożóg 2004, p. 84).

The populists’ language is a vernacular, colloquial variety that simplifies politics, is strongly emotional, and comprehensible to the electorate. Stanisław Barańczak emphasised that emotionalization of reception is a rhetorical device used to persuade, next to tricks frequently used in propaganda, such as: “there is no alternative choice”, simplified value distribution, building a community based on common language and world perception (Barańczak 1975, p. 51–52). These aspects were also considered by Radosław Markowski who wrote that populism usually originates from the feeling of no alternative to the political system and requires that the elites of various parties be “rooted”; ‘One may say that the elites “rotate” but always within the same set’ (Markowski 2004, p. 21). The factor of mobilization or appeal for uncontrolled mobilization (as emphasised by Ewa Nalewajko) also plays an important role. The indicated universal quantifier of language community and common world perception gives the illusion of power to abolish anything in the state. Populism exploits the discrepancy between a yearning for imagined democracy and real democracy (Nalewajko 2004, p. 36). Thus populism performs the basic function of language in political space, the persuasive function (also known as the regulatory function). Its objective is to encourage recipients to act in line with the sender’s intention, to change attitudes and behaviours, to accept specific views and beliefs or ideas, the world of values proposed by the sender (Ożóg 2004, p. 41–42). Kazimierz Ożóg distinguishes the following factors that determine emotions in spoken communication: the dialogue nature of speech based on interchangeable roles of the speaker and the listener; spontaneous nature of the speaking process; situational communication or a dialogue embedded in a situation (Ożóg 2014, p. 91–94).

A populist message differs both from fascist or communist communication and from mere demagoguery. It is based on the following relational components introduced by populism into the communication process: identity understood as a reason for full unity of the sender and recipient (the leader personifies the people; uses the “we” community category); empathy, emotional affinity, ties between the sender and recipient, similar to family relationships; a diagnosis of evil, disclosing / exposing conspiracy theories; prospective thinking, giving a political promise of immediate resolution of all problems. Researchers into the language of politics and political communication, such as Irena Kamińska-Szmaj (2013a, 2013b), Walery Pisarek (2007, 2008), Jadwiga Puzynina (1992, 1993), Janina Fras (2005), Bogdan Walczak (1994), distinguish various types of discourse in Poland after 1989 that should be briefly discussed here. This will reveal the still concealed reason for the use of populist tools, such as the discussed phrase, in political communication acts. Two language discourse types are observed in Polish politics: the pragmatic and the ethical one. Various political parties have used the conceptual apparatus of one or another since 1989.

It was traditionally assumed (see the study by Katarzyna Kłosińska, published in 2012) that the ethical type of discourse is more frequently used by the right-wing parties while the pragmatic type is closer to the left-wing or centrist parties.
The ethical type of discourse is based principally on the category of morality (with two utilitarian values situated in its centre: good, and evil understood as harm). This type originates from a concept of community characteristic of our culture, a community with declared ethical norms resulting from experience that may be communicated using the language and narration techniques developed by the community. This is the condition for existence of each or a specific community (Kłosińska 2012, p. 27−33). In this type of discourse, the sender of message defines tasks (to be completed by the sender), referring to abstract categories that are related to moral values, thus directing attention to the “importance” and solemn nature of events; the sender impersonates a “missionary”, speaks about the tasks and activity as a “mission” and “service”; a “ PANCHRONIC” situation emerges: the sender-missionary rises above the present and everyday life, regarding the present as a link between the past and the future; as a consequence, the recipient of message is passive and deceived by the politicians (Kłosińska 2012, p. 63−67).

The pragmatic, also known as economic, type of discourse represents an interpretation (in a linguistic, communication and persuasive sense) of liberal doctrines. It combines independence of individuals of the state with preventing domination of mass society over individuals. It seeks methods for ensuring individual freedoms in view of the increasing democratization process in social and political life. Consequently, the most important component of this type of discourse is the reference to values associated with classical liberalism, such as freedom and property, treated as inviolable and inalienable citizen’s rights (Kłosińska 2012, p. 145). The role of the sender of message in the pragmatic discourse is identical with the sender’s perceived and adopted social role and associated perception of reality; objectives set by the sender converge with goals pursued by the recipient, and are attainable; the sender-citizen and sender-politician identifies with the recipient, creating a community of thought and feelings (the language and world); categories appear that are useful to the sender in building a language picture of recipient’s world: “effort” – we have to do hard work, but work means activity that must be undertaken (populism glorifies activity and combats passive attitudes, judgements, politics); “necessity”, understood as an “absolute necessity” – “there is no alternative choice” (one of the characteristic features of populism indicated above) which is described as a desirable situation promising success in a long term.

In the Polish literature on the subject, researchers direct attention to yet another division, into a Romantic discourse, associated with the ethos of Solidarity, recognising national and Christian values as foundations of political thought and communication and social solidarity as the principal determinant of relations between people and groups in the new democratic state, aiming to reckoning with the communist past, proposing the truth as the principal value (Ożóg 2004, p. 44); a liberal discourse, defined as a rational speech of technocrats whose highest values include intellectualism, civilization, democracy, local government, pragmatism, efficiency of market activities, identifying reasons for transformation, emphasising superiority of economic goals based on free market foundations, importance
of the present and future (Ożóg 2004, p. 46); and the last, populist discourse, gaining impetus in Poland since mid 1990s. The populist discourse is described as a language of extreme formations, emotional, national and religious, ignoring economic reality (Ożóg 2004, p. 46). Pierre-André Taguieff emphasises that the populist discourse is bipolar. A protest (social) discourse is located on one pole, and an identity (national) discourse on the other. The first of them (hyperdemocratic) idealizes the picture of citizens (indicating their positive qualities) who lost their trust in the system, the other invokes a monolithic people-nation, is also anti-elitist and anti-statist, but first of all directed against strangers (understood as aliens and foreigners). It is characteristic of a charismatic leader who pronounces an appeal to the people (personified by the leader), calls for clearing the nation, liberating it from from harmful elements (Nalewajko 2004, p. 46–49).

“The Long March” of Jarosław Kaczyński

Political communication employing the tool of populism (in its identity and national aspects) has one eristic objective, namely to convince the recipient that the sender of message is different that the actual, real speaker. The device or trick reminds of Schopenhauer’s stratagem 9, that consists in putting questions, but also theses, in an order different from that which the conclusion to be drawn from them requires, and transpose them. The result obtained is that the recipient of message does not know at what the sender is aiming, and may not prevent achieving the aim or make a logical interpretation (Schopenhauer 2014, p. 67–68). This way of communication is also characteristic of using another Schopenhauer’s eristic stratagem («no. 4»), i.e. masking intentions. “If you want to draw a conclusion, you must not let it be foreseen, but you must get the premisses admitted one by one, unobserved, mingling them here and there in your talk”. The sender may also use the trick of advancing the premisses of premisses; drawing up pro-syllogisms (syllogisms that provide no conclusion in a series of syllogisms). Thus the sender’s intention is concealed, and the recipient follows the selected train of thought, accepting everything said (Schopenhauer 2014, p. 63–64).

The populist message of Kaczyński ignores the complexity of circumstances and may be described as a hollow promise (Nalewajko 2004, p. 44): “Areas which must be (…) built from scratch, (…) not two but at least three terms of office are necessary” (Gazeta Polska, 31.01.2018); its verbal layer contains appeals for major fundamental reforms, radical changes and saving democracy (Nalewajko 2004, p. 46–49).
“(...) to make Poland a modern, citizen-friendly country, free from the burden of the past (...) So we set out on a long march and this is our goal” (Gazeta Polska, 31.01.2018). Three aspects of public debate structuring may be distinguished in this example: the aspect of simplicity, politics should transparently incarnate simple values and represent common people – populism thus aims to openness and directness; the aspect of sovereignty is used to legitimize all demands expressed on behalf of the entire people; the aspect of dichotomization brought into public debate is meant to encourage participants to explicitly speak for or against someone or something (Nalewajko 2004, p. 45–46).

The “long march” through the institutions is seemingly a method of action, but only seemingly, in practice it is a demagogic argument. It is resonant in the social and psychological sphere. Kaczyński as a demagogue wins using psychological methods, invoking beliefs (truths), commonly recognised as undoubted or sacred. This is also true for the discussed example – the public is wooed, a rhetorical argumentum ad populum is used. The politician goes further, suggests that he speaks on behalf of the people, expresses the people’s beliefs and will (Karwat 2006, p. 15). The category of march is thus an affective one. And affect is a predictor of political attitudes. Jakubowska accurately describes considerations on affective attitudes as based on analyses of motivation and affective structures of personality that determine unconscious inclinations towards specific political options (Jakubowska 2004, p. 177–178).7

When was the “march” of Jarosław Kaczyński born? It probably dates back to the beginning of 1990s, the times of the Centre Agreement [in Polish Porozumienie Centrum, one of political parties Kaczyński founded and was a member of]. In his publication “Agreement Against Mono-power. On the history of CA”, Jarosław Kaczyński summarizes that time with words that follow the concept of “long march”: “There is always this for that in politics. All objectives are achieved infrequently, and if they are, this is for a short time” (Kaczyński 2016, p. 113). Another point of tangency is indicated by Maciej Gdula and termed the “founding act of a new political age”, when Law and Justice became a party ideally fitting the analytical pattern of populism. It was the time when Donald Tusk and Lech Kaczyński competed in the presidential elections (2005). During the campaign Law and Justice coined a slogan that contrasted “solidary Poland” represented by Kaczyński and “liberal Poland” represented by Tusk. From that moment on, writes Gdula, “Law and Justice resorts to social rhetoric, demands that the dignity of common people is respected, criticizes the elites and follows a strict policy against minorities, clearly demonstrated in bans on marches of gay communities. Simultaneously, Law and Justice not only failed to reverse the logic of reforms initiated by its predecessors, but consistently continued them” (Gdula 2018, p. 17).

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7 More on this subject, see: Jakubowska U. (1999). Preferencje polityczne. Psychologiczne teorie i badania. Warszawa. The author emphasises that anxiety, frustration and hostility encourage acceptance of political beliefs based on categorical divisions of the world ("native–alien"), invoking power and negative emotions (harm, hostility).
The category of "the long march" perfectly fits communication strategy of Law and Justice. It should be emphasised that the communication strategy of that party was described prior to 2015 as based on the ethical communication paradigm, and only using pragmatic discourse to demonstrate expertise of specific people. Kaczyński follows another communication strategy: (using populist tools) effectively "merges" both types of discourse. The populist trick of Kaczyński consists of replacing the grassroots sender, a social movement (the proposed state of affairs) with the ruling party (the actual state of affairs) – and using the pronoun WE, understood in the ethical discourse as YOU and I – inclusive WE, and in the pragmatic discourse as WE, the community. Those two concepts are used by him interchangeably, effectively concealing the sender of message at all times. Attention should be directed to the meaning of the community category WE in an interchangeable use of the two paradigms. “We” in the pragmatic paradigm is generalized, includes the recipient ("we" replaces "you"); the role of message sender is a role the sender wishes to play and assume, with certain perception of reality; the sender remains in contact with everyday life, but is also a citizen who knows his rights and how to exercise them; the sender-citizen and sender-politician do not dissociate from the recipient, but identify with the recipient, establishing the desirable community of thoughts and feelings. Notably, the structure of that community is different than in the ethical discourse or in propaganda. The actual WE (understood as the first-person plural pronoun) is used here as a self-definition by the sender. The sender personifies the recipient and thus introduces authenticity into their interaction (Kłosińska 2012, p. 185). Previously (in other political texts) that inclusive WE was understood as “I”+“you” or “I”+“I”+“you”) (Kłosińska 2012, p. 184) which rarely gave the feeling of real contact (Bralczyk 2001, p. 135). Kłosińska indicates that an optimum persuasive effect is produced when the inclusive WE is used interchangeably with the proper grammatical WE: the effect is stronger, because all recipients-citizens are included in both levels (“I”, one of you, member of the community, and “I” as a politician). This method is used to evoke the feeling of common, shared interests and objectives (Kłosińska 2012, p. 185). The sender of messages also plays the roles of an expert and a spiritual leader, addressing the recipients of messages as citizens of a specific community, both real and symbolic, mystical one. It should be emphasised that the recipients are perceived as active members, responsible for their faith; and passive people, submitted to the will – mission carried out by the sender. The objectives set by the sender in his message are convergent with the objectives of message recipient, and attainable. “We” unites the electorate with the “transition elite”, “breakthrough elite”. Those elites have offered answers to the currently fundamental question about collective identity, associating that “we” with honour, virtue, patriotism and giving it an emotional, sentimental aspect (Wasilewski 2004, p. 75).

Most actions employing populist tools of political communication may be justified by using the *modus operandi* known as “the long march through the institutions” – the more effectively the sender of message is disguised (by interchangeably using the conceptual apparatus from the two described discourses), the stronger is the effect on recipients who feel empowered in the march. It should be emphasised that all
“Smoleńsk remembrance marches”\textsuperscript{8} embody populism and demagoguery. They literally implement the concept of “long march”. During the marches, the popularized message becomes more complete, effective in Jacobson’s terms (Jakobson 1960, p. 434–440). The “Smoleńsk remembrance marches” provide a suitable context, represent in reality the metaphor used. The recipient readily decodes the message transmitted. For example, Kaczyński said at the Smoleńsk remembrance gathering on the 10th of July 2017:

But we will continue our march until monuments are erected in this area. A monument of the late president of the Republic of Poland Lech Kaczyński and a monument to commemorate all those who died in the Smoleńsk crash, and I firmly believe that this will happen within months and not years, and then we will know much more about real causes of the disaster, about the events.

The metaphor of marching and a way appears again in the same speech:

Reconstruction of the state, of justice will be continued. We will walk in the opposite direction than that taken by our predecessors. [...] We cannot get out of the way of reconstruction of Polish democracy, Polish community [...] We know that we have opponents, frequently deceived, misled people, naive or simply unwise, but we will win, because the truth always prevails and Poland will win (https://www.polskieradio24.pl).

The populist aspect of political communication may thus be considered as an emotional propaganda message. The emotive function performed by the message indicates a focus on the recipient and the direct expression of the speaker’s attitude towards the topic discussed (Kwiatkowski 1974, p. 106). This enables the sender to evoke specific and desirable responses and gives the impression of certain emotions.

\textit{Conclusion}

To summarise, Jarosław Kaczyński’s use of the populist phrase “long march” confirms his conscious intention to interchangeably employ the conceptual apparatus associated with the ethical (axiological) and pragmatic discourses. Those paradigms, as demonstrated above, originate from two different views on the

\textsuperscript{8} Smoleńsk marches – remembrance gatherings and marches organized to commemorate the victims of the Smoleńsk disaster: a crash of Tu-154 government aircraft, killing 96 people on board, including Poland’s President Lech Kaczyński with his wife. Supporters of the political party Law and Justice have commemorated the disaster every month since 10 April 2010, using the gatherings to launch a political manifesto. The most recent, 96th Smoleńsk march took place on 10 April 2018. Thus, 2019 saw only the 9th anniversary of the disaster.
role of politics in society. The first is based on the nation as a social entity with its representatives, tradition, symbolism, spirituality, axiology and morality. The other focuses on the supreme task of rulers: managing the national interest. The metaphor of march becomes a perfect synonym of change without the need to precisely define its direction and necessity. A shift of speaker’s identity to the emotional, social “we” conceals the sender’s position. The pronoun denotes interchangeably the ruling party and the social grassroots movement.

It is irrelevant, as also demonstrated, that the construct of “the long march through the institutions” has been used in left-wing or even extreme leftist rhetoric for almost a century – this confirms that conceptual tools employed by populism have (or acquire in time) a universal nature.

Analysing rhetorical mechanisms embedded in the contents of political messages, four components can be distinguished: intentional construction of a community united by its world perception and language, emotional reception, simplified allocation of values and “there is no alternative” choices (Ożóg 2004, p. 96–104). Invocation of “the long march through the institutions” concept is an open manifestation of a plan to make changes on two levels: institutional and mental. The march is being continued now, and the electorate submits to subsequent phases of those changes.

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