Sahrawi Migration in the Context of a Protracted Refugee Situation – a Description of the Phenomenon and Critical Analysis of the State of Research

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Algerian-based Sahrawi refugee camps were established 46 years ago. From that moment, Sahrawis have continuously migrated within organized mobility projects and individually. The aim of the article is to describe this migration as well as critically analyse the state of research. On the basis of a literature review, I have identified both research gaps and some methodological and analytical tendencies: a lack of reliable statistical data, a focus on easily accessible locations and certain groups of migrants, the problem of relating contemporary migration to nomadic traditions, ahistoricism and a lack of processualism in the description of Sahrawi migration, the problematical question of gender in migration processes and the agency of migrants within refugee regimes. Overall, the article introduces the question of Sahrawi migration within a protracted refugee situation and raises questions for further research.

Keywords: protracted refugee situation, migration, refugees, Western Sahara

Introduction

The history of Sahrawi mobility is an example of the migration of a traditionally nomadic population placed in the context of modern refugee and migration regimes,

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2 On the difference between mobility, pastoralism and migration in the Sahrawi culture, see: Wilson 2012b. Similarly to Wilson, in this article I understand migration as a form of mobility connected with "living", changing one’s main place of residence (Wilson 2012b: 5). If adequate, I use migration and mobility as synonyms for the reader’s convenience.

with considerable influences of South-South humanitarian aid (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015) and former colonial Spanish-Sahrawi ties. It also reveals processes of mobility in the context of a protracted refugee situation. Sahrawis originate from Western Sahara territories in North-West Africa in the Maghreb region. In 1884, the territory of Western Sahara was colonized by Spain. Between 1884 and the first half of the 20th century, the vast majority of people living in Western Sahara were classified as nomadic pastoralists (Caro Baroja 1955). The ongoing colonization influenced the local nomadic population (López Bellosa 2016), with the intensification of sedentarization processes in the 1950s (Wilson 2012a). In the 1960s, the development of fisheries, the start of phosphate extraction and the militarization of the territory associated with Morocco’s independence (1956) – all contributed to the urbanization of the Spanish Sahara. Meanwhile, in 1959–60 droughts took place in the region (Deubel 2010), forcing some nomadic communities to settle, at least partially, in emerging cities (San Martín 2009). Simultaneously, the period of colonization and sedentarization was the starting point of Sahrawi international migration, for example, to study abroad in Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and other Arab countries. Many of the founders of the national and independence movement studied in Morocco between 1956–1970 (Deubel 2010), and some of them went into exile in Morocco and Mauritania after the anti-colonial uprising against the Spanish ruling in 1956–58 (Wilson 2012a).

Due to the Madrid Agreement between the Kingdom of Morocco, Mauritania and Spain, the end of the colonial era did not bring independence, but armed conflict. After the Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion in 1975, around 50 thousand Sahrawis had to flee to the south part of Algeria, where refugee camps were created.³ The cease-fire of 1991 failed to enable Sahrawis living in camps to return to the Sahara, as a significant part of the territory is still occupied by the Kingdom of Morocco. The number of inhabitants is a subject of constant debate, however, according to the World Food Program, the most actual number of Sahrawis living in refugee camps is 173 600 (WFP 2018), with half of the population being born in the camps (Loewenberg 2005).

The analysis of the actual situation in the camps varies from emphasizing the lack of a durable solution, internal problems and high level of vulnerability of the population (Gabriel and Holley 2014), to showing the importance of agency, high literacy, democratic structures and gender equality politics. Although recent works do not repeat the admiration easy to find in articles written in the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant narrative in research-based papers is rather a critical description of a community living in a harsh desert environment and facing many external and internal problems, yet remarkably egalitarian and democratic.

³ Until now, the Sahrawi camps are the second oldest case managed by UNHCR (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011a).
Some of those living in the camps are not settled and constitute a part of the global migratory movement – the literature highlights the high level of mobility of people living in refugee camps (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014a), not only in the case of Sahrawis but Tibetans (Frilund 2019), Afghans (Erdal, Oeppen 2018), Somalis (Huisman 2011) or Palestinians (Lindholm Schulz 2003). Their ongoing processes of mobility show us the baffling nexus of forced-voluntary migration and deconstruct this simplistic division.

The article is based on a literature review on contemporary Sahrawi migration from the refugee camps in Algeria. The main aim of the article is to summarize and critically discuss the emerging literature on Sahrawi migration, identify analytical and methodological weaknesses and points out research gaps. Additionally, the article links to the literature on migration in the context of a protracted refugee situation, contributing to the deconstruction of forced-voluntary migration by being part of the ongoing discussion on mixed migration (Oelgemöller 2020) and the theoretical debate which challenges the idea of voluntariness (Erdal, Oeppen 2018).

The first part of the article integrates and summarises the chronological and geographical characteristics of Sahrawi migration from Algerian-based refugee camps. This introduction provides the background for a more detailed description of contemporary Sahrawi destinations, highlighting some research gaps. In the following sections, I critically examine four key analytical trends that describe the migratory experiences of Sahrawis: (1) the normalisation of migration resulting from the placing of contemporary migrations in a framework of a pastoralist tradition, (2) ahistorical descriptions and misinterpretation of ongoing migration as a permanent, never-ending exile, (3) the partiality of analysis of migrants’ agency in the context of refugee regimes and (4) methodological gender bias and gender blindness without taking into account other socio-demographic variables.

Mapping Sahrawi migration – a chronological and geographical description

The year 1975 was the starting point of the creation of the Sahrawi diaspora: approximately half of the Sahrawi population was exiled after the Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion. In October 1976, there were already around 50 thousand people

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4 As a base of the literature review, I used Google Scholar, JSTOR and library catalogues (Bodleian Library at University of Oxford, University of Kent, and Adam Mickiewicz University), limiting the selection to articles written after the cease-fire in 1991 up to now. As a result, articles and reports used in the review were written between 1999 and 2020. In this paper, I focused on articles and books written in English and Spanish, the two main languages used in scientific descriptions and analysis of the situation of Sahrawi refugees.

5 The work was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, under research project no 2020/37/N/HS3/01234.
living in refugee camps in the Tindouf region in southwest Algeria (Deubel 2010),
where the headquarters of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in exile is
located. From the outbreak of the Moroccan-Sahrawi conflict, many countries sup-
ported Polisario\(^6\) independence efforts, which opened the floor for the program of
educational mobility of youths. The program started in the late 70s, on the basis
of bilateral agreements between the Sahrawi government and cooperating countries
such as Algeria, Cuba, Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, Syria and Libya. This political project
was a result of the post-Cold War division and an interesting example of South-
South development and humanitarian aid. The aim of this project was, and still is\(^7\),
to educate personnel essential for the efficient functioning of the state in key areas
such as medicine, nursing, pedagogy, computing, laboratory technicians, journal-
ism, filmmaking but also philosophy or literary studies (San Martín 2009; Gómez
Martín 2011, Corbet 2006 in Gómez Martín 2016b). Since the late 1970s, only in
Cuba, more than 4000 scholarships for Sahrawi refugees have been founded (Fid-
dian-Qasmiyeh 2011a).\(^8\)

This educational program has an impact both on the individuals and at the level
of society (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011a). It is widely spread, as in every family there is
someone who took part in the project (Crivello, Fiddian, Chatty 2006). These youths,
after spending 14–15 years abroad completing studies, are supposed to come back
to refugee camps and work for the community. However, despite Sahrawi progres-
siveness, the differences between Sahrawi and Caribbean culture are enormous.
From the effort to speak Hassaniya\(^9\) in a “proper” way, without a specific accent,
through behaviour, openness and a more critical stance on many aspects of living
in the camps, to the inter-gender relations of socio-cultural practices – the day-to-day
cultural differences are highly visible (San Martín 2009, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013a).
At the personal level, memories about the childhood abroad are full of loneliness and
longing. After their return, students are supposed to work in the camps up until the
country becomes an independent Western Sahara, which is still hoped for, but was
expected especially in the early 1990s when the independence referendum was to
be held. Nevertheless, the work of well-qualified staff is not paid or low-paid, which

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\(^6\) Polisario Front is a Sahrawi liberation national movement considered as a representative of Sah-
rawis by the UN, cooperating closely with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic government.

\(^7\) The project is ongoing, although previous decades have seen less people taking part.

\(^8\) We lack comprehensive statistics and the data provided differs significantly, but according to
Cédric Omet, until 2008 around 6000 Sahrawis were studying in Algeria, 1000 in Cuba, 1000 in Libya,
100 in Syria, a couple hundred in Spain and a few dozen each in Norway, Germany, France, Venezuela,
Mexico, USA (Cédric Omet 2008, cited in Gómez Martín and Correa Álvarez 2015). Moreover, the project
scale is not stable. In the case of Cuba, the most vital donor of stipends apart from Algeria, 1977 was the
first year when a group of 22 students migrated (Gómez Martín and Correa Álvarez 2015). From 1980
to 1999, every year around 800 youths were sent, but from 2000 to 2002, it was only 200, with further
decreases thereafter (Monje 2012 cited in Gómez Martín and Correa Álvarez 2015).

\(^9\) Hassaniya is a dialect of Arabic used by Sahrawis and in several regions of northwest Africa, for
event in Mauritania.
together with the experience of living abroad and socio-economic changes in the camps after 1991 prompt some to consider further migration.

An interesting project called *Vacaciones en Paz* started in the 1980s. It is a Spanish grassroots initiative through which around 5 to 10 thousand Spanish families invite Sahrawi children age 8–12 for two months to their homes. The main purpose of the project is to give time to tend to children’s health, avoid the hottest summertime months and acquire Spanish cultural and language competencies (Gómez Martín 2010; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2012). Simultaneously, a vital aspect of the trip is to create a relationship between a child and a Sahrawi family with a host family in Spain. Equally important are the political aspects of the project, as it aids to spread information about the Western Sahara case and build a strong pro-Sahrawi movement in Spain. Gina Crivello, Elena Fiddian and Dawn Chatty show how the transnationalization of care throughout this project engages families – empathetic however not so much concerned about the politics – in the Sahrawi struggle through young “ambassadors”, not only giving direct financial assistance and two months of childcare but also international solidarity (2006). Moreover, according to the World Food Programme, being part of the program can positively influence a family’s economic position, consequently, those households who do not have access to *Vacaciones en Paz* can be in a financially more vulnerable situation (WFP 2008 cited in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011b).

In the mid-1990s the UN failed to hold a referendum hoped for by everyone (Gómez Martín 2011) which together with socio-economic changes in that decade and harsh environmental conditions (Gila et al. 2011) had an influence on a noticeable increase in the number of migrating Sahrawis.

### Main destinations of actual Sahrawi mobility

María López Belloso has distinguished three main destinations of actual migration flows: 1) Western Sahara territories under Moroccan control, 2) migration toward badía – the so-called Liberated Territories – which makes up of the territory of Western Sahara to the east of the berm, and 3) migration toward Europe, particularly Spain (2016). Additionally, Sahrawis migrate to the countries cooperating within the project of educational mobility, the countries involved in the local version of the *Vacaciones en Paz* project (for instance Italy), and to Mauritania, an important desti-

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10 The late 90s can be interpreted as a decade of an impasse – without a referendum and without the possibility to survive economically (Gómez Martín 2013).
11 The majority of children spend vacations in Spain, however in the last decade some children are also sent to Italy (Medina Martín 2014) or the U.S. (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011b).
12 The wall built in the 1980s by Morocco through the territories of Western Sahara, which had affected the establishment of a ceasefire and divided Western Sahara into an area administrated by the Kingdom of Morocco, with access to the sea and many natural resources, and lands east of the berm, administrated by SADR and Polisario.
nation for Sahrawis from the very beginning of the exile, which is still considered as a reasonable place to migrate from both Western Sahara itself and refugee camps. Sahrawis from campamentos also migrate to other regions of Algeria: mostly to main cities to the north and surrounding areas of the refugee camps.

Migration toward Spain

Spain remains the main destination for Sahrawi migration. Spain is chosen not only because of the geographical proximity but mostly because of (post)colonial ties: Spanish is the second official language of SADR in exile, and Spanish civil society is the most active when it comes to grassroots humanitarian aid in refugee camps in Algeria. The Sahrawi migration occurring before the war of 1975–76 can be treated as another explanatory reason for the tendency of choosing Spain as a destination (Gila et al. 2011).

It is difficult to measure the migration flow toward Spain, as this category is absent in the statistics (López Belloso 2016). The only exact data referring to Sahrawis are those asking for asylum – 31 in 2019 – but it is not possible to differentiate if they were coming from refugee camps or from the Western Sahara territories. The largest effort in calculating the Sahrawi diaspora in Spain was made by Carmen Gómez Martín. By summarizing existing partial data and on the basis of interviews with Polisario officers, she calculated the number of Sahrawis in Spain in 2008 as high as 10–12 thousand (Gómez Martín 2013). Nevertheless, as she mentioned in a more recent article, implications of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 could strongly impact the willingness of many Sahrawis to migrate or to stay in this country (Gómez Martín 2016b), while the COVID-19 pandemic may have an even greater effect.

According to Alice Wilson, migration to Spain is diverse, and apart from students, migrant workers (both short- and long-term), there are many families with children already born in Spain (2012a). The study carried out by Gómez Martín showed that the majority of Sahrawis in Spain were “the second generation of the Polisario”, so those who were 45–50 years old around 2010 (Gómez Martín 2010). Additionally, a considerable part of migrating Sahrawis are those who one-two decades earlier were sent to Cuba and, after returning to refugee camps, without the possibility of finding work and with distinguishable socio-cultural practices, decided to migrate to Spain.

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13 Some statistical tendencies are also given by other authors, but not sufficiently supported by the data. For example, according to Shelley, during his fieldwork around 4000 young men migrated from the camps to work in Spain (2004). Another assumption was made about Sahrawi women’s migration, stating that it is a newer phenomenon than of Sahrawi men, which was based only on a non-representative qualitative research with a particular group of women (García Vega et al. 2009) or migration flows toward Spain were described as increasing without any reliable data (López Belloso 2016).

14 The article was written in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. For the moment, the onset of the pandemic has affected camp residents, with 88% experiencing a disruption of work activities (WFP 2020). The restriction of movement between the camps was in force from March 2020 (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF 2020) to June 2020 and again from March 2021 due to a surge in cases of the disease (UNHCR 2021). The Vacaciones en Paz project is suspended from 2020 (Mateo 2020).
As in many migration flows, the first group of Sahrawis migrating to Spain around 1996–1997 consisted mostly of university graduates (Gómez Martín 2010; Gómez Martín 2013), followed by less qualified workers at the beginning of the 21st century (Wilson 2012a). Simultaneously, in the middle of the 2000s, medical diplomas were quite easily acknowledged (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011b). During the next two decades, the heterogeneity of this migration movement increased and highly skilled professionals and SADR diplomats were followed by less qualified workers, families, and people involved in medical treatment programs.

As Carmen Gómez Martín states (2016a), this mobility has a contradictory perception in campamentos (camps). On the one hand, emigration can be understood as a form of abandonment of the national cause – independence of Western Sahara, undermining the sense of the Sahrawi national liberation struggle and the impact of the SADR government on the Sahrawi society (Gómez Martín 2010; Wilson 2012a). On the other – Sahrawis living abroad are a source of financial remittances, an essential part of the camps’ economy and an important part of the commercial chain of products manufactured in the camps (Tavakoli 2020). The migration from Tindouf, mostly towards Spain, affects the economic and social life in the refugee camps, significantly facilitating access to the goods and services of many families and increasing economic inequalities within society.

López Belloso depicted the ongoing increase of migration barriers (in law and institutional practice) significantly affecting the mobility of Sahrawis to Spain. In the majority of cases, the legalization of stay in Spain requires an Algerian passport, as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is not recognized by Spain. In some situations, Sahrawis enter a group of stateless people in Spain (López Belloso 2016). In addition to problems with legalisation of stay, we can differentiate issues such as xenophobia of the Spanish society, lack of the acknowledgement of Spanish colonization of Western Sahara in the legal system, increasing obstacles to the recognition of higher education qualifications in recent years, and the experience of being stuck in the irregular economy (Gómez Martín 2016b). Sahrawis living in Spain can face problems of cultural differences as well (López Belloso 2016).

Migration towards territories of Western Sahara controlled by Morocco

Migrating to Western Sahara involves the danger of being persecuted or the possibility of the violation of basic human rights (López Belloso 2016)16. However, a Moroccan

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15 For example, at the end of the 2000s, only about 200 Sahrawis worked in the medical sector, and only Cuban diplomas gave the chance to be recognized in Spain (Gómez Martín 2013: 232).

16 Only in 2020, Human Rights Watch noted the physical abuse of Sahrawi activists and journalists working in Western Sahara, preventing gatherings organized by the pro-independent movement and blocking work of some local human rights NGOs (HRW 2021).
project which could be called “funding for belonging” made it an option worth considering: in the late 2000s, 1250 dirham (115 EUR) was offered\(^\text{17}\) for the start of a new life in the Western Sahara territories, in return for alignment to the Moroccan Kingdom. The number of people who decided on such a transaction – so-called ralliés – was estimated at 8 thousand by 2010, and the rise of numbers at that moment could be connected with the closure of the Mauritanian border and the growing financial crisis in Europe (Wilson 2012a). As Wilson stated, 2010 was specific for an emerging migration of young ralliés men, some of whom, after spending some time in Moroccan controlled territory, sold an obtained house and came back to refugee camps with money or new 4-wheel drive cars (Wilson 2012a). Although this migration was satirically commented in poetry as an act of betrayal, especially when it comes to the Moroccan alignment of some notable Polisario politicians, some decided to migrate to Western Sahara due to the harsh living conditions in the camps or with the purpose of family reunification (Boulay 2016). For some Sahrawis, this temporal migration was a form of reclaiming the robbery that Morocco is carrying out on the Sahrawi territory. In 2010, after the Gdem Izik\(^\text{18}\) protests, Morocco changed its policy and restricted the program to families with children, suspending the availability for young men, which shortly resulted in its end around 2009–2012 (Boulay 2016; Wilson 2012a; Wilson 2017).

**Migration towards badia and Algeria**

After unsuccessful attempts to resolve the Saharan-Moroccan conflict, a settlement in the *badia* is considered to be another way to escape the protracted exile (Wilson 2012a). However, although the idea is supported by the government, its implementation poses additional problems. Living within the territory of Western Sahara would change the humanitarian status of Sahrawi refugees and would make it impossible to rely on humanitarian aid (Wilson 2012a). Additionally, the Liberated Territories of Western Sahara lacks natural resources which could provide financial income. Nonetheless, around 2010, it was estimated that 20 000 people were already living in *badia* (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011b). For some families, this is a desirable place of seasonal mobility while the animals are grazing (Wilson 2012a), which provides the opportunity of facilitated movement from *badia* to the camps, back and forth (Wilson 2017). Moving to *badia* is also strongly associated with the return to a more nomadic lifestyle which, while being appealing to many, can be equally challenging as the traditional pastoralist lifestyle is not familiar to the majority of those born in exile (López Belloso 2016).

\(^{17}\) Other sources mention the equivalent of EUR 180 per month or the possibility of lucrative employment (Boulay 2016: 668).

\(^{18}\) Gdem Izik was a protest camp in the Western Sahara territories lasting from 9th October to 8th November 2009. The main claims of the protesters were related to the problem of human rights violations, discrimination of Sahrawis, as well as poverty and economic inequality.
Despite these difficulties, some families have decided to live there, declaring much larger independence as one of the reasons for this choice (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011b).

When the pastoralist lifestyle is considered, a similar destination choice is an Algerian territory around Tindouf, but not the camps themselves. The Algerian-supported settlement around the Tindouf region is an encouraging opportunity for those who have the right to Algerian nationality. This settlement gives a chance to households to be a more independent without relying on humanitarian aid, with electricity and running water, but still close to other Sahrawis – the typical scheme is a type of circular migration between Algerian- and camp-based homes (Wilson 2012a). Moving to the open desert is also a chance to avoid various restrictions imposed by Polisario. As an example, one of Wilson’s interlocutors cites that moving out from the camps enables to organize a traditional wedding with camel slaughtering (Wilson 2017).

**Migration towards Mauritania**

For some, Mauritania is an adequate destination with similar environmental and cultural characteristics as Western Sahara itself, but without Moroccan control. The cities like Zouerate (east to Western Sahara) and Nouadhibou (on the coast, in the borderland of Western Sahara) are typical Sahrawi settlement choices (Deubel 2010). An estimation shows that at the end of the 20th century around 23 000 Sahrawis lived in Mauritania (UNHCR 2000: 187), but it is not clear how many of them came from the camps and Western Sahara, and how many are ethnic Sahrawis born in Mauritania.

In all of the cases mentioned above, we do not have access to reliable statistical data (Garcia Vega et al. 2009), and for many of these destinations we lack research-based studies about the situation of Sahrawis. Even in the case of Spain, the articles are often based on secondary data or the extrapolation of juridical analysis.

Little is known about the migration to Mauritania, Algeria or even to badia. Those destinations are harder to reach for scholars and require additional qualifications exceeding the knowledge of the Spanish language. However, they are necessary to depict a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. Moreover, previous research was focused on groups that were easier to reach by scholars: activists, poets, political collectives, students or young women. Some of the lacking groups are elderly people, physical workers or those migrating for medical treatment – which in migration studies is an emerging field of research (Main 2018). The situation of families with children is equally blurred.

Although there is an increasing number of studies on Sahrawi migration and a significant proportion of them have an excellent methodological basis and high analytical value, we can still distinguish many of the research gaps identified earlier. In addition, certain analytical and methodological tendencies can be observed, which I will critically discuss in the following section.
Culture of migration and traditional pastoralism

Mobility is seen as a fundamental feature and an intrinsic characteristic of the Sahrawi society. Despite the sedentarization process detailed in the introductory part of the article, before the exile in 1975, pastoralism was still widely spread, and semi-sedentary practices were common (Wilson 2012b). The actual constant movement could be considered as a characteristic of the Sahrawi society, visible both in Sahrawi culture and social organization (López Belloso 2016; Claudot-Hawad 2005). Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh suggests that over the last 40 years, a type of migration culture has developed: aspiration, desire and habit of mostly young people to emigrate or start a circular migration, spread among young Sahrawi men and women (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011b). Previously the main reasons for mobility were ecological and seasonal weather factors, while modern transnational connections are a response to politically and economically limited possibilities (Chatty, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Crivello 2010). It is worth noting, however, that relating modern migration – which occurs within the refugee regimes (Kleist 2018) in the context of protracted exile – to the traditional nomadism can be misleading. I would draw attention to an excerpt from the article in which the author refers to the past:

From the very beginning, the history of the Sahrawi community has been tied to migrations coming from the Arabian Peninsula to this territory. The former intermixed with the autochthonous Berber population throughout the 11th and 13th centuries, giving place to the Sahrawi people. These were characterized as being a nomadic society linked to pastoralism and commerce until the 20th century (López Belloso 2016: 31–32).

This nomadic orientalist gaze normalizes migration as an adaptation strategy to the harsh desert environment and lack of work, by referring it to a tradition of pastoralism. A nomadic interpretation can hide crucial aspects of being part of the 21st-century migration regime with its obstacles, laws, institutions and border controls (Glick Schiller, Salazar 2013, Kleist 2018). This kind of orientalist gaze associates pastoralism – one of several ways to ensure one’s existence in desert conditions – with some kind of inherited nomadism. This idealized nomadic tradition is also repeated by some Sahrawis, who points out that colonialism itself was the power that changed socio-cultural practices and introduced borders on free humans (Wilson 2017).

Within the framework of political anthropology, Alice Wilson stated that “a common technique in facing (...) moments of crisis, throughout the history of those presently calling themselves Sahrawis, has been to initiate a migration” (Wilson 2012a: 2). Migration as an “expected” response to harsh environmental circumstances, “was not an extraordinary situation” (Wilson 2012a: 5). Contemporary migration, however, displays other characteristics. Before sedentarization, pastoralism and temporal mobility was a practice of the majority of Sahrawi people. The exile of 1975–76 was the last moment when mobility was a widespread experience. After that point, probably only
a minority of the camps’ population travels for education, work, health or personal reasons: around 2008 it was only 16% (HRW 2008: 122).

The nomadic tradition of contemporary refugees gives an additional challenge to analysis – it should be recognised and acknowledged, but without the nomadic orientalist gaze which normalizes migration within a protracted refugee situation. This kind of normalisation has already been depicted in the analyses of other groups with mobile traditions, e.g. Romani (Lauritzen 2018). This nomadic orientalist gaze which links some characteristics of traditional practices with contemporary analysis is visible also in the next problematic tendency – ahistorical description.

**Time and timelessness of exile – the problem of static culture and permanent exile**

The problematic question of time is visible in Sahrawi research in two descriptive tendencies. The first is visible in the ahistorical description, the lack of linking of some characteristics of the Sahrawi society with a specific time. Scholars tend to refer their analysis to Sahrawis in general or the “past” in the very unspecific context, “to present this long period of occupation and exile from a static perspective” (Gómez Martín 2016a: 105). An example of this ahistoricism can be seen in the below-mentioned text, in which the actual social practices are related to the unspecified past:

> Nomadic social organization afforded some classes of women a position of higher status relative to Arab and Berber women in more sedentary neighbouring populations. This status differential did not, however, hold true for all women as class distinctions were central. (Deubel 2010: 68).

A lack of indication of the precise historical moment is a problem of many articles and may be read not only as a consequence of a general lack of data but should be understood as a version of the orientalist gaze of frozen and static culture, describing the Other as “detached from time” (Thomas 1999) or by denying “coevalness” (Fabian 1983).

The second time-related tendency is the lack of a processual dimension in analysis. For instance, in a detailed and nuanced analysis of Sahrawi migrations, Carmen Gómez Martín distinguished four periods of this prolonged exile (Gómez Martín 2016a). The first period was the forced displacement of a major part of the Sahrawi population from Western Sahara territories toward Algeria and the foundation of refugee camps in 1975–1976. The second period, starting in the late 70s, was characterized by widespread top-down governmental projects of youth mobility with mostly education purposes. The third exile began with a noticeable increase in the number of Sahrawis migrating to Spain in the 90s. The fourth period of exile started with the economic crisis of 2008, imposing changes in migration patterns which
from that moment are characterised by its transnationalism, heterogeneity, circular and multiple characteristics (Gómez Martín 2016a).

The idea of four periods of exile came from the interview conducted by Gómez Martín with a young Sahrawi living in Barcelona, who stated that “Sahrawi migration to Spain can be understood as the third period of exile” (2013: 233). The idea seems encouraging and troubling at the same time. It allows for the analysis relating to the temporal and spatial diversity of the different migration periods since 1975. However, the notion is not thoroughly adequate. The problem with this conceptualization is visible in the processual and the historical analysis of migration. The practices mentioned in each period do not belong only to this specific moment, but take place, with varying degrees of intensity, continuously. One of the examples could be a long-distance migration, visible also during the colonial time when it was caused, mostly but not uniquely, by environmental pressures (Gonzalves Perez 1994 in: Gila et al. 2011). This categorization of four periods of exile, however helpful in describing changes in the main patterns of migration and providing tools to understand the variety of destinations and complexity in specific moments for specific groups of people, does not help understand those migration flows as processes and hides the complexity of mobility regimes.

The impact of politics on migration and migrants’ agency in the context of the refugee regime

According to traditional conceptualizations, migration movements are forced or voluntary. However, this division has been criticized (Carling 2002, De Haas 2003, Turton 2003) and its problematic inadequacy is visible on the macro (for instance mixed-migration flows) and micro (individual) level. The concept of four periods of exile invites us to reflect on all the migratory movement as connected to the outbreak of war and ongoing stalemate. It gives a good background for a deconstruction of understating actual Sahrawi migration as entirely economic. Examples of the protracted refugee situation, as the Sahrawi case, are a relevant illustration of this entanglement. Bahia Awah, a widely known Sahrawi poet, deconstructs the bipolar division: “economic migration is only a side effect of the misery which exile in the refugee camps has made unbearable over the years” (Gómez Martín 2013: 233). However, using the term exile to describe an ongoing Sahrawi migration is not a solution, as it has certain analytical implications. The first exile was a result of the armed conflict – for many, moving was the only option to survive. All further periods of exile were much less forced.

The political dimensions of migration lie not only in the legal differentiation between voluntary and forced migration. As Alice Wilson claimed “[w]here mobility and state power are jointly scrutinized, two related paradigms often recur: those of
control and escape. In increasingly spectacular ways, state authorities seek to control (unwanted) mobility” (Wilson 2017: 79). By referring to power relations in a Foucauldian sense, Wilson pointed out that the political context of migration and agency is much more complex and that both the actions of states and the aspirations of individuals escape any simple division (Wilson 2017). Studying migration and mobility in a context of a paradox in which, on the one hand, the neoliberal economy and globalisation tend to increase flows, while, on the other hand, the political domain shows the opposite direction, for instance through visa proliferation or by putting obstacles on certain migration flows, is a further research problem.

As Wilson states, both the practice of encouraging and discouraging migration can have strictly political purposes (Wilson 2017). The mobility of these protracted refugees gives us two compelling research problems. On the one hand, there is a lack of knowledge about the willingness and capability to migrate or the voluntary-forced mobility nexus. On the other hand, immobility can be forced as much as migration, therefore, drawing attention to people who are not mobile might be a valid and viable continuation of the migration research conducted so far.

As mentioned before, according to Gómez Martín, the emigration from camps in the late 90s was not well seen by some Sahrawis and was treated as abandoning the national cause (Gómez Martín 2010). However, economic and social remittances from migrants are an essential element of reinforcing social change in the camps themselves (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011a; López Belloso, Mendia Azkue 2009 cited in López Belloso 2016). The importance of Sahrawi migration is so high that from 2007 migrants have a representation in a crucial Sahrawi political meeting – the Congress of Polisario (Gómez Martín 2016b).

The triple promise for a migrating Sahrawi population, the importance of national identity and its interdependence with the pro-independent movement, are seen as some of the factors which strengthen the significance of some destinations (like Spain, being the best example) and reinforce the pattern of circular mobility (Gómez Martín 2010; Wilson 2012a). Transnational theory gave scope to understand the project of transnationalization of care, which relies on multitudes of international connections, mostly within the Vacaciones en Paz project – a strategy based on the mobility of youth (Crivello, Fiddian, Chatty 2006). Gómez Martín points out that the top-down project of educational migration has an encouraging impact on the further individual migratory movements toward Spain (Gómez Martín 2013). This interesting path of research concerning the Sahrawis’ agency in tackling political constraints is reflected in the attention paid to labour migration, mainly to Spain, understood as economic household strategies (Wilson 2017).

The vulnerability of Sahrawis in Spain lies mostly in the difficulties related to the process of legalization of stay (López Belloso 2016). The legal routes to “have the paper done” for Sahrawis are: the recognition of the Spanish nationality on the basis of being a member of a Spanish Sahara community in the colonial past, the
recognition of the status of stateless person, the legalization of stay based on Algerian, Moroccan or Mauritanian citizenship and the attempt of acquisition of Spanish citizenship (López Belloso 2016). But the legal obstructions are also visible in the very same process of obtaining visas and passports, which is a long and non-transparent process, consisting of applying for an Algerian passport at headquarters to the SADR Ministry of the Interior, from where it is further processed to Algeria (Wilson 2017).

Sidi Omar indicates the importance of the political commitment of Sahrawis in Spain, contrasting it with the lack of cultural awareness in the educational program (Sidi Omar 2012, cited in López Belloso 2016). However, studies about longing, representation of home and memories of Sahrawi children and youths during their educational stay abroad shows that memories – both inherited and negotiated by younger generations – hold an equally political message (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013a; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013b). To make the picture even more complicated, for some Sahrawis, being a long-term migrant has given space to develop the interesting nexus of being engaged and critical about Polisario in the same moment (Wilson 2012a).

The widely critiqued dependency syndrome emerging in the refugee situation was described as absent within Sahrawi refugees (Voutira, Harrell-Bond 2000). However, because of being one of the examples of the protracted refugee situation, the temporality of camps after more than 40 years is a case of normality in an abnormal situation (Loewenberg 2005) and the self-administration of the camps is just a part of the story about personal agency. The analysis of Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, based on a deep and long-term ethnographic research, is a detailed critique of the relations between Polisario and external institutions, like NGO’s, intergovernmental organizations or the pro-Sahrawi international movement, where the image of “ideal women” and “ideal refugee” is homogenizing a heterogeneous group and excluding a part of Sahrawis’ representation. At the same time, it is also a critique of all these external institutions and international civil society, whose needs and requirements are reproduced in the narratives of the Sahrawi elite (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014a). The positive image of the camps can influence the normalization of the protracted exile and distract attention from the need to find a durable solution other than the more than four decades old temporary camps (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011b).

**Gender in migration processes as a viable research problem for further analysis**

Many ethnographic works depict the nexus between sedentarisation and seduction of women in nomadic societies – a process visible also in the Sahrawi society (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014a). However, according to analyses, Sahrawi women are described as empowered and liberated women with a position equal to man (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014a; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014b; Karaoud 2018), which stands in contrast to the general image of “women and children” refugee as depen-
dent and weak. The construction of social, political and technical infrastructure in refugee camps in the middle of the 1970s, done mostly by Sahrawi women with the noticeable absence of men stationing at the military front, is seen as an important step to gender equality. It was a base for the creation of the image of egalitarian Sahrawi society and the Sahrawi women as liberal, secular and empowered in contrast to other Arab, Muslim and refugee groups (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014a). As Fiddian-Qasmiyeh pointed out, the image of “ideal refugees” in a democratic, egalitarian society, was a crucial strategy of worldwide visibility and continuity of humanitarian aid, what has been termed “the politics of survival” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014a). However, there is a visible scarcity of knowledge about the socio-cultural context of Sahrawi migration, and the absence of analysis concerning gendered experiences of migration not only focused on women or gender-blind but analysing the migratory movement of people of all genders, as well as the impact of migration on gender roles.

Some articles depict the situation of women, both in Spain or in refugee camps. This focus can be a consequence of an image of Sahrawi female refugees as remarkably emancipated. Nevertheless, in many studies, the situation of migrating women is not a part of the analysis at all, or there is an absence of comparative analysis. We may see an example of this kind of research through an analysis according to which Sahrawi women are confronted with more challenging integration processes and obstacles compared to their male comrades (Garcia Vega et al. 2009), but the conclusions are based on the interviews conducted only with a specific group of women: those cooperating with the pro-Sahrawi movement in Spain. No less important differences in the socio-economic positions within every group are even more hidden. This important note is missing in the majority of works (apart from Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014a). Many analyses lack the nuanced view of women as a heterogeneous group, thanks to which we can understand that gender is only one distinction, and the social position and possibilities (also the possibilities to stay/migrate) are connected with socio-economic status, political alliances and many other stratification variables.

**Final remarks**

In the mid-1990s the UN failed to hold a referendum hoped for by everyone (Gómez Martín 2011) which together with socio-economic changes in that decade influenced an increase in the number of migrating Sahrawis. These migrations are the result of, to mention a few important ones, educational international projects, the grassroots actions of Spanish families, the growing economic inequalities in the camps, the wish to return to a nomadic lifestyle, the harsh environmental conditions or the desire to use the competencies acquired in the course of higher education. However, all these motivations should be read in the context of the protracted refugee situation and concern the heterogeneity of Sahrawis, their trajectories and their
situation in the destinations, as well as the immobility of those living in the camps. Despite the complexity of motives and trajectories, both officials, founders of state asylum systems, migration policies and bilateral agreements tend to see migration processes through a lens of bipolar division on forced and voluntary mobility, which labels migration as “forced” or “voluntary” – the division hardly visible during fieldwork and analysis (Erdal, Oeppen 2018).

This article adds to the literature not only by summarising ongoing research of Sahrawi migration, enhancing the existing literature in the field of migration and refugee studies but, above all, by shedding light on some critical points of methodology and analysis on the topic: previous research has been conducted in areas more easily accessible to researchers, and with groups more likely to participate in research, such as artists, academics and young women. It gives us only a partial insight into the question of Sahrawi migration and these voices are sometimes used as representations of the experiences of all Sahrawis, without methodological rigour.

Sahrawis are considered pastoralists. This tradition of movement can have an influence on the normalisation of migration within the context of a protracted refugee situation based on nomadic tradition. This tendency, together with ahistorical descriptions, are visible in some analyses and can be understood as types of orientalist gaze. Additionally, within the literature, there is a thought-provoking analytical inconsistency pointing out the voluntary or forced character of migration, as well as the agency or its lack within the migration regime. Finally, the question of gender within migration processes needs to be analysed more thoroughly, as up to now the analysis was either gender-blind or focused on experiences of women only. Gender, together with other socio-demographic variables are necessary to depict a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of migration within the protracted refugee situation.

Until recently, Sahrawi migration was described mostly in the context of forced displacement caused by the outbreak of the Western Sahara War, within the context of educational migration of youth (Chatty 2010; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2009, 2011a, 2013a), or based on research analysing the situation of a particular group of Sahrawis in Spain. However, to understand the complexity of Saharawi migration, as well as their immobility, the context of the protracted refugee situation should be taken into account to a greater extent, with regard to the heterogeneity of the group, migration trajectories and socio-cultural realities of Sahrawis in every destination. It will also enable us to better understand refugee regimes – with the Sahrawi example in a specific post-colonial and post-Cold War context.

References


