1. Introduction

Today, the party is no longer a political current with an effective impact on the Iranian political scene, but an almost closed sect, similar to a group with few loyal members and followers who have limited to no special participation or appearance in political events and activities common with other parties. Some believe that the party loyalists are mostly the conservative, old “Tudehists”, who cling to the party’s past history and nostalgia.

Under all circumstances, for anyone interested in the political history of Iran, it’s impossible to get insight on the subject without knowing about the Tudeh Party of Iran. In order to understand the history of the leftist current in Iran, it is necessary to study the party’s establishment to get a quick insight into the party’s actions and its fate after the Iranian 1979 revolution.
The most obvious character of the Tudeh Party in the eyes of the Iranian people is its reliance on the then Soviet state, which according to many Iranians has been the party’s major cause of its decline.

However, a return of the Tudeh Party of Iran to the leftist movement can be enriching and reinforcing to the entire movement. A review of the Tudeh Party’s history, an analysis of the party’s attitudes and actions in the course of its history and a critique of its purpose in contributing to transformation of the country could pave the way for this return. This paper attempts to conduct such a review, analysis and criticism.

There are already many studies on the contemporary Iranian political history, in which researchers, historians, and analysts have emphasized the Tudeh Party’s dependence on the then Soviet state.

Some have mentioned the good times of the party (Mottahede, 1985), while some have spoken of how it was in the days of its decline and at the time of the widespread arrests of its members and supporters (Momen, 1985).

Mottahedeh underlines the shining times of the party in the mid-1940s when the Tudeh Party was the party of intellectuals so that only a few intellectuals dared to stand up against the party (Mottahede, 1985).

Momen refers to the raid of the Tudeh Party by the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1983 and repression of the party to the point of its near collapse (Momen, 1985).

This paper focuses on the effect of the dependence relationship between the Tudeh Party of Iran and the Soviet Union during years of the Cold War on the contemporary political developments in Iran. In those years the Tudeh Party was the most rooted leftist political party, so that it represented a solid left wing in Iran during the years.

It started a close cooperation with the Soviet Union from the years of the party’s establishment. This cooperation lasted until the collapse of the SU.

The central questions in this paper are:

First, why did the Tudeh Party that was a strong, extensive and popular political party among different groups of people, especially intellectuals, and youth ultimately decline?

Regarding this question, this paper focuses on the impacts of the Tudeh Party’s full reliance-relationship on both the party’s fate, and the ideas the party claims to fight for.

Secondly, what was role of the party’s ideology in the decline of the party?

In this regard the focus is on the Tudeh political party’s failure to meet the demands of its people due to its unwillingness to adopt a harmonious cooperation with other political groups within the framework of a national struggle. The reason can be identified as an ideological misunderstanding.

Thirdly, what was the role of the Soviet Communist Party and its government in the process of weakening of the Tudeh Party?

In this relation, focus is on the extent of the harmful consequences on the “younger brother” caused by the “big brother’s” actions serving own interests.

Fourth, what impact did the political life of the party and its weakening essentially have on the struggle process of the left movement?

There will be talk about the party’s apparently undesirable role in weakening the socialist ideas among people, and especially in the spread of despair among young people.

Generally, many studies have been done on the issue of the relationship between the Soviet Union and its satellite parties around the world, and the SU’s role on the international political scene during the Cold War era. D. Sylvan and S. Majeski (2009) have emphasized the Westerners’ concerns about Soviet movements in the Middle East, as well as the role of the CIA in the coup against Mossadegh government.

Within a similar context to which Sylvan and Majeski have worked, S. Kinzer (2003) has conducted studies. He has tried to draw the Westerners’ role in Iran in the 1950s and their confrontation with the Tudeh Party in order to prevent Soviet influence in Iran. Kinzer reveals cooperation between the Americans and the British in Iran to undermine the Soviet position and offer financial support to the opponents of the Tudeh Party. He doesn’t see the role of the Tudeh Party on the Iranian political scene in a positive light at all. Kinzer points to the use of the Soviet state as a tool by the party.

E. Abrahamian (1982) refers to the positions and actions of the Tudeh Party around the oil nationalization movement in the 1950s, coupled with the hard line policies of the Soviet Union on the Tudeh Party as the cause of separations and fallout among the party’s members. During his research work, E. Abrahamian follows the history of the party and shows how the Tudeh Party falls from a pinnacle of glory to a humiliation. He also gives indications of influence of the Soviets in Iran.


C. Chaqueri (1999), an Iranian historian, sees the events and processes from another angle. He believes that the Tudeh Party was never an independent political current, but that it was basically created by the Russians in order to preserve their interests in Iran.
My main thesis in this paper is that a political party that could have a positive and constructive role in the field of socialist ideas and realization of them in the Iranian society actually acted in the opposite direction.

The argument that this paper has focused on is that the Tudeh Party relied on a foreign source outside the framework of the national movement. The worse was that the external source used the party in the direction of own purposes, regardless of the consequences of the socialist movement in Iran in general and in particular for the Tudeh Party.

2. Soviet deviations and errors

The way they treated their own satellite parties generally and the Tudeh Party of Iran, in particular, could be considered as a fault from the Soviet part.

The Soviet approach in dealing with Tudeh and other satellite parties could be either due to a normal policy lapse or a result of deeper rooted problems.

Looking at the “Soviet mistake” more closely, we realize that the Soviets had from the first years of taking power, laid numerous fault blocks on top of each other. Among these blocks was the dominant foreign policy approach of the Soviet Union. The nature of this foreign policy was derived from both the early deviation and mechanisms, on which the Western world foreign policies were based. This was the nature of the realist’s definition of international relations. In the West, two major theories of realism and liberalism gradually defined the behavior of states towards each other by their own perspectives and approaches. A socialist system, however, as it claimed to be a popular and democratic system that had emerged from the revolution of the working people, could be in possession of a correct external approach derived from its legitimate internal approach.

But, according to many socialists who were critical of the Soviet political system, this system had gone towards a totalitarian system rather than a system based on the awareness of, and participation of various sectors of society. The Soviet system tried to change economic relations, but the people’s conscious participation in political processes was not prioritized. Michael Albert is a libertarian socialist, who in “what is to be undone” says that Lenin from the very outset was opposed to the participation of the people in political affairs (Albert, 1974). He notes, including the repression of Ukraine in the early years of establishing the Soviet socialist system.

The early years after the October Revolution the Soviets even unilaterally canceled several colonial contracts between the Soviet Union and Iran, and they refunded the part of Iran’s assets to the Iranian government, on the ground that those were Iranian people’s assets. However, their role in Iran in later years was more akin to a competition with other foreign troops, mostly with British to expand their influence field. Their aim was rather to get more political and economic privileges than to offer support to the popular uprisings in the direction of a socialist transformation.

The practices of these two foreign forces, both Soviets and British, in many cases have been similar with the only difference being that their ideologies and their political identity characteristics have had two different appearances. One of them goes advance under the banner of capitalism, while the other in the name of Marxism.

It looks like as time went by from the October Revolution, the Soviet leaders started to gradually disregard people’s conscious participation in the managing of the Soviet society. Instead, they gravitated towards forming a strong government comprised of a stable and wide bureaucrat system. That negatively affected the global socialist movement whose core vision was to create states where authoritarianism would never thrive-The ideological framework of “libertarian socialism”.

Basically, the internal power relations including the power struggles in a country have impacts on the country’s foreign policy, and its orientation and role in its international relations.

Some believe that after the period of Stalin the situation had gone beyond talking about a diversion.

3. The negative behaviors of the Tudeh Party in the midst of major political events in Iran

In the late 1940s, the Truman administration was concerned about Soviet movements in the Middle East (Sylvan, Majeski, 2009, p. 50). Therefore, CIA by acting as the source of funding of the coup against Mossadeq in 1953 played an important role. This was because of the CIA’s analysis on the basis that, the Mossadeq government was unable to resist against the Communists (Sylvan, Majeski, 2009, p. 46).

CIA had such concerns about the activities of the Tudeh Party of Iran and continued monitoring the party’s activities not only just after the 1953 coup against Mossadeq but also for many years after the coup through cooperation with the Shah’s regimen the field of information relevant to the Tudeh Party (Sylvan, Majeski, 2009, p. 85).
Stephen Kinzer in “the entire Shah’s Men” writes that the Dulles brothers (John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles—the two brothers who led American foreign policy at the time) believed that the main risk to relations with Iran was the country’s fall into the embrace of the Communism (Kinzer, 2003, p. 4).

The western politicians were well aware of the impending consequences of having a communist Iran, and having learned from history, they could not risk having another Korea-styled regime in Iran. The solution lied in overthrowing Mossadegh (Kinzer, 2003, p. 10).

The Tudeh Party had sketched such an image of itself—as a political party under Soviet influence—that agents of the Western governments, before the coup against the Mossadeq government, published rumors, propagandas and even declarations on behalf of the Tudeh Party. Their goal was to show that the party was threatening and thus exploit the religious flaws ultimately harming the image and influence of the party (Kinzer, 2003, p. 13).

One of the conscious or unconscious roles of the Tudeh Party in the early 1950s was establishment of futile tensions, fueling the mood of unrest and finally creation of unnecessary power maneuver between itself and the Mossadegh government. This resulted to more spirited efforts by the British and Americans to contain the prospects of communism’s success in Iran culminating in the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953 (Kinzer, 2003, p. 89).

One of the reasons for opposition and unkindness of the Tudeh Party towards Mossadegh was that the Soviet Union’s positions under Stalin towards the international politics were based on the notion that the entire world was divided into two camps of imperialism and socialism, and therefore a middle position between these two camps—where Mossadegh could be placed—was less imaginable (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 322). In fact, the Tudeh Party by getting inspiration and influence from extremist politics, which at that time were dominant in the USSR, tried to undermine Mossadegh’s image, something that was later criticized by some party leaders. Even Iraj Eskandari who was one of the top leaders of the Tudeh Party, years later, in his memoirs wrote that he and his colleagues were of the belief that the Communists should not support a national movement, something he considered as a mistake (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 323).

The Tudeh Party’s errors at the time of Mossadegh was that it exploited the bad conditions and the economic chaos and people’s living difficulties caused by economic pressures from the Western governments, attempted to organize labor protests and provoke various sectors of society, perhaps with the aim of forcing a desperate Mossadegh to approach the Soviets. Ultimately, none of these measures were in favor of the Soviets, but it was the British and the Americans who were victorious in this field. During the years leading up to the fall of the Mossadeq government all these chaos-mongering were excuses in the hands of the Imperial Court and its supporters as well as the Mossadegh’s right-wing enemies and opponents.

Maneuvers of the Tudeh party in the midst of the nationalization of the oil industry movement were used as tools in the hands of Western powers in the direction of their efforts to show the Communist threat. It led to that the Western agents justifying their actions in Iran against Mossadegh and finally completing the project of the overthrowing the Mossadegh government.

As a result, the Tudeh Party’s behavior led to harmful consequences for the democratization movement in Iran. Perhaps it can be seen in two highlighted times:

1. At the time of 1953 the Tudeh Party by weakening Prime Mossadegh helped to provide possibilities for his government’s overthrow and led the country into a prolonged period of political repression.

2. By the continuation of past policies based on dependence on the Soviet Union, the Tudeh Party was subjected to a heavy loss (in 1983—1984 at the time of the Islamic Republic), while it caused a major blow against the democratization process and the left movement in Iran.

In many places of the book, “the entire Shah’s Men” written by Kinzer, one encounters claims from the US and English diplomats, that argued that Iran was in danger of communism. They argued that Mohammad Mossadegh was not the person, who could resist the communists.

S. Kinzer (2003, p. 162–163) refers to an item of cooperation between the Americans and the British, with coordinating responsibility on American Norman Darbyshire and British Donald Wilbur with a budget of 150,000 dollars to finance activities and efforts to tarnish the reputation of Mossadegh, causing fear and panic about his policies, and discrediting him among the people.

Propaganda efforts against Mossadeq were mainly focused on two axes, one, his tendency towards Communism and the other, his enmity towards Islam. These two axes naturally acted together, in a complementary way, and in the same direction. In this way, the Tudeh Party’s verbal attacks on religious forces, was complementary to the American-British agenda.
S. Kinzer (2003, p. 179) writes that, in the midst of those events and in the coup day (on 19 August 1953) the Tudeh Party was the only force that could come to the aid of the Mossadegh government, but the party did not show any reaction. Here S. Kinzer is looking for the cause – or the answer to the question of why the Tudeh Party did not do anything. He immediately states that the Tudeh Party like many Communist Parties around the world was under the leadership and influence of the Soviet Union, and accordingly, in critical cases, this party could not act without receiving instructions by the Soviets. S. Kinzer (2003, p. 179) writes that the party did not receive any command or instruction in the coup day. He mentions that there were researchers who tried to find any answers for the question through access to sources and documents in Moscow, but they were denied access to such documents.

Another mistake of the Tudeh Party at the time of Mossadegh was that the party made itself too visible for its ability. On numerous occasions and in critical situations, it came out in the open exposing itself to infiltration by the Western security agents in Iran, and giving them an opportunity to paint the party in bad light through coordinated vilification propaganda machinery by exaggerating the role of the party in breeding chaos. These exaggerations led to the notion that the threat of Communism in Iran was eminent and disastrous. After the coup against Mossadegh, the CIA agents acknowledged that the Tudeh Party was not as powerful as claimed (Kinzer, 2003, p. 2006).

Kinzer mentions several possibilities under which the coup would not have happened. Of these probabilities, Kinzer mentions the possibility of entering into action by communists of the coherent Tudeh Party in support of Mossadegh (Kinzer, 2003, p. 2006).

The Tudeh Party continued its mistakes after the 1979 revolution, this time in another form. The Tudeh Party after the revolution defended the new rulers based on, in its own view, a realistic analysis of the political and social situation in Iran and finally on the basis of this conclusion that the Islamic Republic had a broad base of people and was in the anti-imperialist line.

However, the party’s affiliation ties to the Soviet Union were still intact. This affiliation by the Tudeh Party, despite its positions in line with the policies of the Islamic Republic could not let it survive the onslaught of the Islamic Republic. This party affiliation had a high price for both the party itself and for the whole of the left movement.

Another mistake of the Tudeh Party that again resulted from a reliance on the Soviet Union was that the party from the start of the Iranian revolution in 1979 was in favor of the Shiite theocracy, and supported the seizure of power by the Shiite clergymen. The main and obvious reason was that the “revolution” now had broken the influence of Westerners, especially Americans, which at least so far could be considered as a great victory for the Soviet Union the neighbor of Iran. In those circumstances, as long as a government though reactionary, religious and equally oppressive against the civil liberties of its people cut the interest of Americans, it was in itself a victory for the Soviets. The Tudeh Party thought that by supporting this Islamic government the party could encourage it to lean more towards the Soviet Union.

This party did not insist on the rights and freedoms of citizens of its country, but based on its analysis of being anti-imperialist of the new government, it went so far as calling the supreme leader “Imam Khomeini”, something that unexpected from a Marxist-Leninist party.

The Tudeh Party of Iran in the first years after the 1979-revolution, with an opportunistic conformist approach, perhaps in its own belief, intended to ride on a populist wave, which was unexpected of a so-called vanguard old political party. This party that was expected to be concerned of restricted revolution-embodied freedoms, be guard of these freedoms, be among one of the defenders of freedom for all political forces, and protest the prohibition of these freedoms, unbelievably in situations played an opposite role, often with this argument that the Islamic government was in the anti-imperialist line.

One of the arguments of the Tudeh Party in its discussions with other political forces, which was based on the theory of “Non-Capitalist Way of Development”, was that unstable, shaky and untrustworthy governments should be helped to get close to the East camp rather than falling into the lap of Western countries.

The high point of failure of the Tudeh Party was the arresting of the party’s leaders in two stages, in 1983 and 1984.

There haven’t yet been serious investigations at a level that can show the consequences and results of such an onslaught and defeat, which the Tudeh Party has been subjected to.

At the time of the terrible blow to the life of the Tudeh Party by the Khomeini regime in 1982 almost all the party’s skeletons and strength were together captured in the hands of the regime. Many of the party leaders were tortured, executed, forced to make televised confessions and to write against their
earlier beliefs, died within the period of their detention, sentenced to lengthy prison terms, dishonored and disgraced. In the meantime, a few people managed to escape before they were arrested. One of the party's stable members—the famous poet Siavosh Kasraie—who had escaped from the clutches of the regime, in a conversation with another poet, Houshang Ebtehaj—who is still alive, said that they (the Russians) betrayed them all.

The Tudeh Party after the revolution had potential that could be used in a better way than it was done, but this never became a reality.

The Tudeh Party was, of course, not a political force with official power in the Islamic Republic structure, but:

1. The party was present in many organizations and institutions across the country.
2. The Party had traditionally a part of the upper echelons of the military with itself.
3. After all other political forces were exterminated, the Tudeh Party had the opportunity to get into the political scene better than ever. The party could gather the other failed political forces around it and find more power.
4. Through more power in the future, the party would adopt a more independent stance towards the government's positions, gradually be transformed into a serious opposition, gain more bargaining power, and speak more clearly and explicitly about socialist ideals, programs and policies in line with popular demands.

4. The coordinated role of the USSR and the Tudeh Party in the cases of Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and the North Oil

The Tudeh Party in the early years of its activity gradually gained a broad popular base among people in many cities.

The party quickly found a broad base among different groups of people in the 1940s, especially the late 40s and early 50s.

In the first day of May 1946, the Tudeh Party gathered around 80,000 people in the oil-backed city of Abadan to take part in protests on Labor Day (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 302–303). This kind of the party's power-showing stunts was a source of concern to the Western politicians.

However, this support and popularity did not last beyond a few years. One of the most obvious reasons of the party's short-lived glory is the undisputed dependence on the Soviet Union. This dependence was something, which Westerners—especially the British vehemently strived to prove in order to apply it as an effective weapon against the party. The Great Britain's High Commission in Tehran—especially in this case, worked with the aim of undermining the party (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 304).

There happened two important events that had a tremendous impact on the judgment of the Iranian public opinion towards the Tudeh Party. One was the presentation of demands for the oil concession in northern Iran from the Soviet Union, and the other was the Russian's direct involvement in the incidents related to parts of the Iranian territories, i.e. Azerbaijan and Kurdistan (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 345).

Based on an agreement between the governments of the Allied forces, the foreign troops in Iran had to leave the Iranian soil within six months after the end of the World War II. However in 1946; Stalin refused to abide by the agreement, and instead strengthened the Soviet military forces on Iranian territory (Kinzer, 2003, p. 65–66).

The Tudeh Party, in collaboration with this Soviet Union, defended the autonomous government of Azerbaijan, something that in the eyes of the Iranian people was not a social justice movement.

After a period of chaos, foreign occupation, famine and so on, all areas of Iran needed social change, and perhaps the formation of popular movements was inevitable with the Azerbaijan being a favorable environment for establishing such a movement.

Despite all this, one cannot close the eyes at the question of what role the Soviets played in this case, and the question of, to what extent the Azerbaijan movement had an influence on the people, and to what extent it was a solely military occupation and foreign interference in Iran's affairs.

E. Abrahamian (1982, p. 198) refers to a case of Soviets' influence in parliamentary elections XIV (this assembly lasted from November 1943 to February 1944) in northern Iran, where the Soviets were in power. They went as far as forcing the governor of Azerbaijan to resign as a reaction to the election results on which they were dissatisfied. Their interference with the electoral process led to disqualification and removal of their candidates from the ballot papers as a protest by the Supreme Electoral Council.

A more serious question was about the direction of the people of Azerbaijan—whether to pursue a better life through an uprising or follow the succession option and form their independent country. Many Iran regions were annexed to Russia in a similar fashion during the Qajar Dynasty. The role and intentions of the Tudeh party remained unclear Ahmed Qavam; the Iranian Prime Minister went to Moscow and persuaded the leaders of Moscow to withdraw their troops from Iran. His action put the party to task about its objectives; whether to act as an agent
of Soviet policy in Iran, or to safeguard the interests of the Azerbaijan people. This was the tipping point of the party’s outlook by the people.

The failure of the Azerbaijan movement was also a hard kick to the body of the Tudeh Party of Iran, because after this defeat the right-wing forces launched a large campaign against the party and claimed it as a political party with received orders from outside the country’s borders.

Here the issue of being cosmopolitan for a socialist man in line with her / his commitment and responsibility towards humanity beyond specified geographical boundaries can be raised. However, this question will also be raised; that if the Soviets also had an (assumed) intention like the Tudeh Party’s intention, why did they reach an agreement with the Iranian government and retreat instead of resistance until achieving victory?

One interesting thing that is mentioned in the book “Iran between Two Revolutions” written by Abrahamian is that the Azerbaijani Association was founded in 1941 by the Qajar nobility and created a cooperation front with the Soviets, while the patriots were united with Great Britain. The Azerbaijan Association began to work with this condition from the Qajar nobility’s side that the Soviets should not speak of a social revolution in Iran. Abrahamian writes that Farmanfarma the leader of the forum that had very few members won an election in a Soviet-occupied zone, an area in which his family had owned many villages.

E. Abrahamian mentions that the other landowner members of this forum and states all wanted Ahmad Qavam, who was known to be an ally with the Soviets, to assume power. Qavam is someone, who Abrahamian considers as an ambitious and shrewd politician (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 180–181). Even Mohammad Reza Shah in a meeting with a British minister mentions Qavam as a dangerous man waiting for implementation of his ambitious plans by help from the Soviets (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 181).

An interesting point was the question of how it was that the Soviets, who were supposedly supporters of socialist revolutions in the entire world, saw no different between uniting with a group of landowner aristocrats in Iran and a few years later participating in founding of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, which mainly contained revolutionaries.

Now the question is whether it was only a firm foothold in Iran at any cost, and an alliance with any party was important for the Soviets. If so, what difference can be seen between for example the British expansionist policies and the Russians? If they both had the same intention, so what guarantee would there be that the Russians did not form their plan solely on the basis of their expansionist goals, but not on a support agenda to progressive groups in Iran in the direction of positive social change?

Establishment of the Democratic Party of Iranian Azerbaijan took place through an in advance coordination between the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party. Abrahamian writes that, when the Pishahvari along with several of his companions announced the founding of the party in Tabriz, the Tudeh Party’s branch in Azerbaijan accompanied it. On the other hand, The Soviets warned the Iranian government about sending military forces to the area (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 217).

The then Great Britain consul in Tabriz writes in his reports that “…it seems that the Soviets are exploiting a genuine revolutionary movement” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 218).

Many believe that the defeat of the Azerbaijan movement was due to a Soviet compromise with the Iranian government.

The Prime Minister of Iran Qavam went to Moscow and asked Stalin to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran and give the opportunity to the Iranian military to enter in Azerbaijan in a peaceful and non-violent manner and with regard to the stipulated rules in the constitution. In return, Iran would withdraw its complaint to the United Nations, which was presented by former prime minister, and it was also agreed that Qavam should present the proposal for the Northern Oil concession to the Russians in the next parliament (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 228).

One of the events that after more than 70 years have remained in the historical memory of the Iranian people is the case of the north oil concession to the Soviet Union.

In 1944, when the British had influence in the southern Iran, and there was talk that the “Saed” government had plans to deliver the southern oil concession to English and American companies, rumors also spread about the possibility of giving the northern oil concession over to the Americans, but the Soviets demanded the northern oil concession. In that situation, it was expected of a government like the Soviet Union to have a stance against the presence of military forces and western colonial companies in the South.

But it was in the wake of a balance of power in Iran and therefore claimed the North oil concession in return of the South oil concession to the British and Americans. It was a further blow to the Soviet Union's credibility in the eyes of the Iranian people.

It had an effect in the face of public opinion, which considered the Soviet Union as a people’s freedom fighter through a socialist alliance of all socialist governments, forces, and parties. It also hurt
the image of the Tudeh Party for aligning with such a government.

It remained forever as a document and a pretext for both anti-socialist forces and the socialists who were critics of the practices of the Soviet state and the Tudeh party and thus their cooperation.

The Tudeh party’s support of the Soviet demands showed out prominently in their characteristic attack on the person of the Prime Minister “Saed” after he suggested that it was best to suspend every concession giving until the end of the foreign occupation of the country. The Tudeh Party called him a British puppet and organized a few thousand people to protest against him.

The Tudeh Party in protest against the rejection of the Iranian government to give the Northern oil concessions to the Soviets organized massive demonstrations in various cities in Iran in October 1944. According to the American embassy in Tehran, part of the protests happened in front of Parliament where about 35,000 people participated (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 299).

5. Ideology and its cosmopolitan being

One of the reasons for the failed policies of the Tudeh Party was this political party’s ideological nature.

Basically, an ideology cannot promote a society in a way in which society’s wishes and demands are realized. As long as its ideology works, a political identity in the service of a political power is alive and perhaps able to play a role in governance. However, from the time when the political power is removed, the ideology is unusable. It can be used only to learn from previous human experiences in the way of getting more knowledge for better management and better behavior and more correct policies.

If the goal, however, is to reach the political power from a new political group or to return to the power from a previous ruler, it would be wiser, more original and more sustainable to look at the society’s economic, social, cultural and political relations rather than to revive an old ideology.

Egalitarianism is an ideal but not an ideology. Social justice has always been one of the noble and ancient ideals of humanity.

Stalinism and the “actually existing socialism” of the then Soviet Union are theories that shaped the body of the ideologies that no longer have any use, both on the basis of the above reasoning, and because of ideological failure in practice. However, socialism’s ideas and ideals are not something that dies or become obsolete.

The Tudeh party paid a high price for the Marxist stereotype theories and being indifferent to the considerations and realities of the national struggle. It was one of the most dramatic and fundamental errors of the Tudeh Party, which after a short period from the beginning of its establishment began and continued to gradually grow into a skewed towering mansion. The party with its sporadic extreme slogans and imitation of the non-Iranian communist experiences made a part of the population frightened (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 309).

The ideological basis of the Tudeh Party was a combination of a commitment to cooperate with the international proletariat and participate in a campaign in which the capitalist system throughout the world was on the one side and the socialism on the other.

Up until this point it can be said that participation in such a campaign for a socialist party was entirely legitimate and justified, but here after there would be a problem. It was the fact that the positions and determinations of orders and prohibitions related to this campaign often depended on definitions and attitudes made by Soviets and certainly not on the basis of national interests of Iranians. If in some situations there was a conflict between these interests and the national interests of Iran, it was quite obvious on whose side the Tudeh Party would be.

Under these circumstances, the influence of the “older brother” can be so overshadowed, so that the relationship between the two - the one who helps and the other who is being helped – can be changed from an ideological relation to an employer-employee-like relation. Thus, the authenticity of the meaning and aim of the “little brother” party will be so doubtful.

The mistake of the Tudeh Party is that it has abandoned the socialism and that it is still living with nostalgia of past ideologies and the “actually existing socialism” in the Soviet era.

The perception or allegation of the leaders of the Tudeh Party was that the socialism did not recognize nationality, but that a socialist man has passed patriotism and has achieved a cosmopolitan insight.

It would be wiser that the party separated the blind nationalism that can be tinged with racism and chauvinism, from real analysis based on existing realities of the Iranian society.

It can be damaging to a political party with a socialist ideological foundation to separate itself from the body of its own national movement. While that political party goes ahead with socialist ideals, aims and theories, it is forced to move within the framework of the national movement to which it belongs.
This is in fact tantamount to the political analysis and thus the positions of the political party exists on the basis of a consideration of the existing nature, circumstances, mechanisms, necessities and opportunities in the economic, social and cultural relations of the society, where the party live.

One can compare any political force with a fish that lives in the water. The water is the national movement. If a political party decides to act outside of the real world of the national features and frameworks, it cannot continue to exist.

What took the Tudeh Party along this road? Perhaps the party considered the national tendency as a conflicting road to the socialism. However, concepts such as racism and nationalism can be laid in one category, while nationalist movements belong to another category.

It cannot be said that man must necessarily be either nationalist or cosmopolitan.

A man may be neither of these two identifications. Even if a person chooses any of the two cases it may not necessarily let the person live without responsibility for a struggle within the framework of the national movement.

It is true that the socialist thinking does not recognize black and white, but that it looks at people from a standpoint higher than nationality and ethnicity. The socialist ideas can lead us to cosmopolitanism, and so far it can be said that it’s a not a bad thing.

But that mistake, which the Tudeh Party of Iran had committed, was that the party ignored the Iranian national existence and requirements, so that the party leaders’ cosmopolitan vision put this party in the service of national interest of another country, consciously or unconsciously. This self - to be in the service of national interest of a particular country - was contrary to the cosmopolitan principle or “value”.

M. Behrooz (2004) explicitly writes that what the party in taking its positions in the period of the Oil Nationalization Movement led by Mossadegh took into account, were the interests of the Soviet Union.

One of the mistakes of the Tudeh party, which can be analyzed in the context of dependence, was that the party without regard to the national requirements did not want the lifting of foreign influence in Iran, but its aim was rather replacing the Western influence with the Soviet influence (Azimi, 2004).

The Tudeh Party made this mistake both under the Oil Nationalization Movement led by Mossadegh and in the years after the 1979 revolution.

Azimi believes that many of the party leaders used the Machiavellian ways to achieve their goals, and that in this way they repeatedly justified the means (Azimi, 2004).

The Tudeh Party is among the political parties with this perception that the loss of or abandonment on a part of the natural freedoms of the citizens is inevitable, in order to achieve social justice. It is one of the crooked fundamentals of these parties, which is rooted in a tradition of the “actually existing socialism”. This tradition clearly shows itself in the behavior of the Tudeh Party in the first years after the revolution in 1979.

6. The consequences for the party itself

People like Cosroe Chaqueri, the Iranian historian, believe that from the beginning of the establishment of the Tudeh Party, the Soviets were the hidden hands behind it, and it can even be said that it was created with the Soviet order and the authority of the party’s early leaders. The Soviet Union aimed to secure its interests in Iran (Chaqueri, 1999).

In connection with this “dependence”, it can be pointed to the Soviet Union’s decision in 1956 when it decided to transfer the public organizations of Tudeh Party from Moscow to East Germany because it wanted to improve its relationship with the Royal Government of Iran. This decision was actually a kind of decision for the Tudeh Party out of the will and authority of the party. The party had to move its workplace and offices and so on to another country, which could affect the functionality of the party, but it was obviously not important to the Russians. The most important thing for them was that the decisions should be in accordance with their own national interest.

One of the consequences of the Tudeh Party dependency to the Soviet Union was that this party shortly after its establishment began with the process of the loss of its leaders, influential forces and followers. They were unhappy about the party dependency to the Soviet Union.

Each of these separations was a detrimental effect on the Tudeh Party. Abrahamian points to a number of groups split from the Tudeh party and the party’s isolation of prominent characters (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 188).

One of the most important members of the party by the name Khalil Maleki in the late 1940s was broke from the party and formed a new party called “Toilers” without dependence to the USSR. In one of his articles, the “Toilers” he explains that, despite accusations from the Tudeh party, he still considers himself a Marxist but expresses dissatisfaction with the party affiliation of the Soviet Union (Abrahamian, 1982, p.
He accused the Tudeh Party of following Moscow with closed eyes (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 277).

Another error of the Tudeh Party was giving propaganda opportunities to the enemies of socialism, which was effectively used to discredit socialism in general and the party specifically. Enemies and the opposition of the party, in fact, were anti-socialist groups and individuals who were happy to see the party’s dependency increase and called the party the fifth column of the enemy. This process contributed to the decline of the party and the effect on the public opinion.

Splits were often caused by this reason. Among them was a split that occurred in 1965, when two of the party leaders came out of the party and formed a new political organization called “Toufan” that means “Hurricane”. They had many criticisms over the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the party’s blind obedience to the Soviets (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 453–454). The most defectors believed that the Soviet Union had gone the wrong way, and thus the “small brothers” parties like the Tudeh Party followed the same wrong path as the Soviet Union did.

The Tudeh Party during the years between 1956 and 1964 – the years, the party established its organization in Eastern Europe and especially in East Berlin – showed its dependence on the Soviet Union more open. The party also defended arms sales from the Soviet Union to the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 455–456).

7. Conclusion

In view of the discussed issues, the following can be concluded as the cause of the Tudeh party:

1. After peaking and political success of the Tudeh Party immediately after its creation in 1941, it gradually entered the era of one after another failure, political despairs, passivity of a part of the active and motivated forces, and finally an era of the splits caused by the policy of reliance on the Soviet Union.

2. The case of the North oil rating, the demand of the concession by the Soviet Union, and the Tudeh Party’s support of this demand.

3. The Tudeh Party’s incorrect assessment, and the consequence of this error, secret agreements between the Soviets and the Iranian government, and finally a dagger in the back of Azerbaijan Democratic Party, the Republic of Kurdistan and the Tudeh Party.

4. The negative or passive role of the party in the oil nationalization movement led by Mossadegh, and finally the 1953 coup against Mossadegh government.

5. The years of normalization of the relations between the Soviet Union and the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah and finally the Tudeh Party’s silent and passive role in the political developments in Iran in these years.

6. The Tudeh Party’s misjudgment on Khomeini being an “anti-imperialist”, and thus supporting him.

7. The lack of a proper assessment from both the Soviet Union and the party of the likelihood of attack on the party and an almost collapse of the party.

8. The party’s inability to have harmony with other opposition groups to adopt a strategy and broad cooperation in order to fight for democracy in Iran.

References

Chaqueri C., 1999, Did the Soviets play a role in founding the Tudeh party in Iran? Cahiers du MONDE Russe, 40/3, 497–528.