Abstract

In this article, I reflect on the productivity of hermeneutic translation criticism, focusing on literary translation. I pose the question whether the hermeneutic mode of translation analysis and evaluation – largely based on the premises of Romantic art criticism – has the potential to make a significant contribution to contemporary discussions on the functional model of translation criticism. My argument is that the source of the productivity (and functionality) of translation criticism is dialogicity – a feature that can be considered fundamental in the case of hermeneutics. Following the dialogical hermeneutics of F. Schlegel, F. Schleiermacher and H.-G. Gadamer, as well as H.R. Jaß’s aesthetics of reception, I formulate some general postulates regarding a hermeneutic critique of literary translations. This critical mode is interrogative: it locates and poses questions that are answered by the examined texts. The critic’s questions include those about the original and for the original, about the translator and for the translator, as well as about the reader and for the reader. Finally, I demonstrate cases in which a critical dialogue crystallizes around literary translations. It is a dialogue that can be shaped and interpreted by the postulated hermeneutic translation criticism.

Keywords: literary translation, translation criticism, hermeneutics, dialogue

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1. Hermeneutics on the defensive

Critical opinions on hermeneutic translation theory have never been hard to come by. Its opposition to scientistic orientations in translation studies (usually based on contrastive linguistics) has irritated their proponents since the 1960s. They often reproach translation hermeneutics for its speculative character, subjective judgements, entanglement in metaphorical language, and detachment from translation practice. These accusations are particularly forceful in the context of hermeneutic translation criticism, or, to be precise, of hermeneutic postulates in the domain of translation criticism, as it is quite widely believed that hermeneuticists have not developed any coherent theory of translation criticism, or, in narrower terms, of translation quality assessment. In the new edition of her classic monograph *Translation Quality Assessment*, Juliane House, who proposed perhaps the most influential translation evaluation model and refined it over the decades, clearly depreciates the significance of hermeneutically-oriented translation criticism (House 2015: 10). She presents a similar view, only condensed for reasons of space, in her compendium *Translation. The Basics*. Reviewing various models of translation criticism, she positions the hermeneutic approach in the category of “anecdotal and subjective views” and concludes that “In the vast majority of cases, [hermeneutic] judgments rest entirely on impressions and feelings, and as such they lead to global, undifferentiated valuations” (House 2018: 79).

I interpret House’s position as symptomatic of something that should worry translation hermeneuticists. I see it as a sign of weakness of hermeneutic translation criticism itself, which has apparently failed as yet to make productive use of its heritage, namely the philological, philosophical, and theological reflections centred around language, text, understanding, and interpretation. In this article, then, I will consider the productivity of hermeneutic translation criticism, focusing on literary translation criticism, the domain in which I feel most at home. My argument is guided by the premise that the source of its productivity (and thus its functionality) lies in a feature that can be considered fundamental to hermeneutics: **dialogicity.**

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2 Discussing dialogue and dialogicity in this context, I evoke a long research tradition that has emphasized the “dialectical ground of hermeneutics” (Grondin 1994: 73–75) and the crucial role of “dialogic agreement” in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy (Grondin 2007:...
I would like to begin with a kind of stock-taking, briefly reviewing the existing hermeneutic models in terms of their heuristic potential. In doing so, I will keep in mind the questions asked by translation scholars sceptical of hermeneutics: do such approaches broaden the critic’s field of vision or do they in fact narrow his or her perspective without going beyond purely subjective judgements?

2. Hermeneutic models of translation criticism

Many supporters of Juliane House’s critical view of translation hermeneutics might be surprised to learn that a balanced, clearly affirmative view of the hermeneutic context of translation criticism was presented by Katharina Reiß in her monograph *Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Übersetzungskritik*, published more than five decades ago. Not only that; the co-founder of the German functionalist school in Translation Studies inscribes the hermeneutic perspective into a linguistic model of translation quality assessment. She distinguishes between translations that correspond to the text type and translations that are adequate in terms of the function of the text in the target culture. In her view, translation criticism is proper if it demands of the translator that he or she should use methods that lead to these types of adequacy. At the same time, however, it must take into account the subjective conditions of the hermeneutic process and the translator’s personality; the same determinants also influence the critic him- or herself (Reiß 2014: 114).

It should be borne in mind, however, that the German scholar regards the subjectivity of the hermeneutic process as a limitation for translation criticism; in her view, including subjective categories into critical reflection is a necessary complement to “normal categories of translation criticism” (Reiß 2014: 113), that is, to objective evaluation criteria. Hermeneutic criticism can at most confront one interpretation with another, one creative vision with another (and their influence on the original and the translation), arriving at only relative critical judgements, which could serve as guidelines for the readers.
Let us note that by emphasizing the role of the confrontation of viewpoints, of interpretative perspectives, and the dialogical constitution of the recipient of a critical text, who is drawn, as it were, into a conversation about translation, Reiß presents a very interesting proposal for translation hermeneutics. It is worth keeping in mind, since it corresponds to the notion of dialogicity, which I will try to describe later in my argument.

The most prominent representative of the hermeneutic school in translation studies today is undoubtedly Radegundis Stolze, who, since the early 1990s, has been trying to combine the German tradition of philosophical hermeneutics with modern linguistic tools for examining the translation process, its outcome, and the translator’s competence. Although her main scholarly work (Hermeneutik und Translation, 2003) mentions the problem of translation criticism only marginally, as do her individual articles and essays, Stolze’s first major research monograph, Hermeneutisches Übersetzen (1992) did address this issue, offering a very interesting conceptualization.

Stolze’s starting point here is the observation that the usefulness of the concept of equivalence in translation criticism is only relative. In this context, she argues, deviations from the structures of the original text are of little importance; what is important is the linguistic means used by the translator to express a particular utterance in the target language. The focus, therefore, is on the formulation of the utterance in the new language. From the hermeneutic perspective, it can be seen as the linguistic expression of the translator’s understanding of the text (Stolze 1992: 68).

Describing the path from the original to the translation, Stolze refers to regulative concepts of “symmetry” and “congruence” (Stimmigkeit). She also discusses the process of “optimisation”, during which understanding is deepened and what has been understood is expressed more and more perfectly in the target language (Stolze 1992: 72). In finding an accurate expression, the translator concludes this process of understanding, “following the criterion of intuitive obviously” (Stolze 1992: 72). This approach emphasizes the processual nature of translation, the translator’s creativity, and the relation between the understanding of the source text and the formulation of the target text. This relation consists in approximating the accurate formulation, i.e., one that is in tune with the meaning of the original, that resonates with it. However, this tuning in of the translation with the dominant tone of the original relies primarily on the translator’s hearing, which does not easily lend itself to rationalisation in critical analysis.
The hermeneutic tradition also inspired eminent translation scholars outside the German-speaking area: George Steiner and Antoine Berman. The author of *After Babel* created a regulative fiction of the ideal translation that would “augment the weight, the aura of the original whatever its linguistic-cultural remoteness or isolation” (Steiner 2004: 8). The paradox of such a translation is that repetition is “never tautological”: the mirror of translation “throws new light” on its object (Steiner 2004: 8). From this perspective, the concept of faithfulness loses its (conventional) meaning. According to Steiner, the translator is faithful when his work “endeavours to restore the balance of forces, of integral presence and identity, subverted by ingress and appropriation” (Steiner 2004: 8). Although these enigmatic remarks become more fathomable in the context of Steiner’s four-stage “hermeneutic motion” described in *After Babel* (Steiner 1998: 312–435), they still seem of little use in critical practice. This is evidenced by Steiner himself, who lists among “pre-eminent”, “equilibrating” translations “passages in Hölderlin’s Pindar and Sophocles” alongside “[A.W.] Schlegel and Tieck’s Shakespeare” (Steiner 2004: 8), even though these are clearly completely different translation projects, guided – which Steiner omits to mention – by quite divergent principles.

That said, other, more promising pathways to hermeneutic translation criticism can also be found in Steiner’s works. One such pathway is delineated by the conviction that translation is essentially a transcendental dialogue. The translator opens himself to the autonomous “being of the text” and, having received this transcendental gift, passes it on in the translation. Such a gift transmission, however, is not possible without a prior Heideggerian “asking about being”, which requires that the inquirer-interpreter opens up to the thing, opens up in himself a space in which it could reveal itself (Steiner 1989: 55). Thus, what manifests itself very clearly in the dialogical horizon of this approach is the question – a crucial element of the hermeneutic reflection on cognition.

Antoine Berman had profound knowledge of the philosophical and literary milieu in which modern German hermeneutics originated. His expertise in this field is evident in his 1984 book *L’épreuve de l’étranger: Culture et traduction dans l’Allemagne romantique*, which is considered a milestone in the historiography of theoretical reflection on translation. The French scholar also showed keen interest in theoretical and practical aspects of literary translation criticism, to which he devoted the book *Pour une critique des traductions: John Donne* (published posthumously in 1995, following
Berman’s premature death in 1991), as well as numerous articles and seminars. As the principles of Berman’s model of translation criticism have received due scholarly interest, here I will only comment on his proposal in terms of its hermeneutic potential.³

Berman’s point of departure is the idea of “traductology”, understood as “hermeneutics of the translation dimension”, the latter appearing as a fundamental dimension of human activity (Kuhn 2007: 24). What is at work here, then, is a broad understanding of translation; the French scholar regards it as experience – of languages, of literary works, of oneself. The first task of Berman’s traductology, i.e., the analysis of translation shortcomings and deficiencies, of the “destruction”, deformation of translated texts, seems to contrast with this view (Kuhn 2007: 25).

Berman sought to link this analytic of translation with translation ethics and poetics. He located the basis that enables identification of translation errors and failings within the domain of ethics: it is the concept of “true” translation – a faithful translation that shows respect for what is different or foreign in the translated work (Kuhn 2007: 30, see Berman 2000). Translation poetics, on the other hand, postulates fidelity to the “fluency of the text”, prompting the translation to transform into an independent work of literature. In Berman’s model, considerations regarding the demands of translation ethics and poetics are necessary in order to counterbalance the analysis of flaws and errors, thus emphasizing the positive rather than the negative side of translation. And yet it is precisely this negative side, the analytic of translation, that received the most precise description; the scholar meticulously enumerated “deforming tendencies” that are present in every translation and which preclude the experience of the foreignness of a foreign text (Kuhn 2007: 46). Against this background, the positive distinctive features of a translation that deserves to be called a successful, valuable work appear to be rather less pronounced. In Berman’s model, they double as the categories for evaluating literary translation: it should exhibit coherence at the level of design and execution, linguistic creativity, and “eventfulness”, which is actualised when the translation becomes a significant literary fact, influencing the original (its continued life in the source culture) (Kuhn 2007: 48). The values inscribed into these categories are quite difficult to grasp,

³ In so doing, I shall draw on Irène Kuhn’s brilliant monograph on Berman, which sheds light on the origins and theoretical contexts of his model. It also contains a German translation of the theoretical part of Pour une critique des traductions (Kuhn 2007).
and thus they seem to encourage subjective judgements. Let us also note that it is only in extremely rare cases that a translation becomes an event on the scale envisaged by Berman.

The postulate of organic wholeness, of a connection between the creative idea and its fruit, of course has a Romantic provenance; praise for originality, organicity, and the conceptual coherence of the artistic creation recurs, for example, in Friedrich Schlegel’s or Friedrich Schleiermacher’s remarks on translation (see De Bończa Bukowski 2023). One cannot help feeling, though, that mere emphatic reiteration of the early Romantic proclamation of a literary work’s sovereignty does not yet quite release the cognitive potential of translation criticism; on the contrary, it enmeshes translation criticism in the aesthetics of genius and ethics of authenticity, which modern hermeneutics has long since left behind.

Berman’s example reveals that if we choose to construct a hermeneutic theory of translation criticism, it will gravitate towards the axiology of Romantic literary aesthetics and art criticism (Kunstkritik). It is worth considering, then, how we decide to interpret Romantic ideas, which concepts we should highlight and how to link them with contemporary hermeneutics. Seeking new pathways for hermeneutic translation criticism, I would like to look at this early Romantic legacy from a slightly different angle, foregrounding one particular concept of importance: namely, dialogue and dialogicity. This concept constitutes a link between Romantic aesthetics and hermeneutics.

3. Romanticism, hermeneutics, and dialogicity: Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher

Even though Friedrich Schlegel left most of his works uncompleted, he is renowned in cultural history as one of the most prolific minds of the turn of the 19th century. His hermeneutic idea of art criticism were developed mainly in his contributions to Athenäum, a literary magazine which he founded, that is – it developed in dialogue with his many friends and comrades-in-arms in the fight for a new philosophy, literature, and a liberal (i.e., Romantic) worldview.

When writing about literature, Schlegel sought to capture the individual character of a work in its ideal realisation (Wanning 2000: 68). He argued that a literary text should not be measured according to a presumed system
of norms, but according to its own ideal, its fulfillable spiritual potential. This of course applies to “true” works of literature, as opposed to “false” ones; the latter ought to be deplored, while the former should be “thoroughly understood”. And this is precisely where the endless work of criticism for the sake of literature is necessary (see Pikulik 1992: 146–147). The critic must use his (literary!) discourse to stimulate the movement of the work towards its ideal. This entails entering into a “sympoetic” dialogue with it: in the course of this dialogue, the critic, who becomes, as it were, a reader-author, gradually comes to a better understanding of both the work and himself (see Benjamin 1973: 60–63). This is the essence of Friedrich Schlegel’s, Novalis’s, and other early Romantics’ positive take on literary criticism.

Schlegel encourages us to read translations with the intention of discerning the movement of literary works through history, of looking critically at where they are situated at a given point in time, captured and presented to us by the translator. It is worth asking, he suggests, what work the translator has fished out of the river of time, how he has presented it, and whether he has maintained a critical distance stemming from historical awareness (Apel 1982: 98). Thus begins the critic’s conversation with the translator, which constitutes the basis of a solid translation review. The most convincing example of a practical realisation of Schlegel’s postulates is his own review of Ludwig Tieck’s new translation of *Don Quixote*, in which the critic enters into a dialogue with both the work and the translator, shows interest in the translator’s dialogue with the reader, and acts as a spokesman for the work of the foreign author (Schlegel 1980: 314–316, see De Boncza Bukowski 2023: 153–179). This is how Romantic hermeneutic criticism dynamizes texts by placing them in different (interpretive) situations.

Schlegel’s hermeneutic intuitions were elaborated and systematized by his friend and collaborator during the Berlin period, Friedrich Schleiermacher. Importantly, in the context of the present argument, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics has a dialogical dimension, thus providing a very sound scaffolding for a productive model of translation criticism. This dialogicity was aptly highlighted by Wolfgang H. Pleger (1988), who emphasized that Schleiermacher conceived of understanding as an everyday practice and, at the same time, an art. Hermeneutics is therefore not detached from our “lived” experience.

For Schleiermacher, every act of understanding is a reversal of the act of speaking, as it leads us from expression to thought (Pleger 1988: 175). Speaking is the external thinking, and thinking is the internal speaking. The
interrelation between thinking and speaking is the key to Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, which, linked to the art of co-thinking, enters the domain of philosophy. It thus establishes a relationship with dialectics as a theory of conversation oscillating between speaking and understanding (Pleger 1988: 176). This is why contributions to Schleiermacher’s dialogics can be found in his lectures on hermeneutics as well as dialectics.

Schleiermacher argued that conversation, dialogue, should be understood more broadly than simply in the context of an “ordinary” exchange between two or more people. Reading can be regarded as a conversation with the author, and writing – as a conversation with readers. The history of individual development, in turn, is a conversation with oneself (Pleger 1988: 176). In his lectures on dialectics, Schleiermacher notes that when reading, we often want to start a conversation with the author because we sense some “difference”. Entering into such a discourse, we must first adopt the author’s point of view. But can a book be a party in a dialogue? Yes, Schleiermacher replies, one can debate with the author who speaks through it, one can consider all arguments that he might put forth and respond with one’s own (Pleger 1988: 177). Eventually, one can either stand one’s ground or accept the author’s arguments. The author, in turn, can either accept the counterarguments presented or admit that he or she is not able to refute them.

Writing is a similar case in point, as its structure is dialogical, too – after all, it is a conversation between the author and the reader (Pleger 1988: 177). The former benefits from identifying the potential reader, his or her expectations and possible objections, in order to align the language and train of thought with the reader’s horizon. “The more dialogical a text is, the more it is perfect”, Schleiermacher concludes (quoted in Pleger 1988: 177). The German scholar’s ultimate concern is cognition, intersubjective knowledge; as Pleger explains, “Transforming into a conversation with the author, an understanding-oriented act of reading thus partakes in the construction of universally valid knowledge” (1988: 178).

What is important for Schleiermacher, then, is the conversation, the confrontation of thoughts and arguments, which restores comprehensibility, the obscured or unnoticed meaning. At the same time, as Odo Marquard rightly points out, it is a conversation without the imperative to reconcile positions [Einigungszwang] (Marquard 1981: 13). What implications might follow from this for hermeneutic translation criticism? Well, it should take into account the dialectic aspect of hermeneutics and make practical use of the form of dialogue. Schleiermacher himself practised dialogicity when
writing about literary translation. In his very extensive review of *Macbeth* in Friedrich Schiller’s translation, he adopted a perspective that I consider dialogical, for on the one hand his main criterion for evaluation was the “inviolable unity and wholeness” of the original drama, and on the other hand, he acknowledged the important value of the work’s “stagability” in the Weimar theatre convention, which necessitated various changes and adaptations (see De Bończa Bukowski 2023: 172–179). In this review, the critic initiates and enacts a multifaceted dialogue with and around the Shakespeare/Schiller text. It clearly demonstrates the dominance of questions and deliberations over synthesis and a final answer. In the textual world of Schleiermacher’s translations of Plato, this space of dialogue manifests itself as a field of *negotiation.* To take one example, the three versions of his translation of *Phaedrus* are accompanied by a multidirectional dialogue, not only with Friedrich Schlegel, who had commented on the translation, but also (in the translator’s endnotes) with the original, with scholarly interpreters of Plato, and the potential readers of the German translation (see Schleiermacher, Plato 2016: 61–413). In the course of this dialogue, the translator negotiated the shape of his work, changing, for example, the extent of the transfer of foreignness. A translation critic who wants to describe and evaluate Schleiermacher’s work must not only recognize the dynamics and logic of this dialogue, but also engage in it as a competent and creative contributor. In the case of a difficult, demanding work such as Plato’s dialogue, I believe that the critic must not advocate for one party: the original, the translator, or the reader; in this model situation, he must inquire about different rationales.

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4 The concept of negotiation has been introduced into scholarly translation analysis by Umberto Eco, who links it primarily to the translator’s interpretive decisions, which are often preceded by calculating gains and losses in the specific communicative situation. In the introduction to his book on the experience of translation, Eco expands the use of the term. He sees the process of translation as a multilateral process of negotiation, “by virtue of which, in order to get something, each party renounces something else” (Eco 2013). The translator appears here as a negotiator between real and virtual parties. According to the Italian scholar, subject to negotiation in translation studies are also the interpretations of fundamental concepts such as “adequacy, equivalence, faithfulness” (Eco 2013) or the translator’s initiative. Like Eco, I believe that the notion of negotiation should be situated in the broader context of a dialectical reflection on the (often opposing) translation determinants and priorities, although I also recognise the need to agree on a common language that would be shared by the negotiating parties.

Even though the dialogical dimension of hermeneutic translation criticism has not been discussed by scholars, the dialogicity of hermeneutics as such is seen today as its primary distinctive feature. In response to some arguments put forth by Radegundis Stolze, Andrew Chesterman stated that “a key concept in the hermeneutic approach is that of dialogue, in particular as developed by Gadamer” (Chesterman 2012: 31). How is this dialogue, then, conceived by the author of *Truth and Method* – the philosopher who, drawing on the long-unacknowledged legacy of the Romantics, shaped contemporary translation hermeneutics? Can his notion of dialogue prove inspirational for translation criticism?

Hans-Georg Gadamer emphasizes the crucial importance of the application of what has been understood; his perspective on hermeneutics differs from Schleiermacher’s, which was focused on the best possible understanding of the foreign sense. Being self-reflexive, understanding always means “applying a meaning to our situation, to the questions we want answered” (Grondin 1994: 115). After all, not understanding a text simply means that it does not have anything to say to us. The idea, then, is to ask the text the questions that are relevant to us here and now, thus including it in a conversation that has been going on for centuries. “Thus successful understanding can be described as the effective-historical concretion of the dialectic of question and answer”, whereby this dialectic is a universal feature of “our verbal experience of the world” (Grondin 1994: 117). Let us take a closer look at Gadamer’s hermeneutics as hermeneutics of dialogue and at its implications for art criticism and translation.

To begin with, one important caveat must be noted: for Gadamer, hermeneutics is not quite a method, but rather “the attitude of a person who wants to understand someone else, or who wants to understand a linguistic expression as a listener or reader” (Gadamer 1997: 161). The goal here is to enable the experience of the speaker and speech. The path is dialogue, although there is no single mode of conducting a conversation, no single method of interpretation. What matters most is to be able to enter this dialogue, “to transform the congealed thought into a movement of questions and answers, while remembering that questions are more important than answers” (Kleszcz 2006: 178).
Hermeneutics assumes the primacy of experience in any kind of cognition. “The nature of the hermeneutical experience”, says Gadamer in “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem”, “is not that something is outside and desires admission. Rather, we are possessed by something and precisely by means of it we are opened up for the new, the different, the true” (Gadamer 1977: 9). This is precisely the logic of prejudice (Vorurteil/Vor-Urteil): “Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something – whereby what we encounter says something to us” (Gadamer 1977: 9). As we are all immersed in tradition, our experience can never be free of prejudice. It is entangled in pre-judgments, historical conditioning factors that influence our cognition.

In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, experience is dialogical, or, to put it more precisely, “responsive”, for it is always a response to the call of reality. This has important consequences: cognition (including that which is realized in the form of criticism) takes the shape of a dialogue with reality, conditioned by the mutual openness to questions, but also by the fact that there is no absolute knowledge (Szulakiewicz 2004: 226–227). Thus, cognition – understanding – becomes a circle of questions and answers, in which the foreignness (of an utterance, a text) is balanced by the experience of shared participation in history (Bronk 1994: 161, cf. Gadamer 2006: 361–362).

It is worth noting that in the course of such a conversation, the language shared by the parties to the dialogue is transformed. For the conversation does not involve “matching an already existing language [e.g., the language of criticism – PdBB] to the matter that is object of understanding”, but rather “developing in the course of understanding (the merging of horizons) a common language” that corresponds to the “common thing” (Bronk 1988: 138). This language is a result of the text and the interpreter interacting in a dialectic of questions and answers (Rosner 1991: 187).

It is not difficult to see, however, that in the case of translation, the dialogic situation is not the same as the prototypical conversation between the interpreting reader and the work. Gadamer is aware of this. He notes that the translator mediates between the two parties, aiding their “agreement in understanding” by “mediating the matter itself”; this appears to involve “seeking to bring about a settlement of the claims and boundaries between both parties”. In this way, the inter-locutor [der Dazwischenredende] – interpres, i.e., the one who interferes in the conversation – “becomes a ‘negotiator’ [Unterhändler]” (Gadamer 2007: 180; emphasis mine). The translator’s role becomes problematic in the case of literature, where the text does not
refer to “some primordial act of oral utterance” but has “its own authenticity” based on the “self-presentation” of discourse (Gadamer 2007: 180–182). Thus, translators cannot, like exegetes, focus on ensuring that the given “interpretation penetrates, as if self-understandably, into the re-reading of the original text and disappears in it” (Gadamer 1993: 285). The translator’s text, Gadamer writes, provides a “co-speaking trail for all our reading and understanding”. It has its own substance, composed of sense and sound. It is like “a bridge that can be entered from both sides. The translation resembles a bridge . . . between two banks in one country. Along such bridges there is a constant flow of traffic” (Gadamer 1993: 285). Capturing this traffic flow seems to be one of the most important tasks of the hermeneutic criticism of literary translation.

I would like to ground my further considerations and propositions in Gadamer’s thesis that the interpreter is always settled in some “life-world” (*Lebenswelt*), positioned “in a certain context of tradition, speaks a certain language, moves within a certain ‘horizon’” (Veraart, Wimmer 2008: 367). The methodological consequence of this situation is the necessity of dialogue, a dialogue which “in the exchange of arguments treats with equal seriousness the claim to validity of the submitted views of both the interpreter and the author” (Veraart, Wimmer 2008: 367). Let us note that this observation develops Schleiermacher’s “dialectical” hermeneutics. As a result, “dialogical hermeneutics” is constituted, which is “always a critical hermeneutics”, enabling a “critical clarification” of the initial understanding, stimulating the expansion of its horizon and the formulation of new questions with which the interpreter approaches the text (whether original or translated) (Veraart, Wimmer 2008: 367).

This translation-oriented critical hermeneutics may benefit from the support of the aesthetics of reception. Disputing Gadamer’s notion of hermeneutic experience, Hans Robert Jauß emphasizes the importance of the aesthetic experience in the domain of literary hermeneutics. He thus dynamizes Gadamer’s approach, reinterpreting it in the spirit of dialogical productivity, which enables a fecund reception that is not immobilized by tradition (Jauß 1991: 26–27). Jauß is concerned that the category of tradition introduces into the interpretive game “the substantialism of monologically self-generating eternal questions” (Jauß 1979: 384). What he seems to disregard, in my view, is that within one tradition a dialogue may take place between different conceptualizations of experience (for instance that which is present in the cultural memory and that which reveals itself in the
communicative memory; see in particular Assmann 2008: 117). Still, he is right in asserting that in the process of reception – that is, “from reception to reception” – it is not uncommon for some sense of texts to concretize that has not yet been known in culture. And this new sense is concretized, I believe, in a clash with the tradition (the magnitude, canonicity of the work), with the question of that particular work, which is never the same question, as it is transformed in the historical process (formed by waves of aesthetic ideologies). The reader’s question can therefore be an answer to the work’s question.\(^5\) After all, this dialogue is shaped in the same way as an ordinary conversation.

5. Hermeneutic translation criticism in dialogue

The conclusions from the above overview of dialogical approaches to hermeneutics in the context of literary criticism can be summarized in several postulates.

- Hermeneutic translation criticism is a dialogue, a conversation in which the critic does not want to have the last word. In its course, a common language is negotiated that corresponds to a common thing.

- Criticism is interrogative: it finds and poses questions that are answered by the examined statements. Among the questions it poses are those about the original and for the original, about the translator and for the translator, as well as about the reader and for the reader. It also inquires into the validity of its own discourse, taking into account its own ignorance (e.g., regarding the conditioning factors and the preparation process of the translation) and the risk of error.

- Criticism is a process of understanding in which prejudices are vindicated, as they enable cognition. They are verified during the course of an open dialogue.

- In the first stage, the critic describes prejudices: his or her own, the translator’s whose interpretation the critic is getting to know, as well as those of the translation readers. This is because the cognizing subject

\(^5\) This is evidenced by the present-day reception of modernist experimental works, which is often soberingly critical of the axiology created and preserved by experts (see, for example, readers’ discussion about Joyce’s *Ulysses* on the popular and influential book review website Lubimyczytać.pl).
is entangled in prejudices – the historical conditioning factors that influence cognition.

- “Speaking between” has a dialogical structure: the translator becomes a negotiator situated between the work and its reader. The hermeneutic critic acts as a negotiation analyst, describing the figure of the negotiator, his or her goals and strategies. In doing so, however, the critic becomes one of the dramatis personae in the described situation: he or she intervenes in the conversation as an *inter-pres*.

- The second stage of translation criticism is oriented towards the hermeneutics of translation reception. The leading questions here are: How does the work speak to the reader? How does the reader receive the translated work? This is not about equating the meaning of the work with its use (reading), but about recognizing such uses as important voices in the conversation about the meaning of the work. The critic thus moves from the circle of the translator’s creative act towards the horizon of the reader.

- Hermeneutically oriented criticism reveals the meeting of different experiences, different understandings, in whose light the role of translation as a confrontation of truths becomes apparent (see Szułakiewicz 2004: 61).

It is worth considering whether these claims have dialogical potential, i.e., whether they correspond to the observations of modern-day scholars interested in translation criticism. I would answer this question in the affirmative, with the proviso that the point of reference here should be non-dogmatic concepts rather than monological models based on a normative, equivalence-oriented approach to translation.

The problem has been recognised by Edward Balcerzan, who in his article *Tajemnica istnienia (sporadycznego) krytyki przekładu* [The Mystery of the (Sporadic) Existence of Translation Criticism] defends the thesis “that divergence from the original is constitutive of translation ‘as such’, and that the purpose of criticism is to keep the reader aware of this fact” (Balcerzan 1999: 32). Beside this statement, generally in line with hermeneutic translation criticism are also Balcerzan’s sceptical remarks about the “corrective function” of translation criticism, where “the critic – emboldened by the variant, non-final and problematic shape of the translation – stoutly proposes his own versions” (Balcerzan 1999: 33). As an example of a corrective critic, he mentions Stanisław Barańczak, “who turned correction into the genre-defining feature of his manifestos and translatological retorts” (Balcerzan
Balcerzan himself, in turn, regards the critic as someone who “limits . . . his own role to the interpretation and evaluation of ‘what is there’” (Balcerzan 1999: 35). As he is not dogmatic about this postulate (his translation theory is highly dialogical), he probably would not mind if the critic’s interpretive competence were expanded to allow for a dialogue with the translator about his reasons in the context of other variants. As far as evaluation is concerned, the scholar would probably agree that it depends on the perspective.

And so, for example, in this context it would be hard to imagine a critical analysis of the Polish translation of Martin Heidegger’s lecture course Was heißt denken?, where philosophical considerations are illustrated with excerpts from Friedrich Hölderlin’s poems, that would not initiate a dialogue with the translator, but would merely assert that, based on the philosopher’s comprehensible German, he created an abstruse Polish idiolect commenting on verses from Hölderlin that were clumsily rendered into Polish (see Heidegger 2000: 17, cf. Heidegger 1968). A hermeneutic interpretation and possible evaluation of “what is there” should take into account not only the rationale of the original and its author, but also the arguments of the Polish translator, his prejudices, historical conditions (Polish representations of the Heideggerian idiom), negotiations with Heidegger’s and Hölderlin’s texts (and with their previous translators), the conflict between artistry and coherence in translating poetic examples, or his idea of the model target reader (including the reader’s horizon of understanding and cognitive motivation). Nor can such an interpretation ignore the question of the reception of this translation work published more than twenty years ago.

Including the perspective of reception in the critic’s cognitive horizon seems particularly urgent. So rarely had this aspect been accounted for in the field of academic translation criticism that the precursors of cognitive translation studies, Hans G. Hönig and Paul Kußmaul, called for it emphatically in their textbook Strategie der Übersetzung. In the chapter provocatively titled “Die Kritik der Kritiker” (“The Criticism of the Critics”), they complained that translation critics do not see the reader as a full-fledged participant in translation communication (Hönig, Kußmaul 1999: 121–123). Despite being an important element of the oft-cited communicative model of translation, the reader does not appear to critics as a partner in the conversation about translation. According to Hönig and Kußmaul, if we wonder what theory of translation could provide the basis for modern scholarly translation criticism, it should be a theory that takes into account
the role of the “translation addressee” (1999: 127). This role is recognized by the hermeneutic model of translation criticism, which does not exclude any of the dramatis personae of the translation process. The hermeneutic critic poses questions about the translator’s impulse and interpretation, about the work’s dialogue with the original text, with the idea of translation, with language and the reader. The answers to these questions can reveal new knowledge about the original, the essence of translation, and the capacity of language (Wuthenow 1969: 9).

Of the various contemporary models that seem open to, and could benefit from, a dialogue with hermeneutics, I find particularly interesting the one that emerges from Clive Scott’s monograph *Translating Baudelaire* (from the chapter entitled “The Criticism of Translation”). The British scholar, who is an expert on translating modern poetry and avant-garde texts, makes it clear from the outset that a translation is not merely a testimony to a more or less fortuitous use of the translator’s trained skills; it is also a “spiritual autobiography” of his or her encounter with the text. It constitutes “a response to the text”, “a cohabitation with a text”, and offers an opportunity to get to know “another reader” and “the process of translation” itself (Scott 2000: 181–182). In many of his postulates, Scott gets close to Romantic hermeneutics, for example when he highlights the importance of translation as a tool for knowing the original, its actual and potential meaning (Scott 2000: 183), or when he emphasizes that “it must always be in a mode of approximation” character (Scott 2000: 184). On the other hand, the scholar is quite right to point out that reading need not be primarily oriented on the meaning of the text, but might as well stimulate textual effects, that is, in fact, the textuality of the work. Thus, reading is not about “closing” the text through an interpretation that ascribes meaning to it, but rather about “activating a text, in a multi-level encounter” (Scott 2000: 184). This is where the discussion with hermeneutics becomes interesting, because taking place within it is also an open dialogue with the text, from which a “pluralizing hermeneutics” can emerge, allowing for “transactions” of meaning (Marquard 1981: 15).

That said, it seems that a major problem of all “pluralizing”, non-normative, non-essentialist visions of translation criticism is how to turn their well-grounded postulates into research practice. In Clive Scott’s practice, for example, his criticism of translation (of Baudelaire’s poetry) is very often reduced to a functional interpretation of particular translation choices (Scott 2000: 215). But attempts at hermeneutic translation criticism are also


disappointing in this respect, especially when their authors formulate ready-made answers instead of questions, often losing sight of the translator’s arguments. In order to protect myself – at least partly – from the accusation of remaining safely postulative, I would like to devote the final section to examples of places where a critical dialogue crystallizes around translations, a dialogue that could be profiled and interpreted by hermeneutic translation criticism.

6. Practicing dialogue

Two domains of dialogue analysis are crucial in hermeneutic, interrogative translation criticism: the domain of the translator and the domain of the translation recipient. Of course, these spaces interpenetrate each other, and it is precisely the description of this interpenetration that appears as one of the most ambitious tasks of criticism. A synthesis of these domains of dialogue becomes possible only if it is based on their thorough analysis, which takes into account the translator’s dialogue with the author and the text, as evidenced by their conversations and correspondence on the one hand, and by statements, comments, essays, and translator paratexts on the other. It is in interviews that translators usually recount, albeit sometimes reluctantly, the important experience of meeting and talking to the empirical authors. Not infrequently, these experiences shape the translator’s pre-understanding and subsequent confrontation with the author’s text (see De Bończa Bukowski, Zarychta 2021: 154–155). Sometimes they influence the sphere of the translator’s moral reception of the author. A personal dialogue with the author may not only shape the interpretation contained in the translation, but also the original itself: it might happen that the author corrects his or her text, influenced by the translator’s comments (see De Bończa Bukowski, Zarychta 2021: 122, 197 and 239).

Especially relevant for the hermeneutic critic are those testimonies in which the translator formulates questions with regard to the text and its “senders”. Such testimonies provide insights into the operations of understanding and the process of translation negotiations. Sometimes, they appear as veritable struggles with the original, in the course of which the translator

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6 I mean here the element of literary communication referred to by Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska as “the concrete reader” (1985: 97–98).
enters different reading roles, poses various questions to the work, and changes his or her attitude towards it. A good case in point is the translator Krzysztof Bartnicki’s many-years dialogue with James Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*, which resulted, among other things, in a remarkable testimony to this conversation: the book *Fu wojny* (Bartnicki 2012). In one interview, Bartnicki admitted that he had sought in *Finnegans Wake* an answer to the question of “the foundations of language”, “the place where language is made” (Jankowicz 2012: 4). He saw himself as a disciple, as it were, asking his master questions (Jankowicz 2012: 3). He even sought a “kinship with the author”. However, in the course of his translation work, his cognitive motivations changed, and he assumed the role of a rebellious trainee who “refused obedience to his superior due to disappointment with the meagre results of years of apprenticeship” (Jankowicz 2012: 3). Bartnicki realized that what was important to him was “the sincerity with which the author presents his artistic intentions”, and that “Joyce was not sincere” because he seems to “linguistically hermetize” a narrative “about one man’s sex and cloaca – content that is not worth ten years [the time it took Bartnicki to translate the book – PdBB] or even ten hours” (Jankowicz 2012: 3). It was from the question about the work’s hidden principle and the author’s intention inscribed in it that the translator’s “disappointment” arose, becoming “unbearable” with time (Jankowicz 2012: 3). Instead of a translation based on a holistic insight into the essence of the work, Bartnicki opted for a “molecular translation”, which is the result of negotiations with the original. Once his translation (or “Polonization”, as he calls it) was completed, Bartnicki, in his own words, mitigated his judgement, but it seems that his conversation with *Finnegan’s Wake* is not over; its important vehicle is his book *Fu wojny*, also a confrontation with the original, only transferred onto another discursive level. The drama and complexity of the relationship sketched here opens up many possibilities for interrogative translation criticism, which raises questions about the perspective rationales of the original, the translator and the translation recipient. The reasons of the latter, the reader of *Fineganów tren* (Joyce 2012), in this context constitute an important counterpoint to the translator’s dialogue with the author.7

7 “This not Joyce’s book in Polish translation, but Bartnicki’s book with Joyce in the background. Or, at most, a free variation on the original. Anyhow, it is unreadable – you can only nibble at it (which can be both entertaining and interesting)”, an anonymous reader wrote in a review at Lubimyczytać.pl (comment from 19 Jan. 2014; https:// lubimyczytac.pl/ksiazka/125296/finneganow-tren; accessed: 5 March 2021).
A crucial aspect of the translator’s dialogue with the work is the merging of horizons, which takes place in the sphere of tensions between traditions and historical styles. In this context, it is important that the critic takes into account the translator’s specific experiential horizon and prejudices, often openly declared in paratexts and conversations. In one interview, Adam Pomorski characterized his horizon very clearly, speaking about the significance of “a worldview basis of translation poetics”, conditioned “generationally” (Smolka 2008: 4). It is in the context of these foundations, the translator suggests, that his rendering of Rilke’s poetry should be read by critics – and also juxtaposed with the translations by Julian Przyboś and Mieczysław Jastrun. This basis is, of course, very broad, encompassing not only a generational intellectual (and interpretive) formation, but also the spiritual experiences from which the translator derives his questions with regard to the translated text. Pomorski mentions, for example, a common tradition of “modernity”, linking the seemingly distant authors he translated: Goethe and Chlebnikov (Smolka 2008: 7). This motif of traditions and continuities “devised” by translators, which form a kind of conversational framework for their dialogue with the translated texts, seems an exciting area of investigation for hermeneutic translation criticism – especially if the critic confronts this dialogue with reception testimonies to see whether the audience accepts the translator’s reasoning.

Highly relevant in this context are critical studies that focus on the dialogue between writer-translators and the works they translate. In such cases, the critic witnesses an extremely interesting problematisation of creative roles, which brings the dialogue with the original into sharper relief. Let us recall here Katarzyna Kuczyńska-Koschany’s essay on Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz as a translator of Hans Christian Andersen (2007: 91–96). Her text is a practice in dialogue: questions are posed about the reading and interpretation style, and the rationales of the original and the translator are considered. Focusing on Iwaszkiewicz as an individual, the researcher confronts his various roles with each another (including the interaction between Iwaszkiewicz the reader, the translator, and the editor), and opens up the hermeneutic space of his experiences and biases (Kuczyńska-Koschany 2007: 94–96).

Another inspiring source for hermeneutic translation criticism is Joanna Grądziel’s article on Witold Wirpsza, who regarded translating literature as “interpretive, that is, critical work”, or even “critical co-work” (qtd in Grądziel 1999: 180). In the spirit of Friedrich Schlegel, Wirpsza wrote that “in contemporary artistic life, it is only the text plus the criticism that
become the complete work”, and translation “is one of the most important ways of interpreting and critiquing texts” (Grądziel 1999: 180). According to the poet, in the act of reception, the translator becomes a co-author of the work and – another Schlegelian reference – he can create his translational interpretation independently of the original author’s intentions, “making use of the potentialities hidden in the text” (Grądziel 1999: 183). Wirpsza demonstrated this freedom of interpretation by translating his own poem into German: the work provoked him, as it were, to introduce new “associations and literary allusions”, the translator in him acting against the author in him (Grądziel 1999: 183). This is how Witold Wirpsza’s hermeneutic concept materializes, in which – as Joanna Grądziel aptly put it – “a continuous dialogue goes on . . . between the translator, the author, the interpreter, and the critic” (1999: 183). His poetry, literary criticism, and translation work intermingle, making us aware of how potentially wide the space of hermeneutic dialogue is into which the translation critic should delve in order to elucidate the rationales and motivations of the participants in this game.

Finally, I would like to devote some space to the domain of dialogue which is of particular interest to the hermeneutics of reception: the domain of the translation recipient. In critical studies, it usually appears in the context of assessing the value of a particular translation for the target culture, that is answering the question so succinctly formulated by Juliusz Żuławski (as he once lamented the state of translation criticism): What can the translation, “under the suggestion of the original”, contribute to its own native literature and native language? (Żuławski 1975: 387). This is, however, only one possible avenue of thinking, and a problematic one at that, as it requires defining the criteria of this “value” or “contribution”. Personally, I believe that it is more interesting to ask what the target reader – the recipient of the translation who is not familiar with the original – can take from his or her reading. How does he or she enter into a dialogic interaction with the translation? With how much trust does the reader credit the translation and the translator? To what extent is he or she motivated by an interest in foreignness? And how does disappointment with foreignness come about, often resulting in the rejection of the translation?

Let us note that reading a literary work in translation when one is unfamiliar with the original (and its language) often prompts interesting questions, which testify to an interpretively productive aesthetic experience. These questions usually reflect prejudices about the aesthetic value of a work presented as pre-eminent. For example, Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, disappointed
with the style of the Polish translation of Selma Lagerlöf’s masterpiece *Gösta Berlings saga*, wrote in a review from 1925:

To us, who do not know the Swedish language, Selma Lagerlöf’s style will forever be closed with seven seals; but we would be grateful to the translator, who, moreover, worked “from the original”, as declared on the title page, if he gave us at least an illusion of the beautiful style that the famous Nobel laureate must undoubtedly possess. (Iwaszkiewicz 1977: 9–10)

But does the author of *Gösta Berling*, asks Iwaszkiewicz, really use this “beautiful style”? (Iwaszkiewicz 1977: 10). Well, he replies, even if her style is not that, is it not up to the translator “to dress the lovely legends of Värmland County in a Polish language more beautiful than its Swedish original?” (Iwaszkiewicz 1977: 10). “From the translation, we have to struggle to imagine what the work itself is”, the reviewer concludes (Iwaszkiewicz 1977: 10), and the translation critic is inclined to ask here whether the imagining of the work was not already completed in this reader’s mind, while the Swedish idiom of Selma Lagerlöf’s writing was of little significance to him. This question could serve as a point of departure for a hermeneutic reflection on the peculiar career of this translation of one of the foremost Scandinavian novels, a translation which has already been corrected, revised, and verified for almost half a century.

Another example of how specific prejudices and horizons of readerly expectations can shape the dialogue with a translation is Piotr Sommer’s reading of Swedish poetry translated into Polish. In his text, Sommer gives a fair account of the limits of his cognitive horizon. He points out that his assessment is made “from the point of view of a reader who is fairly familiar with contemporary poetry, but mainly with contemporary poetry written in Polish and English”, and he admits to “insufficient knowledge of the Swedish context and unfamiliarity with the language” (Sommarkvist [Sommer] 1998: 396–7). From this standpoint – of an admittedly knowledgeable, but still quite culturally unprepared reader of translated Swedish literature – Sommer poses the question about the value of these poetic translations as works in their own right, which should convince the reader of their real importance, their significance for literary language in Polish. Sommer’s critique is built on the juxtaposition of the poems’ value as postulated in the paratexts written by the translators-cum-commentators and their actual, experienced value, which, if we adopt Jauß’s perspective, is inscribed in the history of aesthetic experience. The editor of “Literatura na Świecie”
monthly enters into a dialogue with the translations he reads: he interrogates them, asking a seemingly naïve question: “What have you got to tell me, to communicate?” Like Iwaszkiewicz in the case of Lagerlöf, he also often speculates on what the original “really” says, seeing “that the original must say something different or say what it says better than the translation” (Sommarkvist [Sommer] 1998: 422). And so, with this question in mind, he turns to the English translations. This is how an interesting conversation unfolds, with the reader’s prejudices playing a central role. Regardless of their level of literary expertise, “monolingual” readers draw on their prejudices all the more strongly, the more foreign the work in question appears to them. What is observable here, and in similar contexts, is the phenomenon of the “presumption of the translator’s guilt”. According to this line of thought, the reader’s discomfort stemming from perceived foreignness and lack of importance of the translation is to be blamed on the translator, who has failed at the level of the choice of author and work, translation strategy, and linguistic competence. Looking at this case from the critic’s perspective, one cannot but notice that without revealing the horizons of the Swedish works and their authors, as well as their Polish translators, and inscribing all these horizons into a hermeneutic dialogue, the picture of the very thing Sommer enquires about as a reader will be incomplete. In other words, without an interrogative critical attitude, the thing will not be heard.

The translation critic can thus enact a dialogue between the work, the translator, and the target reader. Confronting the translator with testimonies of the spontaneous reception of his or her translation on the one hand, and, on the other hand, discussing with the translator his or her own confrontation with the original work, usually produce interesting statements which, considered against the hermeneutics of the original, produce a kind of polyphony of arguments and rationales. As a result, the hermeneutic critic faces a peculiar, sometimes indeterminate score, which he or she can then interpret in the critical text. This would mean presenting this score to his or her readers in such a way that they could penetrate the world of the event of translation, and, having listened to the voices and arguments, undertake to evaluate it for themselves.

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8 See, for example, the conversation with Elżbieta Kalinowska, Polish translator of Elfriede Jelinek’s Lust (in the edited volume Między literaturami; De Bończa Bukowski, Zarychta 2021: 88–90 and 105), where different horizons of understanding are confronted: of the work, the translator, (critical) readers, and the critic participating in the dialogue.
Bibliography


