Changes in the perception of immigration, integration, multiculturalism and threats of Islamic radicalism in certain EU member states

The concepts of integration, assimilation and multiculturalism have become highly popular in the present century1. This is the result of the influx of immigrants to Europe, which resembles a sine wave – a curve showing the increase or decrease in migration flows to our continent. This phenomenon was at its greatest in 2015, compounding the problems and threats that had already emerged. The study of them is the purpose of this article. The author will also answer the question of whether the actions taken by the authorities to solve the problems and counteract them could have the desired effect and contribute to calming the public mood, and if so, to what extent. Or whether, on the contrary, these activities may lead to even greater antagonisation of various social groups, and thus to their radicalisation.

The research assumptions of the article focus on problems important for the present and future of Europe related to the migration to our continent of citizens of Muslim countries, who are not always able or willing to integrate with the inhabitants of the host countries. The author also draws attention to the changing attitude of the authorities of selected EU countries to the integration and multicultural projects implemented over the years. There were numerous criticisms of the concept of integration policy, connected with the belief the adaptation of foreigners to European society was ineffective. Some states have begun to officially withdraw from immigrant projects and dismiss the public discussion related to multiculturalism, which proves the failure of the concept of the integration policy of Muslim immigrants. These actions were accompanied by the religious radicalisation of Muslim minorities leading to...

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1 These concepts have been defined and analysed in several publications. The author refers to the book by Janusz Balicki, *Imigranci z krajów muzułmańskich w Unii Europejskiej. Wyzwania dla polityki integracyjnej*, Warszawa 2010.
acts of brutal violence. After many years of distracting the public from the essence of the threat, it sparked a harsh response from several governments in the EU, other than Brussels itself. Studying the above problems, the author used the following methods to analyse this phenomenon: historical – allowing to understand changes taking place in immigrant environments, behavioural – which is understood as the behaviour of individuals and social groups, and comparative – showing changes in the reaction of state authorities to threats from the radicalised part of Muslim minorities.

**Manifestations and effects of the policy of multiculturalism**

In France the negative effects of social changes caused, among others, by the policies of successive governments towards immigration and the welfare system of the state are conspicuous. They derive from, among others, ideas propagated by the French left, which for years has been portraying the immigrants from former colonies only as victims of harm caused by the French state. The latter in turn awakens among the immigrants revendicating and demanding attitudes and contributes to the formation of an aversion towards the host country. France is the country with the largest Muslim population in the European Union. It is also the country most threatened by terrorism in the EU. According to official data, there are 6 million Muslims in France (with a population of 70 million), and according to other sources, there may be between 8 and 10 million of them².

The history of terrorism in France is very long³. After World War II, it was associated with the Algerian War of Independence. After its end, more than a million people had to leave Algeria. According to the French historian Alain Besançon, the first president of the 5th Republic, General Charles de Gaulle (1959–1969), preferred to surrender Algeria rather than admit too many Muslims to the French society. De Gaulle opposed keeping French Algeria because he feared that France’s demographic balance would be undermined by an excessive number of Muslims. He did not yield to the supporters of French Algeria, many of whom were Gaullists, such as Prime Minister Michel Debré. It was only under the rule of Georges Pompidou (1969–1974) and Valery Giscard d’Estaing (1974–1981) that Muslim immigration gained momentum. It should be noted, however, that all the political forces of France contributed to the welcoming of Muslims. Religious communities – Catholics, Protestants, and Jews – wanted to show that they were open to others, entrepreneurs were looking for cheap labour, the left

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² M. Widy, Życie codzienne w muzułmańskim Paryżu, Warszawa 2005, p. 22. Many contemporary publications still give the number of 6 million Muslims in France. Thus, the population of French Muslims has remained stable for the past 15 years, when this figure was first reported. Such a figure seems unreliable. The estimates, characterised by significant discrepancies, result from the fact that in France, during the censuses, it is forbidden to ask about the religion of the respondent.

³ The 13 July 1793, when the Girondist Charlotte Corday stabbed to death the Jacobin tribune, Jean-Paul Marat, is considered the beginning of terrorism in the industrial society.
wing did it in the name of humanitarian ideas, while the right wing wanted to maintain ties with former colonies.

In the 1990s, France began to face the Islamic extremism. It was spread mainly by Frenchmen of Algerian origin, who opposed the authorities because the French government supported the military regime in Algeria in the ongoing civil war with Islamists. At that time, a large group of refugees came to France from Algeria, who, like the previous immigrants, settled in apartment blocks on the outskirts of large cities. In these districts, back in the 1960s and 1970s, flats were built for local and foreign workers in tower blocks, popularly known as housing at moderate rent (fr. habitation à loyer modéré or HLM). Over the years, the French moved out to better apartments or their own homes. Educated, integrated and enriched foreigners did the same. Imams and missionaries who travelled from Muslim countries to France and other Western European countries at that time were involved in preaching the teachings of Islam. However, they found it difficult to convince immigrant workers to obey Islam because they did not know their life problems. Moreover, the immigrants were more concerned with providing for their families than with satisfying their spiritual needs. The first generation of immigrants also took care of educating the many children growing up in European culture and thus fulfilled the assumptions of the policy of social inclusion.

France is an example of a country associated with the immigrant assimilation model as are other countries, incl. Germany. In the countries of Western Europe, it was believed that by the end of the 20th century all newcomers would be assimilated with their new environment. It was supposed to take two or even three generations. However, some began to question such assumptions. According to them, even in the next generation, the cultural difference between immigrants and their children and the environment will not disappear completely. It could also be observed that they are aware that full integration with society and participation in state institutions does not require immigrants to give up their own identity. In the French Jacobin tradition, the main emphasis is on the individual relationship between citizen and state, without intermediaries. This model assumes that immigrants will achieve a high level of cultural adaptation to the new environment. Those who do so have many opportunities, while others risk being marginalised. It turned out that most of them had been marginalised.

The situation changed after 1989, considered to be the apogee of the expansion of the fundamentalist movement until the beginning of the 21st century. The generation of immigrant children then reached adulthood. It was already familiar with European

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5 J. Kubera, Francuzi, Algierczycy? Relacje między identyfikacjami Francuzów algierskiego pochodzenia, Toruń 2017, pp. 381–383. Similar estates were built in West Germany for Turkish workers, the so-called gastarbeiter (in German: guest workers). The German authorities assumed that they would return to the native country after ending their employment, but in the meantime, for various reasons, they stayed and brought their families.

6 J. Balicki, Imigranci z krajów muzułmańskich…, p. 27.
culture and was exposed to numerous social obstacles, including in the labour market, which were often caused by school failures. It was in this environment that for the first time in Western Europe a group of poor Muslim urban youth emerged, which turned out to be more susceptible to the calls of fundamentalist activists than their parents. The fundamentalist ideology penetrated the new generation all the easier because the integration policy failed. In France, there were movements, like: S.O.S. Racism, which was to connect young people from all walks of life in a great anti-racist outburst, and Rebeu7. The latter tried to change the mentality of young Frenchmen of Arab origin that would correspond to their bicultural identity. It turned out, however, that young people were more susceptible to the influence of Muslim preachers and missionaries than to Western culture. Organisations derived from the Al-Ichwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brothers), Jama'at-e Islami Pakistan (the Muslim Party of Pakistan) and the Turkish Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party), well-established in Europe, have adapted their message to the needs of this part of the youth which was quickly re-Islamised. On this occasion, conversion to Islam flourished in languages such as French, English, German as well as Polish. The works of Muslim theoreticians of political Islam and jihad: Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-Ala al-Maududi were translated into these languages8. At the same time, the agitation went beyond the range of Muslim communities. The inhabitants of Paris found leaflets in their mailboxes that read: We Muslims will take over France, just as you once colonised Algeria. French families have one child each, while we give birth to five. In twenty years, we will be controlling France9.

The process of converting and radicalising young people accelerated after 11 September 2001, which was a kind of turning point for contemporary terrorism. European jihadists began to travel to conflict zones in Iraq and Afghanistan. The spectacular return of jihadist terrorism to France took place in March 201210. It coincided with the beginning of the great campaign that led to the election of François Hollande as president. Part of the victory was made by the masses of Muslims voting in his favour. This campaign was followed by parliamentary elections, in which for the first time more than 400 candidates of immigrant background, the vast majority of them Muslims, appeared. The followers of Islam voted for their candidates this time. This was strongly felt by deputy Jacques Myard, a French native who was seeking re-election in the Yvelines department near Paris. In the city of Satrouville, where a large number of Maghreb people live, Myard visited a local market. Here he was accosted by an Arab who instructed the deputy: You have nothing to do here. This is Arab land. Muslim

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7 In French, a colloquial term for European-born people whose parents or grandparents were immigrants from the Maghreb.
10 On 11th, 15th and 19th of March 2012, Mohammad Merah shot and killed seven people in Toulouse and seriously injured two.
land is not French land. You are a racist, a Zionist, and you should go away from here\textsuperscript{11}. Thus, the results of political education, not social integration, were clearly revealed. A parallel society developed in France. The Muslim minority demanded unrestricted access to citizenship, the same rights as Christians and Jews, but maintaining religious distinctiveness and the resulting privileges, obviously disregarding the recognition of the principles of the secular state\textsuperscript{12}. These privileges were granted during the Hollande’s presidency (2012–2017), which significantly differed it from the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012), who tried to restore relative “normality” in relations with the Muslim minority and control its claims. First of all, he proposed to end the traditional definition of the secular nature of the state, which simply meant excluding Christianity from public space. According to Sarkozy, France should no longer be cut off from its Christian roots. The secularism of the state was used by the followers of Islam, as it helped them spread its ideas. It is true that in 2004 the wearing of religious symbols, including Muslim veils, was banned in schools, but other elements of Muslim customs were introduced, including Halal food in educational institutions, gender separation in physical education lessons, burkinis in swimming pools and beaches, turning a blind eye to bigamy and circumcising girls, etc. These practices became common during the Hollande presidency. The then Socialist Interior Minister Manuel Valls spoke only of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in parliament. At the same time, the acts of profaning Christian objects were understated or omitted. If there was a mosque profanation, voices calling racism and Islamophobia could be heard or anti-Semitism if synagogues or Jewish cemeteries were the object of vandalism. Churches and Christian cemeteries were devastated and profaned, which passed without much publicity. Every year the number of acts of anti-Semitism increases. In 2014, more than 850 of them were recorded in France, which is twice as many as in the previous year. Anti-Semitism by the followers of Islam differs from the actions of the extreme right. Right-wingers focused mainly on anti-Jewish propaganda, Muslims used robbery, violence with torture and even murder. No wonder that around 50,000 French Jews left for Israel between 2000 and 2017, the largest number (almost 20,000) after the attacks at the Hyper Cacher supermarket in January 2015\textsuperscript{13}. The same year (13 November), assassinations at the editorial office of the weekly “Charlie Hebdo” and a series of the bloodiest attacks took place in Paris. Therefore, all the secularism of the state, instead of being a defence against violence by the followers of Islam, turned against France and its people. This is noticed by French intellectuals, but their statements and publications are met with hostility by Muslim activists and left-wing politicians and experts\textsuperscript{14}.

\textsuperscript{13} A. Pamuła, \textit{Wrzenie. Francja na…}, p. 351.
\textsuperscript{14} Georges Bensoussan and his book from 2002: \textit{Les Territoires perdus de la République – antisémitisme, racisme et sexisme en milieu scolaire} (Lost territories of the Republic – anti-Semitism, racism and sexism at school) are worth mentioning. The author writes in it about the anti-Semitism of French
Germany is home to the second largest Muslim community in the EU. Unofficial statistics, including illegal and unregistered Muslims, suggest that even more than 7 million. Immigrants in this country cannot remember its colonial past. Germany, on the other hand, opened up to immigrants, thus wanting to compensate foreigners for the crimes and wrongs of Nazism. Politicians made sure that the constitution of their country included provisions ensuring broadly understood tolerance. Germany also pursued the most liberal asylum policy in the world. Groups deemed to be terrorist were allowed to operate, raise funds and recruit new members; provided, however, that they were foreign terrorists, not native, German. Even planning a terrorist operation was not in itself illegal, as long as the attack was to take place abroad. The police were to focus their efforts on tracking down local right-wing extremists, and paid little attention to the groups of foreigners. There was a tacit agreement between the Germans and the radicals living in their country, whereby foreigners could do whatever they wanted, as long as they did not attack the citizens of their adopted country. In an attempt to break with its own past, Germany opened its doors wide to strangers.

Most of the Muslims in Federal Republic of Germany are Turkish citizens and Germans of Turkish origin in the second and third generations – children and grandchildren of Turkish workers who came to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Members of this large community sympathised from the beginning with the movement Hizmet (Service) founded by the renowned preacher Fethullah Gülen. The international mission of spreading Islam in the ideology typical of the Muslim Brothers was carried out under the slogans: Let’s build schools, not mosques and Our jihad is education. It acted in a way that seemingly appeared to support interreligious and intercultural dialogue, lulling the authorities into a false sense of security. In Germany, the movement worked quietly but effectively, creating special schools, private gymnasiums and universities, local centres for the study of the Koran and the so-called Lichthäuser (germ. lantern), i.e. male collectives with strict discipline, total obedience, compulsory reading of the Koran and common prayers five times a day. Gülen promoted the creation of the public image of the ecumenical Islamic movement striving for

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15 After World War I, Germany lost its colonies in Africa: Togo, Cameroon, German South-West Africa (now Namibia) and German East Africa – Tanganyika, which is now the mainland of Tanzania.
international dialogue by establishing 15 associations of dialogue in Germany\textsuperscript{16}. As a side note, it should be added that the Gülen's movement founded private educational institutions in Poland: the international Meridian school (a primary school, middle school and secondary school in Warsaw and a kindergarten and elementary school in Lodz) and the University of Economics and Information Technology. The owner of these educational institutions is Meridian Limited Company\textsuperscript{17}, which has branches in many countries. Gülen's followers were not preparing for armed jihad, but for language jihad, or missionary activity. Their activities are subtle and sophisticated to avoid being accused of spreading religious hatred and violence. This is to be the mission of spreading Islam extended in time, according to a sermon once given by Gülen to his disciples. This harmonious – it would seem – coexistence of Germans and Muslims and their integration, which was more of a wishful thinking than reality, was emphasised by President Christian Wulf, who during the momentous celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the country’s reunification said the following memorable words: 

\textit{Christianity doubtless belongs in Germany. Judaism belongs doubtless in Germany. That is our Judeo-Christian history. But by now, Islam also belongs in Germany.} This speech first caused astonishment, but thanks to the propaganda efforts of the media and statements of politicians, they were socially accepted and analys\textsuperscript{18}.

The first prominent person in Germany who did not hesitate to criticise the existing state was Thilo Sarrazin. In 2010, his book was published: \textit{Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen} (\textit{Germany Abolishes Itself: How we’re putting our country at risk}), in which he stated that immigrants from Muslim countries cause more social costs to the state than they provide benefits to the economy. He refused to recognise as equal citizens those immigrants who live on state benefits, while at the same time reject the state and not care about the education of their children. He blamed this on Islam, which, in his opinion, stands in opposition to Europe’s liberal values. The publication became a bestseller (1.5 million copies had been sold by the end of 2010) and sparked a nationwide debate about immigrants. The author suffered severe consequences. He was expelled from his party, the SPD, and forced to step down as a Bundesbank member. At the same time, pro-government media and Muslim associations launched an attack on Sarrazin, who was labelled, like many similar to him, an Islamophobe and racist. However, he won public support\textsuperscript{19}.


\textsuperscript{17} A. Rusinek, \textit{Nurt radykalny wśród społeczności muzułmańskich w wybranych państwach Unii Europejskiej}, Warszawa 2012, p. 213.


In 2013, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, while still the Prime Minister of Turkey, during his visit to Germany, warned the over three million Turkish minority against integrating with Germany, because Islam prohibits (according to the doctrine) intercourse with infidels. On the other hand, during a visit in 2015 to one of the exhibition halls in Karlsruhe, Erdoğan asked the nearly 14 thousand gathered supporters of the Turkish leader: *Do you want us, starting here in Germany, to build a new Turkey?* In response, he heard a resounding yes. Erdoğan emphasised then that the Pan-Turkish identity was supported by language and Islam. He explained to his countrymen: *You cannot learn German or English if you do not speak Turkish*\(^{20}\). During his speech, he also called the name of Allah several times and appealed for the Turkish communities in Germany to strengthen the global influence of Turkey, which had sent 900 imams to Germany. Each of them may legally reside and work in Muslim communities in Germany for five years. Some German politicians cautioned then against that Turkish imams and preachers in Germany were implementing the policy of the Turkish authorities and were loyal to their own country, not to the country of their residence\(^{21}\). Politicians also demanded to discontinue financing the activities of Islamic religious communities from abroad. However, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany adamantly opposed calls to stop the sending of imams from Turkey. It is no secret that these imams guard Turkishness and guard Islamic separateness. From the minbars (pulpits) of mosques, they condemn and banish the West, and compare the unbelievers to rotten fruit that smells. At the same time, when from October 2014 German citizens participated in the weekly Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident) marches in Dresden, they were denounced by left-wing politicians and pro-government media as Islamophobes, Nazis and people who portray Germany in a bad light. The grassroots opposition movement was too weak to stop Chancellor Angela Merkel from opening Germany to hundreds of thousands and ultimately millions of immigrants. Only a small part of the newcomers were refugees. In this human wave that travelled across the Balkans to the EU, it was mostly young, strong men with smartphones. They were quartered in hotels, recently renovated palaces and castles, in abandoned historic monasteries and private summer houses, without often asking for permission from the owners. New tenants quickly destroyed these facilities\(^{22}\). The German pro-immigration policy was transferred to the European Parliament, which promoted the principle of the compulsory sharing of immigrants among the Member States. In 2016, the most short-sighted idea came from Ska Keller, co-president of the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament, who wanted to relocate whole Syrian villages to Eastern Europe, because only in this way would immigrants be able to integrate\(^{23}\).


\(^{21}\) Ibidem.


Germany has another very serious problem that has also appeared in Sweden. Namely, there are criminal gangs of Arab origin that have a clan structure. A few years ago, the number of criminal clans operating in Berlin was estimated at about 20, and the number of their members at 10,000. Currently, German police sources list as many as 100 Arab crime clans operating in North Rhine-Westphalia alone. Over the last two years, about 6,450 suspects have been registered there who have committed 14,225 crimes, which is 25 percent of the total number of criminal acts. In the Ruhr and Bremen, Arab clans are responsible for 30 percent of crimes. They compete with each other for territories and spheres of influence, taking over entire districts of many cities in Germany. They come into conflict with members of rock and motorcycle clubs, which often end in bloody scores. Arab crime groups Abu Czaker and Miri, as well as Omeirat, Remmo, Rabih, Al-Kadi, Serhan, Nemr, Tamr and Kurdi are also known for their criminal activities in Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, countries where a large number of Muslims have migrated. These clans run all kinds of crime. Their members are difficult to track, surveil and identify because they are not registered with foreigners’ offices, use false documents, and can count on help from a group or fellow believers. The long-term policy of tolerance and political correctness towards foreign religious and cultural immigrants has led to the present situation in Germany in which clan criminal structures have developed into a parallel society, almost impossible to penetrate and eliminate. The situation is aggravated by the shortage of staff in the German police which hinders effective action against organised crime.

In the literature on the subject, Great Britain is usually seen as the prototype of the multiculturalism model. The United Kingdom took care to preserve the cultural differences of minorities, even emphasised their value. It provided refuge to all those persecuted in their countries. It was no surprise then that the capital of the country, sometimes referred to as 'Londonistan,' became the main centre of Islamic radicalism. The extremists expelled from Muslim countries, but also from France, sought refuge here and openly proclaimed their views. London has become an important centre of Islamic extremism influencing the entire world. In Great Britain there are editorial offices of Arabic-language newspapers: “Al-Arab” (“Arabia”), “Al-Hajat” (“Life”), “Al-Quds al-Arabi” (“Arab Jerusalem”) and “Ash-Shark al-Awsat” (“Middle East”), editorial boards of radical Islamic organisations: “Filistin al-Muslima” (“Muslim Palestine”), Hamas magazine, or “Risalet al-Ichwan” (“Message of the Brothers”) – of the Muslim Brothers, and the headquarters of important Muslim institutions and great assemblies of Islamic activists. Many radical imams who preach anti-Western sermons lived or still live there. Despite evident verbal and sometimes physical aggression, Muslims enjoy great freedom in Great Britain and can still count on indulgence. The reason for this is the legal system into which the European Convention on Human Rights of 1989

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was incorporated in 1997. On this basis, you can be punished for even the slightest criticism of Muslim minorities, including the term ‘Islamic terrorism’, recognised as Islamophobia. Even after the attacks in London on 7 July 2005, in which more than 50 people were killed and 700 injured, the media and politicians used the term ‘terrorism’ without religious connotations so as not to arouse discontent and tension in British Muslim community. To this day, their organisations bringing together citizens of the United Kingdom in various parts of the world can count on financial aid. Islamic ideologues were allowed to propagate the most militant ideas provided that they did not try to implement them in Great Britain, as in Germany. It is true that after the 9/11 attacks, a set of anti-terrorist laws was passed in Great Britain, but for a long time they remained only on paper. It was not until the London attacks in July 2005 that more decisive action was taken against Muslim hate preachers, but it took more than years to expel them from the country. Mustafa Kemal Mustafa, alias Abu Hamza al-Masri, was not extradited to the US until October 2012, and Omar Mahmoud Othman, alias Abu Qatada al-Filastini, was not handed over to Jordan until July 2013. After hearing adverse verdicts, they both appealed to the higher court institutions and the European Court of Human Rights. International humanitarian organisations stood up for them, despite the fact that they had committed the crimes of terrorism and had the blood of innocent people on their hands. These examples did not fit in with the regular work of UK law enforcement. The policy of appeasing Islam, i.e. the use of concessions and privileges towards Muslims, was still applied. They were given special rights at the expense of other social groups. This special status exempted Muslims from adhering to norms, the violation of which by members of other social groups is subject to sanctions. In Great Britain, as the only former EU country, Muslim minorities were allowed to use Sharia in civil matters (including marriage and inheritance issues).

The multiculturalism support program aimed at stopping the discontent among newcomers, mainly from Muslim countries, and weakening their critical attitude towards the new homeland. These calculations, however, completely failed, and the friendly policies of successive governments only led to an increase in Islamic extremism25. The problems compounded after the great migration wave in 2015. British police, like in other Western countries, notoriously concealed from the public crimes committed by Muslim minorities. Fear of being accused of racism paralyses the actions of Western security forces. An example of this is the diligent police cover-up of the sexual abuse by Pakistani gangs of approximately 1,400 British girls which dragged on for 10 years. It was only when the whole case could no longer be covered up that the report stated, among other things, that the reason for the failure to explain, for silencing and understating the crimes was the law enforcement agencies’ fear of

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For a time, the model of multicultural society present in Great Britain was also endorsed by Sweden. The Swedish state is perceived as one of the most liberal and immigrant-friendly. In 2015, the country received over 160,000 immigrants, the largest number in Europe in terms of the total number of inhabitants (10 million). Sweden was second only to Belgium in the EU in terms of the number of volunteers per capita who left to fight in the Middle East. It was 32 jihadists per million inhabitants. Volunteer trips to the Islamic State and participation in combat were not considered a crime. Swedish foreign fighters could safely return to the country, heal their wounds, and go to the jihad front again. In Finland, too, foreign fighting was not considered a crime, nor was the mere membership of organisations recognised as terrorist. Sweden has long been one of the most attractive countries for immigrants, because apart from many benefits granted to them, they could completely enjoy impunity here\(^\text{27}\). There is a great deal of political correctness here. The Swedish elite in the EU has probably made the most progress in their oicophobia, i.e. aversion to their own identity and civilisation, and xenophilia – preferring foreign cultures. In 2006, Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt of the liberal-conservative Moderate Coalition Party stated: *Only barbarism is genuinely Swedish. All further development was brought from the outside*\(^\text{28}\). In this culture of self-criticism, the Swedish churches supported the political class. Both Archbishop Antje Jackelén and other famous clergymen argued that Swedish immigration policy must take into account the fact that Jesus himself was a refugee. Later it was only worse. In December 2014, the same Prime Minister Reinfeldt gave a television interview in which he said that the Swedes were “uninteresting”, that the borders were “fictional” and that Sweden belonged to the people who had come there in search of a better life, not to those who had lived there for generations. During the 2015 migration wave, politicians but also alleged and true Islamophiles, often coming from journalistic and scientific circles, even went so far as to say that immigrants (...) *enrich the declining European culture*\(^\text{29}\). They assured that the population would not be bothered if they were replaced by newcomers from other regions of the world. While the situation was certainly not normal in 2015, the authorities of many EU countries pretended that nothing was wrong. For example, in October 2015, the Swedish government organised a conference entitled “Sweden together” to promote its migration policy. The conference was attended by the royal couple and most of the political elite. Ingrid Lomfors, head


\(^{27}\) K. Izak, *Ograniczenia i problemy w zwalczaniu terroryzmu i przestępczości imigrantów w Europie*, “Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego” 2017, no. 17, pp. 118–120.


\(^{29}\) Ibidem, p. 164.
of the Living History Forum (Holocaust awareness-raising institution) gave a speech, which was widely praised. Lomfors put forward three theses: 1. Immigration to Sweden is nothing new; 2. Everyone is a migrant; 3. There is no such thing as Swedish culture. The latter thesis proves the absurd views of the supporters of mixing different nations, cultures and religions. This attitude is represented by the political class of Sweden, despite undeniable facts, incl. the highest number of rapes per 1,000 inhabitants in the world after Lesotho in 2015. The Swedish press rarely reported such incidents, and when it did, it deliberately misrepresented the facts. In addition, the police in Sweden are subject to code 291. This number conceals a ban to inform the media of any incidents involving immigrants. No wonder then that in 2016 Adly Abu Hajar, an imam from Malmö, stated that Sweden was the best Islamic country.

Change in the perception of the “benefits” of immigration and multiculturalism

After the attacks on 13 November 2015 in Paris (which killed 131 people and injured over 300), President François Hollande said the French must remain strong against terrorism. The former prime minister, François Fillon, said that the war is already here. Police asked Parisians to stay in their homes for their safety. In response to the attacks, the borders of France were temporarily closed and the armed forces were put on alert. A state of emergency was declared nationwide and extended several times (it was lifted on 1 November 2017). However, this did not protect the country from further attacks. Another bloody attack took place on the national holiday, 14 July 2016. The terrorist drove his truck into crowds of people walking on the promenade. 87 people were killed and over 200 injured. During the declaration of national mourning, Prime Minister Manuel Valls said the words: France will have to learn to live with terrorism, which stuck in the memory of the French. Many of them saw these words as an expression of the arrogance of a government that does not fulfil its obligation to protect its citizens, but fights all manifestations of nationalism, Islamophobia and racism. The authorities did not take consistent measures against radical Muslims, but the French society reacted. For the first time Frenchmen in such a large number voted in the presidential election on Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Front. She qualified for the second round of elections, in which she obtained nearly 34 percent support, but lost to Emmanuel Macron. In the program, she promised, among others priority for the French on the labour market, greater taxation for companies.

employing foreigners, combating illegal immigration and reducing it to zero, as well as deportation of all people who have entered the country illegally, foreigners with court judgments and people filed in the “Fiche S”\textsuperscript{33}, i.e. posing a serious threat to national security. In those elections, second-generation Muslims made up 8 percent of Le Pen’s electorate, despite her anti-immigrant electoral program. They did not hide that their compatriots should be bound by the principle of integration or return to the country. They realised that the French perceive Arabs worse and worse. They treat everyone equally, to the detriment of assimilated immigrants, who in turn are considered traitors by their fellow believers. Many assimilated immigrants also believe that their people from the new generation who avoid work, extort benefits, proclaim anti-French slogans or commit crimes, should be deported\textsuperscript{34}.

After taking office as president, Emmanuel Macron slowly tightened his policy against illegal immigrants. On the one hand, he officially supported humanitarian actions and agreed to accept more people crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe, but on the other, officials made it difficult to legalise their stay. By surprise, in order not to provoke members of humanitarian organisations and human rights organisations, illegal immigration camps were liquidated in Calais (the famous “jungle”), in Paris and in other big cities. The police began transporting immigrants detained on French territory who had no documents and who reached France via the city of Ventimiglia or the Alps to the Italian side of the border. For the first time, it was evident that the authorities were increasingly using force rather than verbal persuasion and promises. A record number of immigrants in France strained the functioning of the social welfare system, generated enormous costs for both social housing and funds offering benefits. The mayors of seven French cities: Nantes, Lille, Bordeaux, Grenoble, Rennes, Toulouse and Strasbourg signed an open letter addressed to the government asking for help from a social catastrophe caused by a huge number of immigrants, and also demonstrated against Muslims organizing prayers in the streets of the cities. Immigration expert Patrick Weil from the Center national de la recherche scientifique (French National Center for Scientific Research, the equivalent of the Polish Academy of Sciences) stated that Macron’s approach towards immigrants is (...) \textit{the most extreme since the war}\textsuperscript{35}. In the survey, 60 percent of the French expressed the opinion that immigration had

\textsuperscript{33} “Fiches S” is a file of people who potentially threaten the security of the state, prepared by the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure – DGSI (Directorate General for Internal Security). In 2015, Prime Minister Manuel Valls announced that there are 20,000 people on the record including 10.5 thousand related to Islamic extremism. The rest are members of the far-right, leftist movements, etc.

\textsuperscript{34} A. Pamuła, \textit{Wrzenie. Francja na…}, pp. 150–152.

negatively affected their way of life. In a report by the French senate on the fight against the radicalisation of Muslims, the authors stated directly that Muslim immigrants are unable to integrate into society, and the amount of 100 million euros spent by the state in recent years on prevention and education centres has brought poor results. Interior Minister Gerard Collomb stated in December 2017 that France was in danger of a serious crisis because the situation was already explosive\textsuperscript{36}.

The attitude of the authorities towards Islamic extremists in penal institutions changed. It was found that they were able to influence other prisoners, which resulted in the organisation of strikes in 2014 and 2016. In 2014, prisoners demanded the right to shower in their underwear and not be searched by the guards, which they argued with religious modesty and obliging them no contact with “unclean” unbelievers. If the prison authorities agreed to these demands, it would allow prisoners to freely pass on any objects. In 2016, however, there were several weeks of riots in prisons, and then 200 prisoners in various penal institutions (at the behest of several terrorists who had returned from the Islamic State) refused to return to their cells. The prison authorities responded by creating special units, the so-called Unité de prévention de la radicalisation, UPRA (Anti-Radicalisation Units). Their task was to conduct various activities for the most radicalised prisoners. In this way, an attempt was made to deradicalise them. This solution proved to be unworkable after Bilal Taghi, a Franco-Moroccan jihadist convicted of a trip to Islamic State in Syria who was deemed deradicalised, attempted to murder two guards. Following Taghi’s attack, the Interior Minister announced that he would strengthen security procedures to protect the guards. However, in 2018 there was another attempt to murder three guards who were attacked by a jihadist from Germany. The attack was followed by a strike by prison staff and even stricter security rules. The ambitious goal of “deradicalisation” of jihadists was therefore abandoned and replaced with a more modest “restraining from violence”. A new special service was created, called the Service national du renseignement pénitentiaire, SNRP (National Prison Intelligence Service). First of all, the radicalised prisoners, who until then had been held mainly in four prisons of the Paris region, were transferred to 79 special-procedure prisons with properly trained guards, scattered throughout the country. In place of the UPRA, seven Quartiers d’évaluation de la radicalisation, QER (Radicalisation Assessment Units) were established, with 140 places prepared. Radicalised prisoners are monitored for four months not only by specially trained prison guards but also by parole specialists, psychologists and educators. Thus, the tolerance and privileges for detained Muslims ended\textsuperscript{37}.


\textsuperscript{37} G. Lindenberg, Najwięcej ekstremistów we francuskich więzieniach, 4 X 2020, https://euroislam.pl/najwiecciej-ekstremistow-we-francuskich-wiezieniach/ [access: 4 X 2020]. In mid-2020, there were 3,000 prisoners in French prisons “considered to be radicalised or suspected of being radicalised”. Of these, 522 people were convicted of crimes related to Islamic terrorism, and 900 – radical Muslims convicted of common crimes.
On the 25 September 2020, an immigrant severely wounded two people with a knife. The incident took place near the former editorial office of the satirical weekly “Charlie Hebdo”, which again featured caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad on the 1 September. The terrorist believed that he was attacking the journalists of the weekly, while the journalists of the Premieres Lignes agency were the victims. The attacker did not know that after the terrorist attacks of the 7 January 2015, the satirical weekly had changed its seat and its new address was kept secret. After the September attack on the 2 October 2020, President Macron presented a five-point plan to combat Islamist separatism. He announced his intention to “free” Islam in France from foreign influence and create an “enlightened” Islam. He also announced that a special law would be passed at the end of the year, the aim of which was to defend the secular nature of the Republic against the gathering steam conservative and political Islam. He also said that France had to deal with Islamist separatism, describing it as: (...) a conscious, theoretical, political and religious project aimed at creating a counter-society based on principles contrary to the applicable law. The state was to take control of the training of imams and the financing of Muslim organisations. In this way, the system that had been in force since 1977 and responsible for sending radical imams from countries such as Algeria, Morocco and Turkey to French mosques would be abolished. It would be easier to fight not only radical Islam, but also agents of influence. Compulsory education in the spirit of republican values would be introduced in schools (including private ones). Children who remained in the home education system would have to return to school. It concerned 62 thousand students. Illegal schools, often run by religious extremists, were planned to close. France wanted to create a version of “enlightened” Islam that is compatible with the secular values of the Republic. The way to achieve this goal is to limit the influence of Koranic schools and other schools educating children and youth in the Islamic spirit. Macron added that the certification of imams in the country would change with the formalisation of their education by the Conseil français du culte musulman, CFCM (French Council for Muslim Worship). The authorities justified the introduction of the new law by the need to combat Islamic separatism, in which


39 The Council was established in December 2002 on the initiative of Nicolas Sarkozy, the then minister of the interior, who wanted to have a single partner for talks with the fragmented Muslim community. The Council was created as a result of a complex procedure. In order to maintain a balance in the Council, the state made sure that its chairman was Dalil Bubaker, the rector of the Muslim Institute at the Great Mosque of Paris, the oldest Muslim institution in the country, strongly influenced by Algiers (representatives of the Muslim Institute had a poor result in the elections to the CFCM authorities, therefore the French Ministry of the Interior appointed Bubaker as its chairman). An influential person was its vice-president Fuad Alawi, then secretary general of the Union des organisations islamiques de France, UOIF (Union of Muslim Organisations of France). In 2013, UOIF left the CFCM, and in February 2017 it became the Musulmans de France (Muslims of France), usurping the right to represent the entire Muslim minority in the country. Currently, the CFCM represents nine Muslim federations and associations.
religious rights are favoured at the expense of the secular values of the French Republic. Macron defined Islam as a religion that is currently in crisis around the world. In his speech, he focused on the fight against Islamic radicalism in France. He also announced that he would supervise the funding of mosques. He also admitted that the French state was partly responsible for the “ghettoisation” of Muslim residents. Religious organisations took advantage of the errors in integration policy for their own purposes, including intensifying social antagonisms. Macron also said that France’s colonial past, including the colonisation of Algeria, left scars in public awareness that sometimes hampered the integration of immigrants from the former colonies. He noted: *We have not got to grips with our past*40. Deputy Interior Minister Marlene Schiappa, responsible for citizenship, announced that polygamists would be deported from France. They cannot be protected from the fact that they are already nationals of the country or that they have a residence permit. They will only be able to stay there if they obey French law. The minister also announced that issuing “virginity certificates” for women and girls would be prohibited. They cannot be treated as “cows in the market”41.

A turning point in the perception of the “benefits” of immigration and multiculturalism was the brutal murder of the history teacher Samuel Paty by the 18-year-old radicalised Chechen Abdullah Anzorov. The crime took place on the 16th of October 2020. The investigation showed that other young Muslims and their parents were involved in the attack. This event was met with decisive action by the authorities for the first time. Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin ordered the police to deport 231 illegal immigrants known for their extreme religious views and to tighten checks on applicants for a residence permit in France in terms of their attitude towards the host country and Islam. He also instructed the police to tighten checks on people seeking refugee status and scrutinise the applications more carefully to exclude further Islamic extremists, and to prepare a list of Muslim organisations and institutions known for promoting radical ideas. Actions were announced to eradicate hate speech in social media. On 20 October, the authorities ordered the closure of the Grand Pantin Mosque in Seine-Saint-Denis, on the outskirts of Paris, for six months, where sermons full of hatred against France and Europe had been delivered. Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France, CCIF (Collective Against Islamophobia in France) spoke in response to the authorities’ actions. It felt concerned about the political pressure exerted by top politicians and the intimidation campaign against an organisation tasked with combating discrimination and hate crime against Muslim citizens. Minister Darmanin reacted harshly to this statement, announcing that the CCIF

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would be banned. The dissolution was to apply to 50 other Muslim organisations and institutions, such as BarakaCity\(^\text{42}\). Its founder, Idris Sihamedi, was previously accused of harassing, publicly insulting and making criminal threats against a journalist on the RMC radio station Zohra Bitan, who allegedly committed contempt of the prophet Muhammad. The French authorities decided to dissolve the pro-Hamas Sheikh Yassin Collective, led by radical Abdelhakim Sefriui. He was arrested along with other people for participating in organising a campaign on social media against Samuel Paty, which ended with his murder\(^\text{43}\).

On 29 October, there was another attack. A Tunisian immigrant, armed with a knife, attacked in the basilica of Notre Dame in Nice. Three people were killed, one of them (a woman) was decapitated by the terrorist. After this incident, the control of the Franco-Italian border was tightened and joint patrols of the border services of both countries were organised in order to catch illegal immigrants trying to enter France. Another reaction of the Elysée Palace to the increased terrorist threat was commissioning the CFCM to develop a code of ethics for imams. The authorities, in agreement with the CFCM, decided to establish the Conseil national des imams, CNI (National Council of Imams), which would be responsible for educating Muslim preachers (in Arabic: chatib) and imams. CNI workers would be required to oversee their work and disqualify those imams and preachers who preach radical content and sympathise with Islamic extremists. The aforementioned code of ethics for imams was to be based on a set of rules applicable to doctors and lawyers. The postulates of the code include the statement that Islam is a religion, not a political movement, and cannot be subject to foreign interference in the affairs of Muslim communities in France. During a meeting with CFCM representatives, President Macron presented the Charite des valeurs républicaines (Charter of Republican Values), asking for its approval within 15 days. The government was to put pressure on the charter to be signed by organisations and institutions associated with the Muslim Brothers and communities from Turkey that use religion to exert political influence in Europe. The activities of the state authorities were complemented by the book Immigration – Ces réalités qu’on nous cache (Immigration – these realities that are hidden from us), published in November 2020. Its author is Patrick Stefanini\(^\text{44}\), member of the Council of State and former prefect. For years he had dealt with the problem of immigration. His book is the first reliable study of this type. It contains detailed information and statistics that successive French governments for 30 years refused to disclose to the public. The same month, the CCIF announced its decision to dissolve itself. On

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\(^{44}\) B. Dobosz, Islamski terroryzm przestaje być tabu, “Najwyższy czas” 2020, no. 50–51.
9 December 2020, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister Jean Castex\textsuperscript{45} presented a draft bill on combating Islamist separatism. The document listed in detail the tasks awaiting the administration and Muslim communities aimed at limiting the influence of Islamic radicals, who currently posed the greatest threats to the security of citizens and the cohesion of the state. At the same time, the CCIF was dissolved by a decree of the Council of Ministers (probably so that its activists would not make a decision to resume operations in some time), but Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights League stood up in defence of the organisation, which condemned this decision, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which is strongly influenced by the Muslim Brothers, offered its support. With the support of these institutions, the former CCIF activists filed a complaint to the Court of Justice against the Minister of the Interior for an unfounded accusation that the CCIF was directly involved in the murder of Samuel Paty and announced that it was challenging the decree of the Council of Ministers regarding the delegitimisation. The investigation did not support the hypothesis that the organisation was involved in the murder of the teacher\textsuperscript{46}. On 29 December the rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, Chems Eddine Hafiz, announced his withdrawal from the meetings scheduled to establish the CNI. Moreover, Islamist groups with influence in the CFCM successfully impeded the signing of the \textit{Charter of Republican Values}\textsuperscript{47}. It was approved on 17 January 2021, even though several Muslim federations opposed claims that Islam could be reconciled with French laws and values. The signing of the document by representatives of the authorities of organisations associated in the CFCM does not mean, however, that the provisions contained therein will be implemented in practice, because only now is a discussion to start with imams and leaders of Muslim community in France about obtaining the broadest possible support for the \textit{Charter}\textsuperscript{48}.

In Germany, the 2015 migration wave led to a political crisis two years later. Angela Merkel’s decision to open Germany widely to refugees from the Middle East can be considered the second so ground-breaking after the country’s reunification in 1989. The political slogan: “We can do it” (in German: “Wir schaffen das”) coined by the chancellor herself actually reflected the hope and optimism well prevailing in the circles of power at the time as to the possibility of overcoming the refugee crisis. However, support for accepting more refugees decreased from month to month.


\textsuperscript{46} https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_Against_Islamophobia_in_France [access: 20 XII 2020].


\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Francuska Rada Kultu Muzułmańskiego akceptuje zasady Macrona}, https://euroislam.pl/rada-muzulmanow-akceptuje-zasady-macrona/ [access: 18 I 2021].
In November 2016, polls showed that as much as 69 percent respondents in Germany wanted an immediate halt to admitting refugees. Violence against newcomers and the growing anti-Islamic movement became an increasingly visible element of German society and German politics. With hindsight, there are more and more signs that the decision about the uncontrolled admission of refugees was more an expression of wishful thinking than a rational settlement taking into account the actual political situation. The wave of a million immigrants that came to Europe caused a dynamic increase in the ratings of far-right and populist groups. Nevertheless, in 2018, the German authorities prepared another great project implementation plan – the admission of several hundred thousand immigrants as part of family reunification with those who had already obtained the right of residence.

Despite the increase in the number of employees at the consular post, the waiting period for German visas increased to seven months or even a year, which caused dissatisfaction of supporters of admitting immigrants. The Green party, then sitting in the government, demanded the introduction of new solutions. In its opinion, visa applications could also be processed by the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, and not only by German embassies and consulates. It would be an unprecedented situation, invented by someone who has completely lost touch with reality. According to information from the German Ministry of the Interior, by the end of 2017, approximately 180,000 asylum applications had been filed by refugees from Iraq and Syria, and in the next year more than twice as many, which, with the size of Arab families, meant bringing in several times more people, of course at the expense of the state – assuming that they would be only members of the immediate family, not distant relatives. The centre-right and liberal Freie Demokratische Partei, the FDP (Party of Free Democrats), which terminated the talks on the formation of a government coalition in November 2017, refused to accept these new groups of immigrants, which were to come to Germany from 2018. It is worth adding that in 2018 the ban on family reunification of refugees and asylum seekers, introduced as a result of the immigration crisis in 2015, expired. The new government was formed only in mid-March 2018 from a coalition of three political groupings: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU (Christian_Democratic Union), Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU (Christian Social Union in Bavaria) and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany). At that time, one could also observe an increasing polarisation of society, which resulted in pro- and anti-immigrant demonstrations, an increase in the support for far-right organisations, including the presence of Nazi sympathisers in the army and police, promoting Nazi slogans and symbols in cyberspace. The authorities, however, recognised that the extreme right posed a greater threat than the Muslim ghettos and criminal clans. This opinion was issued as a result of the electoral success of the anti-immigrant and xenophobic

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Alternative fur Deutschland, AfD (Alternatives for Germany), which won third place in the 2017 parliamentary elections (12.5 percent of votes and 94 seats). This party was also successful in local elections. Appearing on the official political scene contributed to the further radicalisation of all extreme-right groups. The same process was also taking place in the ranks of the AfD, as evidenced by the re-election of Björn Höcke, known for his neo-Nazi sympathies, as party leader in Thuringia. This was accompanied by information about the activities of racist groups in the army and police, and even in the military anti-terrorist unit. The Bundeskriminalamt, BKA (Federal Criminal Police Office) reported that over 13,000 those associated with the extreme right were willing to use violence, and at least 65 of them posed a direct terrorist threat. The turning point in the government’s behaviour towards the right-wing extremism was the attack on the head of the administration of the Kassel district, Walter Lubke, murdered in June 2018.\(^{50}\)

However, none of the politicians wanted to admit that the source of the aggravation of the domestic situation in the country was the opening of German borders to hundreds of thousands of immigrants. Therefore, it might have been a big surprise to appeal to the Green party to intensify the fight against the Islamist threat and the murderous ideology behind it. The leader of the Greens, Robert Habeck, presented a plan under the slogan: *Islamism is still one of the most serious threats to the internal security of all free societies.* One of the elements of the plan was to increase security forces in places where 24-hour surveillance of extremists must be carried out. There were also calls for the deportation of those who were dangerous. It was also expected that the activities of Salafi organisations would be banned and the funding of these groups would be monitored. The Greens want an extensive, countrywide anti-radicalisation network. It would be based on preventive cooperation with mosques and Muslim communities. In confrontation with a growing group of terrorists about to leave prisons, the party wanted to monitor their activities at large. The party’s initiative is surprising for those who associate the left wing mainly with pro-immigration policies, multiculturalism and concessions to Muslim minorities. In the West, there is often talk of a Muslim-leftist alliance. Nevertheless, the German Greens cannot be classified that easily. For years, Robert Habeck was considered in the party as a person who, apart from promoting a tolerant society, warned against the threat posed by Muslim radicalism. For many years, the leader of the Green party was Cem Özdemir, of Turkic origin, a declared opponent of political Islam and the Islamists currently ruling Turkey.\(^{51}\) So far, however, the German Greens supported the government’s pro-immigrant policy. They opposed the deportation of illegal immigrants and often blocked the take-off of planes with them on board.


In November 2019, the government presented a bill, according to which clergymen coming to Germany from countries outside the EU must demonstrate knowledge of the German language. Although the provisions of the act apply to clergymen of all faiths, there is no doubt that the authorities want to regulate the stay of Muslim imams and preachers in this way. According to the latest data presented by the Adenauer Foundation, there are currently approx. 2,000 mosques, and 90 percent of the imams working there come from abroad. In January 2019, the German Ministry of the Interior informed that only 1,049 imams and preachers were employed in the municipalities under the Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği, DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs). The draft law assumed that clergy who want to live and work in Germany would have to prove within a year of their arrival in Germany that they know German well enough to be able to talk. The German interior minister stressed that the command of language is a must for integration to be effective. The government’s proposal was criticised by the Greens. Their representative, Filitz Polat, expressed concern that the law would worsen the problem of the shortage of Muslim clerics of German origin. Sometimes organisations buy out already educated imams who, for various reasons, change their organisational affiliation, e.g. after the contract expires, the imams from DITIB move to an organisation called Milli Görüş (National Awareness/Vision) and undergo additional supplementary training there. In November 2019, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Minister of the Interior, Horst Seehofer, proposed that Germany educate imams themselves52.

Austria with a population of 9 million is inhabited by 700,000 Muslims of which over 300,000 live in Vienna and its metropolitan area. For many years, the authorities pursued a liberal policy towards immigrants and Muslims. In 2014, Sebastian Kurz, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented a new draft bill on Islam. It included, among others a ban on foreign funding of mosques and imams. The aim of the changes was to increase the number of imams educated in Austria and having Austrian citizenship. Islam was to be taught by imams who not only got to know the Austrian culture, but also learned about the problems of young Muslims in this country. The law explicitly stated that Austrian law had priority over the Sharia law. In addition, it required Muslim communities to present their interpretation of the faith and to translate into German the nine versions of the Koran that were in use. The law also prohibited imams from justifying violence in any way. Muslims immediately objected to the bill, claiming that it makes all Muslims potential bombers. At the same time, Austrian Muslims blamed the country’s authorities and their politics for the radicalisation of their fellow believers (but they did not explain what exactly was their fault). Some media outlets and politicians reacted similarly, arguing that Muslim organisations easily attracted young Muslims with promises of a better life. They proposed fighting among real men,

the possibility of being freed from sins, etc. As a result, in 2014, over 160 jihadists left Austria for Syria. The problem, as in other European countries, was the financing of Muslim associations and institutions by state entities and non-governmental organisations from abroad: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey. In 2015, the situation worsened when hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the Middle East and Africa moved to the EU at Angela Merkel’s invitation. Only in 2015, about 100,000 people came to Austria. The authorities had no idea who they were and, like the rest of the host countries, were unable to verify their identity (over 70 percent of the newcomers had no documents except for smartphones). At that time, Sebastian Kurz demanded the closure of the Balkan route and announced decisive actions against people associated with radical Islam.

After taking leadership of the Österreichische Volkspartei, the ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) and chancellor in 2017, Kurz suggested a massive return of immigrants to Africa and securing the EU’s southern borders, which was met with severe criticism from Western states and NGOs. In June of the same year, a 50-page report was prepared, but its publication was not anticipated. The report was prepared to check that foreigners are not discriminated against in the public employment service (Arbeitsmarktservice, AMS) and in the labour market. However, the document was leaked to the media at the beginning of 2018. It did not find any discrimination against foreigners, but described the cultural and religious barriers to the integration of people whose mother tongue was not German. This regarded especially Chechens and Afghans. It was noted that the employees of the labour office were afraid to suggest the Chechens to take up employment or attend educational courses. The AMS officials were apparently intimidated. Syrians, Chechens and Afghans, according to the authors of the report, had a problem with taking up jobs in such professions as social welfare and gastronomy, because the idea of serving other people is rejected by them. Muslim men, fathers, and husbands also made it difficult to hire or educate their wives and daughters. Following the publication of this report, the politically correct media demanded the dismissal of AMS executives. In mid-2018, the chancellor ordered the expulsion of several foreign-funded imams from the country and announced the closure of seven mosques. He also presented to the European Commission a solution to the problem of immigrants before they reach EU borders. He proposed the creation of closed centres for immigrants in Albania and Kosovo. There, foreigners from outside the continent would be screened and divided into those who are actually refugees and economic immigrants. The latter


would be deported to their countries. The Austrian plan was unofficially supported by representatives of Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany\(^{55}\). However, it remained on paper. On the other hand, Turkish citizens living in Austria and Austrians of Turkish origin were deprived of the possibility of taking driving tests in Turkish, which had been the practice so far. This was to encourage them to learn German. After the attack in the capital on 2 November 2020, in which four people died and 23 were injured, Chancellor Kurz was not politically correct and stated unequivocally that the attack was an act of Islamic terrorism caused by hatred towards the basic values of the Austrian way of life and democracy. He emphasised that this was not a war between Austrians and immigrants or Christians and Muslims, despite the fact that since 2018 there had been several attacks on churches by young Muslims\(^{56}\).

On the 16 of December, the government proposed changes to the law known as the “anti-terrorist package”. Despite earlier announcements, however, it lacked the explicit prohibition of the functioning of political Islam and provisions on the possibility of extending the imprisonment of terrorists after they served their sentence. Instead, alternative measures were proposed in the form of electronic monitoring of persons convicted of terrorist offenses after their release from prison. The provision was to be religiously neutral and apply to the perpetrators of all terrorist offenses, regardless of the type of religious or political motivation. It was emphasised that the goals of their fight against Islamism remained unchanged, and the law was only adapted to the requirements of the constitution. Integration Minister Susanne Raab said that whoever wanted to introduce sharia courts in Austria had to take into account the fact that they would face a criminal court. A debate began in Austria as to whether it is necessary to specify religious extremism in the law at all. Constitutionalist Heinz Mayer recalled that there were provisions in the criminal law on subversive movements that can be used in such cases. However, Raab said an “anti-terrorist package” in this form was necessary. She defended the precise regulation because it is a (...) criminal offense, the aim of which is to create a new social order based on religion\(^{57}\).

Interior Minister Karl Nehammer confirmed the necessity to continue the fight against Islamism, but also pointed to the need to combat right-wing extremism. He announced changes in the provisions on symbols that will also apply to extreme right-wing organisations. Symbols of both the far-right Identitarian movement, the Islamic State and the Turkish Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), considered terrorist, would be banned. The acceleration of the path of deprivation of dual citizenship, however, leaves no doubt as to the intentions of the legislators, as it


\(^{57}\) According to experts and lawyers, the act of terrorism is not an “ordinary” criminal offense and requires a special legal regulation.
would concern almost all Muslim radicals. Associations and mosques disseminating extreme views could be closed quickly in the event of terrorist propaganda appearing in them. Raab also wanted information about imams and mosques. Registers would be created with an indication of people and objects to which special attention should be paid. Compared to the previous law, the government would tighten its control over the funding of religious organisations even further, making it impossible to circumvent the ban on funding their activities through charitable associations and foundations. A lifetime ban on the possession of a weapon by persons convicted of a terrorist offense and a ban on working in security related professions would also be introduced58. On 1 January 2021, the regulation concerning all imams in Austria to register in the Islamic Religious Community came into force. At the same time, Austrian EU Minister Karolin Edstadier appealed to the EU to follow the example of Vienna and introduce compulsory registration of all teaching imams in the European Community. She also drew attention to the need for increased control over the allocation of funds to Muslim organisations and institutions so that the money would not go to associations supporting radical Islam59. By following the changes planned in French and Austrian law, the Swiss authorities intend to introduce the most drastic anti-terrorist law in the West. It would also apply to minors, which would violate the European Convention on Human Rights. But the Swiss government is determined to introduce the new rules, despite the harsh criticism of the UN Human Rights representative, who had already condemned the actions of the authorities for withdrawing Swiss citizenship from a Syrian citizen in early 2020. This was the first such case since World War II. If the changes in the law could not be passed in a referendum by February 2021, radicalised persons suspected of posing a terrorist threat would be placed under house arrest without a court order60.

In 2017, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency) published a report, *Muslimska brödraskapet i Sverige* (*Muslim Brotherhood in Sweden*). This report stated that Muslim organisations officially operating in Sweden create their own parallel society and have connections with the Muslim Brothers, which poses a challenge to the country’s social cohesion. The author of the study, Magnus Norell, a political scientist and expert on terrorism, pointed out that the Muslim Brothers are agitating for a transformation in Sweden towards an Islamic society. The expert claimed that girls should receive special care. Since a Muslim is bound by other separate religious rules than other citizens. According to the report, the Muslim Brothers influence the Stockholm branches of the following charities: Islamic Relief, Studieförbundet Ibn Rushd (Ibn Ruszda Swedish Student Union),

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Islamiska unionen (Islamic Union) and the Sveriges unga muslimer, SUM (Swedish Islamic Youth association). The document emphasises that these organisations receive millions of Swedish Kronas in subsidies from the state. These are various types of grants awarded by local governments and central offices for cultural, educational and integration activities. Norell argued that the Muslim Brothers extend influence in political parties, NGOs, academic institutions and other civil society organisations. He also accused the political elite of a conspiracy of silence dictated by political correctness and the alleged, in his opinion, fight against racism and Islamophobia. The Muslim brothers had the support of the left-wing parties and the Greens. In 2016, the organisation received 1.36 million Swedish Krona (142,000 Euros) for its activities and additional funding for an anti-racism project. It can be concluded that the political and religious activity of the Muslim Brothers in Europe has been built into the model of integration and can be interpreted as standard work for social dialogue. Norell emphasised, however, that in Sweden, the Muslim Brothers could count on the support of some circles supporting multiculturalism, left-wing parties and the Greens. The report stated that SUM members travelled to the battlefront in Syria and participated in the attempted assassination of Swedish artist Lars Vilks, the creator of the Muhammad caricature. The organisation also promotes violence and hatred towards other religions on its social networking site.

The Norell report was severely criticised by a group of Swedish religious scholars. In an open letter, they accused the author of, inter alia, no factual basis and equal treatment of the entire group of Swedish Muslims. Anneli Bergholm Söder, the representative of the MSB, who commissioned the report, stated in a statement for the media that the document would be analysed and the author was responsible for its content. Norell was probably right because SUM did not receive a government subsidy in 2017 due to (…) the lack of respect for democratic ideas. Myndigheten för ungdoms- och civilsamhällesfrågor, the MUCF (The Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society) did not award them a grant the following year. In 2018, the Polish community organisation, the Congress of Poles in Sweden, was also deprived of subsidies. MUCF judged that the activities of the Congress were contrary to democratic ideas. In support of such a conclusion, examples of views expressed in the pages of “Goniec Katolicki” (“Catholic Courier”), a periodical published together with the “Słowo Kongresu” (“Word of the Congress”), were provided. According to Swedish officials, in 2016–2017, “Goniec Katolicki” published (…) generalizing and damaging statements about Muslims, which described this group as a threat to society. There were also opinions in the newspaper that (…) Islam must be fought, not negotiated with. The articles used inappropriate terms

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such as “race” and “Negro”⁶³. In February 2021, the Gothenburg authorities decided to withhold funding from the Ibn Ruszda Swedish Student Union due to the organisation’s ties to the radical Milli Görüs group and the Muslim Brothers⁶⁴.

The following two years slightly changed the attitude towards political correctness promoted in Sweden. The media revealed that at the beginning of 2019, over 19 percent of the entire population living in Sweden were immigrants, with the majority coming to the country in the last 20 years. In addition, it turned out that as much as 90 percent of Moroccan ‘teenagers’ who applied for asylum in the past seven years were male adults. Only recently have politicians started to notice that all assumptions about the integration policy turned out to be utopia. In September 2020, Mats Lofving, Deputy Chief of the Swedish Police, and Edi Mord, Chief of Police in Goteburg, spoke openly about the threats posed by immigrants. They provided the public with information for which they would have been accused of racism two years earlier and lost their jobs.

It turned out that there are at least 40 family gangs from Muslim countries organised in Sweden, similar to criminal clans in Germany. Their members came to the country for the sole purpose of organizing and carrying out criminal activities. They mainly earn money from drug trafficking, assaults and extortion. In the years 2018–2019, about 30 men per year are killed in mafia scores. Muslim customs apply in the clans. Their members reject integration, they do not want to be part of Swedish society. Crime clans have a completely different culture and are difficult to combat using standard police procedures. Politicians have only now begun to work on changes in the law that would permit, among others, interrogating gang members, despite the fact that a serious crime has not yet occurred, and without obtaining the prosecutor’s consent, which until now was necessary. For now, the criminal clans are doing very well. They are favoured both by the law, which in Sweden has not been adapted to the changing reality, and the exceptional leniency of the Swedish law towards juvenile offenders (they enjoy complete impunity). Immigrants in Sweden still exercise many privileges, including a Swedish law which allows defendants to choose the most convenient time for serving a prison sentence. The accused leaves the courthouse and vanishes, whereas the police do not have the power and resources to be after the convict⁶⁵.

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Conclusions

The immigration crisis has a strong impact on politics in Europe, becoming a driving force for movements and parties that negate the current political order, including those that do not hide their xenophobic slogans and ideologies. Angela Merkel, under the catchphrases of openness and multiculturalism, opened the borders to immigrants, but at the same time caused an increase in xenophobia, from which the EU and Germany seemed to have managed to break free. Europe finds itself in a dangerous situation with xenophobic movements on the one hand and radical Islam on the other. Each of these formations legitimises its existence and methods of operation by the existence of the other, and also tries to polarise society and create a situation that will force citizens to take sides. Paradoxically, Chancellor Merkel’s decision to admit immigrants has significantly increased the risk of such a scenario, which is why the German authorities perceive both Islamic and right-wing extremism as posing the same threat to state security.

The terrorist attacks in October and November 2020 in France and Austria put the EU on alert once again, but this time the rhetoric of the political class and the media changed. For the first time, the attacks were associated with political Islam, and not with maladjusted, unbalanced people or enemies of society and democracy, which resulted from political correctness that did not allow terrorism to be combined with Islam. Anti-European (especially anti-French and anti-Austrian) statements of politicians from Muslim countries, often vulgar and full of hatred, demonstrated how important this change of narrative turned out to be. President Macron also became a target of the Arab street because he dared to express his opinion on the motivations of the bombers, and also announced that he would take measures to counteract the export of anti-Western ideas from Muslim countries to the EU in the future. It is worth adding that Al-Jazeera TV turned out to be an ally of Muslim politicians. It released a 3-part film entitled Blood and Tears: French Decolonisation, which tried, inter alia, to explain that the source of the attacks in France was the trauma of the Algerians during the national liberation war, their discrimination and racism of the French. Similar opinions were also expressed by experts, incl. Asma Barlas from New York or Ludwika Włodek, author of the recently published book: Gorsze dzieci republiki. O Algierczykach we Francji66 (Worse children of the Republic. About Algerians in France), whose statements the author of the article drew attention to.

Changes in the law and tightening of regulations may not be enough to change the situation. It could be beneficial to redefine the policy of multiculturalism and integration, not to mention the assimilation of Muslim minorities. If the interpretation

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of the Koran and the Hadith cannot be changed and the dogmas of Islam cannot be thoroughly reformed, perhaps efforts should be made to change the consciousness of Muslim minorities in Europe. In addition, the area of norms and values can be defined in a restrictive way, which, while maintaining different cultures and customs, would determine the granting of the right to stay in the EU. A democratic society cannot accept immigrants who do not respect its basic principles. The solution may be to force them to adopt certain standards or return to their country of origin. The harmonious coexistence of minorities and host societies depends on sound political decisions and long-term, consistent action. They cannot be subordinated to party ideology and current political benefits, i.e. the pro-immigration policy of the left and the anti-immigration policy of the right. The decisive condition should be the newcomers’ acceptance of European rights, norms and values and the ability to integrate. It is important that the EU as a whole, not individual countries, is ready to face this problem.

Putting hope in the education of imams residing in European countries as a way to solve the problem of radicalisation of Muslims is, in the author’s opinion, too optimistic. Already in 2011, the first Center of Islamic Theology was established at the University of Tübingen, and a year later in Osnabrück and Frankfurt. It found that the studies were dominated by women, and many men with 5-year diplomas did not intend to work in mosques. Only a few Muslim theologians educated in Germany remained imams67. It is also wrong to assume that preachers would preach in the European language and imams would lead prayers in the same language. It is simply not compliant with Islam. It would be less costly and more rational to closely monitor clergymen in Europe who came from Muslim countries, and above all to have them reviewed by consular services and checked by special services before issuing a visa. Obtaining a work visa should be compulsory for foreign clerics of Muslim origin wishing to establish themselves in the EU. The validity of the visa can be limited to one or two years with the possibility of its extension, and not – as in Germany – it is valid for at least five years.

It is hoped that the French authorities will be determined enough to implement all the announced measures against Islamic radicals. Relations between the government and Muslim organisations operating in this country were not as strained as they are today. It is difficult to persuade these organisations to any cooperation. So far, the CFM has not accepted the Charter of Civil Liberties, although it had 15 days to do so, and it is not known whether it will happen at all. The creation of the CNI also seems increasingly questionable. Thus, President Macron’s flagship projects may fail to restore “separatist” districts on the outskirts of big cities to the state. Years of neglect, submission, and the admission of new immigrants, despite the failure of the integration policy, led to chaos. All it takes is a spark to open rebellion against the authorities.

Is it justified, then, to seek an agreement with the Muslim Brothers? This grouping is deeply entrenched in many European countries and adapted to our cultural conditions. It shows special care to preserve appearances while building a correct image as an organisation in good relations with the authorities, in conducting social dialogue and presenting itself as a movement integrated with European society. Meanwhile, slowly but systematically and persistently it is building its influence in Muslim institutions and communities as well as local authorities. For years it has controlled many associations and centres of Islam.

Therefore, answering the question posed at the beginning whether the actions taken by the authorities could have the desired effect and contribute to calming the public mood, the author believes that only temporarily. Recently the projects created by the authorities of “old” EU countries and aimed at the so-called political Islam have a pro tempore and a propaganda character. Without changing the mindset of those Muslim minorities that are negative about Europe, all integration initiatives are doomed to failure. In the near term, social tensions are likely to explode with redoubled strength.

Abstract

The 2015 immigration crisis became a driving force for movements and parties that negate the current political order, including those that do not conceal their xenophobic slogans and ideas. In retrospect, there are more and more signs that the decision to accept the uncontrolled refugee influx was more an expression of wishful thinking than a rational decision, taking into account the actual political situation. Thus, Europe finds itself in a dangerous situation with far-right movements on the one hand, and radical Islam on the other. Each of these formations legitimises its existence and methods of operation by the existence of the other side, trying to polarise society and create a situation that will somehow force citizens to opt for one of the two options. Paradoxically, Chancellor Merkel’s decision to admit immigrants significantly increased the risk of such a scenario, hence the perception of Islamic and right-wing extremism by the German authorities as posing an equal threat to state security. However, it was only the recent terrorist attacks in October and November 2020 in France and Germany that changed the political narrative.

Keywords: immigration, integration, Islam, politicians, political correctness, radicalism, multiculturalism.