Abstract

Jung dealt with the concept of the trickster archetypal in many of his works. References to his interpretations of the impact of this archetype and the myths associated with this figure are also scattered in many places of his works devoted to various issues. The notion of the archetype is extremely complex in his grasp, and the ways of understanding it are evolving, similarly to the concept of the unconscious. These evolutions are related to the transition from the plan of patterns of individual human development, to the development of the species, to the recognition of the very patterns of the development of reality, so they contain references to the psychological, anthropological, and philosophical levels. According to Jung, the trickster archetype expresses – in the most general terms – the conflict of these patterns, which introduces a certain factor to the development process that is both disharmonizing and dynamizing at the same time.

Keywords: unconscious, archetype, Trickster, patterns of behavior, patterns of meaning, mental development, laws of mental development, conflict.

The concept of archetype

Carl Gustav Jung interprets the character of trickster as an archetype. What can an archetypal interpretation contribute to the research on this figure? Archetype is a notion that is very important in the whole of Jung’s conception, and it is stereotypically associated with his name. His conception itself is sometimes called “archetypal psychology” or (in some forms and translations) “archetypical.”¹ This is not a notion that
Jung would borrow from a dictionary of psychology but from different fields, including philosophical texts. One might wonder why the psychiatrist goes back to philosophical terms with a long historical origin. The Jungian conception, especially at the late stage of its development, goes beyond the psychological way of understanding the main categories of the collective unconscious, archetype, and self. At earlier stages, Jung declares that he maintains a psychological perspective and does not want to, and cannot, in this area, be tempted to express metaphysical statements. Thus, his concept should have a psychological character, and, because it concerns the evolutionary dimension of development of the human species and cultures that it creates, anthropological.

For a long time, it has been difficult to overlook these kind of his declarations, yet the main categories of the conception have philosophical dimensions as well. Jung himself points to this philosophical heritage. In a text from 1935 [1954] he refers to Philo the Jew (the archetype is imago Dei in man), Irenaeus of Lyon (about the creation of the world by God, de alienis archetypis transstulit), Dionysius Areopagite (“immaterial archetypes”), and to the writings of Corpus Hermeticum (God as “archetypal light”), making some reference to the ideas inherent in the mind of God [ideae… que ipse formatae non sunt]. So, what is the meaning of the conscious choice of such traditions in Jung’s own concept? The philosophical way of using the term determines the immateriality of the archetype, its functioning directing the mind of God, calling beings into existence or reflecting the image of God in the human mind. It does not seem, therefore, that Jung could directly refer to these kinds of meanings, but he surely knew them. He also realized that the application of the term would entail a network of associations connected with its history. In the 1920s and 1930s, he understood “collective unconscious,” which in his view is a matrix of archetypal structures, in a psychological and empirical way, neither metaphysical nor philosophical. With time, however, the meanings of the main categories are shifting more and more towards a philosophical approach and transcendentism, in which the archetype is conceived as a form in se, directly unknowable and with a transcendental status. Nevertheless, as Jerzy Prokopiuk observes, there is a convergence and overlapping of the transcendental and transcendent dimensions in Jung’s conception. The unconscious is no longer just a matrix of structures of the mind and psyche, but it is also transgressive and in the psychoidal form it is a non-psychic reality.

Earlier, in a text from 1936, Jung had written: “the concept of collective unconsciousness is neither speculative nor philosophical – it is a purely empirical matter.” He also defines it very differently, that is (1939) as a “decentralized congeries of


psychic processes,”5 emphasizing the lack of its direct relationship with the ego: “if unconscious processes exist at all, they must surely belong to the totality of the individual, even though they are not components of a conscious ego.”6 Unconsciousness is the sphere in the human psyche which has no direct relationship with the “ego.” It has a potential character (“it is a reality in potentia”). It is rarely noticed that Jung also admits that it is a hypothesis adopted for understanding the phenomena of mental life. That sphere has no relationship with the “ego.”8 If one were to impose all these characteristics, then the multiform conception of the unconscious emerges. The unconscious also refers to non-psychic reality (in the late stages of the development of Jung’s conception). The unconscious has a transcendental character, both a priori and functioning as ready-made structures that build human experience and gather information about the previous course of human development.

From a completely different basis, Jung creates various connections to the meaning of the concept: it points to a similarity to the collective representations of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, and elementary ideas of Adolf Bastian. This is a completely different trace, indicating not the metaphysical but the anthropological and social aspects. Archetype is a form of action of the collective imagination and ideas. In spite of their richness in anthropological concepts, they are ordered according to certain types of human activity. Jung considers, therefore, that the mind of a man creating different types of cultures and various forms of social order works according to a certain order of its activity, and the imagination seems to be more fundamental in guiding forms of collective life than emerging and developing patterns of abstract thinking. Images, symbolic-imaginal thinking, are the first forms; they even had preceded language: “Interpretations make use of certain linguistic matrices that are themselves derived from primordial images.”9

Cultural and individual life is primarily a symbolic process; the human being is living in a universe of images and is experiencing them. Jung defines archetypes in different ways, sometimes in a very close connection with instincts, sometimes showing the tension between them. The method of defining this basic category changes at different times, at various stages of development of its conception. It also changes depending on the problems that he undertakes: for example, he defines it differently in the writings concerning alchemical symbolism, and differently when he discusses the problems of psychotherapy. There are thus such definitions which bind closely to archetypes and instincts: they create “very close analogies to the archetypes;”10 they are “unconscious images of the instincts themselves;”11 “they are the basic pattern of instinctive behaviour.”12 Instincts are common and universal – they act forcefully and aim at their own goals. He

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5 Idem, Świadomość, nieświadomość, indywidualacja (1939), [in:] ANZ, p. 290 [idem, Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation; CW 9.1 & 496, p. 278].
6 Ibidem, p. 287. [CW 9.1 & 490, p. 275].
7 Ibidem, p. 290. [CW 9.1 & 498, p. 279].
8 Ibidem, p. 287. [CW 9.1 & 490, p. 275].
9 ANZ, p. 41 [CW 9.1 & 67, pp. 32–33].
10 Ibidem, p. 54 [CW 9.1 & 91, p. 43].
11 Ibidem [CW 9.1 & 91, p. 44].
12 Ibidem [CW 9.1 & 91, p. 44].
often also shows their relationship to biological patterns of behavior (“hypothetical, inflexible basis”). Already in this brief review one is dealing with several very different dimensions of the archetype: intangible, fundamental ideas of ontogenetic importance (philosophical origin of the concept), collective categories of imagination, collective (anthropological and social) ideas, and reflection of instincts related to patterns of behavior (evolutionary-biological aspect). On the one hand, archetypes act intrapsychically, while on the other they begin to be understood as transgressive “matrices of meaning” (patterns of meaning) ordering the whole reality (psychoidal unconscious, unus mundus). They have transcendental status and are a priori factors, but at the same time they are engrams, the collected information about the experience of the species. Jung was aware of the problems imposed by these dimensions:

The unconscious has a Janus-face: on one side its contents point back to the preconscious, prehistoric world of instinct, while on the other side it potentially anticipates the future – precisely because of the instinctive readiness for action of the factors that determine man’s fate.

It seems that the directions of Jung’s thinking about this category are very different, that they become unraveled, creating a certain dilemma: they are contradictory and give rise to questions about the validity of various forms of interpretation. Often the concept of archetype is used in reference to these different applications, favoring the ones that seem dominant in a given field of research or interpretations. It can often be understood beyond the context of Jung’s conception and in its extensions to the concept of archetypal image.

The archetypal interpretation of the trickster figure brings with it a particular type of insight. It defines a certain universality of the pattern. Archetypal interpretation is not concentrated so much on the forms in which one can assume its specific, mythologically active figure in a peculiar myth of a certain culture. A general perspective raises the question: do these figures of myth really combine such expressive features that one can look for a pattern of higher generality? However, Jung himself started his analyses of the trickster in Paul Radin’s text of the Winnebago cycle. He was certainly inspired
by Radin’s note about the very primeval character of the trickster and his mirroring of the human mind (miroir de l’esprit, speculum mentis).

A further question arises as to whether the figure of a certain myth indicates a universal basis of the archetype of human experience, even if it is not related to a fully human form. However, for Jung archetypes transcend what is human in several ways: they concern the patterns of life of human communities, thus they transcend the horizon of what is individual. They are unconscious structures, and so they transfer what is “human” towards the “foreign,” beyond direct sensual grasp. They are the result of evolutionary development with its very slow (in relation to the historical and cultural world) pace of development, therefore they also transfer towards the “pre-human” (“original, not yet human, anthropoid disposition which we also call the unconscious;” the “phylogenetic substratum which I have called a collective unconscious”). Jung compares the archetype to a stereometric structure, an axial system that maintains certain unchanging geometric relations; the archetype is the power of preforming experience, “a possibility of representation which is given a priori,” preserving an “invariable nucleus of meaning.” Knowledge about it is thanks to the myth. Thanks to it, in Jung’s approach, there is a possibility of understanding the unconscious, although it is largely approximate. The immutable cores of the archetypes are revealed in a hermeneutic approximation, and interpretation is always primarily a hypothesis.

The history of consciousness according to Jung covers about five thousand years, and the unconscious is “in the world where the pulse of time beats infinitely slowly, where the birth and death count for little.” Myth is a narration expressing the unconscious and its archetypal structures. It is a kind of “textbook of archetypes” in his grasp.

Myth

The interpretation of myth in Jung’s conception is very specific and it has a number of commentators and critics (Eleazar Mieletinski, Henryk Podbielski, Jean-Jacques
Wunenburger,²⁷ G.S. Kirk,²⁸ R. Segal²⁹ and others). Part of this specificity comes from the anchoring of the Schellingian philosophy of myth in the psychology and philosophy of the unconscious.³⁰ For Jung, myth is primarily one of the ways of manifesting the unconscious. Thus, it connects, like a bridge, the history of culture with collective consciousness and unconsciousness. On the one hand, it is a manifestation of intrapsychicity, while on the other the unconscious itself is transgressive (especially in Jung’s late conception) and extends beyond the psychic sphere to the level of material processes, and yet it arises in a dialogue with life experiences and forms of the collective imagination. Myth expresses archetypes and archetypal images; it is something like a plot that develops their meanings and their reference to the common human being living in the environment. Myth is not simply an archetype, as some commentators on Jung’s concept maintain (e.g. Northrop Frye). However, there is an interdependence between them. Myth is therefore a plot; the development of meanings arises from intrapsychic structures, their transgression, mutual coupling between them and the environment of a given community: “In myths and fairytales, as in dreams, the psyche tells its own story, and an interplay of the archetypes is revealed in its natural setting.”³¹

Folkloric material allows observation of the motifs and their variants and sets of meanings. It also refers to the individual dynamics of unconscious processes and their symbolism. This material provides a certain neutrality³² to insight into the most important problems of the perspective of human life; the dimensions of “the bewildering interplay of good and evil,” and the “remorseless concatenation of guilt, suffering, and redemption,”³³ as Jung puts it in the introduction to his phenomenology of the spirit studied in this material. This combination of spirituality and mental automatism, the combination of antithetic elements and “harmony of good and evil” have a special meaning for the interpretation of the trickster character: the tension between the spirit and the yet not human “anthropoid disposition,” the unconscious.³⁴

According to Jung, this bridge, which builds the myth between the unconscious, the social imagination and the history of culture, is a reflex of the anthropological process, the very development of the life of the species. In another perspective, mainly intellectual, the idea that the myth builds various forms of connections between the contradictions of existence drew the attention of Claude Lévi-Strauss³⁵ and numer-

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³¹ ANZ, p. 229 [CW & 400, p. 217].
³² Ibidem, p. 237. Archetype points upward; however, it has also chthonic and negative aspects, and “for the rest merely neutral” – *ibidem* [CW & 413, p. 226].
³³ Ibidem, p. 228 [CW 9. 1 & 399, p. 217].
ous critics; it was followed by Paul Ricoeur. For the Frankfurter school both myth and enlightenment (understood as the progress of thought) alike, tried to express human anxiety and free man from it. In this sense they also have a reference to the fundamental relationship between man and the world; symbols express “inexhaustibility, constant renewal, stability of meanings.” In Jung’s approach, however, this is a broader reference, expressing the multiformity and the wholeness of these relations, not only anxious (related to the genesis of power) and not only of an intellectual character, but also – as in Gilbert Durand’s grasp (traget anthropologique) – the basic expression and tool of the process of the development of the species.

The Trickster in On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure (1954)

Jung was asked for a commentary about the trickster, Der Göttliche Schelm. The term der Trickster was turned into der Schelm, which he did not accept. In the associated fields around this figure he marked certain analogies to the carnival, the alchemical characteristics of the spirit of Mercury, the “feast of fools,” and the figure of the “Fools’ Pope” (fatuorum papam).

The archetypal interpretation is intended to visualize the essential character of the figure, the structure that appears in most of its realizations in the history of culture. Such a perspective has philosophical and anthropological features; archetypes in general form indicate the characteristics of a specific experience with an importance for human life and survival. Jung sees the figure of the trickster as compensation for the high demands connected with man’s relation to the sacrum. It is the horizon in which a person should change and usually requires from him some type of internal transformation, spiritual and moral development. The figure of the trickster expresses some kind of a compensation of this requirement and transformation. He directs our attention to a certain state, which is also expressed by other forms of culture and mythology, in games, carnivals, and rituals. He provides “all the wildness, wantonness, and irresponsibility of paganism.” Jung captures the reflection of the mental reality in the carnival, magic, and religious rituals.

In the psychological and anthropological features of this archetype, Jung sees a strong emphasis on the resistance of the unconscious to the challenges of moral development; it creates a tension in the psyche between the “good and bad alike

37 M. Horkheimer, T.W. Adorno, Dialektyka oświecenia. Fragmenty filozoficzne, M. Łukasiewicz (trans.), Warszawa 2010, p. 15. Myth expresses the man’s fear of nature – “Gods, whose names are a constant fear, cannot free people from fear;” “Enlightenment is a radicalized, mythical fear,” ibidem, p. 27.
38 Ibidem, p. 28.
40 ANZ, p. 269; idem, CW 9.1, & 460, p. 258.
41 Ibidem, p. 272 [CW 9.1 & 465, p. 260].
[trickster – I.B.] and is outside, or above, or below the human level," while similar to the ways in which the archetype of spirit is portrayed in folklore, fairy tales, legends and myths. A characteristic feature of the trickster’s archetype is some severity in this movement of the antithetical elements; they become more intense in the psychological, moral, and philosophical spheres. Jung in many places and very often marks this shortening in distance of highly antinomial content: the “contents [of the unconscious – I.B.] are without exception paradoxical and antinomical by nature, not excluding the category of being.” Archetypes and symbols closely connected with them are the ways of expressing the antithetics of the unconscious, its relation to the environment of the individual’s life. There are no “screens” of these properties.

The mythological trickster in the archetypal interpretation itself is part of these expressions and in a specific and characteristic way, among other things, he reveals and “hints at a secret inner relation of evil to good and vice versa.” The dialectics of the relationship between mental development and the processes of nature (although quite different from Jung’s theoretical perspective of “the tangle of myth, reign and work”), Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno emphasize that the creation of the self and the “creation of calculating reason” is the negation of the relationship with nature; circles and stigmata have become punishments in the history of our culture holding back the regress to “dissolve the self in nature.” What is rejected socially (“mimetic, mythical, metaphysical behavior”) as “overcome,” for Jung cannot be really overcome, especially in the field of the individual spiritual development of man. Development is not so much connected with overcoming as integrating, recognizing and understanding. The trickster contains a reference to the sphere of the pre-human but is also present in a modern man in the form of a double personality (double personnalité). It can be understood from the perspective of sub-personality connected with “puerile and inferior character,” in a split, objectified shape.

The character of the trickster is not only based on the image of the tension associated with the axial forms of the “anthropological trajectory”; the Winnebago cycle also had an atmosphere of enjoyment, which is often an important aspect of the functioning of cultural phenomena. Thus, the figure expresses what was initially formative for the human world – the antithetical tension between the primeval, pre-human unconscious and development consciousness. Radin revealed these stages of process, even “before the birth of the myth.” The archetype expresses both: the process of which the mythological form is a carrier, and a certain

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43 Ibidem [CW 9.1 & 419, p. 230].
45 M. Horkheimer, T.W. Adorno, op. cit., p. 42. They write: “Terrible things humanity must have done to itself to create the self, the same refers to the goal-oriented, masculine character of man, and something from this work is repeated in every childhood,” ibidem, p. 43.
46 Ibidem, p. 41.
47 ANZ., p. 274 [CW 9.1 & 469, p. 262].
48 Ibidem, 273 [CW 9.1 & 467, p. 261].
49 Ibidem, s. 275 [CW 9.1 & 470, p. 263].
“unchangeable core of meaning.”

The series of experiences are depicted in the myth-cycles by the characteristic meaning: the initial stage of consciousness-formation is confronted with the antinomial features of the unconscious. Claude Lévi-Strauss and Paul Ricoeur both noticed that myth develops sequences of forms to join together opposites, in trying to solve the dilemma of various existential properties. One should expect that the first stage of a junction of opposites should be imaged by some “friction” between contradictory elements and their incompatibility. The series of images should create a bond between them, coexistence, and a certain harmonization (“He is so unconscious of himself, and his body is not a unity, and his two hands fight each other”). Images of a myth in certain sequences or series would be a tool of this process, occurring at the same time on the mental level (“gift for thinking,” le don à penser) and cultural one (a record of the real experience of the development). Retrospectively – Jung observes – the treatment of the unconscious takes place with a degree of disrespect and mockery. These are some symptoms of crossing some form of development. We are “peculiarly moved” by the trickster – he anticipates “the figure of the savior and, like him, god, man and animal in one person.” He even quotes Radin in agreeing with him to recognize the human will to forget the animal past. The trickster is “both subhuman and superhuman, a bestial and divine being, whose chief and most alarming characteristic is his unconsciousness.” There are certain features of the intensification of the actual conflict in the process of developing consciousness with cognitive, moral and affective and emotional dimensions of the psyche. The figure illustrates this confrontation. It exceeds the individual psyche, and myth indicates precisely the “self-presentation of transcendens.” This is an important issue because it reveals Jung’s approach to the unconscious: the experience of the unconscious imaged in the cycles of myths goes beyond the horizon of the individual’s psychology and even beyond the mental as such. It transcends the human horizon; the forms of myth express what exceeds the conditio humana, though it pervades and co-creates it.

The experience of the unconscious brings the numinous prevalence of the proto-religious sphere in its alienness and autonomy, and yet also its foundation of the human psyche. Jung often characterizes it as follows: it is “foreign,” “non-human” and sometimes “cold.” It is also sometimes analyzed using R. Otto’s conceptualization of religious experience: it is “numinous,” “attracting,” “compelling,” “fascinating.”

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50 It is a problematic disagreement in the understanding of archetypes both as processes (processual existence of archetype) and immutable significance of meanings (noumenal existence of archetype as sphere in se) based on relationship between Jung’s concepts and Husserlian phenomenological perspectives and Kantian noumen, as considers Z. Rosińska in the article Ogląd kształtujący, [in:] Spotkania z Jungiem, K. Maurin, Z.W. Dudek (eds.), Warszawa 2007, p. 198.

51 C. Lévi-Strauss, op. cit.

52 P. Ricoeur, op. cit.

53 ANZ, p. 275 [CW 9.1 & 472, p. 263].

54 Ibidem.


57 Z. Rosińska, op. cit., p. 208.
It is also an axial experience from the point of view of religious experience – being surrounded and subjected to something much bigger and stronger, usually exceeding the human ego. The trickster also exceeds what is human. He has magical, superhuman potencies, but also subhuman and animal ones. However, he also expresses what is characteristic of the human situation – the interpenetration of features of contradictory properties, the course of transformation, which are the axes of human existence. The trickster reminds Jung of the forms of the original demonic creatures that arouse the fascination of consciousness. Their traces, according to him, can be recognized in fairy tales and carnival figures. “The so-called civilized man has forgotten the trickster,” but he seems to control the behavior of the crowd and many phenomena of social psychology. The individuality and a sense of responsibility, as Freud claimed in one of his works (1921), are disappearing in them. The shadow, to which the trickster character passes, is “personified and incarnated.” Similarly to other archetypal forms, the trickster allows one to “know the unknown.” He raises to view the level of the processes that he carries; this content does not subside until it is known. This is well illustrated by Jung’s text in which the meanings of the process are similar, *The Spirit Mercurius*. He interprets the figure appearing in fairy tales and alchemy as having numerous connections with mythical figures. One motif that is very prominent in these interpretations is the release of a hidden spirit, which means “frustrating evil in man.” He also has a meaning of “demonic arcane substance.” His “dual nature” is evident in numerous terms associated with him: “waking/sleeping, dry/moist, good/evil, water/fire, male/female, husband/wife, lover/beloved.”

Jung considers both the trickster’s character and the mercurial spirit as being associated with certain pre-figurations or the first forms of the figure of a savior. The interpretation of the features of the individuation and the process of spiritual, cognitive and moral development dominate in Jung’s conception. Psyche speaks in myths about itself, about the process of its development and about their formative axes. However, myth expresses the general nature of this process, the dynamics of the evolution of reality; in a sense similar to Schelling’s philosophy of mythology.

58 ANZ, p. 279 [CW 9.1 & 478, p. 267].
60 “Trickster is a collective shadow figure, the summation of all the inferior traits of character in individual” – ANZ, p. 282 [CW 9.1 & 484, p. 270]. The term “inferior” may be misleading here as pejorative; it can be assumed, however, that this is a judgment that adopts a point of view of valuations of consciousness. Jung himself did surely not consider the features of the unconscious as “inferior.”
63 Ibidem, p. 203.
64 Ibidem, pp. 217–220.
Thus, the notion of archetype and the conception of myth in Jung’s approach goes far beyond the limits of the psychological area itself. The philosophical history of the concept of the archetype, which – it should be emphasized – has not been properly and systematically studied, nor have the gravity of this story, its impact and encapsulating the notion in a network of relationships with others, such as collective representations, patterns of behavior, and patterns of meaning been well recognized. It causes that it takes on the nature of the pattern organizing the course of reality processes. Hence the most characteristic feature of Jung’s conception – its combination of an individual, collective, intrapsychic, social and non-mental plan. The trickster archetype is an expression not only of the conflict of patterns conditioning individual development, human development, but also of the forms of processes around him and directed towards him.

References

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